MASTER 
NEGA  TIVE 
NO.  92-80495 


MICROFILMED  1992 
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AUTHOR: 


CURTEIS,  ARTHUR  M. 


TITLE: 


RISE  OF  THE 
MACEDONIAN  EMPIRE 


PLACE: 


NEW  YORK 


DA  TE : 


[1 887] 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 


Master  Negative  # 


BIBLIOGRAPHIC  MICROFORM  TARGET 


Original  Material  as  Filmed  -  Existing  Bibliographic  Record 


1    884.07 
!   C941 


Curteis,  Arthur  Mapletoft,  1833- 

"...  nisc  of  t„,  Macedonian  e,,^pire^  bj  Arthn^M.  Om- 

lois  ...    Witli  eiglit  maps.    New  Xotk,  k,.  oc 

'T;;     ,vH,-xvi.  224  p.  inc..  .naps.    3  foH.  .aps.    m™.     («.,/-«</.: 
Epochs  of  ancient  history  ...) 
Series  title  also  at  head  of  t.-p. 


Restrictions  on  Use: 


1.  Macedonia-Hist.    2.  Alexander,  the  Great,  b.  c.  356-323. 


7-^85 


; 


Library  of  Congress 


DF233.C94 


TECHNICAL  MICROFORM  DATA 


FILM     SIZ.l:__';^^_-viir^___^__  REDUCTION     RATIO: 

IMAGE  PLACEMENT:    lA   TIA,  IB    IIB 

DATE     FILMED: c3_.OtJ^i>J^ INITIALS__Oi-i^^W 

FILMED  BY:    RESEARCH  PUBLICATIONS.  INC  WOODDRIDGE.  CT  ' 


\\  ^ 


c 


Association  for  Information  and  Image  Management 

1100  Wayne  Avenue,  Suite  1100 
Silver  Spring,  Maryland  20910 

301/587-8202 


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POCHS  OF  /INCIENT    mSTORY 


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EDITED    BY 


REV.  G.  W.  COX,  M.A.  and  C.  SANKEY,  M.A. 


RISE  OF   THE   MACEDONIAN  EMPIRE 


A.  M.  CURTEIS,  M.A. 


V 


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EPOCHS  OF  ANCIENT  HISTORY 


RISE 


OF  THE 


MACEDONIAN   EMPIRE 


BY 


ARTHUR  M.  CURTEIS,  M.A. 

FORMERLY  FELLOW  OF  TRINITY  COLLEGE,  OXFORD  ;   AND  LATE  ASSISTANT- 
MASTER  IN  SHERBORNE  SCHOOL 


"WITH    EIGHT   MAPS 


NKW  YORK' -    • 

,   J        J     J    J    3     > 


CHA^RLEb   bCRIBNER:'S  'SC^^S 


J  ) 

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Ixuao**  c>ir 


CONTENTS. 


GRANT,   FAIRES  k   RODGERS, 

EUcirotyPers  <5r»  Printers, 

5«  ic  54  North  Sixth  Street,  Philadelphia. 


.•  • 


•  •  • 


•  •    • 


•  •  •  • 


•  •  • 


•  •    •  < 


•     •  •    •  ••?  ••  •  • 


•  •  • 


;    •  •  •  ••  ••:.••••     • 

••.;:..: 


CHAPTER  I. 
GEOGRAPHY  AND   INHABITANTS   OF  MACEDON. 

Effects  of  the  climate  and  physical  characteristics  of  Greece 

upon  the  Greeks  .... 

Contrasts  in  physical  characteristics   . 
Contrasts  between  Hellas  and  Macedon 
Valley  of  Haliakmon  (Elimeia  and  Orestis) 
Valley  of  Erigon  ( Lynkestis  and  Pelagonia) 
Valley  of  Axios  (Paraxia  and  Amphaxitis) 
Eordaia  . 


Emathia  and  Pieria 
Aigai  (yEgre)  . 
Pella  . 


The  maritime  districts 

Chalkidike  . 

Hellenic  colonies    . 

Amphipolis 

Therme  . 

Contrasts  between  Hellenes  and  ATaccdonians  . 

Divergence  between  Hellenes  and  Macedonians 

Hellenic  (Dorian)  immigrants  into  Upper  Macedonia 

CHAPTER  n. 

KINGS  OF  MACEDON  TO  THE   DEATH  OF  AMYNTAS   II., 
FATHER   OF   PHILIP   (700-369). 

Dorian  kings  of  Macedon.     Perdikkas  I.  to  Arayntas  I., 
K.c.  700-498        .         .         .         .         .        .        . 

Alexander  I.  (498-454) 


PACK. 

I 
2 

2 

4 
4 
S 
5 
5 

5 
6 
6 
6 

7 
7 
7 
8 

8 

9 


10 
lo 


/ 


CLc<»cA 


^A' 


VIU 


Contents, 


FAGB. 

Perdikkas  II.  (454-413) .11 

Archelaos  (413-399) 13 

Years  of  anarchy  till  Amyntas  II.  (393-369)  ....  13 

The  marriage  of  Amyntas  fails  in  its  object        ...  14 

The  Olynlhian  Confederacy  and  its  relation  to  its  neighbors  15 
Coalition  against  Olynthos  and  break-up  of  the  Confederacy, 

B-C.  383 17 

By  which  Amyntas  profits  more  than  others  ....  18 

Decreasing  influence  of  Sparta  in  Northern  Greece  (378-370)  18 

Rise  of  Thcosalian  tyrannies  .......  ig 

lason  of  Pherai  (374-370) 20 

Assassination  of  lason   ........  21 

CHAPTER  III. 

MACEDON  AND   HELLAS  AT   PHILIP's   ACCESSION. 

Amyntas  succeeded  by  his  son  Alexander  (369)         .         .  22 

Murder  of  Alexander  and  political  confusion          .         .         .  22 

Pelopidas  in  Macedon 23 

Philip,  son  of  Amyntas,  a  hostage  at  Thebes  (368-365) .         .  23 

Perdikkas,  King  of  Macedon  (365-360)      ....  24 

Confusion  in  Macedon  on  death  of  Perdikkas  (360)       .         .  24 

Philip  king  (359-336) 25 

Importance  of  the  last  half  of  the  fourth  century  B.  c.    .         .  26 

Macedonian  conquest  of  Greece 27 

Macedon  and  Greece  together  conquer  Asia  ....  28 
Contrast  between  the  state  of  Greece  in  the  middle  of  the  fifth 

century,  and  in  the  middle  of  the  fourth  century  B.  C.    .  29 

Corruption  prevalent  in  Greece,  as  shown  by  Demosthenes  .  30 
Reasons  of  the  failure  of  the  second  Athenian  Confederation 

0^378 33 

CHAPTER   IV. 

FROM  THE  ACCESSION   OF   PHILIP   TO   HIS    INTERVENTION 

IN  THE  SACRED   WAR. 

King  Philip o . 

The  Macedonian  army,  and  Philip's  reforms     ...  34 

Position  of  Philip  at  his  accession 38 

Policy  of  Philip  in  the  matter  of  Amphipolis      ...  38 


Contents, 

Outbreak  of  the  Social  War,  and  difficulties  of  Athens  (350). 
Policy  of  Philip  in  the  matter  of  Olynthos 

The  Social  War  (358-5) 

Philip's  aggressions 

Outbreak  of  the  Second  Sacred  War,  and  its  causes  (357)  . 
Successes  of  the  Phokians  under  Philomelos  and  Onomarchos 
The  Phokians  and  Philip  face  to  face  in  Thessaly  (352) 


CHAPTER  V. 

FROM  PHILIP'S  INTERVENTION    IN  THESSALY  TO  THE 
FALL  OF  OLYNTHOS. 


IX 


PAGE. 


King  Philip  intervenes 

Becomes  master  of  Thessaly  and  seizes  Pagasai     . 
But  is  foiled  by  the  Athenians  at  Thermopylai  . 
Sketch  of  Phokian  affairs  to  347     .         .         .         • 
Philip's  position  in  352  and  347  contrasted 
Growing  jealousy  between  King  Philip  and  Olynthos 
Occasion  of  the  rupture      .         .         .         •         • 
Rise  and  influence  of  Demosthenes  at  Athens 
Olynthos  appeals  to   Athens   for   help.     First  Olynthiac 

Demosthenes 

Second  Olynthiac 

Third  Olynthiac 

Troubles  in  Euboia  fostered  by  King  Philip  . 
Last  days  of  Olynthos         .         .         .  ■      • 
Consequences  of  its  fall 


of 


CHAPTER  VI. 
THE  PEACE  OF   PHILOKRAT£s.      FALSA  LEGATIO. 
THERMOPYLAI   IN   PHILIP'S   HANDS. 
The  Thebans  invite  Philip's  intervention  against  the  Phokians 

Policy  of  Philip 

State  of  feeling  at  Athens 

Athenian  help  rudely  declined  by  Phalaikos  at  Thermopylai 
Embassy  from  Athens  to  Philip  about  peace 
Their  report,  and  consequent  proposals  .         .         .         • 

Terms  of  the  peace  proposed  to  the  Assembly  by  Philokrates 


40 

41 

42 

42 

43 
44 
45 


46 
47 

47 
48 

48 
49 
50 
50 

52 
53 
53 
54 
54 
55 


56 
56 

57 
57 
58 
59 
59 


/ 


—-,1 


I 


Contents. 


PAGE. 


Difficulties  with  regard  to  the  allies  of  Athens.     Who  were 

they? 60 

False  assertions  of  Philokrates  and  yEschines     ...  61 

The  Athenians  swear  to  the  Peace  of  Philokrates  ...  62 
Corrupt  delay  of  Athenian  envoys  in  administering  the  oaths 

to  Philip — the  so-called  Falsa  Legatio    ....  62 

King  Philip  at  Pherai ;  Thermopylai  in  danger      •         .         ,  64 

Proposal  of  Pliilokrates  as  to  the  Phokians         ...  64 

Phalaikos  surrenders  Thermopylai  to  Philip  ....  64 

Terrible  consequences  to  Phokis 65 

Panic  at  Athens 66 

Contrast  between  commanding  position  of  King  Philip  and 

the  degradation  of  Athens 67 

CHAPTER  VII. 

FROM  THE  PEACE  OF   PHILOKRATi*:!   TO  THE    BATTLE 
OF  CHAIRONEIA  (346-338). 

Altered  position  of  King  Philip 68 

Fresh  causes  of  quarrel  between  Philip  and  the  Athenians 

(34^340) 68 

Proof  of  embittered  feeling     .         , 70 

Preparations  and  declaration  of  war  by  Athens  (340)         .  71 

Comparative  difficulties  of  Athens  and  Philip         ...  72 

Causes  of  the  Third  Sacred  War  (339)        ....  72 

Intrigues  in  the  Amphiktyonic  meeting  at  Dclphoi  .  •  IZ 
Second   destruction  of  Kirrha,  and  counter-attack  of  the 

Amphissians    .........  74 

Extraordinary  meeting  of  the  Amphiktyonic  Council  .  .  75 
King  Philip  in  Phokis,  as  general  of  the  Amphiktyons,  seizes 

Elateia     ..........  76 

Panic  at  Athens  and  Thebes 73 

Alliance  of  Athens  and  Thebes  against  Philip    ...  'j-j 

Vigour  of  the  allies  during  the  winter  (339-8)         ...  78 

Manoeuvres  of  Philip  and  their  object         ....  78 

Battle  of  Chaironeia  (August,  338) 78 


Contents,  xi 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

FROM  THE  BATTLE  OF  CHAIRONEIA  TO  THE  BEGINNING 
OF   ALEXANDERS   ASIATIC    CAMPAIGNS. 


ictory 


ij  J 


Behaviour  of  Philip  to  Thebes  and  Athens  after  his  v 
(338)        ....... 

The  Peace  of  Demades  ..... 

Philip  in  Peloponnesos        .... 

The  Congress  of  Corinth  (337) 
Assassination  of  Philip  by  Pausanias  (336) 
Estimate  of  Philip's  character  and  reign 
Early  years  and  education  of  Alexander   . 
Alexander  secures  his  position  as  king   . 
And  then  makes  a  progress  through  Greece 
His  campaign  in  the  North  (March  to  August, 
Revolt  of  Thebes  during  his  absence 
Sudden  return  of  Alexander  .... 

Fall  and  destruction  of  Thebes  (335) 

Submission  of  Greece * 

Preparations  for  Asiatic  campaign  (335-4) 

CHAPTER  IX. 

ALEXANDER    IN   ASIA   MINOR. 

Contrast  between  the  extent  and  the  weakness  of  the  Persian 
empire         ....... 

Its  geographical  extent  and  characteristics 

Plateau  of  Iran 

Continuous  plateau  from  the  Indus  to  the  Egean 
The  four  great  river  basins      .... 
The  Oxus  ...«..•• 

The  Indus 

The  Euphrates  and  Tigris 

The  Nile 

Resources  of  the  empire 

Contact  of  Greeks  with  Persians     . 

Alexander  crosses  the  Hellespont  and  visits  Ilion 

Counsels  and  tactics  of  the  Persians 

Battle  of  the  Gri'nlkos 


PAGB. 
80 

8t 
81 
82 
82 

84 
85 
87 
88 
88 
90 

91 
92 

93 
93 


93 

94 

94 

94 
96 

96 

97 
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99 

TOO 
100 
100 


Xll 


Contents. 


Contents. 


xiu 


Results  of  the  battle 

Alexander's  treatment  of  his  prisoners        .... 
Reduction  of  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor 

CHAPTER  X. 

FROM  THE  SIEGE  OF  HALIKARNASSOS   TO  THE  BATTLE 

OF  ISSOS. 

Preparations  at  Halikarnassos  for  defence 

Siege  and  capture  of  the  city  (334) 

Alexander's  circuitous  route  to  Gordion,  and  the  reasons 

for  it 

The  cutting  of  the  Gordian  knot 

The  march  from  Gordion  to  Tarsos 

Alexander's  magnanimous  treatment  of  Philippos  . 
The  pass  of  Issos  (portoe  Kilikia)  et  Syrice) 
Darius  passes  Mount  Amanos  to  Issos  .... 
Preparations  on  both  sides  for  the  battle    .... 

Battle  of  Issos  (November,  333) 

Consequences  of  the  victory 


CHAPTER  XI. 

FROM  THE  BATTLE  OF   ISSOS  TO  THE  BATTLE  OF 

GAUGAMELA. 
Reasons  for  the  invasion  of  Phoenicia  and  Egypt  . 
Alexander  gives  audience  to  envoys  from  Darius 
Consideration  of  Alexander's  treatment  of  the  Tyrians 
Description  of  Tyre    ....... 

Siege  of  Tyre  (333-2,  December  to  July) 

P'all  of  the  city 

Second  embassy  from  Darius  .... 

Alexander  at  Gaza  and  Jerusalem      .... 

He  arrives  in  Egypt 

Foundation  of  Alexander  (332) 

Visit  of  Alexander  to  the  oasis  of  Zeus-Ammon      . 

He  returns  to  Egypt 

And  advances  to  the  Euphrates      .... 
Alexander  and  Darius  face  to  face  at  Gaugamela 


106 
107 

109 
no 
III 
III 
112 
114 
114 
116 
119 


120 
120 
121 
122 
124 
126 
127 
128 
129 
129 

131 
132 

^33 
133 


CHAPTER  XII. 

FROM   THE  BATTLE  OF  GAUGAMELA  TO  THE  SACK  OF 

TERSEPOLIS. 

PAGE. 

Conditions  of  the  battle  stated ^34 

Alexander's  preparations ^35 

Question  of  a  night  attack 13^ 

Pefsian  order  of  battle ^37 

Macedonian  order  of  battle ^37 

Charge  of  Persian  cavalry  on  the  T^Iacedonian  right  flank  and 

of  chariots  on  their  front 138 

Decisive  charge  of  Alexander  in  person  on  the  Persian  centre  139 

Rout  of  the  Persian  left  and  centre    ".....  I39 
Furious  and  evenly  contested  struggle  on  the  Macedonian 

left 141 

The  pursuit M^ 

Final  result  of  the  battle  of  Gaugamcla 142 

Immediate  results  of  the  battle 142 

Babylon ^43 

Susa 143 

March  from  Susa  to  PersepoMs I44 

Persepolis ^45 

The  800  mutilated  Greeks ^45 

Sack  of  Persepolis,  and  burning  of  the  palace     .        .        .  146 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE  DEATH  OF  DARIUS.— REDUCTION  OF  PARTHIA. — 

EXECUTION  OF   PHILOTAS   AND   TARMENION. 

Plans  of  Darius  after  Gaugamela ^47 

Alexander  at  Agbatana ^48 

Alexander  pursues  Darius       .         .         .         ••       •         •         .148 

Death  of  Darius ^49 

Consequent  change  in  Alexander's  position    ....  150 

Difficulties  of  that  position          .         .         .         •         •         •  ^5^ 

Alexander  in  Parthia ^5^ 

Episode  of  Satibarzanes,  satrap  of  Aria      ....  152 
Description   of  Aria,   Drangiana,   and   Arachosia   (modem 

Affghanistan) ^54 


XIV 


Contents, 


Contents. 


Discovery  of  a  supposed  plot  against  Alexander's  life         , 

Difficulty  of  ascertaining  the  truth 

Character  and  position  of  Parmonion  and  Philotas    . 
Betrayal  of  the  plot  tc^  Alexander;  suicide  of  Dimnoi;  arrest 

of  Philotas 

Trial  and  condemnation  of  Philotas 

He  is  tortured,  to  extract  evidence  against  his  father 
Execution  of  Philotas  and  Parmenion         .... 
Summary  of  the  whole  question 

CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE  CAMPAIGNS   IN   BAKTRIA   AND  SOGDIANA. 

March  of  Alexander  from  Prophthasia  into  Baktria   . 

Pursuit  and  capture  of  Bessos 

Episode  of  the  Branchidai 

March  to  the  Jaxartes 

Dangerous  position  of  the  Macedonians  at  Alexandria  Eschate 
(Khojend)        ......... 

Passage  of  the  Jaxartes,  and  battle  with  the  Scythians  . 

Exploits  of  Spitamenes 

In  winter  quarters  at  Baktra  (329-8) 

Measures  for  the  subjection  of  the  two  provinces 

End  of  Spitamenes  ........ 

Capture  of  the  Sogdian  Rock 

Marriage  of  Alexander  to  Roxana 

Capture  of  the  Rock  of  Chorienes 

Reasons  for  a  march  into  India 

Episode  of  Kleitos  (328) 

Episode  of  Kallisthencs  and  the  page  Ilcrmolaos  (327) 

CHAPTER  XV. 

FROM   THE  OXUS   TO   THE    HYPHASIS. 

March  from  Baktria  to  the  Kophen 

The  hill-fort  of  Aornos  ....... 

Capture  of  Aornos 

The  Gyroeans  and  their  legends  of  Dionysos  .         ,         . 
The  Indus 


PAGB. 

156 


160 
162 
164 

166 
167 

i63 
169 
169 
170 
170 
171 
171 
172 
172 
174 


176 

177 
178 
i3o 
i3i 


[Passage  of  the  Hydaspcs 
FTactics  of  Poros  .         .         .         • 

And  of  Alexander  .... 
Battle  of  the  Hydaspes  (326)      . 
Poros  a  prisoner      .... 
Passage  of  the  Akesines  and  Hydraotes 
Advance  to  the  Hyphasis 
The  soldiers  refuse  to  cross 
Return  to  Nikaia    .        .        .         • 

CHAPTER  XVI. 
THE   RETURN   FROM   THE    HYl'HASIS   TO   SUSA. 

Alleviations  of  disappointment 

Preparation  for  the  voyage  down  the  Indus    . 

The  start 

The  Mallians,  Brachmans,  and  Oxydrakans  . 

Campaign  against  the  Mallians 

Attack  of  the  capital  and  danger  of  Alexander 
From  the  confluence  of  the  five  rivers  to  the  sea 
March  of  the  king  through  Gedrosia  and  Karmania       . 
Meeting  with  Krateros  and  Nearchos,  and  arrival  at  Susa 
Voyage  of  Nearchos  from  the  Indus  to  the  Euphrates   . 
Plans  of  Alexander  for  amalgamation  of  his  subjects  . 

Difficulties  of  the  task 

Mutiny  of  troops  at  Opis,  on  the  Tigris      .... 
Despatches  of  Alexander  to  the  Greeks  .... 

CHAPTER  XVII. 
CLOSING  SCENZS. 

Festival  at  Agbatana 

Death  of  Hephaistion 

Subjection  of  the  Kossaeans 

Omens  of  coming  evil 

Their  effect  upon  Alexander 

The  entry  into  Babylon 

New  plans 

Illness  and  death  of  Alexander   .    .    .    •    • 


XV 

PAGE. 
182 
184 

i3S 
i36 

i38 

i38 

189 
189 
190 


190 
191 
191 

192 

193 

194 

196 
197 
199 
199 
201 
202 

263 
204 


205 
205 
206 
206 
203 

208 

209 

209 


XVI 


Contents, 


PAGE. 

His  personal  characteristics 210 

His  conquests  not  immoral  in  the  eyes  of  the  Greeks     .         .  212 
Greek  freedom  destroyed,  because  the  Greeks  hardly  deserved 

to  be  free 213 

Salutary  influence  of  Alexander's  conquest  upon  Asia  .         .  213 

Conclusion 214 

Chronological  Table 217 

Index 219 


THE   MACEDONIAN   EMPIRE. 


MAPS. 

Macedon  and  CHALKIDIKfe       .          .          .         to  face  page  I 

Central  Greece 'jj 

Plan  of  Halikarnassos .107 

The  Pass  of  Issos 113 

Plan  of  Tyre 123 

Plan  of  Alexandria 129 

Field  of  Gaugamela 136 

Campaigns  of  Alexander  ....    to  face  page  216 


S«1 


Effects  of 
the  climate 
and  physical 
characteris- 
tics of 
Greece 
upon   the 
Greeks. 


CHAPTER  I. 

GEOGRAPHY   AND    INHABITANTS   OF   MACEDONIA. 

"The  history  of  a  nation  is  by  no  means  to  be  regard- 
ed solely  as  a  consequence  of  the  natural  condition  of 
its  local  habitations."  So  writes  one  of  the 
latest  of  Greek  historians  in  the  midst  of  a 
graphic  description  of  the  climate  and  phys- 
ical characteristics  of  the  shores  of  the 
lEgean.  But  the  stress  which  he  lays  on 
[these  characteristics,  and  the  inferences 
[which  he  draws  from  them,  show  that  he  considers  them 
[to  have  been  a  strongly  determining  cause  of  the  history 
of  the  peoples  who  dwelt  upon  those  shores.  It  is  in- 
deed impossible  to  suppose  that,  had  the  Greeks  been 
inhabitants  of  a  level  inland  country,  they  would  have 
remained  so  long  disunited,  or  would  have  shown  (as 
they  did)  the  restless  activity  characteristic  of  the  sea- 
man ;  and  we  shall  have  evidence  in  the  following  pages 
of  the  extraordinary  endurance  of  Greeks  amid  sudden 
changes  of  climate,  as  well  as  of  their  superiority  to  Asi- 
atics in  bodily  not  less  than  mental  vigour.  That  some 
part  of  this  vigour  was  owing  to  the  country  in  which 
they  lived  will  hardly  be  denied. 

B  I 


The  Macedonian  Et7ipire. 


CH. 


Contrasts  in 
physical 
characteris- 
tics. 


In  its  physical  characteristics  Greece  was  a  land  d 
singular  contrasts.  A  remarkable  similarity  of  condition^ 
between  the  eastern  and  western  shores  oj 
the  Egcan  was  matched  by  a  remarkablj 
difference  of  conditions  between  the  easteri 
and  western  coasts  of  Greece  itself,  and  still 
more  between  its  southern  and  northern  provinces.  The 
E^ean  was  a  highway  between  two  halves  of  one  coun- 
try— a  sea  exceptionally  suitable  for  commerce.  The 
air  is  clear.  Islands — that  is,  landmarks — are  frequent. 
Bays  and  safe  anchorages  are  innumerable.  During  a 
great  part  of  the  summer  there  arc  regular  winds  which 
blow  daily  from  the  north,  so  regularly  indeed  that  De- 
mosthenes counted  it  among  Philip's  advantages  that  he 
lived  at  the  back  of  the  north  wind.  On  the  other  hand, 
while  the  eastern  side  of  Greece  is  rich  in  fertile  lowlands 
and  has  a  deeply  indented  though  accessible  coastline, 
the  western  side  consists  of  little  but  rocky  ridges  skirtings 
a  savage  shore  with  few  harbours.  But  the  contrast  be- 
tween south  and  north  is  yet  more  striking  than  this, 
There  is  not  on  the  entire  surface  of  the  globe,  it  has  beei 
said,  any  other  region  in  which  the  different  zones  oj 
climate  and  flora  meet  one  another  in  so  rapid  a  succes- 
sion. The  semi-tropical  products  of  the  Cyclades  and 
the  Peloponnesos  have  vanished  in  Boiotia.  The  olives 
of  Attica  are  not  seen  in  Thessaly.  Even  the  myrtle 
disappears  on  the  northern  shores  of  the  Egean. 

If  we  go  further  north,  we  only  heighten  the  contrast ; 
for  the  climate  and  products  of  Macedon  resemble  those 
of  central  Germany.  It  is  a  land  of  broad 
rivers  and  great  plains,  far  superior  to  Illyria 
across  the  mountains  in  fertility,  and  boast- 
ing a  seacoast  of  great  extent.  Yet  seacoast 
and  inland  were  strangely  cut  off  the  one  from  the  other. 


^H.  I. 


Geography. 


Contrasts 
between 
Hellas  and 
Macedon. 


feo  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  interior  until  Philip's  time 
Iwere  to  a  great  extent  a  highland  population  secluded 
Ifrom  the  world.     The  reason  of  this  lay  in  the  peculiar 
[conformation  of  the  mountain  system  of  the  country.    If 
[we  were  to  use  the  language  of  a  cultivated  Athenian,  we 
^hould  say  that  the  range  of  the  Kambounian  (Cambu- 
Inian)  mountains,  stretching  from  the  lofty  mass  of  Olym- 
[pos  in  the  east  to  Lakmon  in  the  west,  formed  a  natural 
)arrier  between  Hellenes  and  Barbarians,  between  pure- 
)reeds  and  half-breeds.     This  range  was  indeed  of  no 
jreat  height,  yet  it  formed,  roughly  speaking,  a  sort  of 
division  between  one  kind  of  country  and  another,  one 
i^ind  of  people  and  another.     The  Hellenes  to  the  south 
[reached  a  high  degree  of  civilization,  and  emigrating 
from  home  and  mingling  with  their  neighbours  in  all  di- 
rections, powerfully  affected  the  history  of  surrounding 
'nations.     The  Macedonians  remained  for  a  long  while  a 
half-barbarous  people,  because  they  were  shut  off  not 
only  from  the  outside  world,  but  from  mutual  intercourse 
by  lofty  and  numerous  mountain  chains.     These  moun- 
tains, in  fact,  were  so  lofty  and   difficult,  that  at  most 
points  they  were  higher  than  the  Kambounian  range  at 
many  points  even  higher  than  Pindos  itself.    It  was  easier 
on  the  whole  to  pass  from  the  adjacent  lowlands  into 
Thessaly  or  the  valley  of  the  Istros  (Danube)  than  from 
one  Macedonian  valley  to  another.     On  the  other  hand, 
the  rivers  that  rise  in  these  mountain  ranges  gradually 
converge  before  falling  into  the  sea  after  long  and  devi- 
ous wanderings.     The  first  outward  expansion  of  these 
highland  tribes  would   needs   follow  the   natural    line 
marked  out  for  them  by  their  rivers  flowing  seaward,  and 
their  first  natural  meeting-points  would  be  Aigai  (^gae) 
and  Pella  in  the  valley  of  the  Axios,  the  successive  capi- 
tals of  Macedonian  kings. 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH. 


CH.  I. 


Geography, 


In  the  widest  extent  of  the  name,  Macedon  includcc 
five  tracts  or  provinces,  singularly  different  from  one  an- 
other. Three  of  these  were  basins  of  large  rivers,  whih 
a  fourth  (Emathia)  was  almost  as  directly  a  "gift"  of  the 
united  rivers  as  Egypt  was  of  the  Nile,  being  formed,  i^ 
would  seem,  out  of  the  alluvial  deposit  brought  down  b) 
them  in  the  course  of  centuries  from  the  lofty  mountains 
of  the  interior. 

The  valley  watered  by  the  Ilaliakmon  was  a  narro\\ 
district,  enclosed  between  the  Kambounian  and  Skardos 
Valley  of  ranges  on  the  south  and  west,  and  Mounts 

m.m!:iT°"        Barnos  and  Bcrmios  on  the  north  and  east, 

^fi/iimcia  Alii-  I 

and  Although  It  was  not  remarkable  for  fertility! 

rest's).  jj^^  possession  of  this  valley  was  yet  a  matter] 

of  importance  to  the  kings  of  Macedon.  At  its  northern 
end  there  was  a  remarkable  gorge,  cleaving  the  moun-1 
tains  from  east  to  west,  the  only  rent  in  the  great  mass  of] 
Skardos  for  more  than  200  miles,  through  which  a  tribu- 
tary of  the  Apsos  flows  from  its  source  in  Mount  Barnos 
on  its  way  to  the  Adriatic.  The  Roman  road  of  later 
days  (Via  Egnatia)  was  carried  over  a  pass  some  thirty 
miles  to  the  north ;  but  before  the  Roman  conquest  of 
Macedon,  this  gorge  of  the  Eordaikos  must  have  formed 
the  main  line  of  communication  between  Illyria  and 
Macedon,  whether  for  commerce  or  invasion,  and  lent 
therefore  an  exceptional  importance  to  the  upper  valley 
of  the  Ilaliakmon.   . 

To  the  north  of  Orestis  lay  the  fertile  uplands,  watered 
by  the  river  Erigon,  as  it  pursues  a  winding  course  to 
Valley  of  J°'^  ^^^  Axios.     Though  averaging  a  height 

fi^ynTestis         ^^^500  fcct  abovc  the  sea,  the  district  boast- 
and  Pela-  cd  "a  fat  rich  soil,"  capable  of  maintaining- 

gonia).  ^1  ,      .  *  <> 

a  large  population. 
The  Axios  was  the  chief  river  in  Macedon,  and  its 


Valley  of 
Axios. 
(Paraxia 
and  Amph- 
axiti  ). 

Presently  it 


eastern  boundary  prior  to  the  reign  of  Philip, 
a  river  too  of  a  different  character  to  the 
preceding.  In  its  upper  course  it  flows 
through  a  narrow  cultivated  plain,  receiving 
the  waters  of  the  Erigon  from  Pelagonia. 
abruptly  changes  its  peaceful  nature,  forming  at  the  so- 
called  Iron  Gates  rapids  for  some  considerable  distance, 
where  its  waters  begin  to  slide  to  the  lowlands  of  Emathia. 
At  the  Gates  the  river  cuts  through  the  mountain  range 
which  joins  Skardos  to  Orbelos,  and  having  cleft  for  itself 
a  passage  through  a  precipitous  gorge  of  more  than  600 
feet  in  height,  gradually  descends  to  the  lower  level,  and 
so  falls  at  last  into  the  sea,  close  to  the  joint  mouths  of 
the  Haliakmon  and  Lydias. 

^  In  the  very  centre  of  the  country,  and  entirely  en- 
i  closed  by  mountains,  lay  the  province  of  Eordaia — an 
'  almost  circular  basin,  difficult  of  access,  and 
with  no  outlet  except  a  couple  of  mountain 
/  passes.  The  water  from  the  hills  appears  to  drain  en- 
tirely into  the  Lake  Begorritis. 

Lastly  there  was  the  irregular  strip  of  alluvial  land, 
stretching  from  Mount  Olympos  to  the  city  of  Therme 
(Thessalonica),  at  first  a  narrow  plain,  en- 
closed between  sea  and  mountains  and  called     ^"1*'^'^ 

T^.      .      ,  •  ,       .  ■,  *"*^  Plena. 

Plena,  but  widening  out  between  the  Haliak- 
mon and  Therme  into  the  fertile  province  of  Emathia, 
watered  by  the  great  river  already  mentioned,  and  con- 
taining the  two  capitals  of  Macedon,  Aigai 
(^gai)  and  Pella.     The  former  lay  at  the     -^^^^ 
head  of  the  valley  of  the  Lydias,  on  a  pla- 
teau 200  feet  above  the  plain,  and  dominated  the  whole 
of  Emathia  as  well  as  the  passes  from  the  seacoast  to 
the  interior.     It  was  the  "  portal  of  the  highlands,"  the 
dominant  "  castle  of  the  plain,"  and  remained  to  the 


Eordaia. 


/ 


TJie  Macedonian  Etnptre. 


CH.  I. 


CH.  I. 


Geography, 


last,  as  became  its  position  and  associations,  the  burial- 
place  of  the  Macedonian  kings,  the  centre  and  hearth 
Pelia.  °^  ^^^  Macedonian  tribes.     Pella  was  a  city 

of  a  different  type.     Archelaos  was  the  first 
of  the  Macedonian  kings  to  understand  its  value  as  a 
capital ;  but  it  remained  comparatively  insignificant  until 
it  became  associated  with  the  glories  of  Philip's  reign. 
It  had   two  great   merits.      It  was  central   and  it  was 
strong— as  strong  as  Aigai,  far  stronger  than  Pydna,  and 
more  central  than  either  for  a  monarch  whose  long  arm 
reached  from  Amphipolis  to  Pagasai.      It  was  afso  in 
direct  communication  with  the  sea  (distant  about  fifteen 
miles)  by  the  marshes  and  the  Lydias.     In  short,  with 
no  claims  to  beauty,  or  grandeur,  or  healthiness,  Pella 
formed  a  strong  central  useful  capital,  thoroughly  char- 
acteristic of  a   common-sense   monarchy,  whose   right 
was  might. 

So  far  we  have  been  dealing  solely  with  Macedon. 
But  there  were  large  districts  and  many  cities  to  the  east 
of  the  Axios,  which  had  been  founded  or 
colonized  by  Hellenes,  and  in  which  they 
were  the  dominant,  if  not  the  more  numer- 
ous part  of  the  population.  These  colonies  fringed  the 
whole  coast  of  the  Euxine  Sea,  the  Chersonese,  Thrace, 
and  Chalkidike :  and  as  the  extension  of  Macedonian 
power  by  Philip  brought  him  into  collision  with  many  of 
them,  it  will  be  well  to  give  a  short  account  of  the  coun- 
try lying  between  the  Axios  and  Amphipolis. 

The  promontory  of  Chalkidik6.  with  its  three  fingers 
or  peninsulas,  seemed  formed  by  nature  to  be  the  mari- 
ChaikidiM.  ?^"^^  province  of  the  inland  country  behind 
it.  Macedon  might  seem  to  have  a  natural 
right  to  it,  and  we  can  hardly  wonder  that  Philip  was  not 
content  until  he  had  won  it.    As  compared  with  the 


The  mari- 
time 
districts. 


\ 


I 


i 


Hellenic 
colonies. 


western  shores  of  the  same  latitude  it  had  marked  ad- 
vantages.    In  place  of  a  savage  coast  and  precipitous 
cliffs,  we  have  a  broad  mass  of  land  reaching  far  into 
the  Southern  Sea,  whose  three  great  spurs  abound  in 
harbours,   and  were  studded  with   flourishing  colonies. 
The  easternmost  (Akte)  runs   forty  miles  into  the  sea, 
with  an   average  breadth   of  four  miles,  and   ends   in 
the  grand  limestone  cone  of  Athos,  towering  more  than 
,  6,000  feet  above  the  level  of  the  Egcan,  and  casting  its 
shadow  even  as  far  as  Lemnos.     The  central  and  wes- 
tern peninsulas  (Sithonia  and  Pall^ne)  are  not  so  moun- 
tainous as  Akle,  but  were  far  more  densely 
populated.      Each  was  fringed  with  a  nu- 
merous belt  of  colonies.    Each  boasted  one 
city  of  first-rate  importance.     On  the  west  coast  of  Sith- 
onia lay  Torone,  the  first  home  of  the  emigrants  from 
Euboian  Chalkis,  who  colonized  Chalkidike  and  gave  it 
their  own  name  :    while  at  the  neck  of  land  connecting 
Pallene  with  the  country  to  the  north  was  Potidaia,  a 
colony  from  Dorian  Corinth  ;  the  near  neighbour,  rival, 
and  sometime  subject  of  the  Chalkidian  Olynthos.     Nor 
does  the  list  of  Hellenic  colonies  end  here.     Besides  a 
host  of  minor  towns,   there   were  TVIethone,    Therme, 
Olynthos,  Akanthos,  Amphipolis,  all  colonized  by  men 
of  Dorian  race,  and  two  of  them  occupying  positions  of 
first-rate  importance.     Amphipolis,  strongly 
situated  in  an  angle  of  the  Strymon,  com- 
manded  the   passage   of  the   river   and  the  road  from 
west  to  east.     To  be  master  of  Amphipolis  was  to  be 
master   also   of   Mount    Pangaios    and   its 
valuable  gold  and  silver  mines.     Nor  did  Thcrmd. 

Therme  occupy  a  less  important  site.  The  gulf  on  which 
it  stands  is  a  splendid  sheet  of  water,  running  inland  100 
miles  in  a  general  direction  from  south-east  to  north- 


Amphipolis. 


s 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  I. 


between 
Hellenes 
and  Mace- 
donians. 


west,  and  gradually  narrowing  at  its  northern  end.  The 
town  itself  was  of  little  consequence  till  Macedonian  times ; 
but  the  moment  that  a  great  state  arose  on  the  northern 
shore  of  the  Egean,  which  swallowed  up  the  pettier  city- 
leagues  of  Chalkidike,  Thermd  at  once  assumed  its 
natural  importance  as  a  great  harbour,  commanding 
and  guarding  the  approaches  from  the  eastward.  It  lay 
close  at  hand  to  the  plains  of  the  Axios,  and  communi- 
cated by  a  pass  with  the  valley  of  the  Strymon. 

The  difference  in  the  physical  features  of  the  countries 
lying  to  the  north  and  south  of  the  Kambounian  range 
Contrasts  was  not  more  remarkable  than  that  between 

the  inhabitants  of  these  countries.  Epeirots, 
Macedonians,  Illyrians,  and  Paionians  were 
not  genuine  Hellenes.  Macedonians,  in- 
deed, were  not  the  mere  barbarians  which  cultivated 
Greeks  like  Demosthenes  affected  to  believe  them ;  yet 
neither  were  they  Hellenes  in  the  highest  sense  of  the 
word.  Their  civilization  was  less  developed,  their  dress 
and  fashion  were  different,  and  their  language,  though 
similar,  was  yet  not  pure  Greek.  What  we  know  of  their 
government  recalls  the  heroic  times  of  the  Iliad.  Their 
national  life  was  not  that  of  the  city,  {j:okic)  but  of  the 
tribe.  In  Italy  the  kingship  died  out.  In  Greece  it  sur- 
vived at  Sparta  alone,  and  even  there  was  reduced  by 
the  Ephorate  almost  to  a  mere  form.  But  in  Macedon 
it  retained  its  essential  character  to  historic  times,  though 
limited,  like  the  power  of  Agamemnon  himself,  by  occa- 
sional assemblies  of  the  people  in  arms. 
Divergence  Whatever  may   have   been    the    precise 

between  relations  of  Macedonians  and  Hellenes,  it  is 

rlelienes  .  ' 

and  Mace-         ccrtam  that  the  civilization  of  Macedon  was 
onians.  \^i^x  Stagnant  or  even  deteriorated  by  inter- 

mixture with  Illyrians.   Hence  Greeks  and  Macedonians 


CH.  I. 


Inhabitants, 


were  ever  tending  to  become  more  and  more  estranged. 
The  higher  the  development  of  Hellenic  civilization  in 
the  south,  the  deeper  was  the  contempt  felt  by  the  genu- 
ine Hellene  for  the  semi-barbarians  of  the  north. 
"  Philip  !"  cries  Demosthenes,  scornfully,  "  Philip  !  who 
is  not  only  no  Hellene,  or  in  any  way  connected  with 
Hellenes,  but  not  even  a  barbarian  from  a  creditable 
country !  He  is  a  worthless  fellow  from  Macedon, 
whence,  in  olden  time,  it  was  impossible  to  get  even  a 
decent  slave!"  This  was,  of  course,  the  exaggerated 
language  of  pride  of  birth,  deepened  by  political  hatred, 
and  it  was  hardly  true  in  any  sense  of  the  Macedonian 
royal  family;  yet  it  expresses  a  partial  truth,  and  it  was 
only  from  Hellas  itself  that  the  influence  came  which 
made  a  national  life  on  a  large  scale  possible  to  these 
rude  highlanders. 

Hellenic  colonies,  it  must  be  remembered,  were  not 
confined  to  the  shores  of  the  Egean.     There  were  also 
important  settlements  on  the  Ionian  Sea,  on     Hellenic 
the  coasts  of  which  the  Dorian  Corinthians     (Donan) 

immigrants 

had  founded  several  colonies,  and  through     into  Upper 

^,  J  ^.,  ...        Macedonia. 

them  opened  up  a  mercantile  connexion  with 
the  interior.  Nor  were  the  Corinthians  alone  in  their 
adventurous  pursuit  of  fortune  north-eastwards.  Other 
Dorians  also,  exiles  from  Peloponnesian  Argos,  followed 
in  their  track,  and  by  the  end  of  the  eighth  century  had 
established  themselves  in  the  upper  valley  of  the  Haliak- 
mon.  Among  these  wanderers,  Herodotus  tells  us,  were 
three  brothers,  of  the  royal  family  of  Argos.  After  many 
adventures  and  hair-breadth  escapes,  they  gradually 
won  a  leading  position  among  the  Macedonians,  in  the 
midst  of  whom  they  were  settled ;  and  from  this  to 
kingship  and  conquest  was  an  easy  step.  But  the 
youngest  brother,  Perdikkas,  was  the  most  intelligent,  or 


lO 


TJie  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  II. 


the  most  favoured  by  fortune.  King  in  Orcstis,  with  a 
new  Argos  for  his  capital,  he  pushed  his  victorious  arms 
almost  to  the  mouth  of  the  Hahakmon,  and  finally 
transferred  the  headquarters  of  his  growing  power  to  a 
more  convenient  capital  in  Aigai.  Thus  was  founded 
the  dynasty  of  the  Argeads ;  and  thus  were  laid  the 
foundations  of  that  Macedonian  empire  which  conquered 
Greece  and  overthrew  the  might  of  Persia. 


CHAPTER  II. 

KINGS   OF   MACEDONIA  TO  THE   DEATH   OF  AMYNTAS   II., 
FATHER   OF   PHILIP,   (70O-369). 

The  first  two  centuries  of  the  Macedonian  monarchy, 
covered  by  the  reigns  of  six  kings,  were  a  period 
Dorian  kings  shrouded  in  obscurity,  during  which  the 
Per^'Si"":  ""^^'"^  kingdom  had  enlarged  itself  at  the 
toAmyntasl.     cxpensc  of  its  neighbours,  and  crossino-  the 

B.  C.  700-498.  A      •  U      J  ,         ,  to  ^ 

Axios  had  even  reached  the  Strymon.  This 
^98-454)"^*  ^'''■^^'"  ^^  conquest  had  been  scarcely  ar- 
rested by  the  Persian  invasions  of  Europe. 
Indeed,  Alexander  I.,  son  of  Amyntas,  was  cunning 
enough  to  bow  to  the  storm,  and  while  cautiously  doing 
his  utmost  to  befriend  the  Greeks,  affected  to  fall  in  with 
Persian  ideas  as  to  Macedon  being  the  centre  of  a  great 
vassal  state,  and  thankfully  accepted  any  extension  of 
territory  which  the  Great  King  might  be  pleased  to  give 
him.  By  these  means  he  gained  a  footing  among  the 
Thracian  tribes  as  far  as  Mount  Haimus,  while  he  at- 
tained an  object  by  which  he  set  even  greater  store  as  a 
true-blooded  Hellene  ;  for  his  claims  to  that  title  were 
publicly  acknowledged  at  Olympia,  and  his  victories  in 
the  Stadium  celebrated  by  the  Hellenic  Pindar.  Yet  the 
difficulties  of  Alexander  did  not  cease,  but  rather  in- 


CH.  II. 


The  Earlier  Kings, 


II 


creased  when  danger  no  longer  threatened  Greece  from 
the  side  of  Persia.     He  had  removed  his  capital  from 
Aigai  to  Pydna,  a  step  nearer  to  the  Hellenes,  whom  he 
admired  so  much.     But  close  to  Pydna  lay  Methone,  an 
independent  Greek  city;  while  to  the  eastward,  in  Chalki- 
dike,  and  as  far  as  the  Strymon,  were  numerous  Hel- 
lenic colonies  whose  sympathies  drew  them  naturally  to 
the  south  rather  than  the  west — to  Hellas,  not  to  Mace- 
don— and  which,  after  the  Persian  wars,  recognized  in 
the  maritime  Athens  their  natural  leader  and  protectress. 
It  was  a  difficult  position  ;  and  for  a  century  it  tried  to 
the  utmost  the  skill  of  the  Macedonian  kings.     On  the 
one  hand,  the  expansion  of  the  kingdom  had  outrun  its 
internal  consolidation,  and  there  were  latent  elements  of 
discontent  which  more  than  once  brought  it  to  the  verge 
of  ruin.     On  the  other  hand,  if  the  Macedonian  mon- 
archs  were  to  be  anything  more  than  petty  lords  of  half- 
barbarous  tribes,  they  could  hardly  put  up  with  the  per- 
manent dependence  of  what  was  practically  their  own 
sea-coast  on  a  far  distant  and  hostile  power,  any  more 
than  with  its  permanent  independence.     The  kings  of 
Macedon  were  forced  by  their  position  to  choose  between 
two  alternatives,  to  make  good  their  claim  to  Methon^ 
and  Potidaia,  Chalkidikd  and  Amphipolis,  and  to  win 
their  way  to  the  coast,  or  else  to  submit  to  a  humiliating 
exclusion  from  the  political  affairs  of  Hellas.     In  such  a 
case  no  able  man  hesitates  in  the  choice  of  his  alterna- 
tive ;  and  we  thus  strike  the  key-note  of  the  discords  and 
jealousies  which  for  so  many  years  troubled  Northern 
Greece.     Even  before   the   Peloponnesian  war,  in   the 
time  of  Perdikkas  II.  (454-413),  Athens  and      Perdikkas 
Macedon  were  face  to  face,  conscious  of  di-      i^-  .(454- 

4^3-/ 

vergent  mterests. 


The  colonization  of  Amphipolis  had  been  the  crownin 


cr 


12 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  II. 


stroke  of  the  policy  by  which  Perikles  sought  to  keep  a 
firm  hold  of  Chalkidikd  and  the  Thracian  coast,  and  so 
of  the  Egean.     Perdikkas.  on  the  other  hand,  threatened 
at  once  by  discontented  neighbours  in  the  west    by  the 
formidable  empire  of  the  Thracian  Sitalkes  in  the  east 
and  by  Athenian  jealousy  in  Chalkidiko.  was  forced  to 
pursue  a  tortuous   policy.     Adroitly   observant   of  the 
current  of  affairs,  and  quite  devoid  of  scruples,  he  made 
treaties  and  broke  them,  he  waged  war  or  bowed  to  the 
storm,  with  equal  facility.     In  the  field  of  diplomacy  he 
must  have  been  an  exceptionally  able  man ;  for  every 
neighbour  in  turn  was  utilized  to  serve  his  purpose  and 
was  neglected  or  attacked  when  the  object  of  the  moment 
was  attained.     Brasidas  the   Spartan   he  made   use   of 
against  his  private  enemies  the  Illyrians.     He  skilfully 
fomented  the   revolt   of   the   Chalkidic   towns    against 
Athens  in  432  ;  while  in  the  next  year  we  find  him  allied 
with  his  old  enemies   the   Athenians,  and  showin-  his 
gratitude  by  attacking  his  old  friends  the  Chalkidlans 
Two  years  later-once  more  allied  with  Chalkidians  and 
at  war  with  Athens-he  was  attacked  by  Sitalkes.  and 
was  within  a  little  of  being  ruined.     Yet  from  these  and 
similar  perils  he  escaped  with  unimpaired  strength    or 
rather  the  stronger,  in  that   the  brilliant  campaign;  of 
Brasidas  had  undermined  the  power  of  Athens  in  the 
north       Nor  was  Athens   ever  again  as   formidable  to 
Macedon   as   she  had  been  ;  for  the  disastrous  issue  of 
the    Sicilian    expedition    (413)    paralyzed   her  influence 
everywhere,  and  probably  Macedon  reaped  more  advan- 

iXlf ""   '^"^  ^''^'""'^   ""^  ^^''''"'''   '^'^^   ^^"^'"'^  ^'^ 

The  policy  of  Perdikkas  was  continued  with  success 

by  his  Illegitimate  son  Archelaos.     He  climbed  to  power 

by  a  series   of  violent  deeds,  with  which  most  barba- 


CH.  II. 


77ie  Earlier  Kings, 


13 


rous  societies  are  only  too  familiar :  for  he  assassinated 
his  brother,  as   well   as   his  uncle   and  his 
uncle's  son.     Such   were   his  crimes.     His         Archelaos 
merits  were  not  less  marked  as  the   great  '^'^  ^^  * 

civilizer  of  Macedon.     Thucydides  goes  out  of  his  way 
to  insist  that  Archelaos  benefited  his  country  more  than 
all  his  eight  predecessors  put  together,  not  only  in  his 
military  improvements,  but  in  building  roads  and  found- 
ing cities.     He   transferred   the   capital   from  Pydna  to 
PcUa,  while  he  pacified  Pieria  by  the  foundation  of  a  new 
city.  Dion,  dedicated  to  Zeus   and  the  Muses,  and   re- 
served for  festival  occasions.     He  gathered  round  him 
some  of  the  most  brilliant  Greeks  of  the  day — not  sorry 
perhaps  to  exchange  the  insecurity  of  their  native  cities 
for  the   lettered  ease  and  secure  patronage  of  a  court. 
But  these   efforts,  though   praiseworthy,  were   not   alto- 
gether successful.     His  clients  seem  to  have  been  cor- 
rupted by  the  atmosphere  around  them  ;  and  the  prema- 
ture attempt  at  artistic  development  was  cut  short  by  the 
forty  years  of  disoVdcr  which  followed  his  murder.     It  is 
an  illustration  of  the  assertion  that  the  history  of  Mace- 
donia is  the  history  of  its  kings,  that  this  effort  should 
have  been  thus  fruitless,  and  that  to  the  last  the  people 
should  apparently  have  retained  so  many  characteristics 
of  barbarism.     Hard  fighters   and   hard   drinkers,  they 
were  fine  soldiers  but  indifferent  citizens,  and  seem  to 
have  received  only  fiiint  impressions  from  the  civiliza- 
tion for  which  they  prepared  the  way  in  Asia. 

The  murder  of  Archelaos  was  the  signal  for  six  years 
of  bloodshed  and  disorder,  until  Amyntas,  the  father  of 
the  great  Philip,  murdered  his  predecessor 
and  seized  the  throne.     Amyntas  was  no-      ^^^^  of 

,  ,  .  ^  .  ,  .  anarchy  till 

minal  king  for  twenty-four  years,  but  it  was      Amyntas  ll. 
a  reign  full  of  romantic  reverses  of  fortune.      ^393-369). 


14 


The  Alacedonian  Empire, 


CH.  II. 


Ten  years  of  anarchy  had  given  to  the  native  nobility  a 
long-coveted  opportunity  of  revolt,  against  a  culture 
and  ordered  peace  which  in  their  hearts  they  disliked, 
as  well  as  against  the  tightening  reins  of  despotism. 
It  is  a  phenomenon  often  seen  in  political  history,  that 
the  substitution  of  one  strong  will  for  a  hundred  con- 
flicting wills  is  a  slow  process,  subject  to  ebb  and  flow, 
and  often  desperately  opposed  by  those  who  have  a  per- 
sonal interest  in  a  time  of  license.  What  Normandy 
suffered  in  the  ninth  and  tenth  centuries  A.  D.,  and 
England  in  the  twelfth,  and  France  in  the  fifteenth,  that 
Macedonia  suffered  in  the  fourth  century  b.  c,  until 
Philip  gained  the  throne.  The  nobility  were  insubordi- 
nate. Authority  was  set  at  nought.  Each  man  fought 
for  his  own  hand.  Murder  was  rife  ;  and  the  anarchy 
was  only  temporarily  allayed  by  a  politic  marriage.  The 
union  of  Amyntas  with  Eurydik6,  a  daughter  of  a  leading 
family  among  the  Lynkestai,  was  intended,  like  the 
marriage  of  Henry  the  Fifth  of  England  with  Katharine 
of  France,  to  put  an  end  to  a  series  of  exhausting 
struggles. 

But  the  marriage  failed  in  its  object  and  only  secured 
him  a  temporary  respite  from  trouble.  The  Lynkestai 
The  ma  wcre  not  mollified  by  the  union  of  a  daugh- 

riage  of  tcr  of  thcir  house  with  the  royal  family  ;  and 

Amyntas  ^i.  •    i  i  c    k 

fails  in  its  the   neighbours  of  Amyntas  wcre  eager  to 

'^^j^^*-  benefit  by  his  difficulties.     Illyrians,  Thra- 

cians,  Thessalians,  in  turn  or  in  concert,  poured  into 
Macedon.  He  was  even  obliged  to  surrender  the  coast 
of  the  Thermaic  gulf  to  the  Chalkidians  of  Olynthos. 
We  might  almost  say  that  he  was  elbowed  out  of  his  own 
country  by  encroaching  frieiids  and  powerful  enemies, 
and  for  nearly  two  years  was  a  king  without  a  king- 
dom. 


CH.  II. 


The  Earlier  Kings. 


15 


But  he  was  a  dexterous  diplomatist,  who  in  the  school 
of  adversity  seems  to  have  learned  the  art  of  playing  off 
one  foe  against  another,  and  of  exciting  them 
to  mutual  jealousy.  If  the  Olynthians  gained      thianCon- 
from   him   more   than   they  srave,  it   would      federacy 

•'     °  and  Its  re 


seem  that  they  checked  the'  further  advance      lationtoits 

/-      1         Til       •  »        •  ^11  •        tr  neighbours. 

of  the  Illyrians.  Against  Olynthos  itself, 
which  was  too  near  and  powerful  not  to  be  disliked,  a 
happy  combination  of  circumstances  gave  him  an  irresisr 
tible  ally  in  Sparta.  For  Olynthos  also  had  enemies, 
whose  enmity  had  arisen  in  the  following  way.  Favoured 
by  accident,  Olynthos  had  become  head  of  a  considera- 
ble league  of  cities  in  and  near  Chalkidike.  Indeed,  the 
terms  of  confederation  (as  described  by  Xenophon,  an 
unwilling  witness)  were  so  fair  and  generous,  that  it  is 
hardly  strange  that  the  smaller  and  more  exposed  Hel- 
lenic cities  in  those  parts  gladly  exchanged  precarious 
independence  for  safety  even  if  combined  with  partial 
dependence ;  or  that  Macedonian  cities,  although  as 
important  as  Pella,  preferred  comparative  security  within 
the  hardly  felt  restraints  of  a  fairly  constituted  con- 
federacy to  being  subjects  of  a  despot  who  could  not 
protect  them  from  even  the  attacks  of  Illyrians.  In  the 
year  383  envoys  appeared  before  the  Spartan  assembly 
from  King  Amyntas  and  the  city  of  Akanthos — men  who 
recounted  to  a  sympathetic  audience  the  political  troubles 
which  vexed  themselves  and  their  friends.  A  careful 
reading  of  the  speech  delivered  on  the  occasion  by  the 
Akanthian  envoy  throws  a  flood  of  light  on  the  feelings 
of  the  day,  and  the  prejudices  (to  call  them  by  no  worse 
name)  which  blinded  the  eyes  and  tied  the  hands  of  free 
Greeks.  For  what  was  it  they  feared?  Not  yet  the 
tyranny  of  a  Macedonian  king,  not  now  the  inroads  of 
Illyrian  savages,  but  the  aggression  of  a  great  city,  which 


i6 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  ir. 


invited  all  to  combine  for  self-defence  and  to  agree  to 
adopt  such  singular  notions  as  common  laws  and  mutual 
citizenship,  and   intermarriage,  and   common   rights   of 
property !     To  Amyntas  it  was  only  natural   that  such 
far-sighted  justice  should  seem  as  dangerous  as  it  was 
strange-a  precedent  to  be  if  possible  never  repeated 
But   Greek  cities    also   of   size  and    importance,    and 
notably  Akanthos.  sympathized  with  the  king  rather  than 
the  free  city,  and  passionately  tenacious  of  their  narrow 
town  life,  actually  joined  Amyntas  in  petitioning  Sparta 
to  save  them  from  their  friends.     For  Olynthos  by  the 
offer  of  manifest  advantages  had  gathered  into  its  con^ 
federation  city  after  city,  until  but  a  few  in   Chalkidik6 
were  left  independent.     Of  these  the  largest  were  Akan- 
thos  and  Apollonia.     Being  invited  to  join  the  league 
they   declined.     Being  threatened   with   compulsion    if 
they  persisted  in  refusal,  they  appealed  to  Sparta,  and 
their  appeal  was  backed  by  Amyntas.     "  You  seem  not 
to  be  aware.  O  Spartans."  said  the  envoys.  "  of  the  ^reat 
power  growing  up  in  Greece.     City  after  city.  Greek  and 
Macedonian,  has  been  won  over   or  freed "   (the  word 
must  have  slipped  from  their  lips  almost  involuntarily) 
by  Olynthos.     We  have  been  invited  to  join,  and  un- 
less some  help  reach  us  we  shall  have  to  do  so  against 
our  wishes.     They  are  already  strong.     They  are  open- 
ing negotiations  with  both  Thebes  and  Athens      If  these 
succeed,  think  of  the  strength  of  such  a  coalition  !   Olyn- 
thos IS  strong  by  sea  as  well  as  land,  having  mines  and 
forests  and   money.     But  as  yet  she  is  vulnerable,  for 
her  allies  are  not  all   reconciled  to  her  rule.     Therefore 
strike   hard  and  strike  soon."     This  appeal  was  only  too 
successful.     The  Spartan  Eudamidas  M^as  despatched  at 
once  with  2.000  men  to  the  scene  of  action,  and  his  mere 
presence  induced  Potidaia  to  revolt  from  the  lea-ue  and 


I 


CH.  II. 


The  Earlier  Kings. 


17 


relieved  Akanthos  and  Apollonia  from  all  danger  of 
absorption.  Eudamidas  was  to  be  followed  by  his 
brother  Phoibidas  with  the  residue  of  10,000  men. 

It  would  be  alien  to  the  subject  of  this  book  to  narrate 
the  rash  seizure  of  the  citadel  of  Thebes  by  Phoibidas  on 
his  northward  march ;  though  it  will  be  ne- 

...  ^     rr  r^    f         Coalition 

cessary  to  explain  its  unexpected  effect.  Suf-      against 
fice  it  to  say,  that  Phoibidas  never  reached      l^nd'break- 
Macedon.     1  he  reinforcements  for  Eudam-      "po/the 

Confe- 

idas,  who  as  yet  was  only  strong  enough  to      deracy, 
maintain  the  status  quo,  were  led  by  Teleu-  ^  ^' 

tias.  a  brother  of  King  Agesilaos,  and  comprised  a  con- 
siderable force  of  Thebans.  Amyntas  was  urged  to  do 
his  utmost  in  the  way  of  getting  mercenaries  and  money. 
And  thus  the  storm  broke  on  the  devoted  city.  The 
defence  was  little  short  of  heroic.  For  at  this  time  (b.c. 
382).  Sparta  was  at  the  height  of  her  power,  and  her  will 
was  law  in  almost  every  part  of  Greece.  The  Olynthians 
at  first  fully  held  their  own,  though  with  varying  fortune. 
In  381  they  even  defeated  Teleutias  in  a  pitched  battle 
under  their  own  walls,  slew  him  and  a  large  part  of  his 
force,  and  drove  the  rest  to  seek  safety  in  Potidaia  or 
whatever  nearest  city  they  could  reach.  For  the  moment 
the  star  of  Olynthos  was  in  the  ascendant.  For  the 
moment  Amyntas  seemed  farther  from  his  throne  than 
ever.  But,  whatever  a  city  with  less  prestige  might  have 
done,  Sparta  had  far  too  much  at  stake  to  acquiesce 
quietly  in  so  rude  a  repulse.  A  second  and  more  im- 
posing force  was  despatched  at  once  under  King  Age- 
sipolis  ;  and  once  more  the  hopes  of  Amyntas  rose  when 
he  saw  the  Olynthian  territory  ravaged,  the  city  itself 
besieged,  and  its  ally  Tor6ne  taken  by  storm.  Agesipolis 
indeed  did  not  live  to  see  the  fruits  of  his  vigorous  attack, 
for  he  was  carried  off  by  fever.     But  his  successor  sue- 


i8 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  II. 


CH.  II. 


The  Earlier  Kings, 


19 


ceeded  both  to  his  throne  and  to  his  tactics.  The  siege 
became  a  blockade,  more  and  more  stringent.  Corn 
was  not  to  be  obtained  either  by  land  or  sea.  At  last, 
the  sufferings  of  the  people  constrained  a  surrender,  and 
the  Olynthian  confederacy  was  at  an  end,  sacrificed  to 
the  fears  of  some  and  the  jealousies  of  others.  Each 
member  of  the  confederacy,  Olynthos  included,  was  en- 
rolled as  a  member  of  the  Spartan  league,  and  sworn  to 
an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance.  But  Olynthos  was 
no  longer  formidable.  The  neighbouring  cities  were  in- 
dependent and  jealously  watchful :  while  her  maritime 
allies  in  Macedon  were  restored  by  Sparta  to  Amyntas. 

Amyntas  indeed  was  the  only  one  of  the  confederates 
who  benefited  in  the  long  run.  Sparta  gained  little  but 
obloquy.  The  cities  of  Chalkidike  won  a  short-lived  in- 
dependence at  the  price  of  eventual  subjection.  To 
Greece  in  general  the  result  was  little  short  of  ruin. 
V      ,..  ^  ^^^  Olynthos  been  allowed  to  consolidate 

Amyntas  ^  Confederacy  in  the  north  Egcan,  it  would 

than  othS^  ^^^'e  formed  a  natural  outwork  for  the  de- 
fence of  Greece  against  Macedonian  en- 
croachment. There  might  even  have  been  no  Macedon 
to  encroach,  confronted,  as  it  would  have  been,  by  a 
compact  league  of  cities,  and  cut  off  from  all  access  to 
the  sea.  As  it  was,  the  same  Sparta  which  had  given 
up  the  Greeks  of  Asia  to  Persia,  gave  up  the  Greeks  of 
the  Egean  to  Macedon— a  political  blunder  repeated 
afterwards  by  Athens,  when  she  left  Olynthos  to  the 
tender  mercies  of  Philip, 

Amyntas  was  once  more  king  in  his  own 
country.  His  difficulties,  however,  were 
not  removed  but  only  shifted  from  one 
quarter  to  another.  If  Olynthos  was  no 
longer  a  danger,  yet  the  influence  of  his  good 


Decreasing 
influence  uf 
Sparta  in 
Northern 
Greece  (378- 
370}. 


friends  the    Spartans   began  to  wane,  and  before  long 

he  was  so  far  shut  off  from   communication  with  them 

as  to  be  obliged  to  look  for  new  allies.     In  Greece  the 

balance  of  power  was  perpetually  shifting.   With  the  fall 

of  Olynthos  Sparta  might  have  seemed  supreme  ;  but  in 

fact  it  was  the  beginning  of  the  end  of  her  supremacy. 

Her  haughtiness  and  high-handedness  led  to  a  revulsion 

of  feeling  which  armed  Athens  and  Thebes  and  their 

allies  against  her  (378),  and  made  many  a  good  Greek 

rejoice  in  the  humiliation  of  this  tyrant  city,  the  friend  of 

the  Great  King,  of  the  despot  of  Syracuse,  and  of  the 

King  of  Macedon.  With  the  defeat  of  Leuktra  (371),  her 

influence  in  the  north  was  at  an  end ;  new  combinations 

brought  other  powers  to  the  front,  and  to  Amyntas  fresh 

troubles. 

The  contest  of  seven  years  (378-371)  between  Sparta 

on  the  one  hand  and  Athens  and  Thebes  on  the  other, 

left  the  field  in  northern  Greece  open  to  adventurers ; 

and  it  was  from  Thessaly  that  Amyntas  was  next  beset 

with  danger.     This  vast  plain — the  largest      _.      , 
*=>  7  Rise  of 

and  most  fertile  in  Greece — was  from  time  Thessaiian 
immemorial  as  notorious  for  its  political  in- 
stability as  for  the  excellence  of  its  horses,  the  luxury 
of  its  rich  men,  and  the  badness  of  its  coinage.  Accord- 
ing to  the  old  prov-erb,  "there  was  no  relying  upon  any- 
thing in  Thessaly;"  and  history  confirms  the  proverb. 
The  country  was  divided  into  four  districts,  sometimes 
united,  more  often  the  reverse ;  but  when  united  truly 
formidable,  being  able  to  place  in  the  field  6,000  cavalry 
and  10,000  infantry.  But  this  was  a  rare  event.  More 
often  the  three  or  four  leading  cities — Larissa,  Krannon, 
Pharsalos — held  their  immediate  neighbours  in  subjec- 
tion, and  were  at  more  or  less  open  war  with  one  another, 
their  government   being  either  a  close  oligarchy  or  a 


20 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  II. 


Pherai 
(374-37^)- 


despotism  in  the  hands  of  a  single  man.  Towards  the 
end  of  the  Peloponnesian  war  (about  407),  Pherai  was 
added  to  the  list  of  leading  cities  by  the  energy  of  a  man 
called  Lykophron,  who  made  himself  Tyrant  and  did 
his  best,  though  without  success,  to  subject  all  Thessaly 
to  himself. 

lason  succeeded  where  Lykophron  failed.  He  was 
strong  and  active,  bold  and  prudent.  He  knew  how  to 
lason  of  ensure  the  discipline  and  to  secure  the  de- 

votion of  soldiers.     His   head  was   full  of 
magnificent   ideas.     With   all  Thessaly  at 
his  back,  and  elected  Tagos  or  generalissimo  in  374,  his 
dreams  extended  to  a  wide  empire,  based  upon  the  sub- 
jection of  Epeiros,  Boiotia,  Attica,  and  perhaps  Lacedae- 
mon,  and  lastly  of  Macedon :  and   the  object   of  this 
great  power  was  to  be  the  humiliation  of  no  less  a  po- 
tentate than  the  Great  King  himself— a  far  easier  task,  as 
he  professed  to  think,  than  the  subjugation  of  Greece. 
These   ideas   of  lason  were  no  secret:   and,  as  might 
have  been  expected,  his  immediate  neighbours  began  to 
be  uneasy.     Boiotia,  no  doubt,  had  little  to  fear,  while 
Epaminondas  and  Pelopidas  were  at  the  head  of  affairs 
at  Thebes :  and  Athens  was  too  far  off  to  be  in  imme- 
diate danger.     But  with  Amyntas  the  case  was  very  dif- 
ferent.    Restored  only  recently  to  his  throne,  and  that 
by  foreign  help,  he  was  too  weak  to  resist  much  pres- 
sure, although  he  did  his  best  to  balance  matters  and  to 
strengthen  himself  by  keeping  up  friendly  relations  with 
Athens   and    individual   Athenians.      Thus   in   378   he 
adopted  as  his  son  Iphikratos,  who  was  one  of  the  ablest 
soldiers  at  Athens,  and  had  great  influence  in  the  north 
Egean.     He  sent  deputies  to  the  regular  meetings  of  the 
Confederacy  at  Athens :  and  in  the  extraordinary  meet- 
ing held  in  that  city  in  the  autumn  of  371,  he  even  pub- 


V 


CH.  II. 


The  Earlier  Kings, 


21 


licly  acknowledged  the  right  of  Athens  to  the  possession 
of  Amphipolis,  her  own  colony.  The  city  was  not,  in- 
deed, his  to  give ;  but  however  little  trouble  the  Athe- 
nians may  have  taken  to  secure  it,  they  were  always 
eager  that  no  one  else  should  have  it.  This  public 
recognition,  therefore,  of  their  right  was  highly  gratifying, 
and  no  doubt  was  regarded  as  deserving  of  reward. 

All  these  schemes  were,  however,  cut  short  by  the  un- 
expected deaths  (370)  of  both  Amyntas  and  lason.  The 
latter  had  announced  his  intention  of  being 
present  at  the  Pythian  games  at  Delphoi,  ^nason.^''°" 
and  had  further  issued  orders  to  his  troops 
to  hold  themselves  ready  for  service.  The  political 
world  of  Greece  was  thoroughly  uneasy,  for  he  had  re- 
cently seized  and  dismantled  Herakleia,  a  forfeited  town 
near  Thermopylai,  fearing,  as  he  alleged,  that  it  might 
hereafter  bar  the  pass  against  him  at  some  time  when  he 
was  wishing  to  march  into  Greece?  Was  it  that  he 
meant  to  seize  the  presidency  of  the  games  ?  Could  it 
be  that  he  meditated  laying  hands  on  the  treasures 
of  Delphoi  1  And,  if  so,  what  next  ?  Immeijse,  there- 
fore, was  the  relief  universally  felt,  when  (as  the  Delphic 
oracle  had  promised)  "  the  God  did  take  care  for  him- 
self." lason  was  murdered,  while  reviewing  his  troops, 
by  a  band  of  seven  youths,  two  of  whom  were  overtaken 
and  slain ;  while  the  remaining  five  escaped,  and  were 
received  everywhere  with  special  honour,  as  those  who 
had  relieved  the  Greek  world  from  a  haunting  fear. 
Thessaly  was  no  more  a  danger  to  Greece.  Of  the  two 
brothers  who  succeeded  lason  as  Tagos,  one  was  mur- 
dered by  the  other :  and  the  latter,  in  his  turn,  was  slain 
by  a  third  brother,  Alexander,  a  brutal  and  unscrupulous 
tyrant.  Once  more  the  old  proverb  had  come  true,  and 
in  Thessaly  all  was  uncertainty. 


Amyntns 
succeeded 
by  his  son 
Alexander, 
(369). 


22  The  Macedonian  Empire,  ch.  in. 


CHAPTER  III. 

MACEDON  AND   HELLAS  AT   PHILIP's  ACCESSION. 

Amyntas  died  in  the  same  year  as  lason,  and  at  tlie 
time  of  his  death  Macedon  was  undoubtedly  in  a 
stronger  condition  than  she  had  ever  been. 
Yet  ten  troubled  years  were  still  to  pass,  be- 
fore Philip's  strong  arm  could  beat  down 
opposition  at  home  and  make  her  formi- 
dable abroad.  Alexander,  son  of  Amyntas,  had  an  un- 
easy reign  of  only  two  years.  After  the  murder  of  lason, 
many  nobles  of  Thessaly,  especially  from  Larissa, 
crossed  the  border  to  escape  death  or  imprisonment,  and 
took  refuge  in  Macedon.  Alexander  espoused  their 
cause,  invaded  Thessaly,  and  seized  Larissa  and  Kran- 
non.  But  it  was  a  premature  step,  taken  without  due 
consideration  of  consequences.  Macedon  was  as  yet 
weak ;  and  Thebes,  at  this  time  in  the  very  heyday  of 
prosperity,  was  too  strong  and  too  ambitious  to  brook  in- 
terference with  her  cherished  influence  in  the  north. 
Pelopidas  at  once  marched  into  Thessaly,  and  occupied 
Larissa  and  other  cities  in  force.  A  year  later  (368)  he 
was  in  Macedon  itself,  and  on  a  graver  errand.  Alex- 
ander had  been  assassinated  by  a  certain 
Ptolemaios,  and  another  competitor  for 
power  soon  appeared  on  the  scene  in  the 
person  of  Pausanias,  who  had  royal  blood  in 
Then  began  the  scramble  for  power  which  was 
so  common  in  those  scenes.  Besides  the  men,  there  was 
Eurydike,  widow  of  Amyntas,  with  her  young  children,  to 
be  reckoned  with  or  to  be  set  aside ;  and  the  latter  was  no 
easy  task,  backed  as  she  was  by  the  support  of  the 
Athenian    Iphikrates,    whom    her    late    husband    had 


Murder  of 
Alexander 
and  political 
confusion. 


his  veins. 


\ 


CH.  III. 


Perdikkas  III. 


23 


adopted.  There  was  yet  a  further  complication  in  The- 
ban  jealousy  of  Athenian,  or,  indeed,  of  any  interfer- 
ence, save  their  own,  in  northern  matters.  Of  these 
various  competitors,  Ptolemaios  and  Eurydike  made 
common  cause  ;  while  Iphikrates,  moved  by  Eurydike's 
pressing  entreaties,  attacked  and  drove  Pau- 

/-  ■« .  1  -r.  1  •     •  Pelopidas  in 

sanias  out  of  Macedon.    But  at  this  juncture      Macedon. 
Pelopidas  appeared  upon  the  scene,  com- 
pelled Ptolemaios  to  bow  to  Theban  dictation,  appointed 
him  regent,  and  guardian  of  Eurydike  and  her  sons,  and 
carried  off  thirty  hostages  for  his  good  be-      phiHp,  son 
haviour  to  Thebes,  one  of  whom  was  Philip,      of  Amyntas, 

'  -"^  a  hostage  at 

son  of  Eurydike  and  Amyntas.  It  is  impe-  Thebes, 
rative  to  remember  this  three  years'  exile  of 
Philip  at  Thebes,  for  it  was  the  beginning  of  a  new  era 
in  his  own  life  and  in  that  of  his  country,  similar  to  that 
which  resulted  to  Russia  in  the  last  century  from  the 
voluntary  exile  of  the  Tsar  Peter.  It  was  the  developy- 
ment  of  the  provincial  into  the  man  of  the  world.  He 
enjoyed  in  Thebes,  and  learned  how  to  use,  all  the  ad- 
vantages of  a  liberal  education  and  of  good  society.  He 
became  familiar  with  all  the  intricacies  of  Greek  politics, 
and  alive  to  the  strong  and  weak  points  of  Greek  city 
life.  He  was  intimate  with  Epaminondas,  the  ablest 
organizer  and  most  scientific  tactician  of  his  day.  In 
short,  Philip  left  Macedon  a  boy,  and  he  returned  a  man, 
full  of  energy  and  new  ideas.  Even  Russia  hardly 
made  greater  advances  during  the  twenty-six  years  of 
Tsar  Peter's  reign  than  did  Macedon  under  Philip's  vig- 
orous rule  of  twenty-three  years,  and  his  son's  thirteen 
years  of  unbroken  victory. 
^fPhilip  returned  to  Macedon   in   365,   and   found  the 

r state  of  affairs  considerably  altered.  His  brother 
Perdikkas  had  overthrown  Ptolemaios,  in  spite  of  the 


24 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  III. 


CH.  III. 


11  << 


/ 


Perdikkas 
III.  King  of 
ALicedon. 
(365-360). 


Thcban  settlement,  and  in   order  to  main- 
tain himself  against  actual  or  possible  ene- 
mies,  had   once   more   made   advances   to 
Athens.    To  play  ofif  one  enemy  against  ano- 
ther, until  strong  enough  to  cope  with  all  at  once,  was  the 
traditional  policy  of  his  house.     Timotheos  had  super- 
seded Iphikratcs  in  the  north  Egean  (365-4).     He  had 
reconquered  Samos,  had  obtained  a  footing  in  the  Cher- 
sonese,   and  was   in   high   favour   at  Athens.     To  him 
therefore   Perdikkas  turned   as  a  useful  ally  upon  the 
spot;  and  in  concert  with  him  he  stripped  Olynthos  once 
more  of  a  great  part  of  the  dominion  which  she  had 
recovered  since  the  fatal  blow  of  383,  and  finally  ruined 
all  hopes  that  a  Chalkidic  Confederacy  could  ever  curb 
successfully  the  power  of  Macedon.     On  the  other  hand, ' 
nothing  could  have   suited   Perdikkas  better  than  that 
Timotheos,  while  helping   him   to   humble  Chalkidik^, 
should  fail  to  master  Amphipolis.     Amyntas,  it  is  true, 
had  recognized  the  right  of  Athens  to  the  city  ;  but  that 
Athens  should  waste  men  and  money  in  vainly  trying  to 
conquer  an  unwilling  subject,  could  not  but  be  a  satis- 
faction to  a  Perdikkas  and  a  Philip.     In  this  state  of 
affairs,  moreover,  the  young  Philip  was  of  great  service 
to  his  brother.     Perdikkas  gave  him  a  district  to  govern ; 
and  there  he  raised  and  trained  according  to  the  newest 
tactics  a  small  army,  the  nucleus  and  origin  of  that 
which  for  nearly  two  centuries  was  the  model  army  and 
best  fighting  machine  in  the  world. 

In  360  Perdikkas  also  passed  away— whether  killed  in 
battle  or  murdered  is  uncertain.  Once  more  the  unhappy 
Confusion  country  was  plunged  into  a  vortex  of  con- 

in  Macedon       fusion  and  civil  war.     There  were  no  less 

on  death  of  , 

Perdikkas         than  Seven  candidates  for  the  throne,  the 
^^^*  last  but  not  the  least  of  whom  was  Philip 


i 


il 


Philip, 


25 

Philip,  with  all  the  advantages  of  a  base  of  operations  in 
his  own  province,  and  of  an  army  trained  and  paid  by 
himself.     To  Philip  the  mere  number  of  the  pretenders 
was  an  advantage,  and  all  the  best  men,  tired  of  anarchy 
rallied  round  him.     He  first  assumed  the  guardianship 
of  the  young  Amyntas,  and  then  quietly  set  him  aside. 
Of  his  half-brothers,   one  was  put  to  death,  while   the 
other  two  succeeded  in  escaping  to  Olynthos.    Pausanias 
was  rendered  harmless  by  a  dexterous  bribe  to  his  sup- 
porters the  Thracians ;    while  to  detach  the  Athenians 
from  the  cause  of  Argaios  Philip  not  only  recognized  the 
justice  of  their  claim  to  Amphipolis,  but  withdrew  the 
garrison  which  Perdikkas  had  posted  there.     Then  sud- 
denly attacking  Argaios  near  Aigai,  he  seized  and  put  to 
death  him  and  his  Macedonian  followers,  but  sent  all  his 
non-Macedonian  allies  to  their  homes  with  a  politic  gen- 
erosity, that  gained  for  him,  if  not  the  alliance,  at  least 
the  non-intervention  of  the  most  powerful  of  his  neigh- 
bours.   There  remained  only  two  enemies  to  reckon  wkh. 
The  Paionians  in  the  north  were  easily  reduced.     But 
the  lUyrians,  who  had  seized  a  large  part  of  western  Ma- 
cedon, were  more  obstinate  enemies.     They  even  ven- 
tured to  risk  a  battle,  which  they  contested  obstinately 
and  lost  without  dishonour.  Hts   result  was  to  fix  once 
more  the  central  chain  of  PiiTHos  as  the  boundary  be- 
tween Illyrians  and  MacedoniaiiD 

Thus  Philip  was  king  without  a  rival;  but  king  of  a 
comparatively  petty  kingdom,  almost  wholly  shut  off 
from  the  sea.  Look  forward  little  more  than 
twenty  years,  and  the  King  of  Macedon 's 
word  was  law  almost  from  the  Propontis  to 
the  Ionian  Sea,  an  extension  of  power  which  is  itself 
a  test  of  Philip's  force  of  character.  His  good  fortune 
was  proverbial,  it  is  true ;  but,  as  Demosthenes  reminds 


Philip 

king. 
(359.-336). 


^ 


26 


The  Afacedonian  Empire 


CH.  III. 


us,  the  proverb  which  he  best  exemplified  was  that  which 
says  that  the  gods  help  those  who  help  themselves.  It 
was  notorious  that  he  freely  used  bribery  and  corruption 
as  a  means  to  an  end,  and  was  as  reckless  in  swearins: 
as  in  breaking  his  oaths.  On  occasion  also,  the  barba- 
rian in  him  would  break  through  the  crust  of  Greek  civil- 
ization and  lead  him  to  brutal  intemperance  and  savagery. 
Yet  he  was  a  marvellous  man.  He  had  force  of  brain 
sufficient  to  gauge  the  possibilities  of  the  world  in  which 
he  was  thrown,  force  of  will  sufficient  to  command  suc- 
cess. It  is  not  every  king  who  is  at  once  the  boldest 
rider  and  swimmer,  the  best  educated  man  of  the  world, 
the  most  versatile  diplomatist,  the  greatest  military 
organizer  of  his  time  and  country.  Philip  was  all  these ; 
and  by  this  untiring  energy  on  every  side  of  hfe  he 
overbore  opposition  and  commanded  admiration  and 
devotion,  if  not  affection  and  respect. 

But  before  describing  the  political  struggles  of  Philip's 
Importance        ^^^S"'  ^^  ^^  neccssary  to  dwell  briefly  on  the 

of  the  last         Condition  of  Greece  at  the  time  when  Mace- 
half  of  the  J       1  1 
fourth  ccn-        don  began  to  be  a  real  danger  to  her  free- 

tary  b.  c.  dom.      For  the  success  of  Philip  was  due 

hardly  less  to  the  apathy  and  mutual  jealousies  of  the 
Hellenic  cities  than  to  his  own  genius.  The  last  half  of 
the  fourth  century  b.  c.  was  indeed  as  critical  a  period 
in  the  history  of  Greece  as  the  last  half  of  the  third  cen- 
tury in  that  of  Rome.  It  was  marked  by  two  struggles 
which  scarcely  admit  of  comparison  in  any  single  point 
except  in  the  greatness  of  their  results  and  in  the  fact 
that  the  one  was  made  possible  by  the  successful  result 
of  the  other.  No  one  would  compare  in  importance  the 
conquest  of  Greece  by  Macedon  with  her  conquest  of 
Asia ;  and  yet  to  conquer  Asia  it  was  necessary  first  to 
conquer  Greece.     The  latter  was,  if  not  conquered  in 


\ 


I 


CH.  Ill, 


and  Hellas. 


27 


the  usual  sense  of  the  word,  at  least  reduced  to  such  a 
state  of  dependence  and  weakness,  that  Alexander  could 
safely  vanish  from  view  in  the  far  depths  of  Asia  for 
eleven  years,  and  a  military  force  of  12,000  men  was 
found  enough  to  maintain  obedience  in  his  absence. 
During  these  eleven  years  (it  has  been  said)  the  history 
of  Greece  is  almost  a  blank— a  remark  sufficiently  true, 
if  we  remember  at  the  same  time  that  Greeks,  in  Alex- 
ander's train,  were  during  those  years  laying  the  founda- 
tions of  the  history  of  ages  to  come. 

In  the  last  half  of  the  fourth  century  Greece  was  called 
upon,  for  the  first  time  since  the  invasion  of  Xerxes,  to 
face  an   enemy   from   without:    while   her 
power  of  resistance  was  far  less  than  it  had      c^nquest"'^" 
been  130  years  before.     Maccdon  was  more      ^^^''^^^e. 
formidable  than  Persia  had  been,  and  iMacedonian  tac- 
tics and  diplomacy  achieved  a  success  unknown  to  the 
multitudinous  forces  of  a  Xerxes.      On  the  other  hand, 
no  single  city  in   Greece  was  in  a  position  to  take  the 
lead  as  Athens  had  taken  it  then.     Peloponnesos  was 
utterly  disorganized  by  the  victories  and  anti-Spartan 
policy  of  Epaminondas.       Elis  and  Sparta  on  the  one 
hand,  Messenia  and  Arkadia  on  the  other,  were  jealously 
on  the  watch— the  former  to  regain  lost  power,  the  latter 
to  keep  hardly  won  liberties.     Argos,  at  this  epoch  a 
satellite  of  Thebes,   was  herself  too  weak  to   interfere. 
Corinth  was  but  just  rid  of  a  tyrant.     Even  north  of  the 
Isthmus,  there  was    scarcely    more  of  organization   or 
unity.     Thebes,  it  is  true,  was  mistress  of  Boiotia,  and 
had  a  considerable  empire  over  Phokians  and  Lokrians 
and  Thessalians.     But  she   had  a  jealous  neighbour  in 
Athens.   The  Phokians  were  such  unwilling  subjects  that 
they  seized   the   first   opportunity  of  revolt.     And   her 
treatment  of  the  once  free  cities  of  Boiotia  had  deeply 


28 


The  Macedonian  Empire 


CH.  III. 


offended  the  public  opinion  of  Hellas.  Even  Athens 
herself,  with  a  large  revenue  and  numerous  allies,  had 
the  semblance  of  power  rather  than  the  reality,  and  had 
lost  the  secret  of  imperial  energy  which  had  held  together 
the  Confederacy  of  Delos.  Thus  disorganized,  Hellas 
fell  an  easy  prey  to  the  diplomacy  and  arms  of  Ma- 
cedon. 

An  overwhelming  calamity  was  brought  upon  Greece 
by  the  result  of  the  battle  of  Chaironeia.  Republics 
Macedon  °"^^  ^^eat  and  free  became  subject  to  the 

to'lSer*^*        will  of  a  king,  or  the  caprices  of  a  king's 
conquer  deputy.     Yet  although  it  was  a  calamity  for 

Greece,  it  was  a  gain  to  the  world  at  large. 
For  if  the  Macedonian  conquest  did  in  a  sense  extinguish 
the  liberties  of  Hellas,  it  opened  afterwards  a  wider  field 
for  Hellenic  empire  and  influence  by  the  conquest  of 
Asia  which  followed  it.  The  victories  of  Alexander  did 
far  more  than  satisfy  a  sentimental  desire  of  vengeance 
upon  Persia.  They  put  an  end  to  whatever  fear  may 
have  been  felt  of  Persian  interference  in  Hellenic  politics. 
They  spread  broadcast  over  half  Asia  the  Greek  lan- 
guage, Greek  ideas,  even  Greek  civilization  in  a  more  or 
less  perfect  form.  They  deeply  affected  the  history  of 
Western  Asia,  and  therefore  of  Asiatic  Christianity. 
Viewed  as  an  episode  in  the  history  of  Greece,  few  things 
seem  more  lamentable  than  the  rise  of  the  Macedonian 
monarchy,  because  it  rose  upon  the  ruins  of  free  Greek 
republics.  Viewed  as  an  episode  in  the  history  of  the 
world,  it  assumes  its  due  relation  in  the  sequence  of 
events,  and  is  seen  to  have  been  in  reality  a  transference 
of  power  fraught  with  advantage  to  multitudes  of  man- 
kind. 

The  Hellas  of  350  b.c.  was  singularly  different  from 
the  Hellas  of  a  century  before :  and  this  difference  is 


CH.  III. 


and  Hellas. 


29 


i 


Contrast 
between  the 
state  of 
Greece  in 
the  middle 
of  the  fifth 
century, 
and  in  the 
middle  of 
the  fourth 
century  b.  c. 


traceable  in  great  measure  to  the  untimely 
failure  of  a  grand   political  development; 
which  indeed  was  within  a  little  of  being 
realized   and   the   success  of  which,  while 
rendering  a  Macedonian   kingdom  impos- 
sible, might  have  rendered  unnecessary  the 
struggles  of  many  generations.      It  was  a 
fatal   defect  in  Greek  political  ideas,  that 
barely  one  or  two  men  in  all  Greek  history  rose  superior 
to  the  petty  notion  that  life  within  the  compass  of  city 
walls  was  theoretically  the  perfection  of  political  exist- 
ence.    Man   (says  Aristotle)   is  a  political  animal,  or  a 
bemg  with  political  instincts,  and  a  city  is  the  highest 
and  most  perfect  organization  which  satisfies  those  in- 
stincts.    Nothing  less  than  a  city  (such  as  village  com- 
munities),  and   nothing   more   than  a  city  (such  as  a 
nation),  seemed  to  satisfy  the  average  Greek  mind.  This 
was  indeed  an  advance  upon  the  primitive  Aryan  custom 
of  the  isolation  of  the  family—  it  was  an  advance  upon 
the  half-civilized  village  life  of  Arkadia  or  ^tolia :  but 
it  fell  lamentably  short  of  the  grand  possibilities  of  na- 
tional unity,  wherein  many  cities  combine  together  for 
common  political  ends.     Now,  in  the  middle  of  the  fifth 
century,  circumstances  threw  such  power  and  influence 
into  the  hands  of  Athens,  that  she  became  the  president 
of  a  great  confederacy  of  Greeks,  and  drove  the  Persian 
fleet  out  of  Egean  waters,  and  Persian  satraps  out  of  the 
Hcllenized   lowlands   of  Asia   Minor.     For  nine  years 
(456-447),  she  was  even  a  continental  power,  and  mis- 
tress of  a  territory  reaching  from  Megara  to  Thermo- 
pylai,  from  Sunium  to  Phokis.     It  might  have  seemed 
not  impossible   that   round   this   nucleus  other  Greeks 
would  gather  (as  the  even  less  homogeneous  inhabitants 
of  mediaeval  Gaul  gathered  round  the  royal  city  of  Paris) 


i 


30 


The  Macedonian  Empire 


CH.  III. 


CH.  III. 


and  that  by  slow  degrees  a  Greek  nation  would  arise,  of 
which  Athens  would  be  the  political  and  intellectual 
capital.  This  might  have  been.  In  reality,  the  facts  of 
the  case  are  better  illustrated  by  the  analogy  of  medieval 
Italy.  The  mutual  jealousies  of  Florence  and  Milan,  of 
Genoa  and  Pisa,  were  only  a  repetition  of  the  jealousies 
of  Thebes  and  Athens  and  Sparta.  But  the  Pelopon- 
nesian  war  scattered  to  the  winds  the  fair  but  delusive 
dream  of  Hellenic  unity.  The  comparatively  tolerant 
hegemony  of  Athens  was  exchanged  for  the  wanton  and 
intolerant  oppression  of  Sparta.  Happily  for  Greece, 
it  lasted  only  thirty  years :  but  they  were  thirty  years 
fraught  with  evil,  when  the  seeds  were  sown  of  a  selfish- 
ness and  corruption  that  bore  fruit  only  too  soon  in 
humiliation  and  foreign  conquest.  It  was  not  merely  the 
policy  of  Sparta  in  Asia,  and  at  Olynthos,  that  was  de- 
moralizing ;  but  the  acts  of  individual  Spartans,  like 
Phoibidas  at  Thebes,  or  Sphodrias  at  Athens,  spread  a 
general  spirit  of  suspicion  which  made  national  union 
impossible  and  the  triumph  of  Macedon  comparatively 
easy.  In  the  middle  of  the  fourth  century  Greece  had 
fallen  back  into  its  normal  state  of  petty  jealous  cities, 
whose  strongest  feeling  was  suspicion  of  the  nearest 
neighbour  city,  and  their  one  object  to  keep  that  neigh- 
bour weak. 

The  evils  of  separatism  are  bad  enough.  They  were 
worse  when  aggravated  by  that  personal  corruption  and 
decay  of  public  spirit  which  often  follow  upon  political 
despair.  The  speeches  of  Demosthenes  are 
prJSienUa  ^o  prccisc  and  severe  in  the  charges  which 
Greece  as         ^g  brings  against  his  countrymen,  that  we 

shown  by  . 

Demos-'  cannot  help  believing  that  a  great  deal  of 

what  he    says    is   true,    more    particularly 

when  we  observe  that  the  actual  course  of  events  corres- 


and  Hellas, 


31 


ponded  exactly  to  the  character  assigned  to  the  actors  who 
took  part  in  them.     "Athenians     (says  the  orator)  are 
indolent,  selfish,  suspicious,  corrupt.     The  festivals  they 
celebrate  with  great  regularity,  and  there  is  money  in 
plenty  for  them  ;   but  their  wars   they  starve.      So  ena- 
moured are  they  of  the  comfortable  refinements  of  home, 
that  they  hate  to  lift  a  finger,  even  in  self-defence,  and 
are  like  raw  boxers,  who  parry  but  never  return  a  blow." 
The  cause  of  it  all  lies  in  the  word,  so  often  on  Demos- 
thenes' lips,  l^adv^ia,  orthe  art  of  taking  things  easily.  This 
it  was,  he  adds,  which  led  them  to  adopt  the  new-fangled 
system  of  mercenaries,  which  made  the  city  ridiculous 
and  the  city's  allies  quake  with  fear.     No  force  was  less 
to  be  trusted,  for  they  regarded  only  their  own  interest, 
not  that  of  their  employers.     Nor  could  anything  exceed 
the  short-sightedness   of  Thessalians  and   Thebans  and 
Peloponnesians    (unless   it  were  that  of  the  Athenians 
themselves)  whom  he  compares  to  men  in  a  hail-storm, 
praying   earnestly  that   it  may  do  them  no   injury,   but 
taking  no  steps  to  prevent  it !     Nor  was  this  all.     That 
Greeks  should  be  selfishly  supine  and  short-sighted  in  the 
face  of  a  great  danger  was  bad  ;  but  it  was  far  worse 
that   they  should  have   publicly  sold  off  and  disposed  of 
a  principle  once  valued— that  it  was  shameful  to  take  a 
bribe  for  the   ruin  of  one's  country,  and  to  sympathize 
with  her  enemies.     Such  men  he  compares  to  sprains 
and  fractures  in  the  body,  which  make  their  presence 
felt  as  soon  as  anything  goes  wrong.      Pure  and  old- 
fashioned  patriotism  was  at  a  discount,  and  in  its  place 
had  come  in  a  vulgar  importation,  "jealousy,  if  a  man 
gained  any  advantage ;  ridicule,  if  he  confessed  it ;  hatred 
of  any  man  who  blamed  such  doings" — feelings  quite 
incompatible  with  a  lofty  tone  and  with  spirited  action. 
In  short,  public  opinion  and  public  spirit  in  Greece  and 


32 


The  Macedonian  Empire 


CH.  III. 


CH.  III. 


Athens  were  very  different  from  what  they  had  been  a 
hundred  years  before.  There  was  money  and  material 
strength  in  abundance ;  but  it  was  rendered  useless  by 
corruption.  What  they  needed  was  less  talking  and 
more  acting.  Again  and  again  he  appeals  to  the 
Athenians  in  the  Olynthiacs  and  Philippics  to  awake  to 
the  realities  of  the  case,  no  longer  to  fold  their  hands  and 
sit  still,  above  all  to  cease  their  perpetual  jealousies 
and  recriminations.  As  for  decrees  and  votes,  "  decrees  *' 
he  cries  "  are  worth  nothing  without  action."  Again,  he 
appeals  to  their  legitimate  pride  in  the  grand  deeds  of 
their  ancestors,  who  were  right  to  run  the  risks  they  did 
in  defence  of  Greece  against  Persia.  They  died  indeed, 
but  what  of  that?  "  Death  comes  to  every  man,  even 
though  he  shut  himself  in  a  dove-cote;  "  and  it  is  for 
brave  men  to  do  and  dare !  He  contrasts  the  forbear- 
ance and  devotion  of  the  Athenians  of  old  with  the  blind 
selfishness  of  his  own  contemporaries,  who  allowed  them- 
selves to  be  hoodwinked  by  fawning  demagogues,  who 
grew  rich  on  the  state's  misfortunes,  while  they  cried 
peace  when  there  was  no  peace.  Their  ancestors  did 
not  seek  for  a  general  or  an  orator  who  would  manage 
that  they  should  live  in  comfortable  servitude.  In  short, 
Athens  had  no  policy  save  that  of  leaving  things  alone  ; 
and  this  fatal  want  of  policy  was  no  new  thing.  Nothing 
could  have  looked  more  hopeful  than  the  new  Naval 
Confederation  which  arose  in  378  under  the  primacy  of 
Athens.  Its  material  power  was  very  considerable.  Its 
object  was  simply  to  curb  the  power  of  Sparta ;  its  rules 
were  framed  to  guard  the  interests  of  each  and  all  against 
oppression  from  within  and  aggression  from  without. 
Yet  not  only  did  Athens  before  long  begin  to  trim  be- 
tween Thebes  and  Sparta,  acting  the  great  power,  and 
professing  to  hold  the  balance,  but  individual  Athenians 


and  Hellas, 


ZZ 


\ 


Reasons  of 
the  failure 
of  the 
second 
Athenian 
Confedera- 
tion of  378. 


were  allowed  abroad  on  a  sort  of  roving 
commission,  and  by   high-handed  exploits 
won  popularity  at  home,  and  perhaps  ex- 
tended the  Athenian  empire,  but  none  the 
less  laid  the  foundations  of  subsequent  re- 
volt against  such  stupid  ambition.     Tactics 
like  these  only  too  surely  quenched  all  enthusiasm  for 
Athens  in  the  minds  of  the  confederates,  and  occasioned 
a  revolt  which  left  her  to  cope  almost  single-handed  with 
the  able  and  unscrupulous  Philip.     The  conditions  of 
the  struggle  meanwhile  were  anything  but  equal.     "  We 
on  our  side"  (says  Demosthenes,  reviewing  their  rela- 
tive resources)   "had  only  the  weakest  of  the  islands ; 
but  neither  Chios  nor  Rhodes  nor  Korkyra.  Our  revenue 
amounted  to  forty-five  talents,  but  even  that  was  raised  be- 
fore it  was  due.     We  had  not  a  single  cavalry  or  infantry 
soldier  beyond  our  own  force.  Worst  of  all,  our  own  poli- 
cy had  made  our  neighbours  more  hostile  than  friendly. 
Philip,  on  the   other  hand,   was  not  hampered  by  col- 
leagues, or  decrees,  or  want  of  money,  or  fear  of  indict- 
ment in  case  of  failure.     He  could  do  what  he  thought 
best,  without  publicly  advertising  his  intentions,  being  in 
brief,  in  his  own  person,  Despot,  Lord,  and  Master  of 
all." 

That  under  such  circumstances,  and  notwithstanding 
innumerable  follies  and  blunders,  Athens  maintained  a 
twenty  years*  struggle  against  the  ever-growing  empire 
of  Philip  is  a  proof  of  the  real  greatness  of  Athenian 
power  (which  nevertheless  Athenians  frittered  away),  as 
well  as  of  the  courage  and  resources  of  the  one  man  who 
seems  never  to  have  despaired  of  his  ountry,  Demos- 
thenes. 

D 


34 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  IV. 


King  Philip. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

FROM  THE  ACCESSION  OF  nilLIP  TO   HIS  INTERVENTION 

IN  THE  SACRED  WAR. 

Once  more  Macedon  was  united  under  a  single  hand, 
and  able  to  present  a  solid  front  to  enemies  without. 
But  it  was  strong  now  with  a  strength  un- 
known before.  Of  the  means,  indeed, 
whereby  a  loose  group  of  mountain  cantons  was  con- 
verted into  a  powerful  empire  we  know  but  little.  One 
thing  only  is  clear.  Philip  himself  was  Macedon,  and 
Philip's  character  the  clamp  that  bound  all  Macedonians, 
willingly  or  unwillingly,  into  one  compact  whole.  Philip, 
moreover,  was  aware  of  a  fact,  which  in  his  day  seemed 
new,  but  has  often  since  then  been  proved  to  be  true — ^that 
there  is  hardly  any  tie  so  strong  as  military  service, 
which  fosters  identity  of  development  and  feeling,  and 
accustoms  men  to  live  and  act  together, 
donianarmy  Hcnce  he  threw  himself  heart  and  soul  into 
and  Philip's  ^^^  rc-organization  of  the  army,  utilizing  the 
experience  he  had  gained  at  Thebes.  In 
the  half-barbarous  days  before  Philip's  time  the  cavalry 
of  Macedon  had  been  almost  as  good  as  that  of  Thes- 
saly,  the  infantry  worth  little — the  former,  as  in  feudal 
times,  being  the  landed  proprietors,  the  latter  the  rural 
population  of  shepherds  or  ploughmen.  Even  in  Greece 
(speaking  broadly)  a  battle  had  meant  a  struggle  of  hop- 
lites  against  hoplites,  all  armed  alike,  in  which  light- 
armed  troops  and  cavalry  were  quite  subsidiary  to  the 
main  issue.  But  when  Epaminondas  won  battles  by 
manoeuvring  with  infantry  and  light-armed  troops  and 
cavalry  at  once,  and  by  massing  unexpectedly  a  superior 


V 


\ 


r'  If  ic» 


CH.  IV. 


The  Army, 


3S 


force  on  a  single  point  of  the  enemy's  line,  the  old  style 
of  fighting  was  doomed.  Victory  was  secured  before- 
hand for  the  man  who  knew  how  to  use  the  new  tactics. 
And  that  man  was  Philip.  Demosthenes,  amongst 
others,  notes  that  of  all  the  various  sides  of  public  life, 
none  within  his  knowledge  had  shown  such  progress  and 
development  as  the  art  of  war.  He  is  almost  pathetic 
over  the  way  in  which  Philip  actually  disregarded 
the  old-fashioned  seasons,  and  made  no  difference  in 
campaigning  between  summer  and  winter !  But  this  was 
comparatively  a  small  matter.  The  fighting  instrument 
itself,  the  actual  army,  was  what  he  and  his  son  brought 
to  perfection.  The  principle  of  Epaminondas,  to  strike 
the  enemy  always  in  superior  force,  he  so  far  improved 
upon  that  his  main  line  of  battle  was  always  and  every- 
where superior  in  weight  to  that  of  the  enemy :  and  the 
success  of  his  application  of  it  is  seen  in  the  fact  that 
the  Macedonian  formation  remained  in  vogue  as  the 
fighting  system  of  the  world  until  superseded  by  the  Ro- 
man legion. 

The  object  proposed  was  so  to  strengthen  the  main  line 
of  infantry  as  to  enable  them  to  withstand  and  break 
any  attacking  force  which  they  were  likely  to  meet  in  the 
field.  The  ordinary  depth  of  Greek  battle  array  seems 
to  have  been  from  eight  to  twelve  files ;  while  the  battle 
of  Leuktra  was  won  by  the  Theban  left  wing  of  fifty  files 
crashing  through  the  Spartans,  only  twelve  files  deep, 
and  sweeping  all  before  it.  Now  Thebans  were  of  all 
others  most  likely  to  meet  Philip  in  the  field,  and  the 
problem  was  how  to  resist  such  a  charge,  how  to  meet 
the  weight  of  a  mass  of  men  fifty  deep.  It  was 
solved  by  the  introduction  of  a  new  weapon,  and  by  a 
change  of  tactics  adapted  to  its  use.  The  weapon  was 
the  sarissa;  and  the  new  formation  was  the  phalanx. 


36 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  IV. 


w  \ 


CH.  IV. 


The  Army, 


37 


The  sarissa  was  a  huge  lance,  held  in  both  hands  (unlike 
the  Greek  pike)  and  twenty-one  feet  in  length ;  the  in- 
fantry soldier  wearing  besides  a  short  sword,  a  round 
shield,  a  breastplate,  and  a  sort  of  broad-brimmed  hel- 
met.    But  such  a  weapon  as  this  lance  was  clearly  fitted 
not  for  independent  fighting  or  single  action,  but  for 
close  array.     Hence  arose  the  peculiar  formation  of  the 
phalanx  with  its  4,096  men.     Its  smallest  unit  was  the 
lochos,  made  up  of  sixteen  men  standing  one  behind  the 
other  at  intervals  of  3  feet,  the  front  rank  man,  or  loch- 
agos,  being  the  most  distinguished  for  experience  and 
strength.     Now  the  sarissa  was  held  6  feet  from  the  butt, 
and  projected  therefore  15  feet  before  the  body  of  its 
holder.    It  follows  that  the  front  man  of  each  lochos  was 
protected  by  a  bristling  mass  of  five  pikes — his  own  pro- 
jecting 15  feet  before  him,  and  the   next  12,  and  the 
next  9,  and  the  fourth  and  fifth  respectively  6  and  3  feet. 
The  remaining  files  added  weight  to  the  mass,  but  car- 
ried their  lances  sloping  over  their  comrades'  shoulders. 
Now  let  us  take  the  more  complete  unit  of  the  phalanx, 
the  syntagma,  numbering  sixteen  lochi — i.  e.,  number- 
ing sixteen  men  each  way,  or  256  in  all.    Two  things  are 
clear  at  once.     Such  a  unit  was  capable  of  indefinite 
multiplication;  and,  indeed,  a  quadruple  phalanx  of  64 
syntagmata,  or   16,384  men,  was  no  uncommon  thing. 
On  the  other  hand,  while  a  direct  attack  in  front  on 
such  a  dense  mass  of  pikemen  might  well  seem  hope- 
less, a  charge  on  their  flank  or  rear,  if  left  exposed  by 
the  accident  of  battle,  was  fatal.     It  was  even  possible, 
if  the  phalanx  became  unsteady,  whether  from  inequal- 
ities of  the  ground  or  from  the  necessity  of  changing 
front,  to  get  inside  the  rows  of  projecting  lances,  as  the 
Romans  found  out  at  Pydna  (b.  c.  168),  when  the  pha- 
lanx became    at    once   a  huddling    mass   of   helpless 


wm. 


wretches  doomed  to  slaughter.  Such  cases,  however, 
were  quite  exceptional.  As  against  Greek  hoplites  and 
ordinary  modes  of  fighting  the  phalanx  was  irresistible, 
the  moral  effect  of  awe  and  intimidation  which  it  pro- 
duced in  an  enemy  predisposing  men  to  recoil  before  its 
impact.  We  know  that  at  the  battle  of  Chaironeia  the 
front  ranks  of  Theban  soldiers  fell  transfixed  before  they 
could  touch  their  enemies,  in  spite  of  desperate  courage. 
We  know  that  before  the  battle  of  Pydna  even  a  Roman 
consul  was  struck  with  mingled  admiration  and  alarm 
at  the  sight  of  the  dense  array  and  the  "rampart  of 
bristling  spears,"  and  that  he  never  forgot  the  impres- 
sion. We  know  further  that  at  Pydna  the  Roman  legion 
succeeded  in  destroying  the  Macedonian  phalanx,  but 
not  before  the  wavering  of  the  long  line  of  pikes  per- 
mitted the  legionary  to  use  his  sword— not  before,  as  Livy 
says,  the  impregnable  mass  was  broken  up  into  an  infi- 
nite series  of  minute  struggles. 

This,  then,  was  the  wonderful  machine  which  Philip 
organized,  and  which  was  gradually  perfected  by  himself 
and  his  son.      In  combination  with  and  supported  by 
light  infantry  (hypaspistai),  armed  like  Greek  hoplites, 
by  irregular  troops  and  cavalry  both  heavy  and  light,  as 
well  as  by  a  large  and  effective  siege  train,  they  speedily 
became  irresistible.     Nor  was  this  all.     For  the  right 
of  bearing  arms,  which  is  common  in  all  free  half-bar- 
barous  tribes,   was   now   substituted  the   obligation   of 
military  service.   Townsmen  and  countrymen,  noble  and 
peasant,  all  were  passed  through  a  great  machine,  so  to 
speak,  of  assimilation,  where  all  learned  to  feel  as  mem- 
bers of  one  body  and  to  obey  a  single  will.     Macedon 
in    fact    became    nothing    but    a  well-drilled   military 
machine ;   and  half-civilized   Macedonians,  led  by  the 
ablest  of  living  generals,  were  superior  not  only  to 


38 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  IV. 


Position  of 
Philip  at  his 
accession. 


Asiatic  hordes  but  even  to  free  Athenians    or    The- 
bans. 

But  in  this  we  are  somewhat  anticipating.     In  359 
PhiHp  had  but  just  driven    Paionians   and  Illyrians  be- 
yond his  borders,  and  the  Greek   world  knew   Httle  be- 
yond the  fact  that  a  young  man  of  more  than  common 
energy  and  abihty  had  seated  himself  on  the   throne  of 
Macedon.     Amphipolis,  though  claimed  by  Athens  and 
occupied  at  intervals  by  Macedonian  garri- 
sons, was  still  virtually  independent.    Olyn- 
thos  was  still  the  first  city  in    Chalkidike. 
Potidaia,   Pydna,  Methon^,  and  the  shores  of  the  Ther- 
maic  Gulf  were  subject  to  Athenian   influence.     Philip 
was  strong  in  Macedon  and  undisputed  king ;   but  he 
had  no  access  to  the  sea,  and  did  not  seem  likely  to 
have.     We  may  even  say  more  than  this.     Had  Am- 
phipolis and  Olynthos   and  Athens  been   able  to  sink 
their  common  jealousies  and  to  unite  loyally   against 
their  common  foe,  Philip  would  never  have  had  scope 
for  his  great  abilities,  or  emerged  from  the  comparative 
obscurity  of  his  predecessors. 

Nothing  could  exceed  the  diplomatic  skill  with  which 

Philip  managed  his  adversaries,  whether  individuals  or 

cities.     His  earliest  efforts,  while  securing- 

Policy  of  -KK         A  1-  , 

Philip  in  the  Macedon,  were  directed  towards  anticipating 
Amphii^Us.  ^"y  movement  for  co-operation  between  the 
three  cities  just  named.  For  the  moment 
this  was  no  very  difficult  matter,  the  Athenians  being 
greatly  vexed  at  their  repulse  before  Amphipolis  in  364, 
and  ready  to  pay  almost  any  price  for  revenge.  Since 
that  time  the  city  had  admitted  Macedonian  troops  as  a 
protection  against  Athens  (362),  and  indeed  was  being 
held  at  this  very  time  by  a  Macedonian  garrison.  Philip 
saw  his  opportunity  of  soothing  Athens  and  gratifying 


), 


CH.  IV. 


Philip  and  Amphipolis, 


39 


Amphipolis  at  the  same  time.  Like  his  father  Amyntas 
before  him,  he  voluntarily  recognised  the  right  of  Athens 
to  Amphipolis,  and  as  an  earnest  of  good-will  withdrew 
his  troops,  leaving  the  city  for  a  while  to  itself  (359). 
Amphipolis  and  Athens  were  equally  flattered  by  so  gra- 
cious an  act.  The  former  was  relieved  of  a  foreign 
garrison,  the  latter  was  freed  from  a  nervous  fear  that 
Philip  meant  to  keep  the  city  himself.  But  even  now  the 
Athenians  could  not  rouse  themselves  to  the  necessary 
sacrifices  for  securing  what  was  all  but  in  their  grasp ; 
and  actually  hoping  to  play  with  Philip,  began  to  cherish 
ideas  of  exchanging  Pydna  for  Amphipolis,  and  so  of 
gaining  the  coveted  town  by  Macedonian  help.  Philip, 
however,  was  alive  to  Athenian  failings,  and  saw  through 
the  motive  which  prompted  their  wish  for  negotiations. 
He  had  no  mind  to  be  a  cat's-paw.  If  they  were  loth  to 
act,  he  was  not.  Having  settled  matters  with  the  Paio- 
nians and  Illyrians  (358),  he  resolved  to  take  the  first  step 
towards  expansion  by  seizing  Amphipolis,  which  com- 
manded tlie  communications  between  Thrace  and 
Macedon,  and  dominated  the  gold  mines  of  Pangaios. 
To  the  dismay  of  the  deluded  inhabitants,  it  became 
suddenly  clear  that  they  had  been  beguiling  themselves 
with  fond  hopes,  and  that  Philip  was  rapidly  advancing 
to  attack  them.  Then  at  last,  but  all  too  late,  a  hurried 
embassy  was  despatched  to  Athens,  imploring  forgive- 
ness for  the  past  and  immediate  help.  Athens  at  the  mo- 
ment was  at  the  height  of  her  power.  Apart  from  the 
ordinary  members  of  the  Naval  Confederation  of  378 
she  had  in  this  year  succeeded  in  wresting  Euboia  from 
Theban  influence  and  in  adding  the  Chersonese  to  her 
empire  (358).  But  she  was  also  on  the  verge  of  the 
serious  struggle  of  the  Social  War.  To  Athens,  therefore, 
in  spite  of  pride  and  power,  it  was  of  prime  importance 


40 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  IV. 


to  maintain  for  the  present  peace  and  alliance  with 
Philip. 

Simultaneously  with  the  ambassadors  from  Amphi- 
polis  an  embassy  arrived  from  Macedon,  to  assure  the 
Athenians  once  more  of  Philip's  regard  for  them,  and  to 
state  that,  although  he  was  besieging  Amphipolis,  it  was 
really  in  their  interest,  for  that  when  he  had  taken  it  he 
should  hand  it  over  to  them.  Blinded  by  dislike  of  the 
obstinate  city,  which  had  so  long  held  them  at  arm's 
length,  and  predisposed  in  Philip's  favour  by  his  politic 
withdrawal  of  troops  from  the  place  in  the  previous  year, 
the  Athenians  were  unwilling  to  offend  a  valuable  ally 
merely  to  save  an  ungrateful  colony  from  merited  humi- 
liation, especially  as  it  was  to  be  theirs  in  any  case.  The 
ambassadors  from  Amphipolis  were  dismissed  with  a  re- 
fusal, and  the  city  was  left  to  its  fate.  Thus  the  Athe- 
nians imagined  they  had  tided  over  a  difficulty  and 
gratified  a  legitimate  feeling';  whereas  they  had  really 
struck  a  blow  at  their  own  prosperity  and  sown  the  seed 
of  future  ruin.  Philip  laid  siege  to  Amphipolis,  which 
fell  before  the  energy  of  his  attack  combined  with  the 
treachery  of  his  partisans  within  ;  and  once  master  of 
the  place,  he  was  too  well  aware  of  its  value  to  dream  of 
giving  it  up  even  to  Athens.  Nevertheless  he  continued 
to  hold  out  delusive  hopes,  with  which  the  Athenians  were 
fain  to  content  themselves  under  the  circumstances, 
though  uneasily  conscious  that  they  had  been  tricked. 

For,  indeed,  circumstances  were  very  much  against 
them.  By  their  own  act  they  had  just  thrown  away 
Outbreak  of  Amphipolis ;  and  now,  in  consequence  of 
the  Social  their  own  acts,  four  of  their  most  important 

difficulties  subject  allies — Rhodes,  Kos,  Chios,  and 
(IsS)'.^*""  Byzantion— renounced  their  allegiance  and 

revolted.    They  accused  Athens  of  having 


CH.  IV. 


The  Social  War, 


41 


'  "W 


103. 


broken  the  treaty  of  378  by  appropriating  her  later 
acquisitions— Samos,  the  Thermaic  Gulf,  and  the  Cher- 
sonese— to  the  exclusive  benefit  of  her  own  citizens. 
They  complained  loudly  of  the  exactions  and  want  of 
discipline  of  the  mercenaries,  whom  Athenian  indolence 
was  content  to  use  but  Athenian  parsimony  forgot  to  pay. 
The  burden  was  all  theirs,  while  Athens  reaped  all  the 
advantage.  They  therefore  formally  seceded  from  the 
league  (358). 

As  if  this  were  not  enough  to  inspire  uneasiness,  an 
embassy  arrived  shortly  afterwards  from  Olynthos.  That 
city  was  thoroughly  alarmed  by  the  Mace- 
donian conquest  of  Amphipolis  ;  for  with  a      ?hiiip  m 
Macedonian  garrison  in  that  city  she  was      *'l^J?^^"5'' 

,     ^  -  ,        ,  "^  ofOlyniho! 

between  two  fires,  and  Philip's  ambition 
was  seen  to  be  growing.  In  the  crisis  Olynthos  turned 
naturally  to  Athens,  Ionian  like  herself,  and,  as  mistress 
of  the  Egean,  able  to  help  if  she  would.  But  now,  as 
before,  Philip  was  alive  to  every  move  in  the  game,  and 
the  Olynthian  deputies  were  met  at  Athens  by  an  em- 
bassy from  Macedon— were  met  and  checkmated.  As 
before,  so  now,  the  Athenians  were  assured  of  Philip's 
unchanging  good-will,  and  of  his  intention  to  cede  Am- 
phipolis even  yet.  He  had  indeed,  it  was  hinted,  ground 
of  complaint,  in  that  they  still  held  Pydna,  which  was 
more  certainly  Macedonian  than  Amphipolis  was  Athe- 
nian. He  did  not  wish,  however,  to  be  hard  on  them, 
and  was  ready  to  negotiate  for  the  exchange  of  one 
against  the  other.  But  the  negotiations  were  too  deli- 
cate for  tlie  rough  treatment  of  a  public  assembly,  espe- 
cially as  the  people  of  Pydna  would  probably  object  to 
the  transfer.  The  ambassadors  therefore  insisted  upon 
secrecy.  It  was  a  trying  dilemma  for  the  unfortunate 
Athenians.      They  could  not  help   distrusting  Philip. 


4« 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  IV. 


I>i 


They  could  not  avoid  fearing  for  and  with  Olynthos. 
Yet  open  distrust  or  precipitate  action  might  now  disap- 
point them  of  AmphipoHs  ;  and  to  offend  Phihp,  when 
they  were  at  war  with  their  aUies,  would  be  nothing  short 
of  madness.  The  ambassadors  of  Olynthos,  therefore, 
like  those  of  Amphipolis,  could  obtain  neither  promise 
nor  prospect  of  support.  Athens  had  saddled  herself 
with  another  enemy,  and  Philip  had  gained  another  ad- 
vantage. For  the  present,  at  any  rate,  Olynthos  and 
Athens  were  at  daggers  drawn. 

Meanwhile,  the  mistress  of  the  Egean  was  in  great 
straits.  The  revolt  of  Byzantion  threatened  to  stop  not 
Th  s  ai  ^^^  ^^  corn-tax  levied  on  ships  passing 
War  westwards   from   the   Euxine   but  even  the 

corn-ships  themselves.  Chios  was  the  head- 
quarters of  this  inconvenient  secession,  and  an  Athenian 
attack  on  the  island  was  repulsed  with  loss  and  the  ad- 
miral, Chabrias,  slain.  For  some  months  Chios  was 
supreme  in  the  Egean.  Even  when  the  Athenian  com- 
manders had  raised  a  considerable  fleet,  and,  in  order  to 
divert  an  attack  of  the  confederates  from  Samos,  affected 
to  threaten  Byzantion,  their  disagreement  was  fatal  to 
success :  and  failure  in  battle  was  followed  by  indictment 
at  home.  Iphikrates  was  virtually  cashiered,  Timotheos 
was  fined,  and  withdrew  from  Athens.  Chares  alone 
was  left ;  a  thorough  soldier  but  no  general.  It  was  in 
the  midst  of  this  trying  series  of  failures  and  losses  that 
the  last  ray  of  hope  in  the  northern   Egean  was  rudely 

and  finally  extinguished.  The  difficulties  of 
jEsrSlions        Athens  were  Philip's  opportunities.    While 

the  former  was  struggling  to  avert  defeat, 
the  latter  was  making  overtures  of  alliance  to  Olynthos, 
seeking  to  widen  the  breach  between  her  and  Athens. 
Feeling  sure  that  the  Athenians  had  their  hands  quite 


CH.  IV. 


The  Sacred  War, 


43 


full  and  would  endure  anything  rather  than  a  rupture 
of  the  peace,  he  advanced  without  compunction  and 
seized  Pydna  (357)  which  he  kept  for  himself.  Thence 
he  proceeded  to  attack  Potidaia,  which,  together  with 
Anthemous  was  handed  over  to  Olynthos  as  an  earnest 
of  Phihp's  good-will.  But  if  the  Olynthians  were  not 
blinded  by  resentment  against  Athens,  they  must  have 
trembled  at  such  a  gift,  even  while  they  accepted  it.  How 
lonff  would  it  be  before  their  turn  came  !  Meanwhile  they 
were  hopelessly  estranged  from  their  real  ally,  Athens, 
as  receivers  of  stolen  goods  in  accepting  Potidaia ! 

Thus  Philip  stood  out  before  the  eyes  of  Greeks  as  a 
disturbing  element  in  their  political  relations — a  man  of 
energy,  who  wielded  great  resources  and  showed  but  few 
scruples  in  using  them.  His  position  has  been  compared 
to  that  of  the  Lydian  Croesus  towards  the  lonians  of  Asia 
Minor,  or  of  lason  of  Pherai  towards  the  surrounding 
tribes.  In  fact  his  position  was  a  far  stronger  one.  He 
was  a  genuine  Hellene ;  and  Croesus  was  not.  He  was  a 
legitimate  king ;  and  lason  was  not.  He  had  at  command 
greater  resources  than  either.  All  that  he  needed  in 
order  to  attain  the  goal  of  a  not  ignoble  ambition,  the 
leadership  of  Hellas,  was  a  fair  opening  for  interference 
in  the  affairs  of  Hellas.  And  this  his  proverbial  good- 
fortune  soon  threw  in  his  way. 

In  357  a  war  broke  out  in  central  Greece  which  is 
known  in  history  as  the  Second  Sacred  War.  On  the 
surface  it  looked  like  a  struggle  between  the  Outbreak  of 
Phokians  and  their  neighbours  for  the  pos-  L^^^^^^*^^^^ 
session  of  the  town  and  oracle  of  Delphoi ;  in  and  its 
reality,  its  cause  lay  far  deeper  in  national  causcs.os?). 
antipathy.  The  Delphians  were  Dorians,  the  Phokians 
were  not.  The  Delphians  moreover  were  an  intruding, 
if  not  a  conquering,  race,  in  occupation  of  what  Phokians 


44 


TJie  Macedoniafi  Empire. 


CH.  IV. 


CH.  IV. 


The  Sacred  War, 


45 


u 


would  regard  as  their  own  territory.     More  than  once  in 
Greek  history  this  precious  strip  of  land  had  been  trans- 
ferred to  its  rightful  owners  ;  more  than  once  it  had  been 
retransferred  to  the  Delphians  by  some  hateful  Dorian 
intervention.     The  Phokians  therefore  nourished  a  tra- 
ditional   hatred   against   Delphians   in    particular,   and 
Dorians  in  general.     The  privileges  and  wealth  attach- 
ing to  the  most  famous  oracle  in  the  world,  situated  on 
Phokian   soil,   were   in   the   hands  of  aliens,   and  the 
political  sympathies  of  its  priesthood  were  notoriously 
Dorian.     But  perhaps  the   strongest  antipathy  of  the 
Phokians  was  reserved  for  Thebes,  whose  subjects  they 
had  been  during  the  Theban  hegemony  (371-362),  just 
as  they  maintained  a  warm  regard  for  Athens,  who  had 
often  stood  their  friend.     These  feelings  of  dislike  were 
brought  to  a  head,  when  the  Thebans  endeavoured  to 
compel  the  Phokians  to  submit  once  more  to  their  rule. 
They  tried,  however,  to  attain  their  object  indirectly  by 
bringing  to  bear  the  antiquated  machinery  of  the  Am- 
phiktyonic  Council,   in   which   at  this   time  they  were 
virtually  supreme.     On  their  motion  the  Phokians  were 
condemned  to  pay  a  heavy  fine  on  the  pretext  that  they 
had  cultivated  some  of  the  consecrated  ground  at  Kirrha. 
This  fine  they  refused  to  pay,  and  the  council  passed  a 
resolution  to  oust  them  from  their  land  and  to  consecrate 
it  to  the  Dorian  Apollo. 

But  this  was  not  so  easily  done  as  voted.  The  Pho- 
kians had  friends  as  well  as  enemies.  Their  enemies 
Snccecsesof      ^^^^   ^^^^  ^o   move,  and  they  themselves 

urde^Sr  ^^""^  ^"  ^^^^  ^^^^^^  ^"  Philom6Ios.  Delphoi 
meios  and  was  scizcd  and  held ;  and  under  the  pres- 
sure  of  circumstances  a  finger  was  laid  for 
the  first  time  on  the  vast  accumulated  treasure  which 
had  been  silently  growing  for  generations  in  the  secret 


chambers  of  the  temple.  This  money  purchased  mer- 
cenaries ;  but  its  seizure  forfeited  what  was  much  more 
valuable,  the  good-will  of  Greeks,  and  compelled  the 
Phokians  as  they  became  more  and  more  isolated  to 
lean  more  and  more  upon  mercenaries.  Hence  it  was 
necessary  to  make  further  requisitions  on  the  treasury  of 
the  god,  and  what  was  at  first  decently  styled  a  loan 
soon  ended  in  naked  spoliation.  At  first  the  Phokians 
more  than  held  their  own.  In  spite  of  the  remissness  of 
Sparta  and  Athens  in  sending  the  aid  they  had  promised 
— ^the  former  as  embittered  enemies  of  Thebes,  the  latter 
as  anti-Dorian  sympathizers — Philomelos  and  his  mer- 
cenaries defeated  the  Lokrians,  and  gained  somo  ad- 
vantages over  the  Thebans  and  Thessalians.  Even  when 
Philomelos  was  defeated  and  slain  (354),  Onomarchos 
his  colleague  was  equal  to  the  occasion.  It  was  too  late 
for  any  hesitation  as  to  the  right  or  wrong  of  appropriat- 
ing the  Delphic  treasure.  He  increased  his  military 
force.  He  bribed  far  and  near,  enemies  no  less  than 
friends.  He  overran  Doris,  invaded  Boiotia,  and  actually 
made  himself  master  of  Thermopylai,  opening  negotia- 
tions with  the  Thessalian  despots  of  Pherai. 

It  was  this  last  step  which  brought  Philip  on  the  scene 
and  led  to  his  taking  part  in  the  Sacred  War.  He  had 
successively  reduced  Amphipolis,  Pydna, 
and  Potidaia.  In  354  he  attacked  Mcth5ne, 
which,  unaided  by  Athens  till  it  was  too  late, 
struggled  vainly  against  its  fate,  but  was 
taken.  Thus,  master  of  Macedon  and  secure  of  the 
neutrality  of  Olynthos  in  his  rear,  he  advanced  in  force 
into  Thessaly  (353)  to  help  the  ruling  family  of  Larissa 
against  the  encroachments  of  the  tyrant  of  Pherai,  who 
in  his  turn  appealed  to  Onomarchos.  It  was  a  fatal  day 
for  the  liberties  of  Hellas  ! 


The  Pholcians 
and  Philip  face 
to  face  in 
Thessaly  (352). 


46 


The  Macedonian  Empire 


CH.  V. 


CH.V. 


The  Sacred  War, 


47 


CHAPTER  V. 
FROM  Philip's  intervention  in  thessaly  to  the 

FALL  OF   OLYNTHOS. 

The  Phokian   intervention   in  the   affairs  of  Thessaly 

brought  PhiHp  upon  the  scene  of  Grecian  poHtics.   Even 

genuine  Hellenes  would  in  a  sense  condone 

Philip  Macedonian  intervention  in  such  a  cause, 

intervenes,  . 

when  its  object  was  to  repress  the  tyrant  of 
Pherai  and  to  resist  the  sacrilegious  mercenaries  of  up- 
start Phokians !  Religious  scruples  and  political  jea- 
lousies were  alike  enlisted  in  his  favour. 

At  first,  however,  Lykophron  and  Onomarchos  got  the 
better  of  Philip  (353).  Whether  it  was  that  he  was  care- 
less and  underrated  his  opponents,  or  that  his  great  mili- 
tary machine  had  not  acquired  the  precision  which  it  at- 
tained under  Alexander,  or  that,  as  Diodoros  says,  he 
was  outnumbered,  he  was  certainly  worsted  in  two  bat- 
tles, and  was  obliged  to  evacuate  Thessaly  for  a  time. 
But  for  a  man  like  Philip  to  acquiesce  in  defeat  was  im- 
possible. He  returned  to  Thessaly  in  force  (352),  in- 
duced the  Thessalians  to  make  common  cause  with  him 
against  the  tyrant  Lykophron,  took  the  field  with  23,000 
troops,  and  inflicted  a  crushing  defeat  upon  the  allies. 
Indeed,  had  it  not  been  for  an  accident,  many  more  than 
the  6,000  slain  and  3,000  prisoners  would  have  been  lost 
to  the  Phokian  cause.  Charts,  the  Athenian,  was  cruis- 
ing off  the  coast  at  the  time,  and  many  of  the  fugitives 
swam  off  to  his  ships.  Onomarchos  himself  was  slain 
or  drowned. 

With  the  downfall  of  Lykophron  Thessaly  became 
practically   Macedonian,   especially   when    Philip   pro- 


\ 


ceeded  to  subdue  its  great  seaport  Pagasai. 
It  was  a  base  of  operations  for  Philip  hardly      master  of 
less  important  than  Amphipolis.     Lying  at      LdTdies 
the  head  of  a  land-locked  gulf,  and  the  only      Pagasai, 
harbour  on  the  Thessalian  coast,  it  boasted  a  consider- 
able fleet  of  its  own,  and  the  export  and  import  duties 
were  valuable.     Nor  was  this  all.     It  was  a  standing 
menace  to  Euboia,  and  through  Euboia  to  Athens,  as 
was  seen  before  three  years  were  over.     From  the  Gulf 
of  Pagasai  issued  flying  squadrons  which  were  for  ever 
harassing  Athenian   commerce,  and   on   one   occasion 
even  ventured   to   show  themselves   at   Marathon   and 
carry  off  the  sacred  trireme.     The  fall  of  Pagasai,  too, 
could  not  fail  to  remind  the  Athenians  how  Philip  had 
successively  deprived  them  of  Amphipolis  and  Pydna 
and  Potidaia  and  Methone,  and  it  was  the  more  alarm- 
ing because  it  was  so  much  nearer. 

But  the  alarm  passed  into  downright  panic  at  Athens, 
when  news  suddenly  reached  the  city  that  Phihp  was 
actually  marching  to  attack  the  Phokians  at 
Thermopylai,  of  which  they  were  then  in   by\he°  ^ 
possession.     Thermopylai  was  the  gate  from   xhe^oplfai. 
northern  to  southern  Greece,  and  it  was  felt 
at  Athens  that  Philip,  south  of  Thermopylai,  meant  the 
ruin  of  their  Phokian  allies,  a  great  accession  of  strength 
to  their  Theban  enemies,  and  imminent  danger  to  them- 
selves.    For  once  the  Athenians  roused  themselves.     A 
considerable  force  was   despatched  without  delay  and, 
reaching  the  place  before  Philip,  fortified  the  pass  with 
Phokian  aid  so  strongly  that  the  king  declined  to  attack 
it,  and  returned  to  the  north.     The  state  of  feeling  in 
Greece,  however,  as   to   the   case   of  the   Phokians,  is 
clearly  marked  by  the  fact  that  the  Macedonian  Philip 
rose  in  public  esteem  by  taking  the  right  side,  while 


48 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  V. 


Athens  lost  caste  by  espousing  the  Phokian  cause ;  al- 
Sketchof  though  each   acted   palpably   from   purely 


Phokian  af- 
fairs to  347. 


selfish  motives.     For  the  moment  the  dan- 
ger to  Greece  was  postponed ;  but  it  was  only 
postponed.     During  the  next  five  years  (352-347)  Pho- 
kian  affairs  went  from  bad  to  worse.     Each  Phokian 
leader  became  less  and  less  scrupulous.     Fresh  requisi- 
tions were  made  on  the  holy  treasures,  on  the  plea  of 
political  necessity,  but  in  reality  for  personal  purposes, 
until  it  was  found  (348)  that  more  than  2,000,000/.  ster- 
ling had  been  squandered,  and  that  the  spring  was  run- 
ning low.     Then  followed  discontent  among  the  mer- 
cenaries, dissensions  among  the  Phokians  themselves; 
until  the  Thebans,  half  ruined  by  nine  years  of  desul- 
tory warfare,  took  a  step  of  which  they  little  foresaw  the 
results.     In  the  name  of  the  Amphiktyonic  Council  they 
appealed  to  Philip  to  come  and  help  the  god  of  Delphoi 
and  themselves  against  their  sacrilegious  enemies,  the 

Phokians  (347)- 

When  Philip  was  thus  invited  by  the  Thebans  to  inter- 
fere directly  in  Greek  affairs,  he  was  in  a  far  stronger 
position  than  he  had  been  five  years  before. 
don'i?i^3?rand   One  morc  rival  had  been  swept  away  from 
347  contrasted.   ^^(^^^^   j^jj^      j^  352  the  Confederation  of 

Olynthos  was  Philip's  friend  and  ally,  prosperous  and 
strong.  In  347  the  Confederation  was  a  thing  of  the 
past.  Olynthos  had  been  sacked  and  the  site  thereof 
knew  it  no  more.  Phihp  breathed  more  easily;  for 
nevermore  could  Athens  and  Olynthos  be  leagued  to- 
gether against  him. 

The  delivery  of  this  startling  lesson  to  upstart  cities 
was  in  Philip's  most  characteristic  manner.  He  had 
succeeded  in  estranging  Olynthos  from  Athens.  He 
had  lulled  Olynthian  suspicions  by  an  ostentation   of 


CH.V. 


Philip  and  Olynthos* 


49 


friendship.     He  had  robbed  Athens  to  pay 

Growint 

Olynthos,  and  had  added  to  the  Confedera-  jealousy 
tion  Potidaia  and  Anthemous.  He  had  won  plJiiip^and 
over  individual  Olynthians  by  gifts  and  Olynthos. 
concessions,  and  had  allowed  their  capitalists  to  grow 
rich  by  shares  in  his  mines.  There  was  apparently 
everything  to  gain  by  working  harmoniously  with  Philip, 
everything  to  lose  by  making  oneself  disagreeable.  For 
a  while  the  pleasant  delusion  lasted.  But  when  in  352 
Philip  was  master  of  Thessaly,  and-  when,  returning 
thence,  he  was  next  heard  of  as  pushing  his  conquests  in 
Thrace  to  the  very  verge  of  Athenian  possessions  in  the 
Chersonese,  then  indeed  the  Olynthians  must  have  felt 
that  Philip  was  gradually  encircling  them,  as  t*he  hunter 
draws  his  nets  closer  and  closer  round  his  prey.  Before 
this,  however,  a  feeling  of  sympathy  seems  to  have 
arisen  between  Olynthos  and  Athens,  which  led  to  a 
formal  peace  between  them,  and  to  very  strained  rela- 
tions between  Olynthos  and  Philip.  The  latter  indeed 
affected  to  think  that  it  was  impossible  any  longer  for 
him  and  the  Olynthians  to  live  quietly  side  by  side. 
Either  he  or  they  must  go;  and  he  resolved  that  it  should 
be  they.  His  tactics  were  of  the  familiar  kind.  Even  so 
early  as  the  First  Philippic  (351)  we  find  Demosthenes 
referring  to  sudden  raids  made  upon  the  Chalkidic  Con- 
federation; while,  if  accused  of  hostility,  Philip  was  ready 
with  specious  apologies.  It  was  neither  peace  nor  war, 
but  it  combined  the  disadvantages  of  both.  Olynthos 
now,  like  Athens  seven  years  before,  saw  herself  stripped 
of  dependent  allies,  one  by  one,  yet  unable  to  prevent  it 
except  at  the  price  of  instant  attack ;  while  Macedonian 
gold  and  Macedonian  compliments  had  won  even  in 
Olynthos  partisans  whose  interest  it  was  to  defer  a 
rupture. 


50 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  V. 


influence  of 
Demos- 
thenes at 
Athens. 


At  this  juncture  it  happened  that  two  of  Philip's  half- 
brothers  who  had  incurred  his  wrath  took  refuge  in  the 
city.   Glad  of  the  pretext,  he  demanded  their 
Occasion  of       surrender.   The  answer  to  that  demand  was 

the  rupture. 

an  embassy  from  Olynthos  to  Athens,  pro- 
posing an  alliance  offensive  and  defensive  against  Mace- 
donian aggression — an  appeal  strongly  seconded  by  De- 
mosthenes. 

The  place  occupied  by  this  orator  at  Athens  was  so 
strange,  and  his  influence  in  after  days  so  remarkable, 
Rise  and  Hl^^X  it  will  be  well  to  explain,  before  going 

further,  some  of  the  causes  of  his  singular 
character  and  exceptional  position.  For  in 
talking  of  the  struggle  between  Maccdon 
and  Athens,  we  involuntarily  think  of  Philip  and  De- 
mosthenes, and  of  no  others.  Of  what  Philip  was,  we 
have  already  some  notion:  let  us  try  and  imagine  his 
great  antagonist,  and  that,  not  as  he  was  in  the  prime  of 
his  powers,  when  Athens  recognized  at  last  her  greatest 
citizen,  but  rather  as  when  he  rose  for  the  first  time  to 
address  the  Athenian  Ekklesia.  We  read  his  speeches, 
and  perhaps  wonder  how  such  an  audience  could  fail  to 
be  convinced  by  them — simple,  terse,  polished,  and 
instinct  with  suppressed  passion.  Yet  he  often  failed  to 
convince.  The  truth  is,  we  forget  the  state  of  parties  at 
Athens:  still  more  do  we  forget  the  difficulties  to  be 
overcome  by  the  orator  himself.  In  a  city  where  Philip 
had  some  sympathizers  and  many  partisans — where 
there  was  much  vapouring  about  the  glory  of  Athens, 
but  little  zeal  to  maintain  that  glory — where  there  was  a 
government  of  peace  at  any  price,  headed  by  men 
as  narrow  as  they  were  honest — where  there  were 
politicians  in  abundance,  but  few  statesmen — in  such 
a  city  it  was   no   easy   matter,  but  the  task  of  years. 


CH.  V. 


Demosthenes, 


51 


for  a  man  like  Demosthenes  to  gain  the  ear  of  the 
Assembly.  He  was  only  half  an  Athenian,  as  his 
enemies  seldom  forgot  to  remind  him.  His  grand- 
mother (if  we  may  believe  ^schines)  had  been  a  bar- 
barian of  the  Tauric  Chersonese  (Crimea);  but  the 
advantages  of  a  strain  of  new  blood  are  too  well  known 
to  allow  us  to  think  worse  of  Demosthenes  for  that. 
We  may  even  infer  that  more  intermarriages  of  a  simi- 
lar kind  might  have  served  to  invigorate  the  exhausted 
Athenian  stock,  as  in  after  days  Gothic  and  Vandal 
blood  invigorated  the  comparatively  effete  Romans. 
Be  that  as  it  may,  to  the  foreign  blood  in  his  veins 
we  may  reasonably  ascribe  much  of  the  vigour  and 
broad  sympathies  of  the  Athenian  orator.  Moreover, 
partly  from  nature,  partly  from  circumstances,  he  was 
singularly  un-Athcnian.  He  was  a  pale,  shy,  awkward 
young  man,  with  a  thin  voice,  and  fauhy  intonation 
— very  poor  company  for  gay  Athenian  gentlemen. 
Hence,  he  was  in  youth  a  solitary — and  a  solitary  soured 
by  ill-treatment :  for  his  father  died  when  he  was  only 
seven  years  old,  and  his  guardians  squandered  his 
property.  But  misfortune  proved  a  good  school-mistress. 
From  an  early  age  he  set  himself  to  correct  the  faults  of 
nature,  that  he  might  be  able,  when  the  time  came, 
to  bring  the  law  to  bear  upon  the  guardians  who  had 
ruined  him.  He  mastered  the  ideas  of  Solon  and  Plato. 
He  knew  Thucydides  almost  by  heart,  and  is  said 
to  have  written  out  his  history  eight  times.  He  studied 
under  Isaios,  and  watched  and  imitated  Isokrates.  He 
condescended  to  learn  dignity,  action,  and  even  play  of 
features  from  actors  on  the  stage.  He  declaimed  aloud, 
it  is  said,  with  pebbles  in  his  mouth,  or  amid  the  roar  of 
waves  upon  the  shore,  to  improve  and  strengthen  his 
voice.     He  would  march  uphill  while  repeating  some 


52 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.V. 


pea's  to 
Athens  for 
help.     De- 
mosthenes' 
First 
Olynthiac. 


speech,  to  open  and  fortify  his  lungs.     In  short,  no  trou- 
ble was  too  great  if  he  might  attain  the  great  object 
of  his  ambition,  the  power  of  persuasive  speaking.    And 
by  dint  of  perseverance  he  did,  slowly  but  surely,  attain 
it :  at  first  speaking  against  the  whole  current  of  Athenian 
feeling,  and  to  almost  unsympathetic  ears,  but  little  by  lit- 
tle commanding  attention,  respect,  admiration,  and  finally 
enthusiastic  assent.     At  last,  though  unhappily  too  late, 
the  policy  of  Demosthenes  became  the  policy  of  Athens. 
Of  the  details  of  the  war  of  Philip  against  Olynthos 
we  know  next  to  nothing :  but  the  speeches  of  Demos- 
Olynthosap-      thenes  enable  us  to  infer  the  progress  of 
events  almost  certainly.     The  proffer  of  al- 
liance was  welcomed  at  Athens,  until  the 
question  arose  as  to  what  was  to  be  done ; 
and  then  the  traditional  caution  of  Athenian 
politicians  led   (as  usual)  to  words  and   nothing   else. 
"Olynthos,  it  was  argued,  was  still  a  formidable  power: 
and   Philip's    strength    (as    Demosthenes    himself   had 
pointed  out)   was  more  apparent  than  real.     No  state 
could  rest  permanently  on  a  basis  of  force,  injustice,  and 
perjury.     No  king  could  find  permanent  support  in  cor- 
rupt partisans,  forced  allies,  and   dissolute  officers,  or 
could  safely  ostracise  all  that  was  noble  and  of  good  re- 
port.    Philip  was  not  strong,  and  therefore  to  the  Athe- 
nians he  ought  not  to  be  a  source  of  fear."     Unfortu- 
nately, from  the  same  premises  the  orator  and  his  audi- 
ence  drew    different    conclusions.      To    the    former   it 
seemed  almost  providential  that  Athens  should  have  the 
opportunity  of  co-operating  with  Olynthos  against   an 
enemy  thus  intrinsically  weak.     The  latter  were  only 
too  happy  to  perceive  that  immediate  action  was  not  a 
necessity.     Accordingly  the  alliance  was  contracted,  but 
nothing  further  was  done. 


*  #1 


CH.V. 


The  Olynthian  Orations, 


53 


The  results  of  this  fatal  policy  were  soon  apparent. 
Philip,  interpreting  aright  this  masterly  inactivity,  con- 
cluded that  for  the  present  he  need  fear 
nothing  from  Athens.  His  agents  within  olynthiac. 
and  without  Olynthos  became  doubly  active, 
even  turning  Athenian  abstention  to  their  master's  ad- 
vantage. At  last  the  pressure  became  so  stringent  that 
further  and  more  urgent  appeals  for  aid  were  made  to 
Athens ;  and  again  Demosthenes  stood  forward  to  second 
the  call.  But  this  time  his  speech  was  at  once  more 
pointed  and  more  earnest.  It  was  a  crisis,  as  he  puts  it, 
almost  calling  on  them  with  articulate  voice  to  act  at 
once.  The  road  to  Athens  lay  through  Olynthos.  "  If 
we  leave  these  men  to  their  fate,  who  is  so  simple  (he 
asks)  as  not  to  know  that  the  war  will  be  transferred 
from  thence  to  us  ?  Fight  Philip  we  must,  either  there 
or  here:  and  Philip's  difficulty  is  our  opportunity."  His 
inference  was  practical.  They  must  prepare  at  once 
and  without  delay  a  double  expedition — the  one  to  pre- 
serve the  confederation,  the  other  to  attack  Macedon. 
But,  to  be  of  use,  these  expeditions  must  be  simultane- 
ous; and,  above  all,  it  must  be  a  genuine  Athenian 
army  and  fleet,  not  a  mere  mercenary  force  without 
interest  in  the  result. 

Shortly  after  the  delivery  of  this  speech  some  foreign 
mercenaries  were  sent  by  Athens  to  Chalkidike,  but  no 
Athenian  soldiers,  and  no  money.  How- 
ever, they  were  so  far  successful  that  there  Olynthiac. 
was  quite  an  excitement  at  Athens,  and  a 
good  deal  of  talk  of  taking  vengeance  on  Philip.  Then 
Demosthenes  for  the  third  time  came  forward  with  the 
warning  that  as  yet  nothing  was  done,  and  that  it  was 
too  soon,  or  rather,  much  too  late,  to  talk  of  vengeance. 
What  was  still  at  stake  was  the  safety  first  of  Olynthos, 


54 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  V. 


CH.V. 


Fall  of  Olynthos, 


55 


then  of  Athens.  Their  only  hope  of  securing  that  safety 
lay  in  readiness  to  fight,  and  to  provide  adequate  ways 
and  means.  They  must  act — and  act  at  once.  But  De- 
mosthenes was  still  a  young  man  (only  thirty-one),  and 
Athenian  fears  were  too  easily  set  at  rest  by  the  influ- 
ence of  older,  and  as  yet  more  trusted,  politicians. 
It  was  some  months  before  any  real  aid  was  sent  to 
Olynthos. 

In  the  meanwhile  Philip  became  alive  to  the  troubles 
brewing  at  Athens,  and  tried  to  anticipate  their  interven- 
tion by  providing  them  with  pressing  busi- 
Eubiia^^ '"  "ess  nearer  home  (349).  We  have  already 
Phifip."^  ^^  ^^^"^  ^^"^  ^^  possession  of  Pagasai :  and 
from  Pagasai  was  but  a  few  hours'  sail  to 
Euboia.  Trouble  in  Euboia  might  banish  Olynthos  from 
Athenian  thoughts.  For  many  years  this  unhappy  island 
had  been  the  centre  of  intrigues  and  conflicts.  Stretch- 
ing along  the  coast  for  100  miles  from  Attica  to  Thes- 
saly,  never  able  from  first  to  last  to  form  a  united  state, 
it  was,  by  whomsoever  held,  a  standing  menace  to  some 
one  else.  Philip's  intrigues  in  the  island  had  begun 
even  before  the  delivery  of  the  First  Philippic  (351): 
and  now  he  stirred  up  a  war  between  Chalkis  and  Eret- 
ria,  in  which  Athens  became  involved.  This  struggle 
led  to  a  large  expenditure,  a  considerable  expedition,  a 
barren  victory,  and,  as  its  only  result,  political  exaspera- 
tion; the  very  things  which  best  served  Philip's  purpose, 
as  causing  embarrassment  at  Athens. 

But  at  last  even  Athens  seemed  aware  of  her  danger. 

In  349  she  not  only  intervened  in  Euboia,  but  actually 

sent  a  citizen  force  to  Olynthos,  which  had 

OlyntlS!  °^      ^°"^^  success,  and  averted  the  ruin  of  the 

city  for  another  year.     But  it  was  only  for  a 

time.     In   spite  of  the  efforts  which,  all  too  late,  the 


I 


I 


Athenians  were  now  ready  to  make  (and  we  know  from 
Demosthenes  that  Athens  helped  Olynthos,  first  and  last, 
with  as  many  as  4,cxx)  citizens,  10,000  mercenaries,  and 
50  triremes) — in  spite  of  all,  Philip,  by  force  of  arms  or 
corruption,  gained  step  by  step  first  one  city,  then  another, 
until  Olynthos,  the  last  hope  of  Hellenic  freedom  in  the 
north,  stood  quite  alone,  and  prepared  to  fight  her  last 
battle  for  independence  with  fruitless  despair.  Even 
Athens  could  now  do  little  to  help.  The  north  wind,  as 
usual,  befriended  Phihp  ;  and  when  the  reinforcements 
from  the  south  arrived  it  was  too  late.  Olynthos  herself 
had  fallen.  The  gold  of  Macedon  completed  what 
Athenian  remissness  had  begun.  Two  cavalry  officers 
betrayed  a  large  part  of  their  force  to  the  enemy.  All 
heart  was  taken  out  of  the  besieged  by  the  treason  of 
the  Philippizers  within.  Further  resistance  was  impos- 
sible. And  then  there  fell  upon  Hellas  a 
blow  perhaps  more  awful  than  anything  in  ^^"ofitsSL 
her  previous  history.  A  free  city  of  10,000 
inhabitants  and  thirty-two  of  her  free  allies  were  so  ruth- 
lessly destroyed,  that  a  chance  traveller  would  not  even 
have  been  aware  of  the  ruins  beneath  his  feet.  They 
vanished  from  the  Hellenic  world  as  though  they  had 
never  been.  Still  worse  was  the  fate  which  befell  the 
inhabitants.  They  were  exiled,  or  sold  into  slavery.  It 
is  pathetic  even  now  to  read  of  the  scene  which  moved 
yEschines  himself  to  tears,  when  "he  met  a  certain 
Atrestidas  coming  from  Macedon,  and  in  his  train  were 
marching  some  thirty  women  and  children ;  and  when 
he  asked  in  astonishment  who  the  man  was,  and  the 
people  with  him,  one  of  the  passers-by  answered  that 
they  were  slaves  from  Olynthos,  whom  Philip  had  given 
as  a  present  to  his  friend  Atrestidas."  If  we  think  of 
the  change  for  these  poor  creatures,  from  the  life  of  free 


56 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  VI. 


and  happy  liberty  to  slavery  and  all  that  slavery  involves, 
we  shall  realize  better  the  awful  shock  which  the  sack  of 
Olynthos  gave  to  the  Hellenic  world.  It  was  not  so 
much  that  Philip  became  at  once  lord  of  an  empire 
reaching  from  the  Chersonese  to  Thcrmopylai,  dominat- 
ing men's  imaginations  as  Russia  dominates  them  now  ; 
but  that  it  suddenly  changed,  as  it  were,  the  balance  of 
men's  minds  (as  Russia's  conquest  of  Constantinople 
might  change  it  now),  blinded  their  eyes,  disturbed  their 
judgment,  and  turned  even  honourable  politicians  into 
timid,  if  not  corrupt.worshippers  of  the  rising  sun.  Sub- 
sequent events  can  only  be  read  aright  in  the  light  of 
the  fall  of  Olynthos. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

the  peace  of  philokrates.      falsa  legatio. 
Thermopylai  in  Philip's  hands. 

In  the  same  year  in  which  Olynthos  fell  (347)  the 
Thebans  called  in  Philip  to  help  them  against  the 
Phokians,  and  to  save  the  Delphian  land 
from  further  sacrilege.  It  is  probably  true 
that  they  did  not  realize  the  result  of  such 
an  invitation ;  but  it  is  also  true  that  they 
thus  took  the  first  step  towards  the  ruin  of 
their  own  city  and  the  enslavement  of  Hellas.  Nothing 
could  better  have  seconded  Philip's  fast-growing  ambi- 
tion ;  and  ambition  in  Philip  was  ably  served 
PhlnJ."^  ^y  diplomatic  tact.     To  divide  and  so  to  en- 

gage his  enemies  singly  was  the  key  to  all 
his  policy.  His  present  object  was  Thermopylae  But 
in  order  to  gain  Thermopylai  it  was  essential  to  throw 
dust  in  Athenian  eyes,  and  so  to  prevent  their  helping 


The  The- 
bans invite 
Philip's  in- 
tervention 
»ga  nst  the 
Phokians. 


CH.  VI. 


Inaction  at  Athens, 


57 


the  Phokians  to  hold  the  pass  against  him.  Accordingly 
all  his  efforts  were  bent  towards  raising  possible  hopes 
at  Athens,  soothing  offended  susceptibilities,  hinting  at 
possible  dangers,  gaining  possible  friends — in  short,  to- 
wards paralyzing  Athenian  resistance,  until  resistance 
would  be  useless.  What  the  terror  of  his  name  and  of 
the  dreadful  fate  of  Olynthos  failed  to  effect,  courteous 
receptions,  winning  manners,  a  magnificent  court,  splen- 
did promises,  and  even  more  vulg^ar  bribes  succeeded  in 
accomplishing.  Secret  agents  and  open  friends  worked 
for  his  cause  in  every  city  in  Greece — and 

1  •       A   1  T/-  »    ,  State  of 

not  least  m  Athens.  If  we  turn  to  Athens,  feeling  at 
on  the  other  hand,  we  observe  a  marvellous 
blindness  to  facts.  Of  the  Athenians  it  might  be  said 
with  singular  truth,  "  Populus  vult  decipi ;  decipiatur  ;" 
deceived  they  were  by  Philip,  deceived  yet  more  by  their 
own  leaders,  and  in  each  case  willingly  deceived.  They 
declined  to  spend  money.  They  declined  to  serve  in 
person.  They  eagerly  caught  at  every  pretext  for  post- 
poning the  evil  day,  when  Philip  must  be  faced  and 
fought. 

Troubles  seldom  come  singly.  In  347  the  disquieting 
news  of  the  Theban  appeal  to  Philip  reached  Athens, 
and  almost  simultaneously  envoys  appeared 
from  Phokis  requesting  instant  aid  at  Ther- 
mopylai against  an  expected  Macedonian 
attack.  Now  Thermopylai  was  in  Athenian 
eyes  what  Strasburg  is  in  German  or  Ant- 
werp in  English  eyes — the  door  of  the  house,  the  gate  of 
the  castle,  the  first  outpost  of  defence.  To  look  on  at  its 
seizure  would  be  little  short  of  madness.  As  five  years 
before,  so  now  all  Athens  was  alarmed,  and  the  Athenian 
commander  at  Oreos  in  Euboia  was  ordered  to  join 
Phalaikos  at  the  pass  without  delay,  and  to  hold  it  at  all 


Athenian 
help  rudely 
declined  by 
Phalaikos 
at  Thermo- 
pylai. 


5« 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  VI. 


risks.  The  alarm  became  a  panic,  when  it  was  found 
that  Phalaikos,  apparently  from  jealousy,  refused  to  ad- 
mit their  troops,  and  had  even  thrown  into  prison  the 
Phokian  envoys  who  had  solicited  aid.  What  could  it 
mean  ?  Was  Phalaikos  intending  to  give  up  the  pass, 
and  make  terms  with  Philip  .?  And  if  so,  how  could  they 
prevent  it.^  Here  was  another  reason,  if  reasons  were 
needed,  for  peaceful  negotiation  to  avert  so  great  a  ca- 
lamity from  Hellas. 

As  the  idea  of  peace  was  uppermost  in  Athenian  minds, 
so  the  word  "peace"  had  already  been  heard  in  the 

Athenian  Assembly,  and  the  same  Philo- 
fromAtLns  kratos,  who  had  first  dared  to  utter  the 
lbi!Il'peace.      ^'^'^^^  HOW  carried  a  decree  that  ten  envoys 

should  ascertain  from  Philip's  own  lips  the 
terms  on  which  he  would  agree  to  peace.  yEschines  and 
Demosthenes  were  of  the  number;  and  they  were 
accompanied  by  Aglaokreon,  of  Tenedos,  representing 
their  allies.  Their  business  was  to  sound  Philip :  and 
justice  requires  us  to  remember,  that  up  to  the  date  of 
this  embassy,  so  far  as  we  can  judge,  each  and  all  of  the 
ambassadors  were  equally  sincere  and  equally  patriotic. 
But  the  success  of  Philip  was  already  casting  a  spell 
over  Hellenic  minds :  and  of  those  who  went  to  Pella 
more  than  one  returned  to  Athens  not  only  deeply  im- 
pressed with  Philip's  geniality  and  ready  wit,  with  his 
wide  knowledge  and  powerful  memory,  but  overawed  by 
his  self-possession  and  display  of  strength,  or  corrupted  by 
his  attentions,  his  promises,  and  even  by  his  gold.  Tim- 
idity and  avarice  in  the  "  Philippizers  "  at  Athens  were 
henceforth  the  main  difficulty  of  Athenian  patriots. 

The  envoys  returned  about  the  1st  of  March,  346; 
and  at  once  laid  the  results  of  their  mission  before  the 
Assembly,  together  with  a  letter  from  Philip  himself; 


w 


CH.  VI. 


Proposal  of  Philokrates, 


59 


while  the  synod  of  allies,  having  heard  the 
report  of  Aglaokreon,  agreed  to  abide  by      and  conse- 
whatever    decision    the   Athenians    should      ^0^",*,^'°" 
adopt,    recommending   however    that   any 
Greek  city,  not  there  represented,  should  have  the  option 
of  declaring  its  adhesion  within  three  months.     Philip's 
letter  was  couched  in  the  true  Philippic  vein.     He  had 
favours,  he  wrote,  in  store  for  Athens  ;  indeed  he  would 
have  mentioned  them  categorically,  had  he  felt  sure  of 
the  Athenian  alliance.      Meanwhile,  he  proposed  as  a 
basis  of  negotiation  that  each  side  should  retain  all  that 
it  then  possessed — which  was,  in  fact,  a  proposal  that 
Athens  should  confess  herself  defeated.     Nevertheless, 
the  highly-coloured  reports  of  the  Athenian  envoys  dis- 
posed the  Assembly  in  Philip's  favour ;  and  when  the 
Macedonian   ambassadors  arrived,  they   were   received 
with  more  than  ordinary  cordiality,  and  found  the  gen- 
eral current  of  public  opinion  running  strongly  in  the 
direction  which  their  master  wished.     Two  special  meet- 
ings of  the  Assembly   were   held   without 
delay  to  discuss  the  whole  question.     At      the  peace 
the  first  of  these  Philokrates  again  took  the      f^'e  Assem? 
lead,  and  proposed  a  decree  only  too  char-      p^Jji^^^attis 
acteristic  of  the  Athens  of  the  day.     It  is  no 
wonder  that  the  charges  of  treason  and  corruption  have 
clung  to  the  names  of  Philokrates  and  ^schines,  when 
the  former  proposed  and  the  latter  supported  the  proposi- 
tion, that  there  should  be  peace  and  alliance  between 
Philip  and  his  allies  and  Athens  and  her  allies,  but  ex- 
cluding the  Phokians  and  the  town  of  Halos  in  Thessaly, 
Athenian  allies  !     For  what  other  reason  could  this  exclu- 
sion of  long-standing  allies  have  been  suggested,  save  that 
Philip  wished  to  have  it  so  ?     And  for  what  other  reason 
could  statesmen  of  Athens  have  stooped  to  so  base  a  de- 


6o 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  VI, 


sertion,  save  that  Philip's  wishes,  for  some  strong  motive, 
outweighed  in  their  minds  the  dictates  of  honour  ?    De- 
mosthenes supported  the  motion,  but  he  protested  against 
the  exception  ;  and  it  appears  that  his  protest  was  effect- 
ual.    The  exception  had  not  originated  with  the  Mace- 
donians.    It  was  not  therefore  essential  to  the  peace. 
On  the  other  hand  there  was  no  alternative  proposal  be- 
fore the  Assembly ;  and  if  they  were  not  prepared  "  to 
march  down  straightway  to  Peiraieus  and  go  on  board 
ship,  and  pay  war  taxes,  and  devote  the  Festival  fund  to 
war  purposes,"  they  must  vote  for  the  peace  as  proposed. 
The  Assembly  therefore  voted  for  peace  and  alliance 
between  Athens  and  Philip,  but  silently  struck  out  the 
rider  about  Phokis  and  Halos,  thus  implicitly  including 
them  in  the  list  of  aUies.     Nothing  was  said  concerning 
the  confederate  allies  and  the  three  months  of  grace, 
mentioned  above.     Six  days  afterwards  another  assem- 
bly was  convened,  that  the  Athenians   might  swear  to 
the  treaty  in  the  presence  of  Philip's  ambassadors  ;  while 
it  was  arranged  that  the  same  ambassadors  who  had  be- 
fore represented  Athens  at  Pella,  should  return  to  Mace- 
don  and  take  the  oaths  of  Philip  and  his  allies. 

But  at  this  assembly  a  critical  question  at  once  arose  : 
who  were  the  allies  of  Athens  1  Was  Halos,  which  Par- 
Difficulties  "^^^^o^'  the  Macedonian,  was  besieging 
with  regard  when  the  Athenian  ambassadors  had  passed 
S  Afhens!'  ^t  o^  their  way  to  Pella  .^  Was  Kersobleptes 
Who  were  of  the  Thrakian  Chersonese,  against  whom 
King  Philip  was  about  to  march  in  person 
when  the  ambassadors  were  leaving  Pella  .?  Above  all 
were  the  Phokians  ?  And  to  Athens,  we  must  remember, 
the  two  last  positions  of  primary  importance— the  Hel- 
lespont, and  safety  of  commerce :  Thermopylai,  and 
safety  from  attack.     Little  objection  was  made  toKer- 


k 


CH.  VI. 


Philokrates  lies. 


6i 


sobleptes.     About  Halos  nothing  was  said.     But  the 
Macedonian    ambassadors,   in   accordance    with    their 
instructions,  positively  refused  to  admit  the  Phokians  as 
parties  to  the  treaty.     And  this  in  the  face  of  the  late 
vote  of  the  Assembly,  ruling  them  to  be      yzXs^t^ss^x- 
allies !     Was  this  then  to  be  the  rock,  on      '^o'j'j^oj^^g^ 
which  the  coveted  peace  was  to  be  wrecked  ?      and  M^ 
And  what  had  Philokrates  and  his  friends      *^^^""- 
to  urge  in  defence  of  such  a  proposal  ?     It  was  an  em- 
barrassing position,  but  they  were  equal  to  the  occasion. 
It  is  not  easy  to  conceive  of  any  motive  save  self-interest 
which  could  have  prompted  men  in  their  position,  and 
on  such  an  occasion,  to  deceive  their  fellow-countrymen 
with  assurances  which  they   must  have   known   to  be 
false.     Yet  they  did  so,  trading  on  a  presumed  acquaint- 
ance with  the  king's  real  intentions,   as  men  who  had 
been  at  Pella  and  seen  him  face  to  face.     They  declared 
that  "  his  present  relations  with  Thebes  and  Thessaly 
would  make  it  ungraceful  for  him  to  accept  the  Phokians 
at  once  as  allies.     At  heart  he  was  the  friend  of  Phokis 
as  of  Athens,  and  the  enemy  of  Thebes  ;  and  when  once 
he  obtained  peace  and  was  free  to  act  as  he  chose,  he 
meant  to  welcome  the  Phokians  as  his  allies,   and  to 
humble  Thebes,  and  was  even  disposed  to  restore  Euboia 
and,  better  still,  the  lost  Oropos  (in  Boiotia)  to  Athens." 
Here  was  good  news  indeed,  if  true  ;  and  Athenians  in 
their  present  mood  were  so  eager  to  think  it  true  that 
they  did  not  stop  to  think  whether  it  was  probable.     In 
reality  they  were  false,  and  known  to  be  false.     The 
Assembly  shut  its  eyes  to  probabilities,  and,  devoutly 
hoping  that  all  would  yet  be  well  in  the  matter  of  Phokis, 
agreed  to  the  Macedonian  terms.     The  oaths  were  ad- 
ministered to  the  Athenians  and  their  allies ;  and  it  only 
remained  now  for  the  Athenian  ambassadors  on  their 


62 


The  Macedonian  E7npire, 


CH.  VI. 


CH.  VI. 


Falsa  Lcgatto, 


63 


The  Athe-         ^^^^  ^°  obtain  Philip's  oath  as  soon  as  might 
nians  swear       bc.     It  was  indeed  high  time,  for  alarming- 

to  the  peace  *^ 

of  Phiio-  reports  were  even  now  reaching  Athens  of 

ra  es.  Macedonian  victories  in   Thrace,  and  that 

Kersobleples,  her  ally,  was  being  rapidly  stripped  of  his 
dominions.     For  this  again  was  a  further  complication. 
The  peace  was  to  date  from  the  day  of  its  acceptance 
at  Athens.     Were  these  victories  of   Philip  anterior  to 
that  date  .^     If  not,  was  it  at  all  probable  that  he  would 
restore  what  he  had  won  ?  or  that,  if  he  refused,  the  Athe- 
nians would  at  the  eleventh  hour  repudiate  the  peace  } 
It  was  of  urgent  importance,  therefore,  that  Philip's  ad- 
hesion should  be  obtained  with  the  least  possible  delay. 
It  is  never  an  easy  matter  to  decide  disputes  as  to 
questions  of  fact,  especially  after  an   interval  of  three 
Comipt  delay    ycars.     But  whcn  a  man  like  Demosthenes 
envoys^^^d-     ^^    P^^^^^^    ^^    ^^^^ails   and   dates,    and   an 
ministering  the   ^Eschines  in  his    reply  unmistakably  slurs 

oaths  to  Phihp      ,  .  .        .         ''  *' 

—the  so-called   thcsc  prccisc  details.  It  IS  hardly  wrong  to 

Falsa  Legatio.    j^^f^^  ^^^^   ^^^   ^^^^^^  j^  j^   ^^^  ^^.^  ^  ^^^^_ 

ible  witness.  "These  venal  envoys"  (Demosthenes 
says)  "were  so  dilatory,  that  seven  days  after  the  vote 
of  the  Assembly  they  were  still  in  Athens,  and  I  had  to 
obtain  a  decree  of  the  Senate,  bidding  us  depart  at  once, 
and  enjoining  Proxenos,  the  general  in  Euboia,  to  con- 
vey us  wherever  Philip  might  bc.  But  when— full  sorely 
against  their  will— we  reached  Oreos,  and  had  joined 
Proxenos,  they  gave  up  all  idea  of  a  voyage,  and  made 
a  circuitous  journey  by  land,  taking  three  and  twenty 
days  to  reach  Maccdon.  And  the  whole  of  the  rest  of 
the  time,  until  Philip  arrived"  (i.e.  twenty-seven  days) 
"we  remained  quietly  at  Pella."  During  these  fifty  pre- 
cious days  what  was  the  king  doing  ?  Again  Demos- 
thenes shall  speak  for  himself.     "In  this  interval"  (he 


says)  "  Philip  made  himself  master  of  Doriskos,  Thrace, 
and  the  castles  on  the  Thracian  coast,"  in  other  words, 
gained  command  of  the  sea-line  from  the  Hebros  to  the 
Propontis,  and,  in  complete  disregard  of  Athens,  reduced 
Kersobleptes.  At  last  he  returned  to  Pella,  master  of 
the  situation.  Envoys  were  awaiting  him  from  Athens, 
Sparta,  Thebes,  Euboia,  and  Phokis — awaiting,  it  might 
seem,  his  fiat  as  to  their  destiny.  Whatever  were  his 
will  it  could  be  done,  for  a  large  army  was  massed,  ready 
to  march  at  a  moment's  notice.  His  intervention  was 
requested  as  arbiter  in  Greek  affairs.  Thebans  and  their 
friends  on  one  side,  Phokians  and  their  allies  on  the 
other,  clamoured  in  turn  for  his  help.  Even  an  Athenian 
ambassador,  in  the  person  of  ^schines,  was  not  ashamed 
to  refer  to  Macedonian  interference  in  central  Greece  as 
a  foregone  conclusion,  and  to  try  to  enlist  his  sympathies 
against  Thebes.  Philip  meanwhile  was  bribing  and 
cajoling,  playing  off  one  against  another,  exciting  hopes, 
refusing  none — until  all  his  preparations  were  completed. 
He  then  set  out  on  his  southward  march  with  a  formid- 
able army,  and  carried  in  his  train  this  jealous,  bicker- 
ing mob  of  Grecian  envoys.  At  last  he  reached  Pherai 
and  there  the  Athenian  ambassadors  succeeded  in  ad- 
ministering the  oath  to  Philip  and  his  allies,  not  mention- 
ing Kersobleptes,  and  formally  excluding  the  Phokians. 
They  then  returned  to  Athens,  after  an  absence  of 
seventy  days,  bearing  also  an  affectionate  letter  from 
Philip,  in  which  he  took  on  himself  all  blame  for  the 
delay  of  the  ambassadors. 

King  Philip  was  within  three  days'  march  of  Thermo- 
pylai,  and  Athens  was  still  dreaming  !  Demosthenes 
was  able  indeed  to  alarm  the  Senate  ;  but  the  Assembly 
would  not  listen  to  him,  for  they  were  beguiled  by  the 
siren  promises  of  yEschines.     "Don't  be  alarmed"  (he 


\ 


64 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  VI. 


CH.  VI. 


said)  "about  Thermopylai.  Thcbans,  not  Phokians, 
will  shortly  feci  Philip's  heavy  hand.  And 
Phefaf-^Ther-  i^  is  you  whom  Philip  has  promised  t9  be- 
mopylai  in  friend.  Euboia  shall  be  yours,  and — if  I 
*^"^"'  could  speak   freely— more   besides."      But 

Philip  was  playing  a  dangerous  game,  and  was  well  aware 
on  what  delicate  ground  he  stood.  Force  was  out  of  the 
question  at  Thermopylai,  for  the  mere  suspicion  of 
violent  seizure  would  probably  be  the  one  thing  capable 
of  uniting  all  Hellas  against  him.  The  pass  must  be 
won,  if  at  all,  by  diplomacy;  and  at  this  juncture  once 
more  Philokrates  played  into  his  hands. 
PhTkrat?!  He  proposed  a  decree  (and  Phokians  were 
as  to  the  present,  listening  doubtless  with  despairing 

Phokians.  ^--jxiety  to  a  debate  involving  their  own  fate) 

that  if  the  Phokians  still  refused  to  give  up  Delphoi  to 
its  rightful  possessors,  the  Amphiktyonic  Council,  the 
Athenians  should  interfere  to  compel  them  to  do  so. 
Now,  up  to  this  time,  the  Phokians  might  well  have 
hoped  even  against  hope.     They  had  heard  repeated 
assurances,  both  at  Pella  and  at  Athens,  that  the  Mace- 
donian arms  were  to  be  really  turned  not  against  them 
but  against  Thebes  their  enemy.    They  might  well  be- 
lieve that,  if  the  worst  came  to  the  worst,  Athens  would 
assuredly  not  throw  them  over.     But  now  they  could 
hardly  cherish  any  further  illusion  on  either  point.    King 
Philip  was  at  their  doors,  and  had  already 
summoned  Phalaikos  to  surrender  Thermo- 
pylai ;  and  at  such  a  crisis  it  was  that  their 
old  ally  Athens  published  what  was  equiv- 
alent to  a  declaration  of  war,  just  when  their  own  re- 
sources of  men  and  money  were  exhausted.    The  Pho- 
kian  envoys   left  Athens  in  despair;    and   three  days 
afterwards  (June  23,  346).  Phalaikos  with  io,ooo  men 


Phalaikos  sur- 
renders  Ther- 
mopylai to 
Phil.p. 


Ruin  of  Phokis, 


6s 


\ 


had  come  to  terms  with  Philip.  Phalaikos  and  his  troops, 
and  any  Phokians  who  chose  to  accompany  them,  were 
at  liberty  to  go  where  they  pleased:  Phokis  and  Thermo- 
pylai were  placed  in  Philip's  hands.  Thus,  with  no 
other  weapons  than  a  courteous  bearing,  empty  pro- 
mises, abundant  gold,  and  a  show  of  force,  the  king  of 
Macedon  was  master  of  the  key  of  Greece,  hcnceforw'Lrd 
a  fortress  of  the  first  order,  and  permanently  occupied 
by  a  Macedonian  garrison. 

The  immediate  results  of  Philip's  bloodless  victory 
were  as  stern  a  warning  to  Greece  as  the  fate  of  Olynthos 
had  been.     Pie  at   once  identified   himself      Terrible. 


lecon- 


with   Thcban   policy.     All  Boiotia  became      sequences  to 
once  more  dependent  on  Thebes,  and  even  °*"^' 

a  part  of  Phokis  was  added  to  her  dominion.     Phokis 
herself  was   irretrievably   mined.      Not   only  was   she 
excluded  from  the  Amphiktyonic  Council  and  her  place 
taken    by    King    Philip,    but    two-and-twenty   Phokian 
towns  were   entirely  dismantled,  and   their   inhabitants 
dispersed   into   petty  villages— a   disintegration   of   po- 
litical  unity  similar   to    that  which    Rome   inflicted   on 
Macedon   herself  after  the   fatal   battle   of  Pydna    (b. 
c.  168.)     These  Phokian  villages  were   in   no   case  to 
number  more  than  fifty  houses,  nor  to  be  nearer  to  each 
other  than  a  furlong.     An  annual  tribute  of  fifty  talents 
(12,188/.)  was  to  be  paid  to  the  temple  at  Delphoi  until 
the  squandered  treasure  was  fully  replaced.     All  horses 
were  to  be  sold,  all  arms  destroyed.     Phokians  who  had 
taken   any   part   in    the    sacrilege    became   ipso  facto 
accursed,    and   were   liable   to   arrest   wherever  foUnd. 
Such  was  the  sentence  passed  on  the  impious  Phokians 
by  the  Amphiktyonic  Council,  yet  far  less  rigorous  than 
some  of  its  members  had  wished  to  inflict.     And  of  this 
rigorous  sentence  the  execution  was  still  more  rigorous. 

F 


66 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  VI. 


Thcbans  and  Thessalians  were  not  likely  to  be  tender  in 
their  mercies  to  Phokians,  and  their  cruelty  was  not  the 
less  cruel  because  veiled  under  the  odious  mask  of 
indignation  at  sacrilege.  The  wealthier  and  upper 
classes  fled  the  country.  Those  who  could  not  flee  had 
Theban  and  Macedonian  soldiers  quartered  upon  them. 
Children  were  torn  from  their  parents,  wives  from  their 
husbands.  Three  years  afterwards  Demosthenes  passed 
through  the  country,  and  declares  that  the  sight  of 
its  utter  desolation  was  heart-rending— houses  in  ruins, 
walls  dismantled,  the  fields  lying  waste,  and  the  only  in- 
habitants a  few  old  men,  women,  and  children.  "Our 
ancestors,"  he  cries,  in  a  burst  of  indignation,  "  could 
they  know  what  we  have  done  in  abandoning  fliithful 
allies  to  so  dreadful  a  fate,  would,  with  their  own  hands, 
take  up  stones  to  cast  at  us  !" 

The  revulsion  of  feeling  at  Athens  was  proportioned 
to  the  greatness  of  the  disappointment.     On  the  very 

Panic  at  ^^^  °"  ^^'^^^^^  ^^^  motion  of  Philokratos  had 

Athens.  been  carried,  ten  envoys  had  been  nomi- 

nated to  communicate  its  contents  to  Philip. 
But  they  got  no  farther  than  Chalkis  in  Euboia.  The 
news  from  Phokis  was  too  grave  to  admit  of  any  further 
doubt  as  to  his  real  policy.  So  one  of  their  number 
returned  with  all  haste  and  laid  before  the  people 
assembled  in  Peiraieus  his  unwelcome  and  startling  re- 
port. It  was  like  the  awaking  from  a  pleasant  dream  to 
the  stern  realities  of  life.  They  had  been  deceived,  out- 
witted, checkmated;  and  now  they  had  to  act  in  the 
very  face  of  a  pressing  danger.  It  was  improbable  that 
Philip  himself  would  wish  to  attack  Athens;  and  if 
he  did,  it  was  easy  to  guard  against  a  sudden  blow  (as 
was  indeed  done)  by  bringing  in  the  women  and 
children  from  the  country  and  by  fortifying  the  city  and 


CH.  VI. 


Philip  triumphant. 


67 


Periaieus ;  but  there  was  a  serious  risk  that  the  various 
enemies  of  Athens  in  the  Amphiktyonic  body  might 
force  Philip's  hand,  and  compel  him  to  break  the 
newly-ratified  peace.  And  Athens  was  in  no  condition 
to  resist  such  a  combined  attack.  Great  diplomatic  skill, 
therefore,  was  needed  at  such  a  juncture  to  avoid  the  ex- 
tremes of  humiliating  acquiescence  on  the  one  hand,  or 
of  imprudent  brusqueness  on  the  other ;  and  it  was  well 
for  the  Athenians  that  at  such  a  juncture  they  could  fall 
back  upon  the  practical  wisdom  of  Demosthenes. 

King  Philip,  meanwhile,  was  the  central  figure  in 
a  scene  of  festivity  and  triumph.  He  had  put  an  end  to 
the  weary  struggle  of  the  Sacred  War.  He 
was  a  leading  member  of  the  Amphiktyonic 
Council.  He  was  a  king,  in  an  age  when 
kings  were  becoming  fashionable— a  man 
who  could  will  and  act  while  others  were 
hesitating  or  quarrelling.  He  conducted 
the  Pythian  festival.  He  celebrated  his  triumph  with 
hecatombs,  gorgeous  processions,  costly  offerings.  Like 
Napoleon  after  Austerlitz  or  Jena,  he  was  the  observed 
of  all  observers,  whether  friend  or  foe — the  man  who 
held  in  the  palm  of  His  hand  the  future  and  the  fortunes 
of  Greece. 

And  if  there  was  one  city  in  Greece  more  than 
another  whose  selfishness  and  cowardice  had  made 
Philip's  course  an  easy  one,  that  city  was  Athens. 
Over  the  errors  of  her  who  was  once  "eye"  and 
"  mistress"  of  Greece  we  may  well  draw  the  veil  of  pity 
and  sorrow. 


Contrast 
between 
command- 
ing position 
of  Philip 
and  the 
degradation 
of  Athens. 


t 


68 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  VII. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

FROM  THE  PEACE  OF  PHILOKRATES  TO  THE  BATTLE  OF 

CHAIRONEIA  (346-338). 

From  the  capture  of  Amphipolis  to  the  peace  of  Philo- 

krates  Athens  had  been  half  at  peace  and  half  at  war 

with  King  Philip.     And  now  a  sham  war  of  ten  years 

was  followed  by  seven  years  of  a  sham  peace,  the  latter 

equally  with  the  former  being  a  time  of  loss  and  humili- 

Altered  ation  to  Athens.      Philip  was  already  firmly 

p..sition  of  planted  in  central  Greece,  president  of  the 
Philip,  All  -1  1  /-  ^   , 

Amphiktyonic  league,  and  protector  of  Del- 

phoi ;  and  as  his  power  increased  so  did  his  ambition 
expand.  But  as  yet  the  most  important  part  of  Greece 
was  independent  of  him — afraid  of  his  power  or  only 
anxious  for  his  aid;  and  if  he  was  to  be,  as  he  hoped  to 
be,  leader  and  protector  of  an  Hellenic  confederation,  it 
must  be  by  skilful  diplomacy  rather  than  brute  force. 
Open  attack  upon  Hellenes — and  specially  upon  Athens, 
the  centre  of  Hellenic  life — must  be  delayed  as  long  as 
possible. 

Demosthenes  describes  the  peace  of  Philokrates  as  a 
period  during  which  Philip  was  at  war  with  Athens,  but 
Fresh  causrs  Athens  was  not  at  war  with  Philip — when 
he  reaped  at  once  the  fruits  of  peace  and 
war.  His  object  being  to  isolate  Athens, 
wherever  there  was  uneasiness  in  Greece, 
there  were  his  agents  and  his  gold  secretly 
or  openly  at  work.  By  slow  degrees,  indeed,  this  never- 
ending  aggressiveness  was  arousing  Athens  to  a  keen 
sense  of  danger.  Boiotia  was  now  Theban  ;  and  Thebes 
was  as  yet  in  alliance  with  Macedon,  and  not  unwilling 


of  quarrel 
between 
Philip  and 
the  Athe- 
nians (346- 
340). 


\-  ) 


I 


CH.  VII. 


Eresh  quarrels. 


69 


to  see  Athens  in  difficulties.  It  became  necessary, 
therefore,  however  unpleasant,  to  maintain  permanent 
garrisons  in  the  frontier  forts  of  Drymos  and  Panakton, 
to  command  the  passes  of  Kithairon.  And  not  only 
was  the  sense  of  insidious  danger  on  every  frontier  thus 
present  to  the  Athenian  mind,  but  petty  differences  were 
perpetually  arising  on  points  where  Athenian  and  Mace- 
donian interests  diverged.  A  dispute,  for  instance, 
arose  with  regard  to  the  island  of  Halonnesos,  to  the  N. 
E.  of  Euboia,  an  irritating  dispute  about  words.  Philip 
had  chastised  a  certain  pirate,  whose  headquarters  were 
in  the  island,  and  with  some  show  of  justice  had  then 
placed  a  garrison  there,  for  Athens  had  clearly  failed  in 
her  recognized  duty  of  maintaining  the  police  of  the  sea. 
Athens  called  upon  Philip  to  give  back  to  her  her  pos- 
session. Philip  replied  that  he  would  give  it  gladly,  as  a 
free  gift,  but  could  not  properly  give  back  what  was  his 
own.  yEschines  professes  to  laugh  at  this  quarrel  about 
a  word;  but  none  the  less  there  was  a  real  question 
at  issue.  Again,  in  342,  Philip  was  unmasking  dangerous 
designs  on  a  vital  point  of  the  Athenian  empire,  the 
Chersonese  and  Bosporos,  as  vital  to  Athens  as  Sicily  or 
Africa  was  in  after  days  to  Rome ;  for  Athens  was  fed  to 
a  great  degree  by  the  corn-growing  countries  of  the 
Euxine.  Demosthenes  roundly  asserts  that  no  people  in 
the  world  consumed  so  much  imported  corn  as  the  Athe- 
nians; and  it  has  been  estimated  that  one-third  of  the 
annual  consumption  of  Attica,  or  1,000,000  medimni 
(nearly  a  million  and  a  half  bushels)  must  have  come 
from  outside,  and  a  large  proportion  of  it  from  the 
Euxine.  It  was  as  essential,  therefore,  to  Athens  to 
hold,  as  it  would  be  desirable  in  Philip's  eyes  to  win,  the 
key  of  this  trade — in  other  words,  to  command  the  Hel- 
lespont and  Propontis.    He  had  an  excellent  base  of 


70 


TJie  Macedonian  Empire 


CH.  VII. 


CH.  VII. 


Athens  prepares  for  War, 


71 


operations  in  the  town  of  Kardia,  which  lay  within  the 
Chersonese  and  was  ill-affected  to  Athens;  and  from 
thence  he  proceeded  to  encroach  upon  and  appropriate 
lands  belonging  to  Athenian  settlers.  A  force  of  mer- 
cenaries was  at  once  sent  out  by  Athens,  who  executed 
reprisals  in  Thrace,  while  Philip's  troops  were  engaged 
in  the  interior.  Angry  remonstrances  followed  on  each 
side;  and  matters  began  to  look  so  serious,  that  in  340 
Demosthenes  was  sent  as  ambassador  to  Byzantion  to 
counteract  Philip's  intrigues,  and  bring  about  an  alliance 
equally  necessary  to  each  city.  A  sense  of  common 
danger  obliterated  the  memory  of  the  grievances  of  the 
Social  War  (358);  and  Byzantion  and  Perinthos  con- 
cluded an  alliance  with  Athens.  This  step  was  a  griev- 
ous disappointment  to  Philip,  which  he  tried  to  counter- 
balance by  a  sudden  seizure  of  the  two  cities ;  but  in 
each  case  he  was  foiled,  and  his  failure  brought  into  re- 
lief the  danger  which  they  had  barely  escaped. 

The  bitter  feelings  aroused  on  both  sides  by  this  state 

of  things  found  expression  in  contemporary  documents. 

An  extant  letter  of  Philip's  "to  the  Athenian 

Proof  of  ~  ,     , , 

embittered  benatc  and  people  sets  forth  nine  indict- 
feehng.  mcnts   against   them,  partly  frivolous   and 

partly  embarrassing,  whose  collective  weight  however 
might  seem  to  justify  action  on  his  part,  if  Athens  still 
persisted  in  refusing  reparation,  or  (as  he  suggested) 
arbitration.  On  the  other  hand  a  reference  to  the  third 
Philippic  of  Demosthenes,  delivered  in  342,  or  to  his 
so-called  answer  to  Philip's  letter  in  340,  will  show  that 
Philip's  policy  was  diplomatic  in  a  sense  of  the  word 
which  has  often  been  illustrated  in  history,  since  the 
fable  of  the  Wolf  and  Lamb  was  written.  Demosthenes 
protested  against  further  delay  in  preparing  for  the  in- 
evitable struggle  for  liberty.     But  it  was  useless  to  hope 


' 


for  energy  in  others — useless  to  expect  Chalkidians  or 
Megarians  to  move  in  defence  of  Greece,  unless  Athe- 
nians set  the  example  of  self-sacrifice. 

Shortly  after  midsummer,  340,  Athens  at  last  declared 
war  against  King  Philip.  A  short  respite  was  allowed 
her  for  preparation  by  a  raid  of  the  king  into 
the  country  between  Mount  Haimos  and  the  and^dedara-^ 
Danube  in  the  spring  of  339,  whence  he  was  A^ilensTo)''^ 
returning  with  many  slaves  and  cattle  when 
suddenly  attacked  by  a  tribe  of  Thracians,  by  whom 
he  was  defeated,  stripped  of  his  plunder,  and  himself 
wounded.  The  respite  was  wisely  used — thanks  to  De- 
mosthenes— in  reforming  the  navy ;  a  reform,  the  details 
of  which  belong  to  Athenian  rather  than  to  Macedonian 
history,  but  the  success  of  which  was  so  marked,  that, 
speaking  nine  years  later,  when  Athens  was  humbled 
to  the  dust  by  Philip's  greater  son,  Demosthenes  could 
boast  that  "under  his  law  no  tricrarch  had  ever  been 
obliged  to  appeal  to  the  State  for  relief,  or  been  thrown 
into  prison  by  the  Naval  Board — no  trireme  had  been 
lost  to  the  city  at  sea,  or  left  behind  in  harbour  unable 
to  put  out."  Such  a  boast,  made  in  public  and  therefore 
open  to  contradiction,  speaks  well  for  the  efficiency 
both  of  ships  and  captains;  while  it  implies  that  such 
events  were  common  enough  under  the  older  and  less 
equitable  system.  About  the  same  time  Demosthenes, 
in  concert  with  friends  like-minded  to  himself,  at  last 
persuaded  the  Athenians  to  set  aside  the  noxious  law 
which  had  decreed  that  all  the  surplus  of  the  State  in- 
come should  go  to  the  Theorikon  (Festival  fund,)  and 
that  anyone  who  moved  a  difTerent  application  of  it 
should  be  put  to  death.  The  new  law  provided  that  any 
surplus  should  accumulate  as  a  war  fund.  In  this  way, 
and  not  a  moment  too  soon,  the  sinews  of  war  were  pro- 


72 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  VII. 


t 


■I 


vided  for  the  fast-approaching  struggle.  Yet  the  dif- 
ficulties of  the  position  were  not  so  easily 
diXuttSsof  removed.  There  was  still  a  Macedonian 
'Phmp?^"'^  party  in  Athens,  as  in  most  other  Greek 
cities — silenced  for  the  moment,  but  watch- 
ful, bitter,  audacious.  There  were  no  experienced  gen- 
erals to  pit  against  Philip,  and  it  was  difficult  to  find  a 
weak  point  for  attack  in  Philip's  empire.  For  a  blockade 
goes  but  a  little  way  towards  ending  a  war ;  and  land- 
ings on  the  coast,  without  some  base  of  operations,  would 
be  mere  temporary  inconveniences.  Philip,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  also  difficulties  of  his  own,  in  that  he  could 
not  afford  to  stir  up  an  Hellenic  war ;  while  his  allies, 
especially  the  Thcbans,  were  not  altogether  trustworthy, 
and  a  direct  attack  upon  Athens  would  probably  at  once 
bring  about  that  very  league  which  he  feared.  One  coign 
of  vantage,  however,  he  had.  If  direct  attack  was  to  bo 
avoided,  intrigue  was  always  possible.  He  was  president 
of  the  Amphiktyons,  and  thereby  guardian  of  the  national 
sanctuary.  His  agents  were  everywhere.  It  was  to  be 
their  business  to  find  an  opportunity  for  him  to  appear 
in  central  Greece  at  the  head  of  an  army,  so  that  he 
might  seem  to  come  as  a  defender  of  the  god  Apollo 
rather  than  for  aggressive  purposes.  Then  whoever 
opposed  him  would  have  to  bear  the  odious  part  of 
seeming  to  oppose  the  god.  This  was  the  occasion  of 
the  Third  Sacred  War, 

At  the  head  of  a  deeply-sunk  bay  in  the  Corinthian 

Gulf  lay  a  small  fortified  town,  Kirrha,  the  port  of  Krissa 

and  of  Delphoi,  distant  about  seven  miles. 

Causes  of  the  , 

Third  Sacred     A  large  number  of  Delphian  pilgrims  came 

ar  (339)-         by  water,  and  of  course  landed  at  Kirrha, 

which  was  therefore  prosperous  and  wealthy,  and  an 

object  of  envy  to  its  neighbours.     So  early  as  the  sixth 


CH.  VII. 


Third  Sacred  War, 


n 


Vf% 


century  B.  c.  this  jealousy  had  shown  itself  on  the  oc- 
casion of  the  First  Sacred  War,  when  Kirrha  had  bee*' 
destroyed,  and  the  whole  plain  as  far  as  Delphoi  had 
been  consecrated  to  the  god — ir  other  words,  pronounced 
"incapable  for  ever  of  being  tilled,  planted,  or  occupied 
by  man."  But  natural  laws  presently  vindicated  them- 
selves. Men  must  eat  and  have  the  necessaries  of  life, 
even  though  land  has  been  consecrated ;  and  as  pilgrims 
did  not  cease  to  resort  to  Delphoi,  and  to  come  as 
heretofore  by  sea,  it  was  found  as  impossible  to  maintain 
the  desolation  of  Kirrha  as  it  would  be  to  leave  in  ruins 
Djidda,  the  port  of  Mecca.  Kirrha  was  rebuilt  and  re- 
occupied  by  Lokrians  of  Amphissa — a  usurpation  which 
from  its  convenience  was  tolerated,  if  not  condoned. 
During  the  Second  Sacred  War  (356-347)  these  Lokrians 
had  been  staunch  allies  of  the  Dclphians  and  Thebans 
against  the  Phokians,  and  had  suffered  many  things  at 
the  hands  of  Philomclos ;  it  follows  that  they  were  no 
friends  to  Athens,  the  friend  of  Phokis  and  enemy  of 
Thebes.  It  was  on  these  long-standing  feuds  and  secret 
jealousies  that  Philip  worked  by  means  of  his  agents. 

The  Philippizers  in  Athens,  for  the  moment  defeated, 
were  still  dangerous.     The  war  party  were  busy  with 
preparations,    and,  while   keeping   vigilant 
watch  on  Philip's  movements,  forgot  or  de-      the  Am- 
spised  possible  intriguers  at  Delphoi  or  in      meetirTg  a't^ 
the  Amphktyonic    Council.      Hence   their      J^'^'pi^"*- 
opponents  stole  an  easy  march  upon  them,  when  they 
succeeded  in  carrying  at  Athens  the  election  of  Philip- 
pizing   representatives   to   the   annual   meeting   of   the 
council  at  Delphoi  in  339,  ^schines  being  one  of  the 
four.     The  Amphiktyons  met  in  February ;  and  imme- 
diately, instigated  by  the  Thebans,  the  Amphissians  made 
a  violent  attack  upon  the  Athenians  for  impiety  in  hav- 


74 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  VII. 


ing  dedicated  afresh  at  Dolphoi,  before  the  temple  was 
purified,  a  memorial  of  the  battle  of  Plataia,  in  the 
shape  of  shields  bearing  the  names  of  Persians  and 
Thcbans  conjointly  as  defeated  there.  Nothing  could 
have  suited  Philip's  purpose  better,  for  it  seemed  to 
make  alliance  between  Athens  and  Thebes  less  possible 
than  ever.  It  happened  that  the  chairman  of  the  Athe- 
nian envoys  at  Delphoi  was  taken  suddenly  ill,  and  his 
duties  devolved  upon  yEschines,  who  has  left  us  his  ac- 
count of  what  happened.  The  Amphissian  speaker  (he 
tells  us)  was  a  violent  and  uneducated  fellow,  who  not 
only  made  this  sudden  onslaught  upon  Athens,  but  ve- 
hemently declared  that  had  the  Greeks  been  wise  they 
would  have  shut  out  the  Athenians  from  the  temple 
itself,  as  accursed  for  their  alliance  with  the  Phokians. 
*'I  was  more  angry"  (says  ^schines)  "than  ever  before 
in  my  life  .  .  .  and  standing  up  where  I  was  (for 
the  whole  plain  of  Kirrha  lay  stretched  at  our  feet)  I 
pointed  out  to  the  Amphiktyons  the  cultivated  plains, 
the  buildings,  the  sacred  harbour  fortified,  and  asked 
them  how  they  could  hope  to  pray  and  sacrifice  accept- 
ably to  the  gods,  when  they  were  forgetting  their  oaths 
Second  de-  ^"^^  Conniving  at  sacrilege."  The  indigna- 
tion of  the  council  was  at  once  diverted 
from  the  offending  Athenians  against  the 
yet  more  guilty  Amphissians ;  and  next  day 
the  whole  population  of  Delphoi,  with  the 
sanction  of  the  council,  trooped  down  to  the  sea  to  burn 
the  accursed  buildings  and  fill  up  the  harbour.  The 
deed  was  done,  and  the  god  perhaps  appeased.  But  as 
they  returned  the  Amphissians  fell  upon  them  and  drove 
them  homewards  in  undisguised  rout.  Here  was  a 
further  complication,  calling  for  prompt  and  signal  pun- 
ishment.    A  second  and  extraordinary  meeting  of  the 


stniction  of 
Kirrha ;  and 
counter- 
attack of  the 
Amphis- 
sians. 


\ 


^A 


CH.  VII. 


TJiird  Sacred  War, 


75 


Extraordi- 
nary meet- 
ing of  the 
Amphikty- 
onic  Council. 


council  was  summoned  atThermopylaito  discuss  this  new 
phase  of  affairs,  and  to  arrange  for  the  punishment  of  the 
now  doubly  guilty  Amphissians.  Meanwhile  the  deputies 
were  to  return  to  their  several  cities,  to  recount  what  had 
happened,  and  to  receive  instructions  for  the  future. 

The  first  feeling  at  Athens  was  one  of  satisfaction  at 
the  vindication  of  the  city  by  ^schines,  and  a  resolve  to 
send  envoys  to  the  extraordinary  meeting. 
But  before  long,  at  Athens  no  less  than  at 
Thebes,  there  followed  a  sense  of  lurking- 
danger,  and  at  each  city  resolutions  were 
passed  to  take  no  part  in  the  coming  meeting.  Never- 
theless the  Amphiktyons  met  in  the  summer  of  339  under 
the  presidency  of  a  Thcssalian  ;  but  it  was  practically  a 
packed  meeting  of  Macedonian  partisans  only.  The 
president  was  charged  with  the  duty  of  punishing  the 
Amphissians.  But  the  half-heartcdness  of  some  and  the 
corrupt  abstention  of  others  appear  to  have  so  effectually 
prevented  success,  that  by  the  time  of  the  usual  autum- 
nal meeting  nothing  had  been  done,  and  the  council 
was  obliged  to  discuss  this  burning  question  under  a 
new  phase.  It  was  just  for  this  crisis  that  Philip's 
agents  had  been  working  and  were  now  prepared. 
When  the  alternative  was  boldly  stated,  that  the  league 
must  either  itself  take  up  the  matter  more  earnestly,  or 
must  appoint  Philip  their  general,  and  let  him  do  it  for 
them,  little  hesitation  was  shown ;  and  the  King  of 
Macedon  was  formally  invited  into  the  heart  of  Greece 
to  settle  Greek  affairs  by  those  who  were  in  reality  most 
interested  in  keeping  him  out.  Philip,  on  his  part, 
gladly  accepted  an  invitation  which  gave  him  a  legiti- 
mate footing  south  of  Thermopylai,  and  brought  him 
nearer  to  his  newly-declared  enemies  the  Athenians 
(autumn,  339). 


76 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  VIT. 


Philip, 

as  general  of 
the  Am- 
phiktyons, 
seizes 
Elateia. 


He  at  once  collected  his  forces  and  marched  upon 
Thermopylai,  as  though  to  punish  the  wicked  Amphis- 
sians.  All  Greece  was  expectant,  and  was 
not  long  kept  in  suspense.  From  the  corner 
of  the  Maliac  Gulf  three  main  roads  led  to 
the  interior  of  Greece;  one  running  due 
south  from  Herakleia  to  Amphiasa  through 
the  defiles  between  Mounts  Parnassus  and  Korax — the 
direct  route  therefore  for  Philip,  if  he  desired  to  carry 
out  honestly  the  duty  imposed  on  him.  The  other  two 
ran  at  first  together  through  the  pass  as  far  as  Skarpheia, 
and  then  diverged  southeastward  along  the  coast  and 
southward  over  Mount  Kallidromos  to  Elateia.  Philip 
passed  Thermopylai,  seized  and  garrisoned  Nikaia  close 
to  Skarpheia,  having  previously  detached  a  small  part  of 
his  army  by  the  first-mentioned  road  ;  and  then  advanc- 
ing rapidly  through  the  mountains  halted  and  formed  an 
intrenched  camp  at  Elateia.  It  was  a  strong  position  on 
the  southern  slope  of  the  mountain  side,  commanding 
the  plain  of  the  Kephissos,  and  favourable,  therefore,  for 
cavalry — commanding  also  the  road  to  Boiotia,  Thebes, 
and  Athens.  At  the  same  time  he  could  communicate 
by  his  right  flank  with  the  division  operating  against 
Amphissa,  while  his  retreat  in  case  of  need  was  com- 
pletely secured. 

This    sudden    blow   fell   like   a  thunderbolt  both  at 
Athens  and  at  Thebes.     The  long-dissembled  war  was 
at  their  doors,  and  Philip's  intentions  stood 
Athens^and       confcsscd.  "  It  was  evening"  (says  Demos- 
Tncbes.  thcncs)  "  when  the  news  arrived  of  the  occu- 

pation of  Elateia.  Hereupon  some  of  the  prytaneis  arose 
at  once  from  supper  and  began  turning  out  the  occu- 
pants of  the  booths  in  the  market-place,  and  setting  fire 
to  the  barriers;  others  sent  for  the  generals,  and  the 


CH.  VII.         Alliance  of  Athens  and  Thebes, 


77 


whole  city  was  full  of  confusion."  Next  morning  at 
break  of  day  there  was  a  special  session  of  both  Senate 
and  Assembly ;  yet  such  was  the  general  panic  that  no 
one  had  a  word  of  advice  to  offer.  Demosthenes  at  this 
moment  was  the  sheet-anchor  of  Athenian  hopes,  and 
all  eyes  were  turned  on  him.  The  most  urgent  question 
was  as  to  the  loyalty  of  Thebes.  Was  she  in  league 
with  Philip  ?  Demosthenes  strenuously  denied  it.  Had 
she  been  so,  Philip  would  have  been  not  in  Elateia  but 
already  on  the  frontiers  of  Attica.  He  was,  where  he 
was,  because  he  wished  to  embolden  his  friends  and 
overawe  his  enemies  in  Thebes.  The  Athenians,  there- 
fore, must  follow  Philip's  example,  and  encourage  their 
friends  in  Thebes  by  a  show  of  force  upon  the  frontiers. 
They  must  further  send  ten  envoys  to  Thebes,  not  to 
haggle  about  conditions,  but  to  promise  help  whenever 
and  wherever  it  might  be  required. 

This  advice  was  followed,  but  it  was  a  delicate  nego- 
tiation for  the  envoys  to  conduct.  Thebes  was  nearer  to 
the  danger  than  was  Athens ;  and  Macedonian  envoys 
were  already  on  the  spot,  reminding  the  Thebans  of 
favours  in  the  past,  and  hinting  at  favours  to  come. 
Thebes,  too,  had  no  special  love  for  Athens.  Thanks, 
however,  to  the  eloquence  of  Demosthenes,  the  offered 
alliance  was  accepted.  The  major  part  of  ^|,j^„^.eof 
the  Athenian  army  joined  the  Thebans  on      Athens  and 

•^    •'  •        J   •  Thebes 

the  Boiotian  frontier ;  the  rest  remamed  m  »j;aiiist 
garrison  at  Thebes,  which  was  to  be  the  base  ^^'^'P' 
of  operations.  The  command  was  shared  equally  by 
the  two  allies.  Of  the  expenses  Athens  undertook  two- 
thirds.  To  Philip,  on  the  other  hand,  the  alliance  was 
seriously  embarrassing.  He  had  two  foes  before  him 
instead  of  one— an  enemy  in  Thebes  where  he  had  ex- 
pected an  ally. 


78 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  VII. 


Vigour  of 
the  allies 
dufinj;  the 
winter 
(339-8). 


During  the  winter  the  allies  held  their  own  with  con- 
siderable success.  They  were  victorious  in 
two  minor  engagements,  and  they  achieved 
a  masterly  stroke  of  policy  in  restoring  the 
Phokian  emigrants  to  their  homes,  and  in  for- 
tifying some  of  their  towns.  Nor  was  the  alliance  against 
Philip  confined  to  the  two  cities.  The  activity  of  Demos- 
thenes secured  further  aid  from  various  allies,  amounting 
(including  Thebans)  to  an  auxiliary  force  of  i5,oo<j 
infantry  and  2,000  horsemen.  But  soldiers  without  gen- 
erals are  little  worth,  and,  as  Phokion  was  in  the  Helles- 
pont, neither  Athens  nor  Thebes  had  a  general  worth 
the  name  to  oppose  to  Philip.  The  decisive 
^^Sip"^  struggle  took  place  in  August,  338.  Philip 
and  their  ^.^s  in  position  at  Elateia  with   30,000  in- 

fantry, and  not  less  than  2,000  cavalry.  He 
had  already  fixed  upon  his  field  of  battle,  and  his  im- 
mediate tactics  were  directed  to  securing  it.  The  allies 
lay  before  him  with  about  equal  numbers,  occupying  the 
pass  through  the  hills  between  the  towns  of  Parapotamii 
and  Chaironeia,  which  led  into  Boiotia.  His  first  object 
was  to  gain  this  pass.  Passing  along  their  front,  his 
vanguard  crossed  the  border,  more  to  the  east,  plundered 
some  villages,  and  threatened  the  whole  country  south 
and  east  of  the  Lake  Kopais.  In  short  their  flank  was 
turned,  and  Thebes  in  danger.  The  allies  were  obliged, 
therefore,  against  their  wish,  to  leave  a  small  garrison  in 
the  pass,  and  to  fall  back  toward  Thebes.  This  was  ex- 
actly what  the  king  desired.  His  chosen  battle-field  was 
the  plain  of  Chaironeia  ;  and  to  gain  it  he 
must  gain  the  pass.  Returning  by  forced 
marches,  he  overpowered  the  garrison, 
passed  the  defile,  and  stood  master  of  the 
situation  on  his  chosen  ground,  the  grave,  as  Marathon 


Battle  of 
Chaironeia 
(August, 
338). 


CH.  VII.        Alliance  of  Athens  and  TJiebes. 


79 


was  the  cradle,  of  Hellenic  liberty.    The  allies  returned 
also,  and  faced  him  in  front  of  Chaironeia. 

The  right  wing  was  held  by  the  Thebans;  in  the  cen- 
tre were  the  allied  contingents  and  mercenaries  ;  on  the 
left  and  nearest  to  Chaironeia  were  the  Athenians.  Op- 
posite to  them  Philip  commanded  in  person;  Phihp's 
son,  Alexander,  was  to  attack  the  Thcban  right.  The 
battle  began  hopefully  for  the  allied  forces.  While  the 
Thebans  sturdily  held  their  ground  against  Alexander's 
vehement  charges,  PhiUp,  whether  from  weakness  or  de- 
sign, fell  back  before  the  vigour  of  the  Athenians.  "Let 
us  pursue  them"  (shouted  one  of  the  generals)  "even  to 
Macedon!"  But  this  boasting  was  premature.  After 
fighting  all  the  morning,  the  brave  Thebans  were  at  last 
overpowered  by  the  superior  training  and  endurance  of 
their  enemies,  and  died  where  they  fought.  Charging 
over  their  bodies  Alexander  fiercely  fell  upon  the  flank 
of  the  centre,  which  gave  way  at  once  ;  and  having  dis- 
posed of  these  he  turned  yet  once  more  upon  the  flanks 
and  rear  of  the  Athenians,  who  after  a  too  hasty  advance 
were  now  slowly  retreating  before  Philip's  renewed  at- 
tack. All  indeed  was  lost  save  honour.  For  a  short 
while  making  head  against  overpowering  odds,  the  brave 
left  wing  at  last  broke  and  fled,  leaving  1,000  dead  upon 
the  field,  and  2,000  prisoners  in  the  enemy's  hands.  The 
Theban  loss  must  have  been  even  greater.  Nor  was  the 
moral  effect  of  the  victory  less  imposing.  It  was  a  con- 
quest rather  than  a  victory.  The  army  of  the  allies 
ceased  to  exist.  There  was  no  thought  of  any  further 
resistance;  and  Athens  and  Thebes  must  prepare  for  the 
worst — for  attack  and  siege — possibly  for  ruin. 


-afbi 


80 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  VIII. 


CH.  VIII.        Residt  of  Battle  of  Chair oneia. 


81 


B«?haviour 
of  Philip  to 
Thebes  and 
Athens  after 
his  victory. 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

FROM  THE   BATTLE  OF   CHAIRONEIA  TO   THE  BEGINNING 
OF  ALEXANDER'S  ASIATIC   CAMPAIGNS. 

In  spite  of  the  collapse  of  all  their  hopes,  energetic 
preparations  for  defence  were  made  both  at  Thebes  and 
at  Athens.  But  there  was  no  more  possi- 
bility of  common  action.  The  latter,  in- 
deed, was  better  off  than  the  former,  for  she 
was  not  a  faithless  ally  but  an  open  enemy ; 
while  her  prestige  was  too  great  to  admit  of 
harsh  treatment,  and  her  power  (at  any  rate  at  sea)  still 
too  formidable  to  make  it  safe  to  drive  her  to  extremi- 
ties. It  was  not  strange,  therefore,  that  Philip  should 
have  treated  Athens  with  marked  leniency,  and  Thebes 
with  great  harshness — selling  his  Theban  prisoners  as 
slaves,  indulging  freely  in  banishment  and  confiscations, 
filling  the  Kadmeia  with  Macedonian  troops,  establish- 
ing a  packed  oligarchy  of  300  of  his  own  partisans,  and 
restoring  nominal  autonomy  to  the  smaller  Boiotian 
towns.  In  his  relations  to  Athens  Polybius  insists  that 
Philip's  conduct  was  marked  by  extraordinary  modera- 
tion, humanity,  and  gentlemanly  courtesy.  Diodoros 
tells  us,  in  a  very  different  strain,  that  Philip's  head  was 
turned  by  his  success,  and  that  he  grossly  insulted  his 
Athenian  prisoners,  until  rebuked  by  one  of  them, 
named  Demadcs,  for  playing  the  part  of  Thersites, 
when  fortune  had  allotted  him  that  of  Agamemnon. 
Whichever  account  be  true,  his  final  treatment  of  Athens 
was  unquestionably  lenient. 

Demades    had  been  released  by  Philip — perhaps  in 


compliment  to  his  plain-speaking— and  shortly  after  his 
return  home  an  embassy  (including  himself 
and  yEschincs.  and  probably  Phokion)  was      '^^'^^^^l^^, 
sent  to  the  king,  to  sound   his  intentions. 
They  found  him,  now  at  any  rate,  full  of  courtesy,  and 
ready  to  make  peace  on  terms,  with  one  exception,  both 
easy  and  welcome.     He  agreed  to  restore  his  prisoners, 
and  to  transfer  the  border  town  of  Oropos  from  Thebes 
to  Athens.     But  one  condition  was  humiliating.   Athens 
must  acknowledge  the  Hegemony  of  the  King  of  Mace- 
don  in  Hellas.     In  other  words,  henceforth  not  Thebes, 
nor   Sparta,   nor  Athens   was    to  be   recognized  chief 
of  Greece,  but  a  barbarous.  half-Hellenic  King  at  Pella! 
It  has  been  said— and  rightly— that  the  peace  of  De- 
mades  was  a  renunciation  of  a  proud  historical  past,  and 
that  with  it  the  connected  history-  of  Greece  is  at  an  end. 
Nevertheless,  Athens  had  but  little  choice  in  the  matter. 
The  terms  were  accepted,  and  the  peace  concluded. 
And  here  we  may  observe  once  more  the  astuteness  of 
Philip.     Not  only  had  he  bought  his  own  recognition  as 
the  leader  of  Greece  from  the  necessities  of  Athens,  but 
by  the  price  paid— the  cession  of  Oropos— he  had  also 
secured  perpetual  jealousy  between  Thebes  and  Athens. 
The  progress  of  the  king's  arms  was  now  rapid  and 
easy.     He  reduced  Akarnania,  and  placed  a  garrison  in 
Ambrakia.     In  the  Pcloponncsos  he  had  so  p^^jp  j„ 

many   friends,   who    counted    on    his    aid  Peiopon- 

against  Sparta,  that  he  met  with  little  or  no 
resistance.  It  does  not  appear  that  he  actually  attacked 
Sparta  itself;  but  he  gratified  Mess^ne,  Megalopolis, 
Arkadia,  and  Argos,  by  restoring  to  them  severally  the 
lands  which  had  been  torn  from  them  by  Spartan  ag- 
gression ;  while  he  served  his  own  purposes  by  thus  con- 
stituting a  number  of  small  communities,  all  jealous  of 

G 


82 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  VIII. 


CH.  VIII. 


Death  of  Philip, 


83 


The  Con 
gress  of 
( Corinth 
(337)- 


each  other  and  all  equally  feeble.  This 
commanding  position  was  further  assured 
at  a  general  congress  of  Greek  cities,  held 
at  Corinth  (337).  The  king  there  publicly 
announced  his  intention  of  invading  Persia,  with  the 
double  purpose  of  freeing  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  and  of 
avenging  the  invasion  of  Xerxes,  and  was  formally  ac- 
cepted by  a  general  vote  as  Commander-in-Chief:  but 
to  some,  and  most  of  all  to  Athens,  it  must  have  been 
gall  and  wormwood  to  find  themselves,  not  only  stripped 
of  subject  allies,  but  enrolled  along  with  them  in  the 
common  herd  of  contributory  appendages  to  King 
PhiHp.  Sparta  alone  held  aloof,  and  was  spared  this 
humiliation.  Preparations  were  at  once  begun,  and  car- 
ried on  throughout  the  year,  for  the  projected  invasion 
of  Asia;  and  in  the  spring  of  336  the  first  division 
crossed  the  Hellespont,  under  the  command  of  Parme- 
nion  and  Attalos,  father  of  Philip's  last  wife,  Kleopatra. 
Philip  himself  was  to  follow  with  the  main  body. 

But  the  king  was  destined  never  to  set  foot  in  Asia. 
In  the  apparently  unchecked  career  of  this  man  of  strong 
Assassina-  passious,  who  had  led  a  joyous,  active,  mas- 
tion  of  terful  existence,  there  was  an  clement  of  dis- 

Philipby  ,  J  t  •  1      * 

Pausanias  cord  and  unhappmcss  only  too  common  m 
(336)-  ^^  courts  of  despots.     Philip  had  married 

several  wives  in  succession :  and  the  same  jealousies  and 
intritrues  which  distract  the  harem  of  an  eastern  sultan, 
or  haunted  the  court  of  a  Louis  XIV.,  disturbed  also  the 
palace  of  King  Philip.  The  last  favourite  was  Kleopatra, 
and  at  her  solicitation  it  was  that  Philip  was  said  to 
have  repudiated  Olympias,  the  mother  of  Alexander, 
who  withdrew  to  her  brother's  court  in  Epeiros.  Furious 
quarrels  ensued  between  father  and  son,  even  at  the 
marriage  feast  of  Kleopatra.     Cabals  arose  within  the 


.. 


' 


-> 


( 


palace.  So  uneasy,  indeed,  did  Philip  feel  at  the  pros- 
pect of  leaving  this  hotbed  of  intrigue  behind  him,  when 
he  went  to  Asia,  that  he  gave  his  own  daughter  in  mar- 
riage to  the  brother  of  Olympias,  to  disarm,  if  possible, 
his  hostility.  This  marriage,  as  well  as  the  birth  of  a 
son  to  Kleopatra,  were  celebrated  at  Aigai,  in  August, 
336,  with  the  utmost  magnificence.  It  was  hoped  that 
banquets  and  games,  and  scenic  representations,  might 
not  only  dazzle  the  minds  of  Greek  deputies,  but  recon- 
cile the  jarring  feuds  of  court  cliques.  But  it  was  a  vain 
hope.  There  was  present  at  the  feast  a  young  man, 
Pausanias  by  name,  who  had  a  deadly  insult  to  avenge 
upon  Attalos,  Kleopatra's  father,  or  (in  the  absence  of 
Attalos)  on  any  connected  with  him  ;  for  Pausanias  had 
complained  to  Philip,  and  with  no  result  but  ridicule. 
He  had  already  resolved,  therefore,  to  divert  his  ven- 
geance from  Attalos,  who  was  in  Asia,  to  Philip,  who 
had  refused  redress,  when  he  fell  into  the  hands  of 
Olympias  and  her  partisans,  who  artfully  whetted  his 
thirst  for  revenge,  and  instigated  the  deed  of  blood. 
On  the  festal  day,  by  Philip's  express  invitation,  hun- 
dreds were  present  from  all  parts  of  Greece,  and  so 
great  was  the  crush  that  many  flocked  to  the  theatre  be- 
fore daylight  to  secure  places.  There  were  dubious  ru- 
mours and  curious  oracles  afloat,  as  on  the  fatal  Ides  of 
March,  when  Caesar  fell  before  the  daggers  of  the  Lib- 
erators :  but  Philip,  absorbed  in  his  own  greatness,  or 
perhaps  careless  of  danger,  proceeded  to  the  theatre  on 
foot,  and  even  bade  his  guards  fall  back,  that  all  might 
see  how  safely  he  was  defended  by  Hellenic  good-will 
and  affection.  At  this  moment  Pausanias  rushed  for- 
ward, and  drawing  out  a  hidden  Keltic  sword,  plunged 
it  into  the  king's  side,  who  fell  dead  upon  the  spot.  His 
guards  and  friends  were  so  paralyzed  with  horror,  that 


82 


The  Macedonian  Etnpire. 


CH.  VIII. 


CH.  VIII. 


Death  of  Philip. 


83 


each  other  and  all  equally  feeble.  This 
^ss^T"  commanding  position  was  further  assured 

Corinth  ^^  ^  general  congress  of  Greek  cities,  held 

at  Corinth  (337).  The  king  there  publicly 
announced  his  intention  of  invading  Persia,  with  the 
double  purpose  of  freeing  the  Asiatic  Greeks,  and  of 
avenging  the  invasion  of  Xerxes,  and  was  formally  ac- 
cepted by  a  general  vote  as  Commander-in-Chief :  but 
to  some,  and  most  of  all  to  Athens,  it  must  have  been 
gall  and  wormwood  to  find  themselves,  not  only  stripped 
of  subject  allies,  but  enrolled  along  with  them  in  the 
common  herd  of  contributory  appendages  to  King 
Philip.  Sparta  alone  held  aloof,  and  was  spared  this 
humiliation.  Preparations  were  at  once  begun,  and  car- 
ried on  throughout  the  year,  for  the  projected  invasion 
of  Asia;  and  in  the  spring  of  336  the  first  division 
crossed  the  Hellespont,  under  the  command  of  Parme- 
nion  and  Attalos,  father  of  Philip's  last  wife,  Kleopatra. 
Philip  himself  was  to  follow  with  the  main  body. 

But  the  king  was  destined  never  to  set  foot  in  Asia. 
In  the  apparently  unchecked  career  of  this  man  of  strong 
Assassina-  passions,  who  had  led  a  joyous,  active,  mas- 
tion  of  terful  existence,  there  was  an  element  of  dis- 

Philip  by  ,  ,  •  i 

Pausanias  cord  and  unhappmcss  only  too  common  m 

(336).  ^^^  courts  of  despots.     Philip  had  married 

several  wives  in  succession :  and  the  same  jealousies  and 
intrigues  which  distract  the  harem  of  an  eastern  sultan, 
or  haunted  the  court  of  a  Louis  XIV.,  disturbed  also  the 
palace  of  King  Philip.  The  last  favourite  was  Kleopatra, 
and  at  her  solicitation  it  was  that  Philip  was  said  to 
have  repudiated  Olympias,  the  mother  of  Alexander, 
who  withdrew  to  her  brother's  court  in  Epeiros.  Furious 
quarrels  ensued  between  father  and  son,  even  at  the 
marriage  feast  of  Kleopatra.     Cabals  arose  within  the 


( 


palace.  So  uneasy,  indeed,  did  Philip  feel  at  the  pros- 
pect of  leaving  this  hotbed  of  intrigue  behind  him,  when 
he  went  to  Asia,  that  he  gave  his  own  daughter  in  mar- 
riage to  the  brother  of  Olympias,  to  disarm,  if  possible, 
his  hostility.  This  marriage,  as  well  as  the  birth  of  a 
son  to  Kleopatra,  were  celebrated  at  Aigai,  in  August, 
336,  with  the  utmost  magnificence.  It  was  hoped  that 
banquets  and  games,  and  scenic  representations,  might 
not  only  dazzle  the  minds  of  Greek  deputies,  but  recon- 
cile the  jarring  feuds  of  court  cliques.  But  it  was  a  vain 
hope.  There  was  present  at  the  feast  a  young  man, 
Pausanias  by  name,  who  had  a  deadly  insult  to  avenge 
upon  Attalos,  Kleopatra's  father,  or  (in  the  absence  of 
Attalos)  on  any  connected  with  him  ;  for  Pausanias  had 
complained  to  Philip,  and  with  no  result  but  ridicule. 
He  had  already  resolved,  therefore,  to  divert  his  ven- 
geance from  Attalos,  who  was  in  Asia,  to  Philip,  who 
had  refused  redress,  when  he  fell  into  the  hands  of 
Olympias  and  her  partisans,  who  artfully  whetted  his 
thirst  for  revenge,  and  instigated  the  deed  of  blood. 
On  the  festal  day,  by  Philip's  express  invitation,  hun- 
dreds were  present  from  all  parts  of  Greece,  and  so 
great  was  the  crush  that  many  flocked  to  the  theatre  be- 
fore daylight  to  secure  places.  There  were  dubious  ru- 
mours and  curious  oracles  afloat,  as  on  the  fatal  Ides  of 
March,  when  Ca}sar  fell  before  the  daggers  of  the  Lib- 
erators :  but  Philip,  absorbed  in  his  own  greatness,  or 
perhaps  careless  of  danger,  proceeded  to  the  theatre  on 
foot,  and  even  bade  his  guards  fall  back,  that  all  might 
see  how  safely  he  was  defended  by  Hellenic  good-will 
and  affection.  At  this  moment  Pausanias  rushed  for- 
ward, and  drawing  out  a  hidden  Keltic  sword,  plunged 
it  into  the  king's  side,  who  fell  dead  upon  the  spot.  His 
guards  and  friends  were  so  paralyzed  with  horror,  that 


1^ 


84 


TJie  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  VIII. 


the  assassin  almost  escaped  their  vengeance ;  but  was 
presently  overtaken  and  slain.  It  was  a  moment  of  tu- 
mult and  confusion,  when,  but  for  one  man's  presence  of 
mind,  Macedon  might  have  been  plunged  into  the  hor- 
rors of  civil  war.  Philip  was  no  sooner  seen  to  be  dead 
than  one  of  those  who  had  been  privy  to  the  plot  has- 
tened to  salute  the  young  Alexander  as  king,  helped  him 
to  arm,  and  accompanied  him  to  the  palace — a  prompt- 
ness which  anticipated  any  action  on  the  part  of  Klco- 
patra  and  her  friends.  From  that  moment  Alexander 
was  king  of  Macedon,  and  the  successor  to  all  his 
father's  power  and  ambitious  plans. 

So  perished  one  of  the  world's  great  conquerors,  in 
the  47th  year  of  his  age,  and  the  24th  of  his  reign — 
great  beyond  question,  if  greatness  consists 
in  having  grand  and  definite  aims,  and  in 
successfully  adapting  means  to  ends.  To 
Macedon,  the  reign  of  Philip  was  the  pas- 
sage from  obscurity  to  empire,  from  barbarism  to  at 
least  semi-civilization.  Arrian  puts  into  the  lips  of  Alex- 
ander a  glowing  eulogy  on  his  father's  benefits  to  his 
country.  From  mountain-shepherds  clad  in  skins,  hard 
pressed  by  warlike  neighbours,  he  turned  them,  he  said, 
into  dwellers  in  cities,  with  laws  and  civilized  habits. 
Illyrians,  Thracians,  Thessalians,  he  reduced  to  subjec- 
tion. He  added  to  the  kingdom  seaports  and  mines. 
Phokians,  Thebans,  Athenians  he  humbled,  and  set  in 
order  the  affairs  of  the  Peloponnese.  Lastly,  "he  was 
appointed  Supreme  Commander  of  United  Greece  for 
the  invasion  of  Persia,  and  thus  attached  glory  not  so 
much  to  himself  as  to  the  whole  of  the  Macedonian 
people."  Philip  was  great,  but  by  no  means  of  a  fine  or 
heroic  nature.  Judged  by  the  moral  standard  of  Greece, 
he  was  not  so  much  immoral  as  devoid  of  moral  sense 


Estimate  of 
Philip's  cha 
racier  and 
reign. 


CH.  VIII. 


Childhood  of  Alexander, 


85 


\ 


altogether.  To  gain  his  ends  all  means  were  alike — 
bribery,  flattery,  cruelty,  reckless  promises,  audacious 
perjury.  He  had  wives  and  mistresses  on  an  almost 
Eastern  scale.  His  court  was  the  resort  of  good-for- 
nothing  adventurers ;  his  body-guard  was  a  corps  in 
which  no  decent  man-  could  live.  And  yet  it  was  some- 
thing that  a  character  so  ungoverned  should  have  been 
willing  to  endure  so  much  for  glory  and  power,  and 
have  been  capable  of  even  winning  sympathy  and 
admiration— that  a  man  so  violent  should  have  pre- 
ferred mild  measures  to  strong,  and  have  been  some- 
times (as  in  the  case  of  Athens)  generous  and  forbear- 
ing. He  was  pre-eminently  fortunate  both  in  his  life 
and  in  his  death.  He  fell  upon  times  of  confusion  in 
Greece,  when  there  was  no  able  general,  no  leading 
city,  no  patriot  army  to  oppose  him.  He  died  at  a 
moment  apparently  premature,  but  in  reality  peculiarly 
happy,  when  the  difficulties  had  been  overcome  with 
which  his  genius  was  most  fitted  to  cope.  To  gain  di- 
plomatic triumphs,  by  fair  means  or  by  foul,  was  as  con- 
genial to  Philip's  character  as  the  forced  march  or  the 
din  of  battle  was  to  Alexander's. 

A  great  man  was  succeeded  by  a  yet   greater  son — 
one  who  ascended   the   throne   before   he   was   twenty, 
and  died  at  the  age  of  thirty-two.     The  his- 
tory of  heroes  is  the  history  of  youth,  it  has      and  Jduca" 
been  said,  and  Alexander  displayed  not  a      *^f^"^f„der. 
few  of  the  qualities  which  the  world  agrees 
to  call  heroic,     It  would  be  premature  to  dwell  at  length 
upon  the  character  and  exploits  which  are  to   develop 
themselves  in  the  following  pages  ;  yet  as  Alexander  re- 
sembled Napokon  and  many  another  great  man  in  the 
fact,  that  extraordinary  success  spoiled  a  really  great 
character,  it  will  be  well  to  touch  briefly  on  some  of  the 


S6 


The  Macedonian  Etnpire, 


CH.  VIII. 


stories  which  have  come  down  to  us  of  his  early  years, 
his  habits,  and  his  education.  He  was  the  son  of  the 
impetuous,  fanatical  Olympias  a  fact  which  itself  ex- 
plains half  the  eccentricities  and  violent  deeds  of  which 
he  was  guilty  when  his  head  was  turned  by  adulation. 
Three  successive  messengers  on  one  day  (it  was  said) 
brought  his  father  Philip  the  good  news,  that  Parme- 
nion  had  defeated  the  lUyrians,  that  his  horse  had  been 
victorious  at  Olympia,  and  that  his  wife  had  given  birth 
to  a  son.  From  early  years  the  boy  showed  signs  of  a 
marked  individuality,  which  was  trained  and  cultivated 
by  the  best  teachers  of  the  day — notably,  from  the  age 
of  thirteen  to  sixteen,  by  the  famous  Aristotle,  from 
whom  he  gained  a  special  taste  for  medical  science  and 
natural  history,  and  a  general  liking  for  knowledge  of 
all  sorts.  He  was  an  adept  in  music,  and  when  only 
eleven  years  old  played  the  lyre  in  public  before  the 
Athenian  ambassadors,  who  were  at  Pella  in  346.  Of 
books  he  loved  the  Iliad  best,  even  keeping  a  copy  by 
his  side  at  night  with  his  sword,  and  of  all  the  characters 
he  admired  most  that  of  Achilles.  If  he  surpassed  his 
compeers  in  general  intelligence,  he  was  not  less  manly 
than  they,  but  loved  hunting  and  fencing,  and  was  so 
bold  a  rider  as  to  manage  even  the  spirited  Boukepha- 
los  (Bucephalus)  whom  no  man  before  had  dared  to 
ride.  Indeed  he  had  the  tenderness  for  animals  cha- 
racteristic of  all  fine  natures,  loving  dog  and  horse  as 
faithful  friends.  Plutarch  even  asserts  that  when  Bou- 
kephalos  once  fell  into  the  hands  of  a  tribe  on  the  shores 
of  the  Caspian,  Alexander  was  inconsolable,  threatening 
fire  and  sword  and  utter  extermination  unless  his  favour- 
ite were  restored  ;  and  that  he  called  a  city  by  his  name, 
when  he  died  of  fatigue  after  the  battle  with  Poros.  In 
person  Alexander  was  of  a  fair  and  ruddy  complexion, 


CH.  VIII. 


Royal  Progress. 


87 


1 


^^ 


and  of  middle  height ;  he  had  bright,  expressive  eyes, 
and  a  strange  trick  of  holding  his  head  on  one  side,  which 
his  generals  and  courtiers  imitated.  His  temper,  if  hot, 
was  generous,  and  found  expression  in  remarks  and  re- 
partees— often  wise,  sometimes  witty,  always  frank.  It 
is  perhaps  more  remarkable  that,  considering  who  he 
was  and  the  atmosphere  in  which  he  lived,  his  life  was 
singularly  pure  and  simple,  and  that  in  circumstances 
of  more  than  ordinary  temptation  his  treatment  of 
women  was  considerate  and  even  chivalrous.  To  those 
around  him  he  was,  with  rare  exceptions,  a  constant  and 
liberal  friend ;  and  many  a  story  is  told  of  his  magnani- 
mous self-control  both  towards  his  enemies  and  his 
s  )ldiers,  graphic  enough  to  account  for  the  admiring 
affection  which  they  often  showed.  On  the  whole  we 
gather  the  idea  of  a  young  man,  superior  to  his  f^ither 
both  in  character  and  abilities,  frank,  passionate,  ambi- 
tious, yet  singularly  self-restrained;  and  all  the  more 
shall  we  lament,  therefore,  the  downward  progress  of 
such  a  youth  into  a  manhood  disfigured  by  acts  of  cruelty 
and  by  excessive  vanity. 

On    his  proclamation,  as  king  Alexander's   first   act 
was  to  Issue  an  address  to  his   Macedonian  subjects, 
promising  to  maintain  the  dignity  of  the 
kingdom  and  to  follow  out  the  Asiatic  plans       fJcuTes'^his 
of  his  father  Philip.    This  was  necessary,  to       position  as 
satisfy  the  statesmen  and  soldiers  who  might 
be  contrasting  the  youth  and  inexperience  of  the  son 
with  the  experience  and  long  success  of  the  father.     His 
next  step  may  have  appeared  not  less  necessary,  from 
the  point  of  view  of  a  successor  to  a  disputed  inheritance, 
whose  mother  had  been  repudiated,   and  whose  half- 
brother  and  male  relations  either  had  better  claims  than 
himself  to  the  throne,  or  thought  to  make  them  appear 


i 


\) 


and  then 
makes  a 
progress 
through 
Greece. 


88  The  Macedonian  Empire,  CH.  viii. 

better.  Not  only  were  all  the  associates  of  Pausanias  in 
his  father's  murder  but  two  put  to  death,  but  Amyntas, 
his  first  cousin,  and  Kleopatra,  his  stepmother,  with  her 
infant  son  and  Attalos  her  father,  were  by  Alexander's 
orders  or  with  his  connivance  put  out  of  the  way. 

His  position  as  king  being  thus  assured,  Alexander  set 
out  three  months  after  his  father's  murder  with  an  army 
of  30,000  men  to  make  a  progress  through 
Greece,  and  to  assert  his  supremacy  there. 
Indeed  the  loyalty  of  Hellas  was  more  than 
doubtful.     Thanksgiving  had  been  openly 
offered  at  Athens  for  the  death  of  Philip.     Anti-Mace- 
donian sentiments  were  everywhere  heard  in  Pelopon- 
nesos.     All  such  expressions,  however,  were  discreetly 
hushed  as  soon  as  the  king  appeared.     The  Amphikty- 
onic  League  named  him,  as  they  had  named  his  father 
before  him,  leader  of  Greece ;  and  a  conciliatory  em- 
bassy from  Athens  endeavoured  by  apologies  to  dispel 
the  memory  of  recent  indiscretions.     Aftcr\his  a  second 
congress  was  held  at  Corinth,  at  which  all  Greek  states 
agam  were  represented,  excepting  Sparta.     A  second 
time  a  kmg  of  Macedon  was  recognized   as   head   of 
Greece,  whom  each  city  was  bound  to  obey,  while  the 
cities  were   severally  to   be   independent   each   of  the 
other,  and  each  was  to  retain  its  existing  constitution. 
On  paper  it  was  a  fair  enough  arrangement;  but  beneath 
the  smooth  exterior  a  deep  irritation  was  smoulderin- 
which  It  needed  but  a  spark  to  set  in  a  blaze. 
At  this  juncture  it  was  (March,  335)  that  Alexander 
was  lost  to  the  sight  of  the  Greek  world  for 
five  months.     He  was  anxious  to  secure  the 
submission  of  his  restless    neighbours  on 
the  north  and  west-Thracians.  Triballians, 
lllyrians-before  setting  out  on  his  distant 


His  cam- 
paign in  the 

North. 
(March  to 
August 
335) 


X 

t 


CH.  VIII. 


Revolt  of  Thebes. 


89 


1 


march  to  the  East ;  and  to  secure  it  he  must  show  him- 
self in  force  among  them.    It  was  an  expedition  which 
fully  served  its  purpose,  and  at  the  same  time  brought 
into  relief  the  military  genius  of  the  great  conqueror— 
specially  his  dashing  audacity,  his  fertility  of  resource, 
his  rapidity  of  movement.     Starting  from  Amphipolis, 
he  forced  a  difficult  pass  of  Mount  Haimos,  and  attacked 
and  defeated  the  Triballians.      He  crossed  the  Istros 
(Danube)  almost  out  of  bravado  ;  and,  recrossing  it,  ex- 
ecuted a  rapid  march  to  the  westward  through  Paionia 
and  by  the  rivers  Axios  and  Erigon  into  the  country  of 
the  Illyrians,  whom  in  the  face  of  superior  numbers  he 
out-manoeuvred,  surprised,  and  defeated.     If  originality 
may  be  defined  as  the  power  of  striking  out  new  thoughts 
at  the  right  moment,  nothing  could  have  been  more 
original  than  his  device  for  baffling  the  Thracians  of 
Mount  Haimos.     They  had  collected  a  number  of  char- 
iots, or  wagons,  intending  to  launch  them  into  the  dense 
mass  of  the  Macedonian  phalanx  as  it  approached,  and 
so  to  make  their  own  attack  easier.     Alexander  ordered 
his  men  to  open  out  their  ranks  wherever  it  was  possible 
and  let  the  wagons  through,  but  if  not,  to  lie  flat  upon 
tile  ground  with  their  shields  interlaced  and  slanted  over 
their  bodies,  so  that  the  chariots  should  run  over  and 
bound  off  them.     Thus  not  a  singJe  Macedonian  was 
killed.     It  was  a  piece  of  audacity  to  cross  the  greatest 
of  rivers  without  a  bridge  and  in  the  face  of  an  enemy, 
the  Getai,  4,000  strong  :    yet  he  accomplished  it  under 
cover  of  night  by  aid  of  canoes  and  rafts,  and  without 
the  loss  of  a  man.     It  showed  not  a  little  fertility  of  re- 
source to  extricate  an  army  from  a  narrow  gorge,  where 
in  some  places  only  four  men  could  march  abreast,  in 
the  teeth  of  superior  numbers,  and  then  to  turn  upon 
them  in  the  dead  of  night  and  inflict  a  crushing  defeat. 


I 

/ 


90 


The  Macedonian  Empire.  CH.  viii. 


CH.  VIII. 


Destruciion  of  Thebes, 


I 


And  the  general  who  displayed  this  audacity,  resource, 
and  originality  was  only  twenty  years  old. 

Meanwhile  no  news  of  Alexander  reached  Greece.  No 
one  knew  where  he  was  or  what  he  was  doing.  Pres- 
ently rumours  were  rife  of  disasters  and  rever'^es  ;  im- 
proved before  long  into  authoritative  statements  thkt  he 
was  dead.  In  truth,  the  wish  was  father  to  the  thought. 
Nevertheless  such  rumours  were  highly  dangerous  to  Ma- 
cedonian interests  amid  the  general  discon- 
Thebes°^  tent  of  Greece.     Of  all  Greeks,  perhaps,  the 

Si!"'*         Thebans  were  the  most  ill-disposed  to  Ma- 
cedon,  suffering,  as  they  did.  from  the  con- 
stant surveillance  of  a  foreign  garrison  in  the  Kadmeia. 
As,  forty-four  years  before,  when  a  Spartan  force  had 
seized  the  citadel,  so  now  there  were  exiles  from  Thebes 
in  Athens,  where  they  were  encouraged   by  Athenian 
orators  and  subsidized  by  Athenian  money.     When  re- 
ports of  Alexander's  death  were  bruited  about  and  gen- 
erally believed,  these  exiles  conceived  the  design,  which 
Pelopidas  had  devised  and  carried  out,  of  recovering 
Thebes  and  of  ejecting  the  Macedonian  garrison— a  de- 
sign warmly  seconded  by  Demosthenes  and  his  friends. 
Accordingly   they   marched   unexpectedly,   and    being 
welcomed  by  their  partisans,  seized  the  town,  and  suni^ 
moned  the  garrison  in  the  Kadmeia  to  surrender— a  de- 
mand   scornfully   refused.      Simultaneously  they   sent 
deputies   to   Peloponnesos,    imploring   immediate   help 
both  in  men  and  money  for  what  was  essentially  the 
cause  of  Hellas.     But  Greeks  had  almost  forgotten  how 
to  act  in  concert.     Sympathy  was  to  be  had  in  abund- 
ance.    Promises  might  be  bought  not  to  help  the  Mace- 
donians.    The  Arkadians  actually  sent  troops  as  far  as 
the  Isthmus.     Even  the  Athenians  were  over-persuaded 
by  Demades  and  Phokion  to  wait  until  rumour  was  con- 


Sudden 
return  of 
Alexander. 


firmed   before  they  committed  themselves.     Thu. 
favourable  moment  was  again  let  slip,  when  the  passS 
into  Greece  might  have  been  barred  against  the  invader; 
and    the   Thebans   were    left   to   shift   for  themselves! 
Nothing  daunted,  they  proclaimed  themselves  indepen- 
dent of  Macedon,   and  drew  lines  of  circumvallation 
round  the  garrison  in  the  citadel,  hoping  to  starve  them 
out.     Suddenly,  like  a  thunderbolt,  while  they  were  yet 
dreaming  of  fair  weather  and  recovered  freedom,  Alex- 
ander was  upon  them.     Hurried  news  had  reached  him  of 
the  Theban  rising,  while  he  was  still  west  of 
Mount  Skardos,  and,  aware  of  the  gravity  of 
the  crisis,  without  a  thought  of  rest  for  himself 
or  his  troops,  or  of  returning  first  to  Pclla,  he  started  at 
once  on   a  forced  march  of  thirteen  days  for  Boiotia. 
Following  the  valley  of  the  river  Haliakmon,  he  crossed 
the  Kambounian  ridge  on  the  seventh  day  and  reached 
the  town  of  Pehnna  ;  thence  in  six  days  he  traversed 
Thessaly,  passed  Thermopylai,  hurried  by  Elateia,  and 
was  first  heard  of  by  the  astounded  Greeks  as  present  in 
force  at  Onchestos,  a  few  miles  from  Thebes.   He  moved 
up  at  once  to  the  city  and  established  his  camp  to  the 
southward,  in   order  to    cut  off  all  access  to  or  from 
Athens,  and  to  open  communications  with  the  Kadmeian 
garrison.     After  waiting  a  day  or  two,  in  hopes  of  their 
submission,  he  issued  a  proclamation    demanding  the 
surrender  of  the  anti-Macedonian  leaders,  and  inviting 
any  Thebans  who  pleased  to  join  him.     The  Thebans 
rejoined  with   a  counter-proclamation,   demanding  the 
surrender  of  two  of  his  generals,  and  inviting  all  who 
would  assist  the  Great  King  and  the  Thebans  in  freeing 
the  Greeks,  and  overthrowing  the  Tyrant  of  Greece,  to 
join  them  at  once.     This  was  in  fact  to  draw  the  sword 
and  throw  away  the  scabbard.     Nothing  remained  but 


The  Afacedo7iian  Empire, 


CH.  VIII. 


^t  it  out  to  the  bitter  end.     The  city  was  assaulted 
and  at  last  taken,   after  a  desperate  resistance  which 
contested  every  inch  of  ground.     Five  hundred  Mace- 
donians were  said  to  have  fallen  and  6000  Thebans, 
while  no  less  than  30,000  men,  women,  and  children 
were  taken  prisoners.     The  question  at  once  arose  as  to 
what  was  to  be  done  with   the  city  and  the  captives. 
Nominally  the  decision  was  left  by  Alexander  to  the 
Phokians,  Plataians,  and  other  Greek  auxiliaries,  the  bit- 
terest foes  of  the  Theban  name.     But  it  is  obvious  that 
in  reality  it  must  have  been  known   to  coincide  with 
Alexander's  wishes,  and  that  his  wish  was  to  bring  home 
to  the  mind  of  every  Greek  citizen  a  terrible 
destruction        example  of  the  consequences  of  dislovahy 
t,2)!^^^         to  Macedon.     That  decision  was  a  fearful 
one.   Thebes  was  to  be  razed  to  the  ground; 
her  territory  was  to  be  distributed  among  the  Boiotian 
towns  ;  the  prisoners  were  to  be  sold  as  slaves,  excepting 
only  priests  and  priestesses  and  personal  friends  of  Ma- 
cedonians;  and   all  Theban  fugitives  were  to  be  out- 
lawed.   It  was  an  unimportant  addition  that  Orchomenos 
and  Plataia  were  to  be  rebuilt ;  that  a  Macedonian  gar- 
rison was  to  be  permanently  quartered  in  the  Kadmeia ; 
and  that  the  house  of  Pindar  was  to  be  spared.    Arrian's 
account,  the  tone  of  which  is  certainly  truthful,  repre- 
sents the  whole  transaction  from  first  to  last  as  unex- 
pected, the  result  of  accident  rather  than  calculation,  and 
makes  the  revengeful  fury  of  Phokians  and  Boiotians 
more  responsible  for  the  tragedy  than  the  policy  of  Alex- 
ander.   Taken  at  the  worst,  and  viewed  merely  as  an  act 
of  policy,  we  may  set  it  side  by  side  with  the  massacres 
of  Drogheda  and  Wexford  (1649),  or  the  devastation  of 
the  Palatinate  (1688),  and  say  that  Alexander's  was  a 
venial  deed  compared  with  the  deliberate  cruelties  of  a 
Cromwell  and  a  Louis  XIV. 


Submission  of  Greece. 


ii 


m> 


V^H,     IX.  t.  tit.i/iii  I  win  n     y-ii-      #       ^,  y,  ^  ,.  y, 

93 

All  further  opposition  at  once  collapsed.     Arkadians 
t-leians,  ^tolians.  vied  in  their  protestations  of  loyalty  • 
while  Athens  which  three  short  years  before 
had  fought  for  freedom  at  Chaironeia    now      Submission 
sank  so  low  as  to  congratulate  a  kin-  of      °^  ^'■''''• 
Macedon  on  his  safe  return  from  the  north  and  on  his 
destruction  of  Thebes;    and  she   owed  it  to  the  inter- 
vention of  a  Uemades  that  she  was  excused  from  the 
necessity  of  giving  up  ten  of  her  most  prominent  citizens 
to  the  vengeance  of  Alexander. 

From  Thebes  the  victorious  king  repaired  to  Corinth 
to  preside  over  another  synod,  and  to  fix  the  contingents 
of  the  various  cities  for  his  Asiatic  campaign ; 
and  thence  returned  by  way  of  Dcluhoi  to       Preparation 

\^^n  .  r  .      .  "^^        for  Asiatic 

i  clla,  never  to  set  foot  again  in  Hellas.  The  campaign 
winter  (335-4)  was  spent  in  preparations,  ^"^^~^^' 
the  army  for  Asia  being  massed  in  early  spring,  in  the 
district  between  Pella  and  Amphipolis.  Antipater  was 
left  as  governor  of  Macedon  during  the  king's  absence, 
with  a  force  of  12.000  infantry  and  1,500  cavalry,  to 
maintain  order  there,  and  to  keep  down,  if  necessary, 
the  cities  of  Greece. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

ALEXANDER    IN    ASIA    MINOR. 

The  empire,  which  Alexander  was  about 
was  the  greatest  in  the  world— the  greatest 
world  had  ever  seen.  Hellas  itself  to  the 
south  of  the  Kambounian  range  was  but 
little  larger  than  Portugal ;  while  the  empire 
of  Darius  Codomannus  did  not  foil  far  short 
of  the  extent  of  modern  Europe.     From  the 


to   attack, 
which  the 

Contrast 
betwetn  the 
extent  and 
the  weal<- 
ness  of  the 
Persian 
empire. 


// 


94 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  IX. 


Sahara  to  the   Indus,   from   the   Caspian   Sea    to   the 
Persian   Gulf,   all    nations   were    subject   to   the  Great 
King,  who  could  place  a  million  of  men  in  the  field 
and  had  often  overrun  provinces  larger  than  Greece  in 
a  smgle  campaign.     To  resist  his  will,  and  much  more 
to  mvade  his  kingdom,  might  seem  like  madness.      But 
the  appearance  of  strength  belied  the  reality.     From  the 
days  of  the  first  Darius  to  those  of  the  third  luxury  and 
corruption,  bloodshed  and  revolt,  had  been  sappin-  the 
strength  of  the  empire.     The  sinews  of  war  were  still 
abundant;  and.  among  the  multitude  of  subject  races 
individual    nations  were  brave,   and  even    formidable! 
But  the  organization  was  defective,  and  the  tactics  and 
arms  were  antiquated;  while  the  natural  leader  of  the 
army  was  too  often  a  spoiled  child,  with  a  spirit  softened 
m  the  harem  and  a   judgment  blinded  by  adulation. 
Of  course  no  one  could  have  foreseen  the  issue  of  the 
campaign  ;    yet  it  is  certain  that  some  Greeks  had  al- 
ready formed  a  shrewd  estimate  of  the  real  stren-th  of 
the  empire;  and  even  seventy  years  before.  Xenophon 
had   observed    that   the   vast   distances,    and   the   con- 
sequent isolation,  of  the  imperial  forces  were  a  source 
of  weakness. 

There  was  hardly  a  corner  of  this  vast  dominion  to 
which  Alexander  did  not  penetrate :  its  capitals,  with 
Itsgeo.  ^^ci^  rock-hewn  tombs  and  marvellous  pal- 

fxSand  f'""'  '  '^^  ^^'i^^  plateaus,  its  fertilizing  rivers. 
temS;  '^^  ^""^^"""^  mountain  passes.     It  will  be  well 

•  therefore,   at   the  outset  to  gain  a  general 

Idea  of  the  countries  whose  inhabitants  he  visited  or 
reduced,  and  so  to  apprehend  more  clearly  the  objects 
at  which  he  aimed,  and  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  his 
attaining  them. 

The  first  thing  to  observe  in  the  physical  configura- 


f 


CH.  IX. 


Geography  of  Persia, 


95 

tion  of  the  empire  is  the  relatively  great  extent  of  desert 
and  plateau,  and  the  way  in  which  they  split 
it  up  into  thin  strips  and  isolated  patches  of      Plateau  of 
population.     The  teeming  thousands  of  the      ^'^''"* 
Nile  valley,  and  the   Euphrates,   and  the  Indus,   were 
sundered  from  each  other  by  vast  tracts  of  uninhabitable 
rock  and  sand,  and  by  a  journey  of  several  months' 
duration.     The  most  remarkable  of  these  plateaus  was 
the  table-land  of  Aria  (Iran),  rising  more  than  3,000  feet 
above  the  sea,  and  forming  one  link  in  the  great  chain 
of  desert  which   runs  from  the  west   of  Africa   to   the 
frontiers  of  China.     It  is  itself  only  the  southern  portion 
of  a  yet  vaster  desert,  arid  and  barren,  which  stretches 
in  unbroken  monotony  from  the  Indian  Ocean  for  to  the 
north  of  the  Sea  of  Aral— unl^rokcn  save  by  the  narrow 
strip  of  valley  and  mountain  which  cuts  it  at  right  angles 
in  the  middle.  For  at  this  point  Mount  Tauros  (Elburz), 
after  skirting  the  Caspian,  runs  eastward  to  meet  the 
Paropanisan  mountains  (Hindu  Kush)  in  three  or  four 
parallel  ranges,   which  average  200  miles  in  breadth, 
while  the  fertile  plains  which  lie  between  them  form  the 
natural  route  of  traveller  or  army  from  west  to  east.    To 
the  north-east  of  this  plateau,  as  well  as  between  it  and 
the  Indus,    lay  a  considerable   population  (in  modern 
Affghanistan  and  Turkestan),  who  were  Persian  subjects, 
but  whose  connexion  with  the  empire  must  have  always 
been  precarious. 

Again,  we  may  change  our  point  of  view,  and  regard 
this  plateau  in  a  wa\-  altogether  different.  Its  general 
direction  is  from  south-east  to  north-west, 
where  the  greatest  length  is  1,100  miles; 
but  at  both  the  north-eastern  and  north- 
western corners  it  communicates  immedi- 
ately, in  the  former  case  with  the  higher  table-land  of 


Continuous 
plateau  from 
the  Indus  to 
the  Egean. 


fl 


95 


T/ie  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  IX. 


'<i 


CH.  IX. 


Rivers  of  Persia, 


97 


Central  Asia,  in  the  latter  with  the  lower  plateau  of  Asia 
Minor  through  the  mountains  and  uplands  of  Armenia. 
P'rom  the  western  borders  of  Phrygia,  where  the  uplands 
sink  into  the  fertile  valleys  of  Ionia,  to  the  tangled 
mountain  systems  of  Arachosia  (Affghanistan),  there  is 
continuous  highland,  whose  fertility  varies  inversely  with 
its  elevation  above  the  sea,  from  the  abundant  corn  and 
flocks  of  Kappadokia  to  the  utter  absence  of  all  life, 
whether  animal  or  vegetable,  in  the  loose  red  sands  of 
Aria,  or  Khorasmia,  "a  country  the  image  of  death." 
From  end  to  end,  moreover,  this  plateau,  whether  ele- 
vated or  low,  has  one  pervading  characteristic.  It  is 
bordered  on  every  side  by  mountain  ranges,  in  Pontus 
as  in  Karmania,  in  Kilikia  as  in  Hyrkania,  which  slope 
more  or  less  abruptly  on  the  outer  side,  and  have  a 
comparatively  narrow  fringe  of  habitable  country  at 
their  base. 

Once  more  we  may  change  our  point  of  view,  and  re- 
mark that,  rich  as  was  the  empire  in  every  sort  of  pro- 
duce, this  richness  was  confined  within  nar- 
row and  well-defined  limits,  especially  to 
the  valleys  of  the  four  great  rivers.  Take 
out  of  the  empire  the  upper  waters  of  the  Oxus  and  the 
Indus,  and  the  basins  of  the  Euphrates  and  the  Nile,  and 
a  glance  at  the  map  will  show  that  we  have  taken  away 
its  fairest  and  most  prolific  regions.     In  the 

The  Oxus.  ,  .    -  r  1-      1       L       T      , 

higher  courses  of  both  the  Indus  and  the 
Oxus  irrigation  still  produces  great  fertility ;  but  in  the 
case  of  the  latter  there  is  satisfactor>'  evidence  to  show, 
not  only  that  the  valley  was  fertile  enough  to  support  a 
large  population,  as  it  does  now,  but  also  that  a  valuable 
trade  was  carried  on  by  that  route  between  India  and  the 
Euxine,  the  goods  passing  down  the  river,  and  by  its 
western  mouth,  now  dry,  into  the  Caspian,  and  thence 


The  four 
great  river 
basins. 


by  way  of  the  river  Cyrus  (Kur)  to  Phasis. 
The  valley  of  the  Indus  resembles  that  of  '^^'^  ^"^"'• 
the  Oxus,  not  only  in  the  fact  of  the  two  rivers  being 
almost  exactly  of  the  same  length,  1,860  miles,  but  be- 
cause the  upper  course  of  each  is  made  up  of  numerous 
tributaries  that  help  to  fertilize  a  wide  district.  On  the 
other  hand,  there  is  no  comparison  between  the  tribu- 
taries of  the  Oxus  and  the  five  rivers  which  make  the 
beauty  and  the  fertility  of  the  Punjab.  The  desert,  it  is 
true,  is  near  at  hand;  but  the  bounteous  rivers  and 
laborious  irrigation  make  the  plain  rich,  wherever  the 
rivers  flow,  with  corn,  and  rice,  and  fruits ;  and  the  people 
are  among  the  noblest  of  India. 

But,  though  the  valleys  of  the   Indus  and  Oxus  were 
sufficiently  rich,  they  were  as  nothing  compared  to  Baby- 
lonia or  Egypt,  the  "gifts"  of  the  Euphrates  and  the  Nile. 
Herodotus  tells  of  the  rare  barley  crops  of  Babylonia, 
never  returning  less  than  two  hundredfold.     The  date 
palms   were  unparalleled  elsewhere.     And 
this    fertility    was    due   to    the    abounding      phrates'and 
streams  of  Euphrates  and  Tigris,  convcrg-       ^isns. 
ing  slowly  through  more  than  1,000  miles  of  level  coun- 
try, and  diffusing  their  superabundant  waters  by  innumer- 
able canals.     Nor  is  this  less  true  of  the  Nile 
valley.     Hardly  more  than  600  miles  of  the         ^^^  ^'''^' 
river's  course  was  within  the  limits  of  the  Persian  em- 
pire, but  that  was  the  richest  part.     The  annual  inunda- 
tions  and   subsequent  irrigation  secured   a  marvellous 
return,  so  that  three  crops  in  a  year  were  not  uncommon  ; 
and  the  river  itself  was  in  those  days,  as  it  still  is,  the 
high  road  of  a  great  commerce  with  central  Africa. 

These  four  great  river  basins  were  sources  of  vast 
wealth  and  power  to  the  ruler  who  controlled  them, 
whoever  he  might  be  ;  and  we  have  probably  here  a 

H 


HI 


f 


h 


98 


27ie  Macedonian  EmJ>irc, 


CH.   IX. 


satisfactory  clue  to  Alexander's  seemingly  erratic  course. 
He  would  make  himself  master  of  the  great  centres  of 
life  in  the  empire,  one  by  one-first  the  Nile,  then  the 
Euphrates,  then  the  Oxus.  and  last  the  Indus-reducincr 
all  alike  to  subjection  first,  that  he  might  afterwards 
concentrate,  regulate,  and  combine.  The  route  which  he 
followed  from  one  river  basin  to  another  will  find  its  ex- 
planation in  the  description  given  above  of  the  deserts 
and  plateaus  in  his  way. 

Lastly,  the  resources  of  the  empire  were  as  various  as 
Resources  '^^  pcoples  and  climate,  and  so  boundless  in 
onhe^  both  men  and  money,  that  had  there  been 

an  organizing  brain,  or  a  strong  will  at  the 
head  of  affairs,  its  powers  of  offence  and  defence  would 
have  been  equally  irresistible.     As  it  was.  the  vigour  was 
gone  ;  and  the  vast  fabric,  externally  so  formidable,  was 
ready  to  fall  to  pieces  at  a  touch.      The  Great  Kincr  was 
for  the  most  part  a  tyrant  or  a  cipher.     The  satraps'were 
either  too  strong  or  not  strong  enough-too  strong  to  be 
loyal  to  the  central  government;  too  weak  to  offer  suc- 
cessful resistance  to  an  invader.    In  the  field  the  Persian 
tactics  were  altogether  out  of  date,  for  by  these  numbers 
were  always  presumed  to  be  more  than  a  match  for  dis- 
cipline.   Strategy  there  was  none,  the  game  of  war  con- 
sisting merely  in  finding  the  enemy  and  trampling  him 
under  foot.     Moreover,  a  Persian  army  was  ill-assorted- 
some  nations  were  warlike,  others  were  cowards  •  some 
were  well-armed,  others  the  reverse.    Even  the  belt  were 
armed  less  well  than  the  enemy  whom  they  were  about  to 
meet.     The'  rifled  gun  is  not  more  superior  to  the  unrifled 
than   was   the   Greek   spear  to   the    Persian,   the  latter 
having  only  seven  feet  of  length   against  the  ten.  or  in 
the  sarissa.  the  twenty,  feet  of  the  former.     In  short   the 
component  parts  of  the  Persian  host  were  armed  accord- 


J 


CH.  IX. 


Persian  Resources. 


99 


ing  to  local  habits  or  ancient  tradition,  not  with  a  view 
to  efficiency ;  and  a  Persian  army  was  little  better  than  a 
fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms.  A  Macedonian  army,  on 
the  other  hand,  was  a  finished  machine,  each  part  de- 
vised to  supplement  another,  each  arm  equipped  with  a 
view  to  its  special  purpose.  Hence  disparity  of  num- 
bers ceased  to  be  of  any  importance;  and  we  are  the 
less  surprised  to  read  of  the  calmness  with  which  a 
Macedonian  army  would  march  to  attack  a  Persian  host 
ten  times  its  own  size,  and  of  the  terrible  carnage  among 
the  latter  which  always  followed  defeat. 

With  this  immense  empire  Greeks  had  been  repeatedly 
in  contact  since  the  days  of  Xerxes,  especially  in  Asia 
Minor  and  Egypt.  Greeks  had  helped  Cyrus  the  Younger 
to  fight  the  battle  of  Cunaxa  (b.  c.  401).  and  had  been 
strong  enough  to  make  a  treaty  with  the  Great  King  (b. 
c.  387).  Greeks  had  been  mixed  up  with  the  revolt  of 
Egypt  from  Persia,  and  had  fought  on  both  sides  when 
it  was  reduced  to  subjection  (b.  c.  346).  A  Greek  of 
Rhodes,  Memnon  by  name,  for  his  services 
on  that  occasion,  had  been  rewarded  with  a  (ireckrwith 
satrapy  in  Asia  Alinor.  In  short,  Greeks  Persians, 
were  admitted  behind  the  scenes,  and  were  awaking  to  a 
sense  of  their  own  strength  and  of  the  weakness  of 
Persia.  At  this  crisis  it  was  that  a  man  of  genius  and 
energy  arose  on  the  horizon  of  Greek  politics,  who  had 
the  means  at  his  disposal  for  attacking  Persia,  as  well  as 
the  will  to  use  them.  That  Alexander's  career  changed 
the  whole  current  of  subsequent  history  is  certain :  but  it 
is  impossible  not  to  regret,  in  his  case  as  in  Hannibal's, 
the  silence  and  stupidity  of  some  who  accompanied  him 
all  the  way  from  the  Hellespont  to  Babylon,  and  who 
might  have  told  us  how  far  that  career  was  shaped  or 
foreseen  by  Alexander  himself,  what  opinions  he  ex- 


If 


lOO 


The  Macedonian  Empire 


CH.  IX. 


AlexandT 
crosses  the 
Hellespont 
and  visits 
liion. 


pressed  beforehand  on  the  chances  of  the  conflict,  and 
what  end  precisely  he  had  in  view,  as  opposition  ceased 
and  half  Asia  was  at  his  feet.  Gossip  has  handed  down 
to  us  isolated  expressions,  and  a  few  chance  conver- 
sations; but  our  judgment  of  the  man  rests  only  on 
his  deeds,  uninterrupted  by  any  thought  or  word  of  his 
own. 

Alexander  crossed  the  Hellespont  in  the  spring  of 
334,  just  eleven  years  before  his  death,  with  a  force  of 
30,000  infantry  and  5,000  cavalry;  leaving 
Antipater  to  maintain  the  peace  of  Ilcllas 
and  Macedonia  in  his  absence.  The  actual 
crossing  was  superintended  by  Parmenion  ; 
while  the  king  with  a  few  companions  crossed  lower 
down  the  strait  for  the  purpose  of  visiting  Ilion.  To  his 
susceptible  mind,  familiar  with  Homer  from  his  earliest 
days,  such  a  visit  would  be  a  pilgrimage  at  once  of  duty 
and  of  pleasure  ;  and  when  he  took  down  the  arms  hang- 
ing in  the  temple  of  Athene,  or  visited  the  barrow  of  the 
Hellenic  Achilles,  it  was  probably  with  feelings  of  exalta- 
tion, which  may  have  been  confused,  but  were  certainly 
genuine.  This  pious  duty  fulfilled,  he  joined  the  army 
once  more  at  Arisbe,  and  directed  its  march  towards 
Priapos,  along  the  lowlands  lying  between  the  mountains 
and  the  sea,  throwing  out  light  cavalry  as  he  advanced 
to  feel  for  the  enemy. 

Meanwhile  the  Persian  leaders  were  divided  as  to 
what  was  best  to  be  done.  They  were  three  in  council : 
Spithridatcs,  satrap  of  Lydia,  Arsitos,  satrap 
of  Phrygia,  and  Memnon  the  Rhodian,  high 
in  favour  at  court  for  his  services  in  the 
Egyptian  war  twelve  years  before.  The 
counsel  of  the  latter  was  bold  and  original.  He  proposed 
to  avoid  giving  battle  as  long  as  possible,  retreating  and 


Counsels 
and  tactics 
of  the 
Persians. 


CH.  IX. 


Persian  Tactics, 


lOI 


ravaging  the  country  ;  while  the  fleet  in  superior  force 
should  make  a  diversion  in  the  rear,  land  troops  in 
Maccdon,  and  open  communications  with  disaffected 
Greek  cities.  The  plan  might  have  saved  the  Persian 
Empire,  and  was  easy  of  execution ;  but  it  was  overruled. 
The  two  satraps  were  jealous  of  Memnon;  and,  having 
the  command  of  some  20,000  Greek  mercenaries  and 
20,000  Asiatic  cavalry,  they  believed  themselves  a  match 
for  Alexander,  and  desired  to  end  the  struggle  at  once. 
They  resolved,  therefore,  to  occupy  the  right  bank  of 
the  Granikos  and  to  dispute  the  passage  of  the  river, 
being  aware  of  its  extreme  difficulty  from  the  depth  of 
the  water  here  and  there,  from  the  numerous  holes,  and 
from  the  height  and  steepness  of  the  banks.  The  cross- 
ing in  itself  was  clearly  no  easy  task,  or  Alexander's 
best  general  Parmenion  would  not  have  advised  that  it 
should  be  deferred  for  a  day.  But  the  king's  judgment 
was  against  him.  Delay  before  such  a  tiny  brook 
would  only  discourage  his  own  troops  and  encourage 
the  Persians.  Immediate  action  was  the  right  thing ; 
and  the  event  proved  that  it  was  so., 

Alexander,  as  usual,  commanded  the  right  wing,  and 
Parmenion  the  left — an  arrangement  which  was  speedily 
observed  by  the  enemy   across  the  river,       „    ,    , 

^  -^      .       ^  '         Battle  of 

from  the  splendour  of  the  king's  armour  and  the  Grani- 
the  respectful  courtesy  of  his  suite.  Ac- 
cordingly they  at  once  increased  the  depth  of  the  squad- 
rons on  their  left  flank,  For  a  while  there  was  silence 
as  the  two  armies  on  either  bank  stood  confronting  one  an- 
other, dimly  conscious  perhaps  of  the  great  issues  staked 
upon  that  day's  battle.  Then  Alexander  leaped  upon 
his  horse,  and  calling  on  those  around  him  to  show  their 
courage,  bade  Ptolemy  lead  the  advance  with  a  squad- 
ron of  cavalry  and  a  division  of  the  phalanx,  while  he 


I02 


TJie  Macedonia7t  Ejtipire, 


CH.  IX. 


Cil.  IX. 


Battle  of  the  Granikos, 


103 


himself,  at  the  head  of  the  extreme  right,  plunged  into 
the  river,  the  men  shouting,  and  the  trumpets  sounding 
the  charge.     Both  the  left  and  right  wings  appear  to 
have  crossed  the  river  obliquely  to  the  course  of  the 
main  body,  partly  to  avoid  the  holes  in  the  river  bed, 
partly  to  reach  the  opposite  bank  as  much  as  possible 
in  hne,  and  so  exposing  the  flanks  of  columns  to  the 
charge  of  the  enemy's  swarms  of  cavalry.      As    they 
nearcd   the   opposite   bank  the  Macedonians  met   with 
a  warm  reception.     Where  the  ground  was  higher  than 
the  river,  the  Persian  cavalry  kept  up  a  constant  shower 
of  javelins  from  above ;  where  it  was  on  the  river  level, 
there  they  advanced  even  into  the  river  itself  and  barred 
the  way  in   superior  numbers,  so  that  many  of  the  Ma- 
cedonians were  cut   down  at   once   on    coming  within 
sword's  reach,  and  all   were  for  the  moment   confused, 
being   annoyed  by   the   enemy's   missiles   and  finding 
great  difficulty  in  keeping  their  own  footing.     But  when 
they  came  to  close  quarters  the  action  became  a  trial  of 
strength,   each   side   pushing    desperately   against    the 
other ;  and  ere  long  weight  and  physical  strength,  dis- 
cipline and  tenacity,  won  the  victory,  even  on  these  un- 
equal terms,  over  men  of  light  frame  and  inferior  resolu- 
tion, less  stoutly  armed.     Hence  it  was  not  long  before 
the  whole  Macedonian  line  had  emerged  from  the  river, 
and  was  establishing  itself  in  the  teeth  of  obstinate  resis- 
tance on  the  banks  above.    But  the  fiercest  fighting  was 
round  the   king  himself,  on  the  wing  where  the   best  of 
the  Persian  troops  were  posted,  and  where  most  of  the 
leaders  had  gathered,  as  if  to  the  turning  point  of  the 
battle.    The  reckless  courage  of  Alexander  often  led  him 
into  peril  and  hair-breadth  escapes;  but  never  perhaps 
but  once  was  he  in  such  instant  peril  of  death  as  in  this 
cavalry  skirmish,  which  opened  his  campaigns  in  Asia. 


Li4 


His  spear  broke  in  his  hand  at  the  first  onset.  Turning 
to  a  groom  he  asked  for  another  ;  but  this  man  was  in 
the  same  plight  as  the  king,  and  was  reduced  to  fighting 
as  best  he  could  with  the  butt.  At  last  a  Corinthian 
supplied  him  with  another.  At  this  moment  Mithrida- 
t6s,  a  son-in-law  of  Darius,  was  advancing  to  the  charge 
at  the  head  of  a  wedge-shaped  squadron  of  cavalry. 
Alexander  dashed  out  from  his  own  line  to  meet  him, 
smote  him  in  the  face,  and  brought  him  to  the  ground. 
At  the  same  instant  he  was  assailed  by  another  general, 
who  aimed  a  sweeping  blow  with  his  scimitar  at  the 
king's  head,  and  broke  off  a  piece  of  his  helmet.  Alex- 
ander retaliated  with  a  javelin  thrust,  which  pierced 
corslet  and  breastbone,  and  laid  his  assailant  low ;  but, 
while  thus  engaged  in  front,  he  was  himself  in  imminent 
danger  from  behind  ;  for  Spithridatos,  at  the  instant  of 
his  friend's  fall,  had  raised  his  sword  to  aim  a  blow  at  the 
king's  now  only  half-defended  head.  But  there  were 
quick  eyes  and  strong  arms  around.  A  timely  and  dex- 
terous sabre-cut  from  Kleitos,  Alexander's  foster-brother, 
averted  the  danger,  severing  the  Persian's  sword-arm  at 
the  shoulder.  Every  moment  brought  to  the  king's  side 
a  fresh  accession  of  strength  from  those  who  had  suc- 
ceeded in  forcing  the  passage,  so  that  the  enemy  were 
more  and  more  hardly  pressed  on  their  left  flank  and 
centre,  until  they  broke  before  the  pressure,  and  gave 
way  at  all  points,  in  a  headlong  rout,  leaving  1,000  dead 
upon  the  field.  Their  loss  was  comparatively  trifling; 
for  there  was  but  little  pursuit  of  the  broken  cavalry, 
Alexander  recalling  his  troops  to  join  in  the  attack  upon 
the  mercenaries.  The  battle  so  far  had  apparently  been 
as  short  as  it  was  brilliant :  for  these  mercenaries  were 
still  in  the  position  which  they  had  occupied  at  first,  and 
were  now  paralyzed  with  astonishment  at  the  unexpected 


I04 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  IX. 


Results  of 
the  battle. 


turn  of  events,  and  rapidly  becoming  demoralized  by 
the  sight  of  their  comrades'  defeat.     Thus,  troubled  and 
irresolute,  they  found  themselves  suddenly  surrounded, 
and  that  by  foes  whose  prowess  was  known  to  them  not 
only  from  the  witness  of  their  own  eyes,  but  from  their 
memory  of  what  Macedonians  had  done  in  recent  times. 
They  were   defeated  even  before  they  were  attacked. 
Assailed  in  front  and  flank  and  rear,  they  speedily  be- 
came a  mere  huddling  mass  of  men  with  arms  in  their 
hands,  and  were  butchered  where  they  stood,  only  2,000 
being  made  prisoners,  and  of  the  rest  not  a  man  escap- 
ing, save  a  few  lucky  ones  who  were  overlooked  amoncr 
the  dead  bodies.     It  was  a  brilliant  victory, 
and  won   at  slight  cost.     The  Persians  had 
lost  not  only  half  their  force  of  40,000  men, 
and  an  extraordinary  proportion  of  superior  officers,  but 
prestige  as  well.     There  were   no   more  troops   in  Asia 
Minor  to  bring  into  the  field— indeed  no  force  existed 
except  some  isolated  garrisons,  and  after  the  fait  of  Hali- 
karnassos  resistance  in  that   quarter  ceased.      On   the 
other  hand  the  Macedonian  losses  are  said  to  have  been 
so  slight  as  to  amount  to  no  more  than  twenty-five  of  the 
Companion  cavalry,   who  fell  at  the  first  onset,  about 
sixty  of  the  other  cavalry  and  thirty  infantry  soldiers,  or 
less   than   120  in  all:  a  small  price  to  pay  for  such  im- 
mense results.  They  were  buried  with  all  military  honours, 
the  twenty-five  Companions   even    receiving  the   extra- 
ordinary compliment   of  brazen   statues,  carved  by  Ly- 
sippos,  and  set  up  in  their  honour  at  Dion, 

The  wives  and  children  of  those  who  had  fallen 
received  the  substantial  boon  of  a  remission 
of  all  taxation  and  of  personal  service.  The 
wounded  were  treated  with  signal  marks 
of   favour,  the  king  visiting  them   in  per- 


Alexander's 
treatment 
of  his 
prisoners. 


CH.  IX. 


Result  of  the  Victory. 


105 


son,  and  in  kindly  conversation  giving  each  man  the 
flattering  opportunity  of  telling  his  own  story  and  re- 
counting his  own  deeds.  All  his  Greek  prisoners  Alex- 
ander sent  in  chains  to  Maccdon,  to  be  kept  to  hard  la- 
bour. In  his  eyes  they  were  guilty  of  treason  for  taking 
up  arms  against  their  rightful  leader.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  strove  to  gain  increased  interest  and  sympathy 
for  his  cause  in  Greece  by  sending  to  Athens  300  suits  of 
armour  as  an  offering  to  Athene,  with  an  inscription 
stating  that  they  were  taken  by  Alexander,  son  of  Philip, 
and  by  the  Greeks  (excepting  the  Lakedaimonians)  from 
the  barbarians  who  dwell  in  Asia. 

The  effects  of  the  victory  of  the  Granikos  were  seen 
at  once  in  the  surrender  of  Sardis  and  Ephesus,  as  soon 
as  the  king  appeared  before  them — a  sub- 
mission of  great  value  w^iile  the  Persians 
were  masters  of  the  Egean  ;  for  at  present 
his  main  danger  arose  from  the  possible  ac- 
ceptance of  Memnon's  plan,  and  from  insurrection  and 
invasion  across  the  sea.  It  was,  therefore,  of  primary 
importance  to  secure  the  adhesion  of  the  Asiatic  Greeks, 
and  by  so  doing  to  shut  out  the  Persians  from  the  har- 
bours of  Asia  Minor.  Miletos,  indeed,  attempted  a  brief 
resistance,  being  encouraged  by  the  presence  of  a  Per- 
sian fleet  of  400  sail  at  Mykale.  Alexander,  however, 
had  seized  the  island  of  Lade  ;  moored  his  fleet  of  160 
ships  so  as  to  bar  ingress  and  egress  ;  and,  having  made 
a  practicable  breach  in  the  wall,  stormed  the  town  in  the 
face  of  a  languid  resistance.  There  remained  one  strong 
fortress  in  those  parts,  Halikarnassos,  where  the  Per- 
sians had  collected  all  their  forces  for  a  serious  defence, 
and  where  Memnon  was  in  chief  command.  Alexander, 
therefore,  resolved  to  send  away  his  fleet,  which  was  at 
once  expensive  and  numerically  weak,  and  to  direct  all 


P  eduction 
of  the 
coast  of 
Asia  Minor. 


io6 


The  Macedonian  Einpire, 


CH.  X. 


his  efforts  to  the  capture  of  that  city,  as  a  step  to  driving 
the  Pcrsiano  from  Asia  Minor. 


Prepara- 
tions at 
Halikar- 
iiassos  for 
defence. 


CHAPTER  X. 

FROM  THE  SIEGE  OF   HALIKARNASSOS  TO  THE  BATTLE  OF 

ISSOS. 

HALIKARNASSOS  was  the  Strongest  city  of  Karia.     Built 
on  the  side  of  a  precipitous  rock,  sloping  steeply  to  the 
southward  and  to  the  sea,  it  was  doubly  de- 
fensible from  the  possession  of  two  citadels, 
the   chief  one   lying   at   the    northern  and 
highest  point  of  the  city.     On  the  eastern 
face  of  the  hill  can  still  be  traced  remains  of  the  famous 
tomb  built  by  Queen  Artemisia  in  memory  of  her  hus- 
band, Mausolos.     There  were  two  good  harbours,   the 
larger  and  safer  lying  to  the  north,  its  entrance  being  at 
once  sheltered  and  protected  by  a  fortified  island.     The 
whole  city  was  surrounded  with  walls,  and  strengthened 
further  by  a  ditch,  45  feet  broad  and  more  than*'2o  feet 
deep.     Moreover,  the  preparations  for  defence  were  on 
a  scale  adequate  to  the  strength  and  importance  of  the 
place.    The  Persian  fleet  had  been  brought  up  from  My- 
kale.     Besides  native  troops,  there  was  a  considerable 
garrison  of  Greek  mercenaries  under  an  Athenian,  Eph- 
ialt^s;  and  the  guiding  spirit  of  the  defence  was  Mem- 
non,  a  man  as  versatile  as  he  was  brave.     The  siege  of 
Halikarnassos  was  the  most  arduous  task  which  Alex- 
ander had  as  yet  to  face. 

Before  he  actually  began  the  operations  of  the  sie-e 
he  took  care  to  render  the  attack  as  easy  as  possible,  and 


CH.  X. 


Halikarnassos. 


\Q*J 


to  secure  his  communications  by  conciliat- 

insf  the  nearer  Greek  towns  with  freedom      ^'*^f^  ^"^^ 

o  capture  of 

and  special  immunities;  while  he  won  the      the  city 
good-will  of  the  Karians  by  restoring  the 
kingdom  to  Ada,  the  popular  representative  of  their  an- 
cient line  of  kings.     He  then  sat  down  before  the  city, 


A.  The  citadel,  Salinakis. 
13.  Citadel  No.  2. 

E.  Mausoleum. 


C.  Great  Harbour. 

D.  Gato  of  Mylasa. 


about  half  a  mile  from  the  walls.  At  first  the  proceed- 
ings on  both  sides  were  desultory.  One  or  two  sallies  of 
the  besieged  were  repulsed  with  ease ;  and  a  night  at- 
tack of  Alexander's  on  the  neighbouring  town  of  Myn- 
dos  was  foiled.  But  thenceforward  both  the  attack  and 
defence  became  serious.  To  get  at  the  walls  with  bat- 
tering engines,  it  was  first  necessary  to  fill  up  the  ditch  ; 
and  this  was  done  by  the  soldiers,  under  cover  of  three 
movable  penthouses.  The  rams  were  then  brought  up, 
and  ere  lon^j  two  towers,  with  the  intermediate  extent  of 


io8 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  X. 


wall,  had  yielded  to  the  incessant  shocks,  and  were  in 
rums      Mcanwliile  the  besieged  made  repeated  sallies 
and  bus.ed  themselves  in  raising  a  thick  wall  of  brick  in 
the  shape  of  a  crescent  behind  the  city  wall,  and  abut- 
ting on  It  at  each  end,  in  case,  as  actually  happened   a 
breach  were  made.     Before  the  wall  was  finished,  how- 
ever, the  breach  was  practicable;  and  an  attack  wa-^  in- 
advertently brought   on    by  the   drunken  frolic  of  two 
Macedonian  soldiers,  who,  to  settle  a  disputed  question 
as  to  their  comparative  valour,  donned  their  armour,  and 
boldly  set  out  to  storm  the  town  alone.     A  few  who  saw 
them  coming  ran  out  to  attack   them  ;  but  these  they 
slew,  and  proceeded  to  throw  their  javelins  at  others 
more  distant.     Presently  the  first  amazement  of  either 
Side  gave   place  to  excitement ;  and  hurried  reinforce- 
ments two  or  three  at  a  time,  joined  the  two  reckless 
Macedonians,  as  well  as  their  opponents.     The  fi-ht  be- 
came general.     The  besiegers,  after  a  struggle,"  drove 
back  the  besieged  behind  their  walls,  and  (so  great  was 
the  confusion)  might  probably  have  captured  the  citv 
then  and  there,  had   the  assault   been   intentional  and 
we  I-suppoited      As  it  was,  the  half-moon  was  finished 
before  Alexander  was  ready  to  deliver  the  attack     More- 
over, when  the  engines  were  moved  up,  the  troops,  bein<. 
thus  as  It  were  within  the  circle  of  the  city  walls  were 
exposed  to  a  harassing  cross  fire  in  front  and  on  both 
flanks,  while  the  sallies  of  the  enemy  became  more  des- 
perate and  impetuous.     Gradually,  however,  the  attack 
directed  by  Alexander  in  person,  began  to  overpowe; 
the  defence,  and  the  Persian  commanders  held  a  coun- 
cil of  war.     The  end  was  clearly  approaching.     What 
was  to  be  done  ?    Ephialtds  was  urgent  that  they  should 
not  tamely  surrender,  but  at  least  make  one  more  effort 
for  victory,  and  by  persistence  obtained  the  consent  of 


\ 


CH.   X. 


Fall  of  the  City. 


109 


Memnon  to  his  heading  one  more  desperate  sally.     Two 
thousand  men  were  chosen.    Half  he  armed  with  torches 
to  set  fire  to  the  engines  ;  half  he  drew  up  in  a  deep  col- 
umn to  charge  the  enemy.     At  daybreak  all  the  gates 
were  thrown  open,  and  the  sallying  parties  dashed  out. 
Some  of  the  engines  were   soon  in  flames,  while  Eph- 
ialtes  and  his  column  steadily  pressed  onwards,  over- 
powering all  resistance,  and  even  putting  some  of  the 
younger  soldiers  to  flight.     But  the  efforts  of  Alexander 
presently  rallied   them;    and  yet  more  the  disciplined 
courage   of  the   veteran   reserves,  who,  taunting   them 
with  cowardice,  fell  into  the  ranks  of  their  own  accord 
with  a  coolness  learnt  on  many  a  battle-field,  and  soon 
checked  and  eventually  swept  back  again  their  already 
triumphant  assailants,  Ephialtes  being  one  of  the  first  to 
fall.     The  loss  of  the  besieged  in  this  sally  was  heavy; 
and  Memnon  and  his  colleagues,  aware  that  they  could 
not  hold  out  much  longer,  resolved  to  evacuate  the  city. 
Under  cover  of  night  they  set  fire  to  the  engines  and 
magazines,  and   carried  off  the  stores  and  troops  and 
some   of  the  inhabitants,  pardy  to   the   upper   citadel, 
partly  to  adjacent  islands.     Alexander  razed  the  city  to 
the  ground ;  and  left  3,000  infantry  and  200  cavalry  with 
Queen  Ada  to  blockade  and  reduce  the  citadel,  while  he 
himself  pursued  his  march  eastward. 

Having  detached  Parmenion  with  the  cavalry  and 
baggage  to  meet  him  in  the  spring  in  Phrygia,  he  himself 
led  the  rest  of  his  army  through  Lykia  and  Pamphylia, 
Pisidia  and  Phrygia,  to  Gordion  in  Bithynia.  At  first 
sight  this  seems  a  strangely  circuitous  route 
for  a  man  whose  next  object  was  to  reach 
Syria  ;  nor  is  it  likely  that  a  man  like  Alex- 
ander would  go  so  far  out  of  his  way  merely 
to  reach  better  winter-quarters,  or  to  escape 


Alexander's 
circuitous 
route  to  Gor- 
(iion,  and 
the  reasons 
for  it. 


7 


J 


no 


T/ie  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.X. 


CH.  X. 


March  across  Asia  Minor. 


Ill 


the  difficulties  of   western   Kilikia.      Two  things  were 
of  primary  importance    at  this  time.      To   protect   the 
Greeks  of  the  coast  from  annoyance  in  his  absence  at 
the  hands  of  the   satraps  of  the  interior,  and  to  secure 
his  own  communications  with  Macedon.     It  was  a  wise 
step,  therefore,  to  make  a  display  of  his  power,  and  to 
exact  if  it  were  only  a  passing  submission  in  the  high- 
lands of  Phrygia  and  Kappadokia ;    while  the  position 
of  Gordion  would  facilitate  rapid  overland  communica- 
tion with  the  west,  as  well  as  a  ready  control  of  the  sa- 
traps to  the  north  and  east.     Here  he  was  joined  once 
more  by  Parmenion  and  by  reinforcements  from  Greece, 
to  the  number  of  3000  infantry  and  650  cavalry.     Here, 
The  cutting       ^°°'  before  he  turned  his  face  southward,  he 
of  the  Cor.         cut  the  famous  Gordian  knot.     In  the  cita- 

dian  knot.  j    i        r      i 

del   of   the  town    (so   runs   the  talc)  was  a 
wagon,  in  which,   once  upon  a  time,   when  the    people 
were  at  strife,  a  certain  Midas  with  his  f-ither  and  mother 
had  entered  the  place.     Now  it  had  been  revealed  to  the 
Gordians  that  a  wagon  would  bring  them  a  king,  who 
should  allay  their  strife.     So  they  laid  hands  on'jVIidas 
and  made  him   king;    the  wagon  was  dedicated  in  the 
Akropolis,  and  a  further   oracle  declared  that  whoever 
should  loose  the  pole  from  the  yoke  was  destined  to  be 
lord  of  Asia.     Now  the  knot  that  tied  it  was  of  cornel 
bark,  and   had  seemingly  neither  end  nor  beginning. 
But   for  the   omen's   sake,  and  for  the  comfort  of  his 
friends,  it  was  needful  that   Alexander   should  do   the 
deed ;    so  he  went  to  the  citadel  and  loosed  the  pole, 
either  cutting  the  knot  with  his  sword,  or  pulling  out  the 
peg.     At  any  rate  the  conditions  of  the  oracle  were  satis- 
fied, and  a  thunder-storm  the  following  night  rendered 
assurance  doubly  sure. 

From   Gordion   he   marched   to   Ankyra,    and    then 


\ 


The  march 
from  Gor- 
dion to 
Tarsos. 


straight  for  Mount  Tauros  and  the  Kilikian  Gates.  The 
folly  of  the  Persians  in  disregarding  Mcm- 
non's  advice,  and  in  neglecting  to  occupy 
in  force  so  defensible  a  pass,  is  incredible, 
especially  when  we  remember  that,  not 
seventy  years  before,  Cyrus  the  Younger  had  traversed 
it  on  an  errand  similar  to  Alexander's,  and  that  Xcno- 
phon,  who  was  in  his  train,  calls  it  a  carriage-road,  im- 
passable in  the  face  of  an  opposing  force.  In  one  place 
there  was  no  more  room  than  for  four  armed  men  abreast. 
A  resistance,  possibly  successful,  might  there  have  been 
made  to  invasion,  which  was  attempted  to  no  purpose  at 
Issos,  especially  as  Alexander  had  not,  like  Cyrus,  a 
fleet  with  which  to  make  a  diversion  in  the  rear.  As  it 
was,  the  Persians  in  their  supineness  seem  hardly  to 
have  been  aware  of  the  king's  approach.  The  scanty 
garrison  of  the  pass  fled  at  once  without  a  blow.  Scarcely 
able  to  credit  his  good  fortune,  Alexander  marched  with- 
out a  day's  delay  into  Kilikia,  only  to  find  that  the 
satrap  Arsames  also  had  fled,  and  that  Tarsos  was  his — 
a  place  then  important  as  a  great  commercial  centre, 
and  since  famous  as  the  home  of  the  Apostle  Paul,  and 
the  burial-place  of  the  Emperor  Julian.  It  was  near 
being  famous  also  as  the  burial-place  of  Alexander  him- 
self.     Having  bathed    incautiously  in  the 

ij  ri         T^i  /•!,        1         Alexander's 

cold  waters  01  the   Kydnos  when    his  blood      magnani- 
was   heated   by   his   recent   exertions    and      memor^^" 
forced  marches,  he  was   seized  with   fever,       Piiilippos. 
and  presently  was  dangerously  ill.     The  physicians  were 
quite  baffled.     One  alone,  an  Akarnanian  named  Philip- 
pos,  undertook  to  give  the  king  a  medicine  which  would 
certainly  cure  him.    Meanwhile  a  letter  reached  Alexan- 
der from   Parmenion,  warning  him  to  beware  of  Philip- 
pos  ;  as  a  rumour  was  abroad  that  he  had  been  bribed  by 


112 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  X. 


The  Pass  of 
Issos  (portae 
Kilikiae  et 
Syriae;. 


Darius  to  poison  him.  As  yet  the  hero  was  untainted  by 
success,  and  was  as  generously  above  suspicion  as  he 
was  chivalrously  above  fear.  Having  read  the  letter,  he 
held  it  in  his  hand  ;  and  when  Philippos  appeared,  gave 
it  to  him  as  he  handed  him  the  cup.  Then,  as  Philippos 
read,  he  drank  the  cup  to  the  dregs. 

It  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  a  more  apt  illustration  of 
the  virtue  of  high-mi ndcdness,  as  conceived  by  the 
Greeks  and  described  by  Aristotle,  which  indeed  (he 
says)  is  impossible  without  goodness  and  beauty  of  char- 
acter. 

After  celebrating  his  recovery   by  solemn   sacrifices 
and  games  to  Asklcpios  (/Esculapius),  the  king  set  out  on 
his  eastward  march  to  find  Darius,  of  whose 
approach  with  a  vast  host  he  had  alVeady 
heard.     The  Macedonian  army  converged 
by  different  routes  upon   Issos,  where  the 
sick  and  wounded  were  left  behind  ;  and  then  marched 
southward  through  the  Kilikian  Gates,  reaching  Myrian- 
dros  on  the  third  day  after  leaving  Issos.     The  bay  and 
plain,  called  after  the  last-named  place,  are  formed  by 
the  two  diverging  arms  of  Mount  Amanos,  a  southern 
off-shoot  of  Mount  Tauros  ;    the  bay  running  some  fifty 
miles  mland  and  having  an  average  breadth  of  twenty- 
five  miles.     Its  importance  has  been  recognized  from 
very  early  times,   for  the  best  and  most  natural  route 
from  Asia  Minor  to  Syria  and  Mesopotamia  runs  round 
the  head  of  the  bay,  and  then  passes  along  the  narrow 
defile  between  the  mountains  and  the  sea.  turning  near 
Myriandros  to  the  south-east,  and  passing  over  Mount 
Amanos  by  the  Syrian  Gates  (or  Beilan  pass)  to  Antioch 
on   the   south,  and   to  Thapsakos,   the   ford  of  the  Eu- 
phrates, on  the  east.     In  parts  the  mountains  approach 
very  closely  to  the  sea ;    hence  the  pass  is  very  easily 


CH.  X. 


The  Pass  of  Issos, 


"3 


defensible,  and  is  the  exact  spot  which  a  general  would 
choose  who  had  to  contend  with  an  enemy  superior  in 
numbers,  but  inferior  in  discipline  and  courage.  On  the 
other  hand  the  folly  of  Darius  in  not  defending  so  strong 
a  position,  which,  like  the  Kilikian  Gates  of  Mount 
Tauros.  might  have  been  made  practically  impregnable, 


ntioch 


was  as  fatal  as  the  pride  which  led  him  and  others  to 
slight  the  advice  of  Memnon  while  he  was  alive,  and  to 
exchange  his  policy  of  defence  for  offence  as  soon  as  he 
was  dead.  The  Great  King  had  collected  a  vast  host  of 
400,000  infantry,  and  100,000  cavalry  ;  but  the  Athenian 
Charidemos  (like  Demaratos,  the  Spartan,  in  the  days 


114 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.   X. 


of  Xerxes),  warned  him  that  these  numbers  were  delu- 
sive, and  worthless  against  the  enemy  whom  he  was 
marching  to  attack.  The  warning  cost  Charidemos  his 
life,  and  the  neglect  of  it  cost  Darius  his  throne. 

While  Alexander  was  in  the  defile  of  Issos,  Darius 
was   encamped   in  the  Syrian   plain,   about  two   days' 

march  from  Mount  Amanos.  He  had 
sesMoimT  brought  his  vast  army,  his  courtiers,  his 
Amanos  to         harem,   as  for  a  triumphal  progress:    and 

now  that  his  rash  enemy,  as  he  vainly  imag- 
ined, was  skulking  behind  the  mountains,  or  lying  sick 
at  Tarsos,  he  would  go  and  find  him  out.  So  the  huge 
array,  which  had  taken  five  days  to  cross  the  Euphrates, 
slowly  made  its  way  by  the  Amanian  Gates  over  the 
mountain  ridge  (the  heavy  baggage  and  treasure  being 
sent  to  Damascus),  and  came  down  upon  Issos  only  two 
days  after  Alexander  had  left  it  on  his  southward  march. 
It  was  a  singular  chance  which  thus  led  two  enemies, 
each  in  search  of  the  other,  to  march  on  nearly  parallel 
lines  but  in  opposite  directions,  and  to  be  so  near  with- 
out knowing  it.  At  Issos  were  found  the  sick  and  the 
wounded  of  the  Macedonian  army,  whom  Darius  was 
persuaded  by  his  courtiers  to  torture  and  put  to  death  ; 
after  which  he  turned  southward  in  pursuit  of  his  foe, 

and   encamped   on   the   right  bank  of  the 

Prepara-  •-!->•  i  i  i    •       .  ,       - 

tions  of  nver  Tmaros,  where  the  plam  is  only  from 

^e'bauE.^*''"  ^'^'^  ^o  th^ce  miles  in  breadth.  Darius  there- 
fore could  bring  no  more  than  90,000  troops 
into  line  of  battle.  The  king  would  scarcely  believe  the 
good  news,  when  told  that  the  Persians  were  actually 
within  reach  ;  and  sent  off  some  of  the  Companions  in 
a  fifty-oared  galley  to  reconnoitre  and  bring  him  back 
word.  They  soon  returned  with  the  tidings  that  Darius 
was  close  at  hand.     Alexander  at  once  assembled   his 


CH.  X. 


Preparations  for  Battle, 


"5 


officers,  and  addressed  them  in  words  which  were  clearly 
intended  to  serve  as  the  text  for  each  officer's  address  to 
his  own  division.     They  had  every  reason  (he  urged)  for 
good  hope.    They  and  he  had  fought  together  before,  and 
always  with  success.     They  were  about  to  fight  now  with 
men  whom  they  had  conquered,   and  to    whom   they 
were  as  superior  as  warrior  freemen  always  must  be  to 
unwariike   slaves.    "  Moreover,  it  was  Alexander  pitted 
against  Darius ;    and  the  prize  was  the  empire  of  Asia. 
He  reminded  each  man  by  name  of  his  former  brilliant 
deeds— of  the  rewards    now  within  his  grasp — of  the 
great  things  which  Xenophon  had  done  on  a  similar 
scene,  but  with  vastly  inferior  means— and  at  last  roused 
them  to  such  enthusiasm  that  they  begged  him  to  ad- 
vance  at  once.      Sending  forward  a  few  cavalry   and 
bowmen  to  feel  for  the  enemy,  and  having  offered  sacri- 
fice, he  set  out  after  the  evening  meal,  and  by  midnight 
reached  the  narrowest  part  of  the  pass— the  Kilikian 
Gates— where  he  halted  for  the  night.     At  dawn  he  ad- 
vanced once  more,  in  column,  until  the  pass  widened  as 
the  mountains  receded  from  the  sea;  here  he  deployed 
his  troops  into  line  of  battle,  and  again  moved  forward 
in  the  usual  order  into  the  plain  of  the  river  Pinaros. 
Darius,  meanwhile,  had  made  his  preparations,  and  they 
were  such  as  by  no  means  to  encourage  his  men  ;  beino- 
rather  those  of  one  who  expects  not  to  attack  but  to  be 
attacked,  and  who  has  a  lurking  distrust  of  himself.  He 
posted  20,000  men  in  the  mountains  in  the  rear  of  Alex- 
ander's right  flank.     These,  had  they  been  worth  any- 
thing, might  have  paralyzed  the  Macedonian  advance, 
or  charged  at  a  decisive  moment  on  his  rear.     As  it  was, 
their  real  merit  was  soon  discovered;    for  at  the  first 
charge  of  some  troops  whom  Alexander  detached  for 
the  service,  they  retired  to  higher  ground  and  were  act- 


ii6 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  X. 


ually  held  in  check  during  the  rest  of  the  battle  by  a 
mere  handful  of  300  horsemen.  The  interval  of  about 
two  miles  between  the  mountains  and  the  sea  Darius 
occupied  with  a  continuous  mass  of  heavy-armed  in- 
fantry— 30,000  Greek  mercenaries  in  the  centre,  and  on 
their  flanks  troops  called  Kardakes  (or  Asiatics  armed 
as  hoplitcs)  to  the  number  of  60,000.  The  line  of  troops 
followed  the  line  of  the  river  bank,  which  in  parts  was 
precipitous  and,  where  it  was  not  so  steep,  was  defended 
by  intrenchments.  The  mass  of  the  Persian  cavalry  was 
on  the  right  wing  in  advance  of  the  Kardakes.  Of  the 
actual  500,000  men  present,  there  was  thus  room  for  no 
more  than  120,000  to  fight,  the  residue  being  massed  on 
the  plain  in  the  rear,  by  tribes  and  nations.  Well  might 
Alexander  exclaim  that  heaven  itself  was  fighting  on  his 
side,  when  Darius  had  been  prompted  to  entangle  his 
overwhelming  numbers  in  so  narrow  a  space!  Well 
might  he  believe  the  Persians  to  be  cowed  in  spirit,  and 
already  as  good  as  defeated,  when  he  saw  their  prepara- 
tions, not  so  much  for  delivering  a  blow,  or  trampling 
the  audacious  invader  under  foot,  as  for  resisting  his 
attack  as  best  they  might. 

He  advanced  with  the  phalanx  in   six  divisions,  with 
the  Hypaspists  and  Macedonian   cavalry  on  the  right 
wing  under  his  own  command,  and  the  Pclo- 
Fs^"!^^'^  ponnesian  and  Thessalian  cavalry  on  the  left 

(November,  under  Parmenion.  His  idea  of  the  battle 
was,  as  actually  happened,  that  the  right 
wing  under  his  command  should  charge  the  Persian  left, 
and  drive  it  off  the  field,  and  then  fall  upon  the  flank  of 
the  centre,  which  would  be  occupied  in  front  with  resist- 
ing the  impact  of  the  phalanx.  The  approach  to  the 
river  was  conducted  slowly,  so  as  to  maintain  the  order 
of  the  ranks,  the  king  all  the  while  riding  up  and  down 


CH.  X. 


Battle  of  Issos. 


117 


along  the  lines  and  encouraging  both  officers  and  men, 
who  answered  him  with  cheers.      Presently  they  came 
within  bowshot  of  the  enemy,  and  the  Persian  arrows 
began  to  fall  among  them  thickly.      Like   Miltiades  at 
Marathon,    Alexander  gave  immediate  orders   for  the 
charge  at  the  double,  that  his  men  might  be  exposed  to 
the  galling  fire  for  as  short  a  time   as  possible ;   and  set- 
ting spurs  to  his  horse  dashed  into   the  river  at  the  head 
of  the   Hypaspists,   charging  furiously  into  the  Asiatic 
troops  opposite  to  him.     Ill  prepared  and  little  accus- 
tomed to  such  stress  of  war  as  this,  they  began  to  falter 
and  give  ground  almost  from  the  moment  of  attack  ;  and 
presently,  overborne  by  the  tremendous  energy  of  their 
assailants,  they  yielded  to  the  pressure,  broke,  and  fled. 
Alexander  pursued  them  far  enough  to  ensure  their  utter 
rout,  and  then  returned  to  the  relief  of  his  centre,  against 
which  the  Greek  mercenaries  of  the  Persian  host  were 
maintaining  a  fierce  and  not  wholly  unsuccessful  strug- 
gle.    Alexander's  own  rapid  advance  had  made  a  gap 
in  his  array,   and  left  his  phalanx  a  little  behind  him ; 
and  as  they  pressed  hurriedly  into  the  water  and  surged 
up  against  the   opposite   bank,  it   was  with  ill-dressed 
ranks  and  a  wavering  line,   while  their  right  flank  was 
open  to  attack.     Such   disorderly  advance  was  fatal  to 
the  full  efficiency  of  the  phalanx ;  and  the  Greeks  op- 
posed to  them  were  quite  aware  of  it,  and  were  eager  to 
win  the  honour  of  defeating  them  in  fair  fight  for  the 
first  time.     A  desperate  struggle  ensued  for  the  posses- 
sion of  the  bank;  while  on  the  flank  between  them  and 
the  sea  an  encounter  no  less  desperate  was  going  on  be- 
tween the  Thessalian  cavalry  and  the  main  body  of  the 
Persian  horse,  who  had  crossed  the  river  to  attack  them. 
At  this  juncture  Alexander,  having  driven  the  Persian 
left  wing  off  the  field,  fell  suddenly  and  furiously  on  the 


ii8 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  X. 


left  flank  of  the  Greeks,  who  were  already  engaged  with 
the  phalanx  in  front,  and  threw  them  into  utter  confusion. 
Even  then  the  resistance  might  have  been  stouter  than  it 
was,  had  not  Darius  himself  despaired  of  success,  and 
with  craven  timidity  set  the  example  of  flight.     As  soon 
as  his  left  wing  was  broken  and  scattered,  fearing  that 
his  own  sacred  person  in  the  centre  was  no  longer  safe, 
he  leaped  on  his  chariot,  just  as  he  was,  and  fled  away 
along  the  plain  with  a  few  of  his  suite.     To  an  army  like 
the  Persian  such  an   example  was  disastrous,  and  the 
flight  of  the  Great   King  became  the  signal  that  all  was 
lost.     And   all   was   lost,    indeed,    beyond  recall.     The 
Greeks,  attacked  on  two  sides  at  once,  wavered  and  then 
gave  ground,  and  at  last  broke  up  into  a  seething  mass 
of  struggling  men  ;  while  the  cavalry  beyond  the  river, 
seeing  what  was  going  on  behind  them,  hastily  recrossed 
it,  hotly  pursued  by  the  Thcssalians,  and  strove  to  make 
good  their  own   retreat,  jostling  and  trampling  on  one 
another  in  their  panic,  and  even  riding  down   their  own 
infantry.     The  whole  length  of  the  narrow  plain  from 
the  Pinaros  to  Issos  was  now  one  scene  of  indescribable 
horror  and  confusion,  the  great  mukitude  that  had  never 
struck  a  blow  helping  to  swell  the  vast  tide  of  terror- 
stricken  fugitives.     The  slaughter  was  prodigious,  and 
not  only  by  the  sword.     The  plain  was  in  some  places 
narrower  than  others,  and  here  and  there  were  water- 
courses, where  the  crush  and  pressure  were  so  terrific 
that  hundreds  appear    to    have    been    suffocated,    and 
Ptolemy,  who  himself  took  part  in  the  pursuit,  avers  that 
he  crossed  a  ravine  by  aid  of  the  dead  bodies  with  which 
it  was  choked.     Of  the  cavalry   10,000  are  said  to  have 
perished,    and   100,000  of  the  infantry;  4,000  fugitives 
succeeded  in  reaching  Thapsakos  and  crossing  the  Eu- 
phrates ;  8,000  of  the  Greeks  actually  fought  their  way 


CH.  X. 


Results  of  the  Victory. 


119 


through  the  Macedonian  army,  and  marching  down  to 
Tripolis  seized  some  Phoenician  transports,  and  crossed 
the  sea  first  to  Cyprus  and  eventually  to  Egypt.  But 
with  these  trifling  exceptions  the  rest  of  the  vast  host 
disappears  from  sight.  Only  after  the  lapse  of  two  years- 
could  Darius  gather  another  army  wherewith  to  meet  his 
enemy,  and  that  was  raised  almost  wholly  from  coun- 
tries east  of  the  Euphrates.  The  Macedonian  loss  was 
returned  at  300  foot  and  1 50  horse  soldiers  slain,  and 
about  500  wounded.  Alexander  himself  was  slightly 
injured  in  the  thigh  by  a  sword  thrust. 

The  pursuit  was  continued  as  long  as  the  brief  light  of 
a  November  day  allowed.     Darius  himself  escaped  ;  but 
his  wife  and  sister  and  mother,  his  young 
son  and  two  daughters,  his  tent  and  chariot,      quences  of 
his  shield  and  bow,  together  with  3,000  tal-      '^^  victory. 
ents  of  money,  fell  into  the  conqueror's  hands.      If  we 
remember  what  the  ideas  of  those  days  were  with  regard 
to  prisoners  of  war,  it  will  seem  to  be  no  small  part  of 
Alexander's  glory  that  he  treated  these  ladies  from  first 
to  last  with  unvarying  courtesy  and  respect. 

When  he  returned  from  the  pursuit,  the  king  found 
that  the  Persian  camp  had  already  been  plundered  by 
his  soldiers;  but  the  royal  tent,  and  perfumed  bath,  and 
the  royal  banquet  had  been  carefully  reserved  for  his 
use — luxuries  to  which  hitherto  he  had  been  a  stranger, 
and  which  possibly  occasioned  the  sarcastic  remark, 
quoted  by  Plutarch,  that  this  apparently  was  what  was 
meant  by  being  a  king.  The  next  day  he  celebrated  his 
victory  on  the  spot,  erecting  altars  on  the  Pinaros  to 
Zeus,  Herakles,  and  Athene ;  and  sent  Parmenion  for- 
ward, with  some  Thessalian  cavalry,  to  seize  whatever 
treasure  was  to  be  found  in  Damascus.  Its  amount  and 
varied  character  must  have  been  almost  embarrassing. 


I20  The  Macedonian  Empire.  ch.  xi. 

for  we  are  told  that  he  became  master  not  only  of  the 
mihtary  chest,  but  of  a  great  number  of  Persian  nobles 
and  ladies  of  the  highest  rank,  and  of  camp  followers  of 
every  sort  and  description  to  the  amazing  number  of 
30,000.     Such  it  was,  it  seems,  to  be  a  conqueror. 


CHAPTER  XI. 

FROM  THE  BATTLE  OF  ISSOS  TO  THE  BATTLE  OF. 

GAUGAMELA. 

The   victory   of    Issos  not  only  gave  Alexander  prac- 
tically the  command  of  Asia  west  of  the  Euphrates,  but 
relieved  him  of  much  anxiety  as  to  any  al- 
Jhrinvastn      ^^^^^^  between  Greeks  and  Persians  in  his 
and^Eg^pf      ^^'''-      '^^^^t  alliance  had  been  a   possible 
and   even  threatening  danger,  and  it  was 
with  a  view  to  guard  against  its  recurrence  in  the  future 
that  Alexander  directed  his  next  attack  against  Phoenicia 
and    Egypt,  the  homes   and    recruiting  ground  of   the 
Persian  fleet,  rather  than  against  Babylon  or  Persepolis. 
From  the  Pinaros.  Alexander  retraced  his  steps  as  far 
as  Myriandros,  and  then,  crossing  the  Syrian  Gates,  fol- 
lowed    the    valley    of    the     Orontes    to    Arados    and 
Marathos,   which,   like  Byblos  and  Sidon   immediately 
afterwards,  welcomed  with  acclamation  the  conqueror  of 
Persia. 

At  Marathos  the  king  gave  audience  to  two  envoys 
from  Darius  himself.  They  were  bearers  of  a  letter  of 
Alexander  remonstrance  at  Alexander's  unprovoked 
gives  audi-        attack,  and  of  a  request  that  he  would  send 

ence  to  en-  i,       1      t  • 

voys  from  Dack  his  Wife,  mother,  and  children.     The 

Daiius.  1  •       »  1  .     . 

kmg  s    answer  was   characteristic,  and  re- 
vealed the  larger  views  that  were  now  occupying  his 


CH.  XI. 


Embassies  to  Alexander. 


121 


mind.  After  adducing  a  number  of  grievances,  of  which 
Greeks  in  general  and  he  himself  in  particular  had  to 
complain,  he  repeated  in  other  words  what  he  had  al- 
ready said  to  the  mother  of  Darius,  that  the  contest 
between  them  was  fortjic  empire  of  Asia.  He  bade  the 
Great  King  come  to  his  presence,  as  to  one  who  was 
master  of  all  Asia.  "And  in  future"  (he  adds),  "  when  thou 
sendest  to  me,  send  as  to  the  King  of  Asia,  and  write 
not  as  an  equal,  and  speak,  if  thou  requirest  aught,  as  to 
one  who  is  lord  of  all  thy  possessions.  If  not,  I  will  take 
counsel  against  thee  as  a  wrong-doer.  And  if  thou  hast 
aught  to  object  in  the  matter  of  the  royal  power,  await 
my  coming  and  do  not  flee,  but  try  the  issue  of  battle.  I 
will  come  to  thee  wherever  thou  art."  These  lofty  words 
have  to  our  ears  an  arrogant  ring,  but  they  defined  ex- 
actly the  relative  position  of  the  two  men. 

From     Sidon    Alexander   proceeded    towards    Tyre, 
hoping  to  find  as  cordial  a  welcome  as  he  had  just  ex- 
perienced in  the  northern  cities.     He  was 
met  by  an  embassy  with  valuable  presents,    of°ATex^andcr"s 
and  with  promises  on  the  part  of  their  city   treatment  of 

^  ^  ^  •'      the  1  yrians. 

to  do  all  that  the  king  desired.  The  king's 
answer  was  that  he  desired  to  enter  Tyre,  and  to  sacrifice 
to  the  Tyrian  Herakl^s.  The  ambassadors  replied,  in 
the  name  of  the  city,  that  they  would  gladly  accede  to 
whatever  else  the  king  might  wish,  but  that  they  could 
not  admit  any  man,  whether  Persian  or  Macedonian, 
within  their  walls.  But  the  king  (they  added)  could 
sacrifice  equally  well  at  Palai  Tyros,  the  old  town,  on 
the  mainland,  where  was  a  temple  of  Herakles,  more 
ancient  and  more  venerable  than  their  own.  Alexander 
was  deeply  offended  by  their  refusal,  and  at  once  called 
a  council  of  war,  at  which  it  was  resolved  that,  however 
difficult  the  siege  might  be,  it  was  a  task  which  could 


^22  'The  Macedonia?i  Empire.  CH.  xi. 

not  safely  be  declined.     It  has  been  said  that  impatient 
pride  on  the  king's  part  prompted  this  resolution  ;  but 
his  own  speech  to  his  officers  in  council  suggests  three 
or  four  weighty  reasons  for  the  step,  which  amply  justify 
It.  The  wording  of  the  Tyrian  refusal  gave  the  impression 
of'tnmmmg/'and  of  their  wishing  to  remain  neutral 
m  a  contest  which  seemed  as  yet  undecided.     Could 
Alexander  safely  leave  behind  him,  unreduced,  those 
who  were  either  secret  enemies,  or  at  best  lukewarm 
friends  ?    The  Phoenician  fleet  in  Egean  waters  was  his 
greatest  source  of  danger;  but  if  Phoenicia  were  reduced 
that  fleet  would  be  his.     In  that  case  the  submission  of 
Cyprus  would  be  certain  ;  and  with  Cyprus  and  Phcenicia 
as  the  base  of  operations,  the  conquest  of  Egypt  would 
be  no  less  certain.     Then,  and  not  till  then,  would  it  be 
possible  to  feel  secure  of  Greece,  and  to  turn  his  face 
resolutely  towards  Babylon.     But  everything  depended 
on  that  first  link  in  the  chain-the  complete  reduction 
of  Phoenicia.     So  great  a  military  genius  as  Alexander 
hving  amid  his  own  ideas  and  not  ours,  could  hardly  be 
expected  to  admit  such  considerations  as  that  Tyrians 
wished  to  remain  neutral,  or  were  "an  ancient  and  in- 
telligent community,"  or  fancied  their  position  impreg- 
nable. It  was  an  essential  part  of  his  policy  that  Phccnichi 
and  Egypt  should  be  wrested  from   Persia,  and  com- 
pletely subdued. 

The  city  of  Tyre  (Tsur,  Sur,  the  Rock)  was  built  partly 
on  the  mainland,  partly  on  a  rocky  island,  twenty-four 

ofTyJe.*""*  nearly  three  miles  in  circumference,  and 
separated  from  the  continent  by  an  arm  of 
the  sea  seven-tenths  of  a  mile  in  breadth,  which  was 
comparatively  shallow  near  the  mainland,  but  three 
fathoms  deep  off  the  island.     The  line  of  coast  seems  to 


CH.  XI. 


Siege  of  Tyre. 


123 


have  altered  considerably  from  time  to  time,  owing  to 
the  silting  of  sand  and  to  volcanic  agencies  ;  so  that  part 
of  the  island  on  the  western  side  is  now  submerged, 
ruins  of  columns  being  still  visible  below  the  water, 
while  the  channel  between  it  and  the  mainland,  which 
is  now  one-third  of  a  mile  across,  was  in  Strabo's  time 
(about  the  Christian  era)  entirely  blocked  by  an  isthmus 
of  sand,  resting  on  the  ruins  of  Alexander's  mole.  The 
city  had  two  harbours,  to  the  north  and  south  of  the 
island  respectively,  protected  by  sea-walls ;  and  the 
southern,  which  was  the  more  exposed,  was  defended 
further  by  an  immense  breakwater,  thirty-five  feet  thick, 
and  now  covered  with  six  or  eight  feet  of  water.  These 
harbours  were  connected  by  a  canal  running  across  the 
island,  the  outline  of  which  is  still  traceable.  All  round 
the  city  ran  a  wall,  which  opposite  the  mainland  rose  to 
the  stupendous  height  of  1 50  feet.    Within  this  compara- 


A.  North  (Sidonian)  harbour. 

B.  South  (Egyptian)  harbour. 

C.  Supposed  extent  of  north  har- 

bour 

D.  Canal  connecting  hirbours. 

E.  Submarine  breakwater. 


F.  Double  sea-wall,  loo  feet  apart. 

G.  Ruins  of  harbour-wall,  25  feet 

broad. 
H.  Alexander's  mole. 

a.  Line  of  coast  in  Strabo's  day. 

b.  Old  Tyre 


124 


The  Macedonian  EmJ>ire, 


CH.  XI. 


tively  limited  area,  it  has  been  supposed  that  the  popula- 
tion must  in  Alexander's  day  have  amounted  to  nearly 
50,000;  but  the  narrowness  of  the  area  was  compensated 
by  the  immense  number  of  stories  in  which  the  houses 
were  built,  reminding  us  of  the  "insulie"  at  Rome  or  of 
the  vast  piles  crowded  within  the  fortifications  of  some 
foreign  town. 

The-Tyrians  were  masters  of  the  sea,  and  Alexander 
had  no  fleet.     It  was  necessary,  therefore,  in  order  to 
reach  the  city  at  all,  to  run  a  mole  across  the  channel, 
by  which  the  engines  might  be  brought  to  bear  upon  the 
wall.     At  first  the  work  was  easy  enough.     There  were 
stones  in  plenty  at  Old  Tyre,  abundance  of  timber  was 
Siege  of  Tyre     ^°  ^^  ^^^  ^"  Lebanon,  and  the  piles  were 
feo'jil^r*   ^"""^  ^^'ithout  difficulty  in  the  soft  sand  and 
mud.     But  the  further  the  work  was  carried 
the  more  difficult  it  became  :  for  the  water  grew  deeper, 
and  the  Tyrian   men-of-war  could  sail  up  from  either 
harbour  and  molest  the  men  at  work,  who  ere  long  came 
also  within  range  from  the  walls.     When  the  ivfacedo- 
nian  engineers  erected  mantlets  and  two  wooden  towers 
on  the  mole  to  protect  their  workers,  the  Tyrians  were 
equal  to  this  emergency  also.     They  prepared  a  fire- 
ship,  and  having  waited  for  a  wind  steered  her  skilfully, 
so  as    to  set  alight  the   towers  and  everything  inflam- 
mable within  reach ;   the  men  on  board  the  ships  mean- 
while kept  up  an  incessant  shower  of  darts  and  arrows, 
while  volunteers  from  the  city,  pushing  off  in  any  boat 
that  came  to  hand,  eagerly  joined  in  the  work  of  destruc- 
tion, pulling  up  palisades  and  helping  to  spread  the  fire. 
Most  of  the  engines  and  a  large  part  of  the  mole  were 
thus  destroyed,  and  the  destruction  was  completed  by  a 
storm.     Alexander,  however,  nothing  daunted,  at   once 
set  to  work   to  construct  more  engines,  and  to  build 


CH.  XI. 


Siege  of  Tyre. 


125 


another  mole,  broader  than  the  first,  and  carried  ob- 
liquely across  the  channel  in  a  south-west  direction  to 
escape  the  force  of  the  waves.     At  the  same  time  it  was 
clear  that  his  task  was  doubly  difficult  while  the  Tyrians 
were  masters  of  the  sea.     Accordingly,  leaving  his  en- 
gineers to  carry  on  the  mole,  he  took  some  picked  troops 
and  marched  to  Sidon,  to  collect  as  large  a  fleet  as  pos- 
sible.    Here  the  wisdom  of  his  policy  in  first  reducing 
Phoenicia  became  evident  at  once,  for  he  found  there 
the  fleets  of  Sidon  and  Byblos  and  Arados,  which  had 
left  the  Persian  side  as  soon  as  they  heard  of  the  ad- 
hesion of  their  native  towns  to  Alexander,  as  well  as 
ships  from  Rhodes,  and  Lykia,  and  Cyprus,  and  4,000 
mercenaries  from  Pcloponnesos.     He  thus  returned  to 
Tyre  with  a  fleet  of  more  than  200  sail,  and  so  formi- 
dable from  its  equipment  and  the  skill  of  the  sailors,  that 
the  Tyrians  gave  up  all  idea  of  fighting  them,  and  merely 
blocked  the  entrances  of  the  ports  with  a  tightly-packed 
row  of  triremes.    The  fleet,  however,  was  useful  to  Alex- 
ander, not  more  from  giving  him  the  command  of  the 
sea,  than  because  the  larger  ships  could  carry  engines 
and  so  multiply  his  means  of  offence.     But  even  this 
was  at  first  useless,  for  the  Tyrians  had  thrown  great 
stones  into  the  sea  to  bar  the  approach,  and  their  divers 
cut  the  cables  of  any  ships  that  were  moored  there  to 
pick  them  up.    Next  they  organized  and  cleverly  carried 
out  a  surprise,   which  was   near   proving   fatal   to   the 
Cyprian  ships  on  the  north  side  of  the  mole.     Getting 
ready  a  squadron  of  thirteen  vessels  behind  a  screen  of 
sails   set    up   for   the    purpose,    at   mid-day,    when   the 
Cyprian  crews  were  ashore  reposing  in  the  shade,  they 
sent  them  out  silently  and  suddenly  in   single  file   to 
charge  and  destroy  whatever  they  could   reach.     The 
surprise  was  complete.    Alexander  hastily  manned  a 


126 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  XI. 


few  ships,  which  he  sent  off  at  once  to  stop  more  from 
sailing  out  of  the  north  harbour,  and  pushed  off  himself 
with  some  half-dozen  others,  to  round  the  island  and 
help  the  Cyprians.     The  scene  soon  became  excitinjr 
Alexander's  little  squadron  was  strainin-  every  nerve  to 
reach  the  scene  of  action,  while  the  inhabitants,  who 
were  lining   the  walls  of  their  city,   suddenly  became 
aware  of  the  danger  of  their  own  vessels,  now  busily  en- 
gaged in  the  work  of  destruction.     At  first  they  shouted 
to  attract  their  attention,  but  the  din  on  shore  drowned 
the  shouts.     Then  they  signalled  them  to  come  back 
but  It  was  too  late.  for.  as  they  strove  to  regain  the  har- 
bour. Alexander  was  upon  them  ;  a  few  ships  escaped 
but  the  majority  were  damaged  and  waterlogged  while 
two  were  captured  at  the  very  mouth  of  the  harbour 

The  failure  of  this  gallant  effort  was  the  beginning  of 
the  end.  The  strength  of  the  wall,  indeed,  resisted  the 
Fall  of  the  ^"^'''^'  ^""^  ^  ^^^^il^'  ^-^"d  the  struggle  became 
ciiy.  daily  more  bitter,  the  inhabitants  even  going 

.      ,  so  far  as  to  kill  some  prisoners  on  the  walls 

in  the  sight  of  the  besiegers,  and  toss  their  bodies  into 
the  sea.    But  at  last  a  breach  was  battered  in  the  wall  on 
the  south  side  of  the  city,  and  three  days  afterwards 
Alexander  took  advantage  of  a  calm  to  deliver  the  as- 
sault, which  he  led  in  person,  while  a  simultaneous  at- 
tack was  made  on  both  harbours.     The  resistance  was 
desperate,  but  vain.     The  assaulting  party  made  good 
their  footing  at  the  breach,  and  gradually  fought  their 
way  to  the  king's  palace,  while  the  harbours  were  forced 
and  the  ships  sunk  or  driven  ashore.     The  slauo-hter  was 
merciless,  for  the  Macedonians  were  exasperated  by  the 
length  of  the  siege,  and  the  slaughter  of  their  comrades 
on  the  wall ;  so  that  8.000  perished  in  the  struggle  at  the 
breach  and  in  the  streets,  while  30.000  are  said  to  have 


/ 


CH.  XI.  Results  of  the  fall  of  Tyre. 


127 


been  captured  and  sold  as  slaves.  One  author  asserts: 
that  several  thousand  were  carried  off  into  safety  by 
Sidonian  triremes,  of  course  with  Alexander's  conni- 
vance. The  Macedonian  losses  during  the  siege  are 
.stated  at  the  quite  impossible  total  of  400,  considering 
that  it  lasted  nine  months,  and  that  there  was  very  se- 
vere fighting  from  first  to  last.  Be  that  as  it  may,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  the  fall  of  the  first  city  of  Phoenicia 
was  worth  to  Alexander  whatever  time,  or  money,  or 
lives  it  may  have  cost. 

Before  the  siege  was  concluded  the  king  had  already 
received  a  second  embassy  from  Darius,  offering  such 
splendid  terms  of  alliance  that,  at  the  coun-  second  em- 
cil  where  they  were  discussed.  Parmenion  ^^sy  from 
declared  that  if  he  were  Alexander  he  should 
accept  them.  "  So  should  I."  rejoined  Alexander.  "  if  I 
were  Parmenion."  These  terms  were,  the  payment  of 
10.000  talents  as  the  ransom  for  his  family,  the  cession  of 
all  provinces  west  of  the  Euphrates,  and  the  hand  of  his 
daughter  in  marriage.  But,  however  tempting  these 
offers  might  be  to  the  older  man,  who  would  not.  per- 
haps, be  sorry  to  return  home,  they  had  no  attraction  for 
the  younger,  who  had  schemes  of  an  ever-widening  am- 
bition in  his  head,  and  was  brimful  of  restless  energy. 
Alexander  replied  almost  exactly  as  before.  These 
things  which  Darius  offered  were  his  already.  Let 
Darius  come  and  see  him  if  he  had  anything  to  ask. 
Then  the  Great  King  (we  are  told]  abandoned  embassies 
as  useless,  and  set  about  preparing  for  war.  It  was.  in- 
deed, time  ;  for  during  the  summer  of  332,  and  while 
Alexander  was  besieging  Tyre,  his  admirals  in  the 
Egean,  relieved  by  the  sudden  withdrawal  of  the  Phoeni- 
cian contingents,  had  driven  the  Persian  fleet  from  those 
waters,  had  recovered  Chios  and  the  other  islands,  and 


,\ 


128 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  XI. 


CH.  XI. 


Alexandria. 


129 


1 
I 


had  taken  prisoner  Pharnabazos,  the  Persian,  with  all  his 
forces.  Thus  Persian  influence  in  the  Egean  was  de- 
stroyed; and  when  Alexander  had  reduced  Egypt  (as  he 
would  clearly  do  with  ease)  he  would  at  once  be  free  to 
attack  the  heart  of  the  empire. 

From    Tyre   the   king    marched    southward   towards 
Egypt ;  but  he  did  not  actually  reach  that  country  until 

Alexander  at  ^"^^^  ^^^  ^^^  °^  ^^^  y^^^'  ^^'^^S  detained 
Gaza  and  more  than  three  months  before  the  fortress 

Jerusalem.  - 

of  Gaza.     It  is  needless  to  dwell  on  the  de- 
tails of  a  siege  where  operations  were  carried  out  similar 
to  those  at  Tyre  and  Halikarnassos.     The  place  was  ex- 
ceptionally strong,  from  the  height  of  the  artificial  mound 
on  which  it  stood,  and  of  the  walls  which  surrounded  it, 
and  it  was  under  the  command  of  a  man  of  exceptional 
resolution.     But  Alexander  was  resolute  also.     In  spite 
of  a  desperate  resistance,  the  place  was  taken,  every  man 
falling  where  he  stood,  and  the  women  and  children  were 
sold  as  slaves.     At  this  point  it  was,  if  we  may  believe 
Josephus,  that  the  king  retraced  his  steps,  and  visited 
Jerusalem,  intending  to  punish  the  Jews  for  refusing  him 
aid  in  the  siege  of  Tyre ;  but  was  moved  from  his  pur- 
pose by  the  high-priest,  Jaddua,  who,  being  warned  of 
God  in  a  dream,  went  boldly  with  the  priests  to  meet  the 
king  outside  the  city.    Like  Attila  before  Leo  the  Roman 
pontiff,   Alexander  was  awe-struck  before  Jaddua,  and 
bowed  down  before  him  ;  and  when  Parmcnion  asked 
him  why  he  did  so,  he  declared  that  he  had  seen  in  a 
dream  in  Macedon,  before  he  started,  a  figure  like  Jad- 
dua's,  which  had  promised  to  go  before  his  army,  and  to 
give  him  dominion  over  the  Persians.     Then  he  entered 
the  city  and  the  temple,  and  offered  sacrifice  under  Jad- 
dua's  direction,  bestowing  both  on  priests  and  people 
whatever  favours  they  chose  to  ask. 


At  last  the  king  was  able  to  pursue  his  way  to  Egypt, 
and  seven  days  after  passing  Gaza  reached  Pelusium. 
A  willing  submission  awaited  him  on  the 
part   of  the   Egyptians,  who   had   suffered      in  Egypt?^ 
many   things   from    their  Persian   masters. 
From  Pelusium  he  marched  to  Memphis,  and  was  there 
joined  by  the  fleet ;  and  thence,  after  sacrificing  to  the 
god  Apis  and  celebrating  gymnastic  games,  he  dropped 
down  the  river  to  the  mouth  of  the  western  arm  of  the 


Delta,  and,  after  sailing  round  the  Mareotic  lake,  landed 
on  the  narrow  neck  of  land  separating  it  from  the  Medi- 
terranean, where  stood  a  little  villa<jfe  called      ^      ,   . 

Foundation 

Rhakotis.      The    place   had   long    been    a      ofAlexan- 
haunt  of  Greek  and  Phoenician  pirates,  par-        "^        ' 
ticularly  because  the  roadstead  was  sheltered  from  the 
Etesian  winds  by  the  island  of  Pharos,  and  was  the  only 
refuge  along  the  coast  for  many  miles.    Alexander's  eye 


\ 


130 


TJie  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  XI. 


CH.  XL 


Oasis  of  Zeus-Ammon, 


131 


seems  to  have  been  caught  at  once  by  the  possibihties  of 
the  place,  and  he  began  surveying  and  drawing  plans 
without  delay.  The  first  and  most  important  thing  was 
to  take  advantage  of  the  shelter  of  the  island  for  con- 
structing a  harbour  at  once  safe  and  large;  and  this  was 
done  by  means  of  a  mole  or  causeway  seven  stades 
(Heptastadion)  or  three-quarters  of  a  mile  in  length, 
which  ran  from  mainland  to  island,  and  formed  on  either 
side  a  spacious  harbour,  along  whose  sides  were  pre- 
sently built  numerous  quays  and  docks.  The  city  of 
Alexandria  itself — the  first  and  greatest  of  that  name — 
was  laid  out  between  the  ports  and  the  Marcotic  lake  in 
the  shape  of  an  irregular  parallelogram,  with  broad 
streets  crossing  at  right  angles ;  but  although,  no  doubt, 
it  rose  at  once,  even  in  Alexander's  day,  to  the  rank  of 
a  fine  and  important  city,  its  beauty  and  grandeur  date 
from  later  days,  when  a  succession  of  Ptolemies  vied 
with  each  other  in  adorning  it.  Water  in  abundance 
was  supplied  by  an  artificial  canal  from  the  Nile;  the 
soil  was  dry,  and  the  air  healthy ;  and  the  annual  inun- 
dation of  the  river,  which  was  connected  with  the  Mare- 
otic  lake  at  the  back,  prevented  it  from  degenerating  in- 
to a  lagoon.  Indeed,  much  of  the  commerce  of  Alex- 
andria reached  the  city  by  the  Canopic  branch  of  the 
Nile,  and  by  the  various  canals  which  led  into  the  lake. 
The  population  of  the  place,  thus  favoured  by  position, 
climate,  and  royal  patronage,  like  that  of  Constantinople 
six  centuries  later,  increased  rapidly;  and  we  know  that 
250  years  afterwards  it  was  estimated  at  600,000  souls. 
It  was  certainly  not  the  least  of  the  glories  of  Alexander 
to  have  founded  Alexandria,  the  granary  first  of  imperial 
Rome,  and  then  of  imperial  Constantinople,  the  rival  of 
Athens  in  intellectual  life,  the  focus  and  highway  of  the 
commerce  of  the  Middle  Atcs. 


I 


It  is  hard  to  determine  the  motives  which  led  Alexan- 
der's steps  westward  from  Alexandria.     His  mind  was 
at  once  practical  and  romantic,  and  he  may      yisit  of 
possibly  have  wished  to  emulate  the  deeds      Alexander 

r        T  T         1  1  A  tr^  .  to  the  oasis 


ot  a  Herakles  or  a  Perseus,  while  satisfying      of  Zcus- 
at  the  same  time  his  thirst  for  knowledge      ^""'°"- 
and  adventure.     He  set  out  on  the  march   along   the 
coast,  intending  to  follow  the  southward  caravan  route, 
which  led   to   the   oasis   of  Amnion  from  Paraitonion, 
where  he  was  met  by  a  deputation  from  Kyrcne,  bring- 
ing presents,  and  wisely  inviting  a  visit  which  they  had 
certainly  no  power  to  prevent.     But  his  mind  was  bent 
on  other  objects.     A  march  of  six  days  across  the  desert 
from  Paraitonion   brought   him   to  the   oasis— a  march 
whose  dangers  only  divine  interposition  (it  was  believed) 
enabled  the  army  to  surmount.     At  last  they  reached 
their  goal,  the  most  northerly  of  those  wonderful  "  rest- 
ing-places" in  the  barren,  sandy  desert,  whose  green 
fertility  is  the  more  striking  from  contrast  with  the  end- 
less stretch  of  red  sand  around,  and  which  alone  make 
travelling  possible.     Being  dips  or  depressions  in  the 
limestone  bed  of  the  desert,  they  catch  and   retain  in 
their  spongy  clay  the  moisture  which  runs  from  the  lime- 
stone rim  around  or  percolates  through  the  sand,  and 
which  is  the  cause  of  their  beautiful  vegetation.     The 
oasis  of  Zeus-Ammon  is  six  miles  in  length  and  three  in 
breadth,  abounding  in  springs,  and  producing  in  profu- 
sion  wheat,  millet,  and  dates ;    while  the  only  animal 
which  cannot  flourish,  probably  because  of  the  moisture 
of  the  soil,  is  the  camel.      The  present  population  is 
8,000;  but  in  Alexander's  day  it  must  have  been  larger, 
when  the  oasis  was  not  only  a  focus  of  commerce,  but  the 
seat  of  a  famous  oracle  as  well,  and  therefore  visited  by 
numerous  pilgrims.     But  never  before  had  the  shrine  of 


132 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  XI. 


CH.  XI. 


Gaiimmela, 


Zeus  been  visited  by  so  famous  a  pilgrim,  or  one  to  whom 
the  god  and  his  priests  were  more  zealous  to  do  honour. 
A  grand  procession  of  priests  and  virgins  met  the  king 
and  his  army  on  the  confines  of  the  oasis,  and  the  an- 
swers returned  by  the  god  to  the  inquiring  hero  were  (it 
is  said)  all  that  he  wished.  The  purport  of  these  answers 
he  does  not  seem  to  have  made  public  till  a  later  period; 
but  we  can,  perhaps,  imagine  how,  even  after  Issos,  and 
before  Gaugamela,  Alexander  must  have  seemed  both  to 
himself  and  to  others  one  of  the  greatest  of  earth's  con- 
querors, almost  more  than  human,  and  how  the  cunning 
suggestion  of  a  priest  or  an  oracle  might  give  rise  to  the 
astonishing  belief  in  his  divine  birth,  or  might  at  least 
inflame  the  vanity  which  gradually  clouded  the  great 
qualities  of  a  great  genius. 

From  the  oasis  the  return  was  made  to  Memphis  by 
the  direct  route ;  and  a  short  time  was  spent 
SYgyptr  ^^^^^  in  settling  the  future  government  of 
the  province  of  Egypt,  its  loyalty  being  se- 
cured by  letting  well  alone,  and  by  leaving  the  reins  as 
far  as  possible  in  the  hands  of  native  rulers,  while  gar- 
risons were  placed  in  Memphis  and  Pclusium,  with  a 
small  naval  and  military  force  to  support  them.  Then 
at  last  the  course  was  clear  for  that  march  to  the  east, 
which  was  to  end  in  such  unparalleled  results.  It  is,  per- 
haps, as  useless  as  it  is  fascinating  to  speculate  on  the  feel- 
ings with  which  men  have  entered  on  any  course  of  action 
which  has  definitely  shaped  and  changed  the  thoughts, 
or  habits,  or  political  history  of  other  men  ;  and,  per- 
haps, Alexander's  vision  of  the  future,  when  he  set  his 
face  towards  the  Euphrates,  was  not  more  defined  than 
Coisar's  when  he  crossed  the  Rubicon,  or  than  Luther's 
when  he  stood  before  the  Diet  of  the  Empire  at  Worms. 
Yet  the  exaltation  of  feeling,  which  at  the  entrance  of  a 


^ZZ 


I 


'law- 


' 


great  task  fires  the  imagination  and  kindles  enthusiasm, 
amounts  in  some  men  to  prescience  of  success  ;  and  what 
was  true  of  Columbus  may  well  have  been  true  also  of 
Alexander.  In  action,  the  genius  is  the  man  who  gauges 
dififtculties  most  correctly. 

Leaving  Memphis  in  the  spring  of  331,  and  passing  a 
short  time  at  Tyre,  the  king  there  left  the  sea-coast,  and, 
marching  to  the  eastward  of  Anti-Libanus, 
reached  the  river  Euphrates  about  the  mid-    ?o"fh?Elt""^ 
die  of  August  at  Thapsakos,  the  same  ford    P^^'^^^s. 
which  Darius  had  crossed  in  pursuit  of  Alexander  him- 
self two  years  before,  and  by  which  Cyrus  and  his  army 
had   passed  to  the  eastward  in  401.      Two   bridges   of 
boats  were  already  being  buiU,  and  only   not  finished 
because  a  body  of  3,000  cavalry  was   posted  on  the  fur- 
ther bank;   but  when    the    Macedonians    appeared   in 
force  from  the  westward  these  retired  precipitately,  and 
the  crossing    was  effected   without   opposition.       From 
Thapsakos   the   army   marched  to  the  north-eastward, 
and  crossed  the  Tigris  likewise  without  difficulty,  some 
distance  above  Nineveh,  and  then  halted  for  a  {q.\\  days' 
rest  prior  to  the  impending   struggle.       Impending   it 
clearly  was,  for  some   Persian  scouts  had  been  taken 
prisoners,  who  announced  that  Darius  was 
close  at  hand  with  an  army  far  larger  than     Alexander 
that  which   had  fought  and   been  routed  at    face  to  face 
Issos,  and  more  formidable  because  levied    *^  ^^"samela. 
from  the  more  warlike  tribes   of  Parthia  and  Baktria. 
Alexander  rode  forward  in  person  with  a  few  squadrons 
of  cavalry  to  reconnoitre,  and,  having  had  a  smart  skir- 
mish with  some  outposts  of  the  enemy,  ascertained  that 
Darius  was  immediately  before  him,  encamped  in  the 
broad  plain  between  the  Tigris  and  the  mountains  of 
Kurdistan,  at  a  place  called  Gaugamela  (or  the  Camel's 


134 


TJie  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  XII. 


CH.  XII. 


Parmenion^ s  Advice. 


135 


House),  with  a  force  estimated  at  the  lowest  at  200,000 
infantry  and   40,000   cavalry,  with  200  scythe  chariots 
and  15  elephants.      Every  endeavour,  moreover,  had 
been  made  that  the  fight  should  be  fought  under  cir- 
cumstances favourable  to  the  Persian  arms.     There  was 
ample  room  in  the  vast  plain  to  deploy  all  the  host. 
There  was  neither  sea  nor   mountain,   as  at    Issos,   to 
protect  the  enemy's  flank  and  to  prevent  his  being  over- 
lapped ;    and   a   part   of  the   field   had  been   carefully 
levelled  and  cleared  to  facilitate  the  charge  of  cavalry 
and  chariots.     It  was  indeed  a  critical  moment  for  the 
invading  army.     In  point  of  numbers  they  were  at  most 
as  one  to  six,   and  defeat  would  probably  mean   utter 
destruction.     Yet  defeat  was  not  dreamed  of.     The  king 
himself  slept  soundly  the  night  before  the  battle,  and 
remarked  to  Parmenion,  who  woke  him  in  the  morning, 
that  it  was  as  good  as  a  victory  to  have  overtaken  the 
enemy  !     Tq  a  man  of  such  a  spirit,  at  the  head  of  vete- 
ran and  disciplined  troops,  victory  was  assured  before  a 
blow  was  struck. 


CHAPTER  XII. 

FROM    THE    BATTLE    OF    GAUGAMELA  TO    THE    SACK   OP 

FERSEPOLIS 

Once  more  Darius  and  Alexander  were  face  to  flice,  and 
this  time  the  conditions  were  all  in  favour  of  the  former. 
Conditions  of  ^^  ^^^  Overwhelming  numbers  of  the 
s^^ed"'^  br^^vest  troops  which  the   empire   could  fur- 

nish.    They   had   been   newly   armed   and 
equipped.     The    field  of  battle  had   been  chosen  by 


i  \1 


I 


li 


themselves.  If  they  could  not  conquer  now  they  would 
never  conquer.  Alexander,  on  the  other  hand,  had  no 
more  than  40,000  infantry  and  7,000  cavalry  ;  and  were 
it  not  that  fighting  men  must  be  weighed  as  well  as 
counted,  they  might  have  seemed  doomed  to  certain 
destruction  from  combined  attacks  in  front  and  Hank 
and  rear. 

After  four  days*  rest,  jfnd  having  fortified  a  camp  to 
contain  his  invalids,  prisoners,  and  baggage,  Alexander 
-advanced  boldly  to  find  his  enemy.      Start- 
ing  shortly  before   midnight,  he  timed  his    Alexander's 
march  over   the  seven    or  eight   miles   that    P'^^^""^"""** 
intervened   between    himself  and  the  Persians  so    as  to 
reach  them  at  the  early  dawn  of  a  September  day.     Im- 
mediately in  his  front  were  a  few  low  hills,  entirely  con- 
cealing each  army  from  the  other ;  but,  as  he  breasted 
the  slight  ascent   and   halted   on  the  top,  there  in  the 
broad  plain  below  were  marshalled,  already  in  order  of 
batde,  the  tens  of  thousands   whom   Darius  had  levied 
during  the  previous  two  years  from  every  corner  of  his 
vast  empire.     At  a  distance  of  little  more  than  three 
miles  from  the  enemy  Alexander  halted,   and  called  a 
council  of  war.     It  was  a  critical  moment,  and  opinions 
were  divided  ;  the  majority  of  generals   voting   for   in- 
stant attack  with  tacit  reference  probably  to  the  king's 
supposed  wishes.     Not  so   Parmenion,  who  was  cautious 
as  well  as  able,  and  who  urged  that  on  such  ground  and 
against  such  odds,  it  was  necessary  to  reconnoitre  the 
field  before  engaging  the  enemy.     His  advice  was  adopt- 
ed, and  the  rest  of  that  day  was  spent  by  the  king  in  riding 
about  and  carefully  examining  the  ground.     In  the  eve- 
ning  he   summoned   his  generals   to   receive  their   last 
orders,  which  were  brief  but  imperative.     Then  he  dis- 
missed them  to  their  quarters  to  get  supper  and  rest. 


rs:-*"''Si- 


136 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  XII. 


But  Parmenion  was  not  yet  satisfied  that  the  right 
Question  of  ^o^^^se  had  been  adopted.  It  was  well  not 
anight  to  risk  all  in  impetuously  givincr  battle   at 

off  oplr  ^ 

once  ;  was  it  equally  well  to  risk  all  in  fight- 
ing when  and  where  the  enemy  pleased?  So  he  re- 
turned to  the  king's  tent  and  proposed  to  him  a  night- 
attack,  when  the  foe  would  be  off  their  guard,  and  ea'sily 


panic-stricken.  There  were  others  present,  and  per- 
haps for  their  sakes  the  king's  refusal  was  emphatic. 
"  It  would  be  disgraceful  "  (he  cried)  "  to  steal  a  victory ; 
and  the  success  of  an  Alexander  must  be  manifest  and 
beyond  cavil."  These  were  brave  words,  but  there  was 
also  doubtless  present  to  his  mind  the  reflection  which 
Arrian  makes,  that  night  attacks  are  hazardous  things, 
in  which  science  is  often  checkmated  by  accident ;  while. 


CH.  XII. 


Alexander's  Tactics. 


137 


Persian 

onierof 

battle. 


if  Darius  were  to  be  defeated,  it  were  well  that  he 
should  recognize  that  his  victor  was  really  abler  and 
stronger,  not  merely  more  lucky  than  himself.  Accord- 
ingly, Alexander  adhered  to  his  original  purpose. 

Strangely   enough,    Darius    had   expected   the    very 
thing  which  Parmenion  proposed,  and  had  kept  his  troops 
under  arms  all  night  in  consequence.  When 
morning  dawned,  they  were  in  battle  array 
and  ready  ;  but  it  was  the  readiness  of  men 
who  have  waited  till  they  are  weary,  and  in  whom  the 
excitement  of  expectation  is  apt  to  pass  into  despond- 
ency.    They  were   massed  by  nations  all  across   the 
plain:  the  Baktrians  on  the  extreme  left   under  their 
satrap,  Bcssos  ;  the  Syrians  on  the  extreme  right ;  while 
Darius   himself  was   as   usual   in   the   centre,  with   the 
Persian  horse  and  foot  guards  and  the  Greek  mercena- 
ries.   Behind,  and  supporting  the  main  line,  were  dense 
columns   of  Babylonians,    and  other  central  nations  of 
the  empire.     Resting  on  the  left  wing  were  the  Scythian 
and    1,000   Baktrian   cavalry,  with  loo   scythe  chariots, 
designed,  it  would  seem,  to  overlap  and  turn  Alexander's 
right   flank.      Immediately   opposite   the   place   where 
Alexander  himself  usually  took   up   his   position    were 
stationed   fifty   chariots,    and   the   fifteen   elephants,  to 
serve  doubtless  as   ramparts   and  bastions  in   the  fierce 
stress  of  battle  to  be  there  expected.     On  the  right  win^- 
were  posted  the  remaining  cavalry  and  chariots. 

In  the  face  of  such  a  multitude  of  men,  Alexander's 
tactics  were  of  necessity  slightly  modified.  As  usual,  in- 
deed, the  flower  of  the  cavalry  was  on  his 
right  flank,  commanded  by  Parmenion 's 
son  Philotas,  while  the  six  divisions  of  the 
phalanx  were  in  the  centre,  and  the  allied  cavalry  on 
the  left  under  Parmenion ;  but  in  order  to  guard  against 


Macedonian 
order  of 
battle. 


138 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  XII. 


CH.  XII. 


Charge  of  Alexander, 


the  special  risk  of  being  outflanked  and  surrounded,  he 
held  a  second  line  in  reserve,  ready  either  to  support  the 
phalanx,  or  to  wheel  round  and  resist  an  attack  in  flank 
or  rear.  A  few  squadrons  of  light  cavalry  and  bowmen 
were  thrown  forward  in  advance,  to  deal  by  anticipation 
with  the  scythe  chariots,  and  under  special  orders  to 
watch  the  enemy's  cavalry  on  their  right,  and  if  they  at- 
tempted to  ride  round  and  overlap  the  Macedonian  right, 
to  charge  them  in  flank  at  once.  So  great,  however,  was 
the  disparity  of  numbers  on  the  two  sides,  that  at  the 
outset  Alexander,  in  command  of  his  own  right  wing, 
found  himself  exactly  opposite  the  Persian  centre  and 
Darius  in  person,  while  the  Persian  left  stretched  far  be- 
yond him,  and  was  ready  at  once  to  swing  round  and 
envelop  his  flank  and  rear.  To  obviate  this  pressing 
danger,  which  was  even  greater  than  he  had  anticipated, 
he  appears  to  have  opened  out  the  ranks  of  his  right 
wing,  deploying  columns  into  line,  and  throwing  his 
right  back,  so  that  the  Companion  cavalry  might  ad- 
vance obliquely,  and  somewhat  repair  the  inequality. 
But  it  was  clear  to  Darius  that,  if  this  movement  were 
not  stopped,  it  would  soon  be  impossible  for  the  Persians 
cither  to  outflank  the  Macedonian  right,  or  even  to  use 
against  them  the  chariots,  for  which  the  ground  had 
been  artificially  levelled.  He  therefore  ordered  the 
Scythian  and  Baktrian  cavalry  to  stop  the  advancing 
Macedonians  by  riding  round  and  charging  them  in 
flank,  while  at  the  same  time  the  chariots  were  to  dash 
in  upon  the  front.     It  was  a  well-conceived, 


139 


Charge  of  ...               t      •   • 

Persian  cvcn  possibly  a   decisive   movement,   had 

the  Aiace-  scythc  chariots  been  really  the  terrible  wea- 

donian  right  pon  which  our  imagination  conceives  them : 

ilitnk  and  01  _                                    °                                                           ' 

chariots  on  but  in  reality  they  had  no  terrors  for  disci- 

their  front.  v       j  ^                      a        ..    t^ 

phned  troops.     As  at  Kunaxa,  so  now  the 


Macedonian  skirmishers  wounded  the  drivers  and  killed 
the  horses,  or  seized  the  reins  and  turned  the  chariots 
round ;  while  if  any  succeeded  in  getting  through,  it  was 
but  a  few  here  and  there,  and  their  attack  was  rendered 
harmless  by  the  coolness  of  the  veterans  of  the  phalanx, 
who  opened  their  ranks  and  let  them  pass,  or,  striking 
spear  upon  shield,  scared  the  horses  into  charging  back 
upon  their  own  line.  In  the  meantime  a  far  more  des- 
perate struggle  had  been  raging  on  the  extreme  right, 
where  the  Baktrian  cavalry  had  been  met  by  some  Greek 
squadrons,  whom  they  drove  in,  and  by  reinforcements 
of  both  horse  and  foot  which  Alexander  sent  up  in  haste. 
It  was  of  the  first  importance  to  check  this  flank  move- 
ment; and  presently,  by  reason  of  the  superior  training 
and  precision  of  the  Greeks,  the  Baktrians  and  Scythians 
were  stopped,  pushed  back,  and  at  last  swept  off  the 
field.  Still  the  Persian  left  overlapped  the  Macedonian 
right;  and,  as  the  main  bodies  of  the  two  armies  were 
on  the  point  of  coming  into  action,  first  one  division  of 
Persian  cavalry  and  presently  another,  nearer  to  the 
centre,  moved  by  their  left  with  the  appar- 
ent  intention  of  repeating  the  manoeuvre  charge  of 
attempted  by  the  Baktrians  at  the  beginning      Alexander 

^  ^  *=*  °        in  person  on 

of  the  battle,  and  of  charging  the  Macedo-  the  Persian 
nian  right  flank  and  rear.  But  the  move- 
ment left  a  gap  in  the  line,  of  which  Alexander  was  not 
slow  to  make  use.  Ordering  up  the  light  horse  in  re- 
serve to  engage  and  occupy  these  cavalry,  he  formed 
his  own  squadrons  of  Companions  into  a  pointed  column 
or  wedge,  and  charged  boldly  into  the  opening,  the 
men  shouting  as  they  charged.  Almost  at  the  same 
moment  the  phalanx  crossed  spears  with  the  enemy  in 
the  centre,  and  at  the  first  contact  bore  back  with  irresist- 
ible weight  even  the  Greek  mercenaries  opposed  to  them. 


I40 


The  Macedonian  Etnpire,  ch.  xii. 


Meanwhile,  the  Macedonian  left  had  been  outflanked, 
and  was  being  hard  pressed  by  the  cavalry  on  the  Per- 
sian right.     But  a  temporary  repulse  on  either  flank  was 
of  little  moment  now,  when  Alexander  and  his  cavalry, 
and  four  divisions  of  the  terrible  phalanx  with  its  brist- 
ling hedge  of  spears,  were  battling  vehemently  on  the 
front  and  flank  of  the  Greeks  and  Persians  in  the  centre, 
step  by  step  and  by  dint  of  sheer  determination  forcing  a 
way  into  their  very  midst.     The  Persian  left  and  centre. 
Route  of  the      ^'^  ^P^^*^  ^^  ^^^^^  ^^s^  numbers,  reeled  before 
anTce"'*"^'       the   shock,    and   the   disorder   had    begun 
which  presages  a  panic;    when   the  timid 
Darius,   seeing  the  press   of  battle  drawing  nearer  to 
himself,  and  remembering  only  too  well  all  the  horrors 
of  Issos,   set  a   shameful   example   of  cowardice,    and 
hastily  exchanging  his  chariot   for  horseback  rode  off 
the  field  to  Arbela.     Darius  himself,  says  Arrian,  was 
the  very  first  to  turn  and  flee.     Immediately,  all  in  that 
part  of  the  field  was  panic  and  confusion.     Many  of  the 
officers  followed  the  king.     The  troops  rapidly  lost  co- 
hesion, having  no  centre  or  commander  to  rally  round, 
and  presently  became  a  mere  mob,  whose  first  object 
was  personal  safety.     Thus  the  left  wing  and  main  body 
were  soon  in  hopeless  rout,  nothing  saving  Darius  him- 
self from  the  relentless  pursuit  of  Alexander's  light  horse, 
but  the  dense  clouds  of  dust  which  went  up  from  be- 
neath the  feet  of  the  flying  host.     The  destruction  of 
life  was  immense;  it  would  have  been  yet  greater,  had 
not  Alexander  been  obliged  to  return  in  haste  to  the 
battle-field. 

It  appears  that  the  attempt  to  overlap  the  Macedonian 
flank  with  superior  numbers,  which  had  been  foiled  on 
the  Persian  left  wing,  had  been  made  on  their  right 
with  success.     The  Greek  cavalry  of  the  allies  had  been 


CH.  XII. 


Result  of  the  Victory. 


141 


outflanked,  and  nearly  surrounded  by  the  Armenian  and 
Kappadokian  horse.     Two  of  the  six  divi- 
sions of  the  phalanx  were   brought  up  to      Jvenw' con"*^ 
their  support ;  yet  even  so  Parmenion  had      *"^^^ , 

1-        /     .      1      1  1    1  •  ,        ,  -,  struggle  on 

much  ado  to  hold  his  ground,  while  a  gap  the  Mace- 
was  thus  left  in  the  phalanx  itself.  Into  this 
gap  the  generals  of  the  Persian  and  Indian  cavalry  on  the 
Persian  right  centre  led  a  furious  charge,  passing  right 
through  the  Macedonian  double  line,  and  emerging  in 
the  rear  of  the  whole  army;  but,  instead  of  wheeling 
round  and  falling  upon  Parmenion's  rear,  they  galloped 
on  to  assault  the  camp,  where  the  Thracian  troops  were 
wholly  off  their  guard.  Then  it  was  that  Parmenion 
sent  a  hasty  message  to  recall  Alexander  from  the  pur- 
suit ;  and  the  king  was  obliged  to  return  with  some  of 
the  cavalry  to  the  aid  of  his  own  hard-pressed  left.  As 
he  was  riding  hastily  thither,  he  suddenly  met  the  flying 
squadrons  of  Persians  and  Indians,  who  had  been  driven 
out  of  the  camp  by  the  reserves,  and  were  now  in  full 
retreat.  A  furious  combat  ensued ;  and  only  a  handful 
succeeded  in  cutting  their  way  out,  while  sixty  of  the 
Macedonians  were  slain,  and  Hephaistion  and  two  other 
generals  fell  wounded.  When  the  king  at  last  reached 
the  scene  of  fighting  on  the  left  the  battle  was  practically 
over,  the  gallant  efforts  of  the  Thessalian  horse  having 
extricated  Parmenion  from  his  danger.  The 
Persian  right,  now  broken  and  routed,  and  epursm  . 

aware  of  the  issue  of  the  day  in  other  parts  of  the  field, 
were  following  their  companions  in  headlong  flight. 
Then  Alexander  at  once  turned  upon  his  steps,  and 
started  again  in  pursuit  of  his  unhappy  rival.  He  halted 
on  the  banks  of  the  Lykos  till  midnight,  and  then  rode 
on  once  more,  hoping  to  overtake  Darius  at  Arbela. 
How  hot  was  the  pursuit,  and  how  exhausting  the  strain. 


142 


The  Aldcedonian  Empire, 


CH.  XII. 


CH.  XII. 


PersepoUs. 


143 


II 


of  Gauga- 
mela. 


we  may  judge  from  the  fact  that  during  the  day,  partly 
from  wounds,  partly  from  fatigue,  1,000  horses  were  lost, 
500  of  which  belonged  to  Alexander's  own  division.  But 
at  Arbela  the  bird  had  flown ;  and  the  spoils  were  but  a 
shield,  a  bow,  and  a  chariot,  money  and  baggage.  The 
royal  fugitive  was  far  on  his  way,  with  a  small  escort, 
over  the  mountains  to  Agbatana. 

The  battle  of  Gaugamela  was  decisive  of  the  stru'^^-le 
between  Greece   and   Persia — between  Alexander   and 
Darius.    It  was  a  battle  as  conclusive  as  that 
of  the  battle       ^^  Issos  in  its  immediate,  and  far  more  so  in 
its  wider  and  final  results.     It  gave  to  Alex- 
ander not  merely  the  command  of  western 
Asia,  but  the  dominion  of  all  Asia.     It  seated  him  on  the 
throne  of  the  Great  King,  and  gave  him  that  dubious, 
undefined    position,    half  king  of  a   free   and  warlike 
people,  half  despot  of  a  subject  world,  in  which  he  lost 
the  regard  of  the  best  of  the  Macedonians,  without  weld- 
ing the  diverse  nations  of  his  empire  into  one  homoge- 
neous  people.      Henceforward  no  such  levy  was  any 
more  possible  as  that  of  whose  fighting  powers  Darius 
had  made  so  poor  a  use.     Contingents  and  detachments 
only  were  met  with  afterwards,  who  waged  purely  local 
and    useless    struggles.     The    oracle    of  Gordion   was 
proved  to  have  spoken  truly,  and  Alexander  was  the 
Lord  of  Asia. 

Nor  were  the  immediate  results  less  striking  in  their 
way.  Other  battles  have  been  fought  be- 
tween Europeans  and  Asiatics,  in  which  the 
disparity  of  numbers  was  greater,  or  the  dis- 
proportion of  losses  was  more  startling.  Clive  won  the 
battle  of  Plassy  (a.  D.  1757),  and  laid  the  foundation  of 
our  Indian  empire,  with  a  force  of  3,000,  of  whom  only 
900  were  Europeans,  against  55,000 ;  but  his  enemy,  whom 


Immediate 
results  of 
the  battle. 


he  routed,  lost  no  more  than  500  men.  The  Romans  at 
Magnesia  (b.  c.  190),  where  Antiochus,  king  of  Syria, 
was  irreparably  defeated,  were  as  one  to  two,  but  they 
destroyed  50,000  out  of  92,000  men,  with  a  loss  to  them- 
selves of  only  324.  At  Gaugamela  the  numbers  were 
not  so  disproportioned  as  at  Plassy,  nor  the  disparity  of 
losses  so  overwhelming  as  at  Magnesia.  The  forces  of 
Alexander  were  as  one  to  six  instead  of  one  to  two :  and 
at  the  lowest  estimate  40,000  Persians  were  left  Jiors  de 
combat,  while  the  Macedonian  loss  was  500.  Nor  were 
the  fruits  of  victory  confined  to  the  destruction  of  an 
army.      Babylon  and   Susa   opened    their 

^  "^  .  ,  Babylon. 

gates  to  the  king  without  resistance,  who 
thus  became  master  of  almost  fabulous  treasures.  Baby- 
lon, indeed,  like  Sidon  and  Egypt,  had  suffered  under 
Persian  rule.  It  was  the  less  surprising,  therefore,  that 
Alexander  was  welcomed  in  the  capital,  and  that  his 
entry  was  in  the  manner  of  a  triumph,  amid  songs  and 
flowers  and  smoking  altars.  In  this  most  splendid  of 
Eastern  cities  the  army  was  permitted  to  reward  itself 
for  past  toils  and  dangers  for  nearly  a  month  ;  while  the 
king  was  regulating  the  government  of  his  new  provin- 
ces, utilizing  his  vast  treasures,  or  devising  schemes  for 
the  improvement  of  Babylon  as  the  destined  capital  of 
his  new  empire.  At  Susa,  which  was  reached 
in  twenty  days,  and  which  had  already  sur- 
rendered, were  found  treasures  yet  vaster— 50,000  talents 
of  silver  (equal  to  11,500,000/.  sterling)  ;  the  rest  of  the 
royal  bagagc;  and  various  spoils  which  Xerxes  had 
brought  away  with  him  from  Greece,  especially  certain 
bronze  statues  of  Harmodios  and  Aristogciton,  the  Athe- 
nian "liberators,"  which  Alexander  sent  back  to  Athens, 
and  which  were  seen  by  Arrian  in  the  Kerameikos.  At 
Susa  he  received  reinforcements  from  Greece— 13,500 


Susa. 


144 


The  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  XII. 


infantry,  and  1,500  cavalry,  as  well  as  fifty  young  Mace- 
donian nobles  who  had  come  out  to  serve  in  his  personal 
suite.  Then,  after  celebrating  games  and  distributing 
promotions  and  donatives,  he  set  out  on  the  difficult 
march  from  Susa  to  the  more  ancient  and  hereditary 
March  from  capital  of  the  Persian  monarchs,  Persepolis. 
Susato  It  was  a  district  of  rugged  mountains  and 

fcrsepohs.  °° 

narrow  passes,  occupied   by  a  fierce  tribe 
called  Uxians— so  fierce  that  the  Great  King  on  his  pas- 
sage through  the  country  had  been  always  wont  to  pay 
them  black-mail,  which  he  disguised  under  the  name  of 
largess.     At  one  point  of  the  district,  moreover,  the  Su- 
sian  Gates,  all  roads  converged,  and  in  this  almost  im- 
pregnable pass  the  satrap  of   the  province  intrenched 
himself  with   40,000   troops   to   bar   the  way.     But  the 
Uxians  were  soon  taught  the  rough  lesson  that  times 
were  changed;    while  the  satrap's  position  was  turned, 
as  that  of  Leonidas  is  said  to  have  been  at  Thermopylai. 
For  Alexander,  with  some  picked  troops,  was  guided  by 
a  shepherd  over  a  precipitous  path,  which  brought  him 
into  the  Persian  rear  and  flank.     Resistance  was  hope- 
less, and  the  Persians,  abandoning  their  intrenchments, 
fled  or  were  cut  to  pieces.     Persepolis,  like  Susa  and 
Babylon,  fell  into  the  conqueror's  hands,  with  treasure 
amounting,   (it  was   said)   to    120,000  talents  or  nearly 
28,000,000/. — a  sum  not  wholly  incredible  if  we  remem- 
ber the  Eastern  passion  for  hoarding  coin,  and  the  love 
of  Eastern  potentates  for  amassing  precious  stones,  and 
for  displaying  gold  and  silver  ornaments  on  their  per- 
sons. 

The  glories  of  Persepolis  dated  from  the  days  of 
Darius  I.  The  capital  of  Cyrus  had  been  Pcrsagerd 
(Pasargadai),  where  the  tomb  of  the  great  conqueror  is 
still  to  be  seen.     But  Persepolis  was  the  centre  and   the 


CH.  XII. 


Persepolis. 


145 


Persepolis. 


pride  of  the  Persians,  grander  than  Persagerd,  more 
national  than  Susa  or  Babylon — a  Moscow  rather  than  a 
Petersburg.  At  this  favoured  capital  were 
built  temples  and  palaces,  whose  ruins  still 
suggest  both  beauty  and  grandeur — vistas  of  columns, 
bright  hangings,  gorgeous  colours ;  while  the  city  lay  at 
the  base  of  the  rock  on  which  the  ruins  stand.  This 
rock  was  enclosed  by  a  triple  wall,  the  innermost  and 
highest  rising  to  90  feet,  and  each  of  its  four  sides  having 
a  gate  of  brass.  On  the  eastern  side  of  the  hill  were  the 
royal  tombs  and  treasuries. 

The  city  and  all  its  wealth  were  delivered  up  without 
a  blow.  A  sad  sight,  however,  awaited  the  army,  as  it 
drew  near  to  the  capital.  A  miserable  body 
of  800  Greeks  came  out  to  meet  them,  in  mutilated 
suppliant  guise,  and  with  shame  and  confu-  Greeks, 
sion  of  face,  every  one  mutilated  in  hand,  or  foot,  or  ear, 
or  nose,  and  most  of  them  stricken  in  years — men  who 
for  various  offences  had  been  brought  up  long  years  be- 
fore to  the  capital  and  consigned  to  this  wretched  exist- 
ence, in  accordance  with  that  Eastern  custom  which,  in 
our  own  days  as  in  Xenophon's,  looks  on  mutilation  as 
the  natural  punishment  of  crime.  The  whole  army  was 
deeply  moved  at  the  hideous  spectacle,  and  Alexander 
himself  could  not  refrain  from  tears.  He  offered  to  restore 
them  to  their  homes  and  provide  for  them  in  the  future ; 
but  to  this  they  could  not  bring  themselves  for  very  shame, 
choosing  rather  to  stay  on  the  spot  and  to  receive  their 
satisfaction  in  Persian  land  and  Persian  money.  This 
dreadful  episode,  however,  helps  to  throw  some  light  on 
an  event,  the  motives  for  which  are  singularly  obscure, 
and  which  is  generally  regarded  as  one  of  the  greatest 
blots  on  Alexander's  fair  fame.  That  event  was  the  sack 
of  Persepolis,  and  the  burning  of  the  royal  palace.     If 


146 


The  Macedonian  Empire,  CH.  xil. 


CH.  XIII. 


Sack  of  the  Palace, 


147 


we  may  believe  Arrian  and  Diodoros,  it  was  an  act  of 
deliberate  state  policy.  The  former  asserts  that  Alex- 
ander had  resolved  to  exact  a  vengeance  similar  in  kind 
to  the  sack  and  burning  of  Athens  by  Xerx- 
Pereepolis,  es,  and  that  he  carried  it  out  in  spite  of  the 
and^burning  ^emonstranccs  of  Parmenion.  When  we 
palace.  remember  that  Alexander's  imagination  was 

singularly  open  to  such  half-poetical,  half-superstitious 
ideas  (leading  him.  for  instance,  to  visit  Ilion  and  Am- 
mon  and  Gordion)  it  seems  probable  that  their  account 
is  correct,  and  that  the  sack  of  Persepolis  was  a  delibe- 
rate act  of  political  vengeance,  embittered  and  aggrava- 
ted by  the  dreadful  sight  of  the  mutilated  captives,  and 
occasioned  by  the  drunken  revel  which  Plutarch  and 
Diodoros  describe.  At  a  great  banquet  (they  say), 
given  by  the  king  before  leaving  the  city,  when  the  revel 
was  at  its  height,  one  of  the  women  present,  an  Athenian, 
remarked  that  it  would  be  one  of  Alexander's  most 
notable  deeds  if  he  should  burn  the  palace,  and  if 
womcn'shandsshoulddestroy  as  in  a  moment  the  boasted 

glories  of  the  Persians.  The  idle  words  were  caught  up 
by  young  blood  heated  with  wine.  Torches  were  lit.  Shouts 
were  heard  for  "  revenge  for  the  Greek  temples  !  "  and 
cries  that  Alexander  alone  ought  to  do  the  deed  ;  until, 
earned  away  by  the  mad  excitement,  and  led  on  by  a 
crowd  of  reckless  women,  he  cast  the  first  torch  among 
the  cedar  columns,  others  following  his  example,  until 
the  venerable  building,  witness  of  so  many  glories,  was 
in  a  blaze,  and  the  ruin  of  Athens  was  avenged  by  the 
counsel  and  the  deed  of  an  Athenian  woman.  The  city 
itself  also  was  sacked.  The  men  were  slain  and  the 
women  sold  as  slaves  ;  and,  amid  the  wild  and  unre- 
strained pillage,  an  amount  past  reckoning  of  robes 
and  plate  was  wasted  or  destroyed.      We  are  told  that 


the  king  repented  before  the  work  of  destruction  was 
half  accomplished,  and  sought  to  arrest  it;  but  from 
any  point  of  view  it  was  a  deplorable  mistake,  and 
politically  a  blunder.  It  was  an  act  at  once  cruel,  wan- 
ton, and  useless — a  sad  episode,  whose  incidents  deve- 
lop themselves  naturally  from  the  first  romantic  concep- 
tion of  revenge  down  to  its  brutal  realization  in  drunken 
revels  and  burning  temples,  in  wasted  property  and 
ruined  lives. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

THE    DEATH     OF     DARIUS. — REDUCTION    OF     PARTHIA — 
EXECUTION  OF  PHILOTAS  AND    PARMENION. 

Darius,  meanwhile,  who  had  fled  through  the  moun- 
tains to  the  eastward,  was  resting  at   Agbatana.     There 
were  still  30,000  infantry  and  3,000  cavalry 
with  him ;  he   had  still  the  support  of  sa-      Darius°after 
traps,   undaunted   as    Bessos   and  loyal  as      ^augamela. 
Artabazos ;   but  all  heart  was  gone  from  his  resistance, 
and  his  one  thought  was  to  flee  from  Alexander's  face 
to  the  farthest  corner  of  his  empire.     With  this  view  the 
heavy  baggage  and   the   harem   had  been  sent  forward 
some  days'  journey  in   advance  ;   and  when  he  learnt 
that  his  restless  enemy,  not  content  with  being  master  of 
his  finest  capitals  and  of  the  fairest  parts  of  his  empire, 
was  bent  on  having  possession  of  his    person   also,  he 
delayed  no  more  but  set  out  eastwards  at  once,  intending 
to  pass  through  Hyrkania  and  Parthia,  and  to  hinder  his 
pursuers'  march  by  ravaging  as  he  went  (July,  330). 
Eight  days  afterwards  Alexander  was  in   Agbatana. 


148 


TJie  Macedonian  Empire.  ch.  xiii. 


At  three  days'  march  from  the  capital  he  was  met  by  the 
news  that  Darius  had  set  out  five   days  be- 
^t  Agba"         fore,  and  taken  with  him  all  his  treasures. 
^^'  When  the  Macedonians,  therefore,  entered 

the  city,  it  was  only  to  make  hurried  preparations  for  a 
forced  march  in  pursuit.  At  the  same  time  a  short  de- 
lay was  inevitable,  for  some  of  his  Greek  troops  were 
anxious  to  return  home  after  their  four  years'  service, 
and  it  was  necessary  to  remodel  the  military  organiza- 
tion, which  had  so  far  served  its  purpose  perfectly. 
Henceforth  he  was  to  deal  not  with  regular  armies,  but 
with  provincial  levies ;  and  still  more  with  vast  distances, 
with  mountains  and  deserts,  where  rapidity  of  move- 
ment might  mean  not  victory  only  but  life.  Hence  he 
needed  archers,  light  troops,  and  flying  columns,  more 
than  the  massive  weight  of  the  phalanx.  Lastly,  he  had 
to  provide  for  the  safe  custody  of  the  extraordinary 
amount  of  treasure  which  had  fallen  into  his  hands  dur- 
ing the  previous  nine  months.  This  was  lodged  in  the 
citadel  of  Agbatana,  and  entrusted  to  the  care  of  Har- 
palos. 

Then  once  more  he  started  in  pursuit  of  the  Great 

King.     In  eleven   days  he  traversed  300  miles  of  the 

broken,  difficult  ground  lying  between  the 

Alexander  ,  rr-.  i  i. 

pursucs  desert  and  Mount  Tauros  to  the  north,  pass- 

Danus.  ,       ^^^^  ^^  ^j^^  ^^  ^^  modcrn  Teheran  and 

almost  at  the  foot  of  the  splendid  peak  of  Demavcnd, 
rising  20,000  feet  into  the  air.  On  the  eleventh  day  he 
reached  Rhagai,  but  only  to  learn  that  Darius  had 
already  passed  the  Caspian  Gates,  fifty  miles  to  the 
eastward,  and  to  find  that  a  short  rest  was  indispensable 
for  his  jaded  men  and  horses.  In  five  days  he  was 
again  in  the  saddle.  Before  him  were  the  Caspian 
Gates,  a  long  and  difficult  series  of  defiles,  where  he 


CH.  XIII. 


Pursuit  of  Darius, 


149 


had  vainly  hoped  to  intercept  the   fugitive.     A  day's 
march  beyond  the  pass  he  heard  the  alarming  tidings 
that  Bessos  and  his  friends  had  laid  hands  on  Darius, 
and  that  his  life  was  in  danger.     Headlong  as  had  been 
the  speed  of  the  pursuit  so  far,  there  was  clearly  need  of 
yet  greater  efforts.     The  eastern  satraps,  it  appears,  had 
resolved  to  seize  Darius  and  surrender  him  to  Alexander 
if  it  were  necessary,  but  if  possible  to  push  on  across 
Parthia,  outstripping  pursuit,  and  to  organize  a  resist- 
ance on  their  own  behalf  in  Baktria  and  Sogdiana.    But 
Alexander  was  determined  to  cut  them  off.   Taking  with 
him  only  the  Companion  cavalry,  the  light  horse,  and 
some  picked  infantry,  and  leaving  Koinos  to  bring  on 
the  rest  by  slower  marches,  he  rode  on  all  that  night  and 
the  next  day  till  midday.     After  a  short  rest  they  started 
again,  and   again   rode  all   the   night   through,  in   the 
morning  coming  on  traces  of  a  camp  recently  occupied. 
Here  further  tidings  reached  them,  to   the  effect  that 
Bessos  had  actually  superseded  Darius,  and  that  Arta- 
bazos   and   the   Greek   mercenaries,  unable  to  prevent 
what  they  disapproved,  had  parted  company  with  the 
others  and  turned  off  into  the  mountains.     Darius,  in 
short,  was   utterly  in   his   enemy's   hands.     So   fagged 
were  both  horses  and  men,  that  another  forced  march  of 
a  night  and  half  a  day  only  brought  Alexander  to  a  vil- 
lage where  Bessos  and  his  party  had  encamped  the  day 
before ;  and,  just  when  all  reserve  of  energy  in  his  own 
men   seemed  gone,  he   learned   that  the  fugitives  also 
were  resohcd   to  make   a  forced   march   all   the   next 
night.     To  overtake  them  was  out  of  the  question  ;  was 
it  possible  to  intercept  them  ?   At  this  juncture,  when  his 
prey  seemed  about  to  slip  from  his  grasp, 
some   of   the    natives   informed  him   of  a      EarSs!^^ 
route,  shorter,  indeed,  but  waste  and  water- 


^5o 


The  Macedonian  Empire,  CH.  xiii. 


less.  Difficulties,  however,  were  no  bar  to  the  impetuous 
Alexander.  Picking  out  the  strongest  and  freshest  both 
of  horses  and  men,  again  he  set  out  in  the  afternoon, 
and  actually  accomplished  nearly  fifty  miles  in  the 
course  of  the  night,  coming  suddenly,  about  dawn,  upon 
the  weary  and  bewildered  fugitives,  the  majority  of 
whom  lied  at  once  on  sight  of  Alexander.  Bessos  and 
his  friends  tried  vainly  for  a  while  to  induce  Darius  to 
mount  a  horse  and  flee  with  them ;  and  as  he  again  and 
.again  refused,  they  cast  their  javelins  at  their  unhappy 
victim  and  rode  off,  leaving  him  in  his  chariot  mortally 
wounded,  where,  though  presently  found  and  recognized 
by  a  Macedonian  soldier,  he  breathed  his  last  before  his 
indefatigable  enemy  could  come  up. 

So  died  Darius,  the  last  of  the  Achacmenids,  at  the 
age  of  fifty,  after  a  troubled  reign  of  barely  six  years — 
hurled  in  that  short  time  from  the  height  of 
human  grandeur  to  the  depths  of  misfortune 
— a  man  who  might  have  adorned  more 
peaceful  times  with  the  gentler  graces  of  a 
benevolent  despot,  but  too  feeble  and  apathetic  to  cope 
with  so  tremendous  a  crisis — a  king  who  would  have 
been  happier  had  he  never  reigned.  More  fortunate  in 
death  than  in  life,  he  was  honoured  with  the  burial  of  a 
king  in  the  sepulchre  of  his  ancestors;  while  his  con- 
queror married  his  daughter,  and  provided  for  the  edu- 
cation of  his  other  children.  But  that  Alexander  was 
mortified  at  the  result  of  his  march  cannot  be  doubted; 
for  the  death  of  Darius  left  the  hands  of  the  Eastern 
satraps  free,  and  forced  him  to  pursue  them  if  he  meant 
to  complete  the  subjection  of  the  empire.  It  further 
changed  Alexander's  position  entirely.  The  king  of 
Macedon  became  transformed  into  the  Great  King^ 
Polla  ceased  to  be  the  first  city  of  a  petty  kingdom,  and 


Consequent 
change  in 
Alexander's 
position. 


Ctf.  XIII. 


Death  of  Darius. 


151 


became  a  second-rate  town  in  a  vast  empire,  whose 
capital  was  the  splendid  Babylon.  But  it  was  a  special 
difficulty  of  this  new  position  that,  though  perfect  suc- 
cess was  scarcely  possible,  an  effort,  at  least,  had  to  be 
made  to  unite  two  incompatible  things — Alexander  was 
forced  to  endeavour  to  be  king  of  Asia  and  king  of 
Macedon ;  to  rule  Macedonian  freemen  and  Persian 
slaves   at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same       ,,.^    , 

I'lfiiculties 

way.  It  IS  to  be  regretted,  mdeed,  that  his  ofthat 
premature  death  cut  short  the  plans  which  ^°^'  ''^"' 
he  initiated  for  the  amalgamation  of  his  diverse  subjects  ; 
but  an  Alexander  usually  forms  juster  conceptions,  and 
has  loftier  aims  than  the  courtiers  and  generals  around 
him.  We  can  perceive  that  he  started  from  the  sound 
basis  of  universal  equality,  which  was  so  great  a  source 
of  strength  in  after  days  to  Rome ;  and  it  seems  proba- 
ble that  his  adoption  of  Persian  habits,  and  his  plans  for 
associating  Persians  and  Macedonians,  in  the  army  and 
elsewhere,  were  due  to  a  desire  to  harmonize  discordant 
elements,  rather  than  to  vanity.  Without  such  harmony 
the  government  of  so  vast  an  empire  was  impossible. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  certain  that  Macedonians  had 
begun  to  be  jealous  of  Asiatics  even  before  Alexan- 
der's death,  and  were  seriously  annoyed  by  his  assump- 
tion of  Eastern  customs  and  a  state  ceremonial,  which 
he  himself  deemed  to  be  only  advisable  concessions  to 
prevalent  ideas. 

And   now  Alexander  was   in    Parthia — the   Atak   or 
"  Skirt"  of  the  desert— the  beautiful  tract  of  300  miles  of 
mountain,  stream,  and  valley,  which  parts 
the  desert   uplands  of  Iran   from  the   still      Alexander 

'^  in  Parthia. 

more  awful  desert  of  Chorasmia  (Kharesm 

or  Khiva),  where  the  traveller  may  wander  for  weeks 

without   finding  a  drop  of  sweet  water,  the  home  of  a 


152 


The  ATacedoniati  Empire.  CH.  xiii. 


Tatar   population   encamped   amidst   alien   Aryans,  as 
Basques  amid  Teutons,  or  Magyars  amid  Slaves,  who, 
less  than  a  century  later,  issued  forth  to  subvert  the  con- 
quests of  Alexander's  successors,  and  founded  an  empire 
which  lasted  for   500  years.     From  Hekatompylos,  the 
capital,  he  crossed  Blount  Tauros  in  three  columns  into 
Hyrkania.     There  were  barbarous  tribes  in  that  happy 
district  (as  Strabo  calls  it)  too  fierce  and  independent  to 
be  safely  left  unvisited  ;    the  Greek  mercenaries  were 
there  who  had  abandoned  Darius,  and  who  must  be 
dealt  with ;  lasdy,  it  was  important  to  secure  the  con- 
nexion between  the  provinces  of  the  south  and  the  Cas- 
pian.    Hyrkania  itself  was   speedily  reduced,  and  the 
Mardians  were  taught  a  bitter  lesson.     The  Greek  mer- 
cenaries also,  1,500  in  number,  came  in  and  made  their 
submission.     As  after  the  battles  of  Granikos  and  Issos, 
so  now  Alexander  appealed  to  the   resolutions  of  the 
Synod  of  Corinth  as  a  test  of  their  loyahy  or  treason. 
All  who  had  taken  arms  in  the  service  of  Darius,  prior 
to  the  Synod,  he  set  free  at  once ;  they  had  been  within 
their  rights  in  so  doing.     To  the  rest  he  used  the  lan- 
guage which  he  always  held.     They  were  traitors  to  the 
common  cause  of  Greece  against  the  barbarians,  and 
might  therefore   think   themselves   happy  to   have   no 
worse  fate  than  to  enter  his  service  on  their  former  pay. 
Alexander   now   set  his   face   steadily  eastwards   for 
Baktra  (Balkh),  and  it  seemed  as  if  it  would  be  none  too 
Episode  of        soon.     For  news  met  him  on  the  way  to  the 
SatibarzdnOs,     effect  that  Bessos  had  assumed  the  tiara  of 

satrap  of  Aria.  ,  •  ,        , 

royalty,  together  with  the  name  of  Artax- 
erxes,  that  he  had  a  large  Persian  and  Baktrian  force 
under  arms,  and  that  he  was  expecting  Scythian  auxil- 
iaries from  Central  Asia.  In  fact  his  position  on  the 
upper  waters  of  the  Oxus  and  Jaxartes  gave  him  the 


CH.  XIII. 


Satlbarzanes. 


^SZ 


simultaneous  advantages  of  inexhaustible  reinforcements 
from  the  tribes  of  the  steppes  and  of  inaccessible  retreat 
in  case  of  need.  A  rapid  attack,  therefore,  seemed 
beyond  all  things  necessary.  And  yet  Bessos  was  fated 
to  enjoy  his  ill-gotten  power  for  another  year.  Alex- 
ander had  passed  the  modern  Meshed,  the  frontier  town 
of  Persia,  and  had  crossed  the  Margus,  the  river  of  clear 
green  waters,  which  further  to  the  north  creates  the  oasis 
of  Mcrv  (Margia)  and  then  is  lost  in  the  sands,  when  he 
heard  that  the  satrap  of  Aria,  Satibarzanes,  to  whom  he 
had  committed  the  government  of  that  province,  had 
murdered  the  forty  lancers  whom  he  had  attached  to  his 
suite,  was  gathering  troops  and  money  in  his  capital  of 
Artakoana,  eighty  miles  to  the  southward,  and  intended 
to  join  Bessos  in  attacking  the  Macedonians  wherever 
they  might  be  found.  Alexander  did  not  hesitate.  A 
variety  of  motives  would  lead  Bessos  to  await  an  attack  ; 
but  the  treachery  of  a  pardoned  satrap  could  not  be 
overlooked.  Turning  sharply  to  the  south,  and  leaving 
the  main  body  under  Krateros  to  a  more  leisurely  ad- 
vance, he  reached  Artakoana  with  some  picked  troops 
by  a  forced  march  in  two  days.  But  Satibarzanes  had 
heard  and  fled.  With  a  small  body  of  horsemen  he  rode 
for  his  life,  leaving  the  hapless  villagers  of  his  satrapy, 
whom  he  had  beguiled,  to  the  vengeance  of  the  king 
and  his  flying  column.  Still  Alexander  was  not  sads- 
fied,  and  he  resolved,  before  turning  northwards,  to  face 
a  circuitous  march  of  800  miles  and  to  teach  the  wild 
tribes  of  Drangiana  and  Arachosia — true  forefathers  of 
the  restless  Affghans — that  they  had  better  acquiesce  in 
the  will  of  the  stronger. 

Speaking  generally,  these  provinces  are  the  southern 
slopes  of  a  huge  mountain  bastion,  thrown  out  from  the 
towering   Paropanisos    towards    the    lower  level  of  the 


154 


The  Macedonian  Efnpire, 


CH.  XIII. 


Description 
of  Aria, 
Drangiana, 
and  Ara- 
chosia  ( mod. 
Afghanistan). 


Arian  plateau.  From  time  immemorial,  and  in  spite  of 
the  perpetual  barbarism  of  the  population, 
this  country  has  been  of  first-rate  impor- 
tance as  the  easiest  approach  to  India  from 
the  west.  The  climate  is  fine,  though  se- 
vere. Snow  falls  heavily  throughout  the 
mountain  district  in  winter,  and  is  even  seen  in  the 
plains ;  and  in  summer  the  heat  in  the  lower  lands, 
though  oppressive  in  parts,  is  less  intense  than  in  India. 
The  irrigation,  which  alone  turns  the  parched  country 
into  a  garden,  diminishes  the  volume  of  the  rivers, 
which  are  rarely  full  except  after  the  melting  of  the 
winter  snows. 

In  Affghanistan  there  are  four  cities  which  boast  of 
Alexander,  if  not  as  their  founder,  at  least  as  the  origi- 
nator of  their  greatness.  Kandahar  (Alexandria)  even 
tries  to  trace  its  name  to  the  great  Iskandar  (Alexander). 
That  Alexander  passed  through  both  Kabul  (Ortospana) 
and  Kandahar  is  certain,  as  also  that  he  spent  some 
time  at  Furrah  (Prophthasia).  It  is  far  from  improbable 
that  he  actually  founded  the  now  important  city  of 
Herat  (Alexandria  in  Ariis),  which  for  ages  has  been 
the  centre  of  commercial  intercourse  between  India, 
Persia,  and  Tartary.  The  mere  site  of  this  Gate  of 
Central  Asia  marks  it  out  as  an  object  of  contention  to 
its  neighbours,  a  prize  for  which  Persians  and  Affghans 
fight,  and  which  Russia  desires  to  have.  It  lies  in  an 
immense  plain  on  the  north-eastern  edge  of  the  desert, 
destitute  indeed  of  trees,  but  fertile  and  beautiful.  There 
are  numerous  canals  and  scattered  villages,  watered 
and  fertilized  by  the  Heri-rood  (Arius)  and  on  all  sides 
are  ruins  attesting  former  greatness.  To  the  traveller 
fresh  from  the  steppes  of  the  north  and  the  desert  of  the 
west,  the  plain  of  Herat  is,  as  the  Eastern  proverb  says. 


CH.  XIII. 


Fotindaiioti  of  Herat, 


155 


Discovery  of  a 
supposed  plot 
against  Alex- 
ander's life. 


like  Paradise.  Its  climate  is  one  of  the  most  delightful 
in  Asia,  and  its  products  as  plentiful  as  they  are  various. 
It  would  not  be  strange,  therefore,  that  a  man  of  keen 
and  rapid  judgment  like  Alexander  should  have  fixed 
upon  Herat  as  a  link  in  his  long  chain  of  fortress- 
colonies,  to  reach  from  Babylon  to  the  Indus  ;  or  that 
he  who  stands  there  as  a  victorious  invader  from  the 
north  or  west  should  be  said  to  hold  the  key  of  India  in 
his  hand. 

From  Herat  Alexander  marched  southward  to  Pro- 
phthasia (Furrah)  a  place  of  sinister  influence  on  his 
good  name  and  character.  For  it  was  there 
that  the  terrible  tragedy  was  enacted  which 
ended  in  the  deaths  of  Philotas  and  his 
father  Parmenion, — "the  first  cloud  that 
casts  a  shadow  over  Alexander's  heroic  character — the 
first  calamity  that  embittered  his  hitherto  uninterrupted 
prosperity." 

It  is  difficult  to  ascertain  exactly  the  precise  share  of 
guilt  attaching  to  each  actor  in  this  tragedy,  when  the 
most  trustworthy  of  our  authorities,  Arrian, 

.  ^  '        Difficulty  of 

gives  only  a  brief  and  guarded  account,  and  ascertaining 
the  fuller  details  are  added  by  men  like  the  *  ^  ^"^"^  ' 
Roman  Curtius  or  the  gossip  Plutarch  ;  yet,  granting 
this,  it  is  certain  that  of  all  who  were  concerned  in  it, 
not  one  save,  perhaps,  the  aged  Parmenion  himself,  was 
wholly  guiltless,  while  the  conduct  of  some  of  the  Mace- 
donian generals  was  atrocious.  The  inherent  difficulties 
of  the  king's  position  have  already  been  briefly  noticed. 
His  great  officers  were  strongly  averse  to  his  adoption 
of  Persian  customs,  and  Philotas,  no  less  than  others, 
was  apt  to  ridicule  in  private  his  growing  vanity ;  they 
were  also  more  spoiled  than  he  by  their  marvellous  suc- 
cesses, and  were  furiously  jealous  of  each  other.     And 


156 


The  Macedonian  Empire,  CH.  xiii. 


Character  and 
position  of 
Parmenion 
and  Philotas. 


if  Krateros  or  Perdikkas  were  envious  of  the  influence 
and  wealth  of  Parmenion  and  his  family,  Philotas  him- 
self was  unguarded  in  his  language  and  insatiable  in 
his  claims.  If  we  would  understand  by  what  kind  of 
men  Alexander  was  surrounded,  and  how  baleful  an  in- 
fluence they  might  possibly  exert  on  his  susceptible 
mind,  we  have  only  to  look  forward  a  few  short  years, 
and  to  observe  how,  when  his  strong  hand  was  removed, 
his  generals  fought  for  the  power  which  they  were  neither 
worthy  to  gain  nor  able  to  retain. 

Philotas  was  the  commander  of  the  Companion  cavalry, 
and  therefore  in   daily,  almost  hourly,  communication 
with  Alexander  himself.     He  was  the  sole 
survivor   of   three    brothers,    sons   of   that 
Parmenion  of  whom  Philip  once  said,  that 
the  Athenians  were  lucky  indeed  to  find  ten 
generals  every  year,  for  he  in  the  course  of  many  years 
had  never  found  but  one.     Next  to  the  king  himself,  the 
father  and  son  were  perhaps  the  most  important  men 
in  the  empire.     But  they  were  not  popular,  nor  even 
wholly  trusted.     Parmenion,  it  is  true,  was  left  in  chief 
command  at  Agbatana  ;  but  he  was  getting  old,  and  was 
thought  to  have  shown  a  want  of  energy  and  resource 
at  the  battle  of  Gaugamela.     Philotas  also  was  in  bad 
odour  with  both  officers  and  men— with  the  former  for 
his  arrogance  and  bluntness,  and  his  very  success ;  with 
the  latter  for  a  supercilious  selfishness,  which  showed 
itself  in  disregard  for  their  comfort  as  compared  with  his 
own,  and  a  studied  contempt  of  their  wishes  and  preju- 
dices.    Even  with  the  king  himself  for  the  past  eighteen 
months  his  relations  had  been  less  cordial  than  before, 
owing  to  some  disparagement  of  Alexander,  which  he 
had  let  fall  in  conversation  with  his  mistress,  and  which 
had  been  betrayed  by  her  to  Krateros,  and  by  Krateros 


\ 


i 


\ 


CH.  XIII. 


Episode  of  Philotas. 


157 


Petrayal  of 
the  plot  to 
Alexander: 
suicide  of 
Dimnos  ; 
arrest  of 
Philotas. 


— only  too  willingly — to  the  king.  In  so  perilous  a  posi- 
tion caution  was  needed ;  and  caution  was  a  virtue  of 
which  Philotas  was  incapable. 

Now  it  happened  at  this  time  that  a  certain  officer 
named  Dimnos  was  accused  by  one  of  his  bosom  friends 
of  a  design  against  Alexander's  life.  This 
friend  had  imparted  the  secret  to  his  own 
brother;  and  the  brother  in  turn  disclosed 
the  plot  to  Philotas,  as  to  one  who  would 
certainly  provide  against  the  danger.  The 
attempt  was  to  be  made  on  the  next  day  but  one.  On 
that  day  and  on  the  next  Philotas  had  long  interviews 
with  the  king ;  and  on  each  occasion  omitted  to  mention 
what  he  had  heard.  On  the  third  day  his  informant, 
finding  that  nothing  had  been  done,  resolved  to  take  the 
matter  boldly  into  his  own  hands.  He  demanded  ad- 
mission to  the  king's  presence  at  once — even  though  he 
was  in  the  bath — and  told  him  all  he  knew.  Orders 
Were  immediately  issued  for  the  arrest  of  Dimnos,  who, 
however,  either  slew  himself  or  was  slain  in  resisting ; 
and  thus  the  most  important  witness  in  the  matter  was 
removed  by  an  act  that  appeared  to  prove  his  guilt.  It 
presently  came  out  that  Philotas  also  had  been  aware  of 
the  plot  two  days  before,  and  had  said  nothing.  In  so 
grave  a  matter  silence  would  in  any  man  seem  strange. 
In  Philotas,  not  unnaturally,  it  was  taken  to  prove  compli- 
city ;  while  his  defence,  that  the  story  seemed  to  rest  on 
insufficient  authority,  was  looked  upon  as  an  afterthought. 

The   suspicions   aroused   in   Alexander's   mind  were 
artfully  inflamed  by  Krateros  and  other  enemies  of  Phi- 
lotas.    A  council  of  officers  was  held,  and 
they  insisted  that  the  only  means  of  arriving      ^ndimnl- 
at  the  truth  was  to  arrest  and  question  Phi-      tion  of 

,     ,         ,.    ,     .  •         .  Philotas. 

lotas.     It  needs  but  little  imagmation  to  see 


158 


The  Macedonian  E7ttpire,  CH.  xiii. 


how  it  all  happened  ;  Alexander  hurt,  angry,  suspicious  ; 

the  generals,  one  here  and  another  there,  hinting,  arguing.' 

or  openly  accusing ;  the  very  absence  of  Philotas.  wh*o 

was   not   present   at  the  council,  perhaps   being  turned 

against  him.     That  night  the  accused  man  was  arrested ; 

and  on  the  next  day,  according  to  the  national  custom.' 

he  was  brought  before  an  assembly  of  the  Macedonian 

troops,  where  the  king  himself  stated  the  charge  against 

him.  though  he  retired  before  the  trial  began.   But^'there 

was  little  hope  of  an  impartial  hearing  where  the  accuser 

was  the  idol  of  the  generals  who  envied  the  accused,  and 

of  the  soldiers  who   hated  him.     He  was  found  guilty  of 

the  charge  of  being  privy  to  the  act. 

But  this  was  not  enough.     If  the  son  were  condemned 
on  evidence  so  slight,  what  view  would   the  father   take 
of  the  whole  affair  ?    And  if  he  chose  to  re- 
sent it,  or  took  up  arms  in  self-defence,  the 
revolt  of  so  famous  a  man,  master  of  all  the 
vast  treasure  stored  at  Agbatana,  would  be 
formidable  even  to  Alexander.     Parmcnion, 
therefore,  must  be  involved  in  the  fate  of  Philotas.     Evi- 
dence must  be  gained  against  the  father  as  well ;  and 
that  evidence  must  come  from  the  lips  of  the  son.    'to  us 
both  the  end  and  the  means  taken  to  achieve  the  end 
are  equally  odious.     Philotas  was   tortured. 
But  we  must  not  forget,  if  we  wish  to  be  just, 
that   the   false   notion  of  torture  being  the 
surest  means  of  eliciting  truth   has   been 
common  in  nearly  every  age  and  nation,  and  was  neither 
more  nor  less  disgraceful  in  Macedonian  officers  than  in 
Roman  slave-masters  or  Christian  inquisitors.     However 
vyicked  the  object  may  have  been,  we  may  be  sure  that 
the  means  used  for  its  attainment  seemed  natural  and 
suitable.     Philotas  was  tortured,  and  confessed  what  was 


He  is  tor- 
tured, to 
extract 
evidence 
against  his 
father. 


Execution 
of  Philotas 
and  Par- 
menion. 


r 


CH.  XIII.    Philotas  and  Parmenion  Executed,         159 

desired,  that  both  his  father  and  himself  were  guilty  of  a 
design  against  the  king's  life,  and  that  he  himself  had 
purposely  precipitated  measures,  lest  death  should  re- 
move his  father,  who  was  now  seventy,  from  the  com- 
mand of  the  treasures  which  were  necessary  to  success — 
a  confession,  the  truth  of  which  was  said  to  be  confirmed 
by  the  contents  of  a  letter  from  Parmenion,  seized  among 
the  papers  of  Philotas.  On  the  next  day  this  confession 
was  read  before  the  troops,  and  Philotas  and  others,  his 
accomplices,  were  executed ;  while  a  hurried  messenger 
was  sent  off  to  Agbatana,  eleven  days'  march  across  the 
desert,  with  orders  to  Klcander,  the  second  in  command, 
to  put  Parmenion  instantly  to  death.  The  command 
was  obeyed ;  and  the  old  man  was  killed  while  reading 
a  forged  letter  purporting  to  come  from  his  son. 

An  impartial  consideration  of  the  story  just  narrated 
leads  us  to  the  conclusion,  that  of  all  the  persons  con- 
cerned Krateros  and  his  friends  were  the 
most  guilty.  Whether  we  assume  that  th"e"wSe° 
Philotas  was  really  privy  to  the  plot,  or  question, 
without  being  privy  to  it  would  not  have  been  ill-pleased 
to  see  it  succeed,  or  was  simply  imprudent  and  forgot  to 
speak — and  either  of  these  assumptions  is  possible — it  is 
clear  that  there  was  prima  facie  ground  for  suspicion, 
and  that  the  generals  used  it  to  ruin  Philotas.  They 
might  have  ilsed  their  influence  to  pacify  Alexander ; 
they  did  in  fact  exasperate  him  against  their  enemy.  It 
is  hardly  strange  that  the  king  himself  should  have  sus- 
pected Philotas,  when  he  knew  that  for  two  days  he  had 
been  aware  of  a  plot  against  his  life  and  said  nothing 
about  it,  while  the  very  first  man  implicated  had  pre- 
ferred death  to  facing  investigation.  Appearances  were 
against  Philotas.  It  is  equally  clear  that  the  charge  was 
not  proven,  and  that,  if  the  accused  had  had  friends  at 


7^ 


^^°  The  Macedofiian  Empire.  CH.  xiv. 

court,  there  was  much  to  be  said  in  his  defence;  while 
the  actual  way  in  which  he  was  treated  showed  a  p'assion. 
a  suspiciousness,  and  a  want  of  generous  forbearance.' 
not  unnatural  perhaps  in  a  son  of  Olympias,  but  hitherto 
unexampled  in  Alexander.      If  we  conclude,  however, 
that  It  remains  an  open  question  whether  Philotas  was 
innocent  or  guilty,  the  same  cannot  be  said  of  the  fate 
of  Parmenion.      That  the  death  of  the  son  should  have 
made  the  father's  death  an  apparent  necessity  both  for 
Alexander  and  his  generals  may  be  granted,  but  that  is 
only  saying  that  one  false  step  necessitates  another.    No 
man  who  admires  the  genius  or  respects  the  noble  quali- 
ties of  Alexander  the  Great  can  fail  to  deplore  the  odious 
crime  which  he  allowed  himself  to  commit  in  assenting 
to  the  assassination  of  his  oldest  and  ablest  general,  or 
to  condemn  the  wickedness  of  those  who  urged  such  a 
barbarous  judicial  murder.      Philotas   may  have  been 
guilty.     Parmenion  was  almost  certainly  innocent. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

THE  CAMPAIGNS   IN    BAKTRIA   AND   SOGDIANA. 

In  the  autumn  of  330  Alexander  set  out  from  Prophtha- 
sia  on  his  long  march  of  more  than   600  miles  to  Orto- 
spana  (Kabul),  which  he  did  not  reach  until 
early  in  329.     The  weather  was  severe,  for 
snow  had  fallen  and  was  lying  on  all  the 
highlands ;  the  country  was  difficult,  espe- 
cially the  latter  part  of  it.  where  the  route 
was  intersected  by  lofty  ridges,  deep  gorges,  and  narrow 
passes.      He  met  with  no  combined  resistance  from  the 
tribes   through   which   he   marched;    although  he   was 
obliged  to  detach  a  division  to  return  to  Aria,  which  the 
indefatigible  Satibarzancs  had  entered  once  more  with 


March  of 

Alexander 

from  Pro- 

phthasia 

into 

IJaktria. 


CH.  XIV. 


Pursuit  of  Bessos, 


161 


2,000  horse  and  was  rousing  to  rebellion.     This  was  soon 
crushed ;  and  two  more  military  colonies  were  planted 
at  Alexandria  (Kandahar)  and  Ortospana  to  secure  the 
peace   of  the  provmce.     But   though   his    march    was 
checked  by  no  serious  resistance,  the  soldiers  suffered 
terribly  from  the  intense  cold  and  want  of  food,  the  snow 
(it  would  seem)  being  exceptionally  deep.     Yet,  in  spite 
of  hardships,   Alexander  pressed  on,  being  anxious  to 
cross   the  central  range  before  the  melting  of  the  snow. 
There   are   four  passes   over  the  Paropanisos  from  the 
country  of  the  Gandarians  to  Baktria;  and  it  is  probable 
that  the  army  took  the  so-called  Koushan  Pass,  8,500  feet 
above  the  sea — a  march  of  extreme  difficulty,  which  con- 
sumed sixteen  days  and  cost  the  lives  of  many  both  of  the 
soldiers  and  the  camp-followers.    At  the  southern  end  of 
the  pass,  and  twenty-five  miles  north-east  of  Ortospana, 
a  new  city  (Alexandria  ad  Caucasum)  was  founded  in 
a   commanding  position   at   or   near    the    site    of   the 
modern  Beghram,  where  vast  numbers  of  Greek  coins 
are  still  to  be  found.     Thence  the  army  struggled  on  its 
weary  march,  half  blinded  by  the  dazzling  brightness  of 
the  snow,  half-buried  in  the  drifts;   and  all  the  more 
bitter  was  their  disappointment  when,  on  emerging  from 
the  mountains  at  Adrapsa   (Anderab),  they  found  the 
whole  country  lying  between  them   and  the  Oxus  laid 
waste   by   order   of  Bessos ;   and   men   who   had  been 
battling  with  cold  and  fatigue  had  now  to  battle  with 
hunger  also.      It  was  not  indeed  a  difficult  country  to 
ravage,  for  much  of  it  is  barren  and  hilly  where  the  spurs 
of  Paropanisos  run   northwards  to  the  desert,  and  it  is 
only  the  valleys  of  the  tributaries  of  the  Oxus  that  are 
fertile.      In   spite   of  difficulties,    however.    Alexander 
pressed  onwards,  taking  at  the  first  onset  the  two  most 
important  towns  of  Baktria  ;  but  Bessos  himself  he  did 

M 


1 62  The  Macedonian  Empire.  CH.  xiv. 

not  find,  for.  shrinking  at  the  last  moment  from  the  colli- 
sion he  had  provoked,  he   had   fled  with  7,000  of  his 
native  troops  and  a  few  of  his  fcUow-conspirators,  and 
had  placed  the  Oxus  between  himself  and  his  pitiless 
pursuer,   burning  the  boats  in  which  he  had  crossed. 
Disunion,  however,  was  already  at  work  in  the  ranks  of 
his   adherents;    for   the    Baktrian    cavalry   rather   than 
accompany  him  broke  up,  and  dispersed  in  all  directions. 
Alexander  left  garrisons  in  Aornos— a  great  hill-fort 
whose  name,  like  that  of  another  Aornos  in  the  Indus 
Pursuit  and       valley,  imports    inaccessibility  even  to  the 
c..ptureof         birds  of  the  air -and  in  Baktra  or  Zariaspa 
(the  modern  Balkh).  where  ruins  that  cover 
five  leagues  of  country  remain  to  prove  the  former  great- 
ness of  what  Orientals  call  the  Mother  of  Cities,  in  the 
Middle  Ages  the  rival  of  Bokhara  and  Samarkand  and 
the  capital  of  Mohammedan  civilization.      Then  he  set 
out  across  the  desert  in  pursuit  of  Bessos.     The  foresight 
of  Alexander  in  timing  his  march  now  received  another 
confirmation.     The  Oxus  was  before  him,  and  he  had  no 
boats.     Even  then  it  was  a  deep  and  rapid  river,  not  far 
short  of  a  mile  in  breadth.     There   was   no  wood  near 
enough  to  use.  and  the  bottom  was  formed  of  shiftino- 
loose  sand.     So  great,   indeed,  is  the  quantity  of  sand 
which  its  yellow  waves  hold  in  solution,  that,  although 
the  water  is  proverbially  sweet  and  delicious  to  drink^'it 
grits  under  the  teeth  if  taken  straight  from  the  river,  and 
requires  time  for  the  sand  to  settle.     Had  Alexander 
reached  it  in  flood  time,  when  the  snows  are  melted  in 
the  mountains,  and  when  its  breadth  is  so  great  that  both 
banks   cannot   be   seen  at  the  same  time,  the  passage 
would  have  been  hardly  practicable.    Nor  would  he  have 
had  an  easy  task,  had  Bessos  chosen  to  dispute  the  pas- 
sage.    As  it  was,  Bessos  was  far  away  in  Nautaka  of  the 


CH.  XIV. 


Pursuit  of  Bessos, 


163 


/ 


y 


Sogdians;and  the  army  got  across  the  river  safely  in 
five   days,  on  tent   skins  stuffed  with  straw.     Had  he 
been   able  to   seek  safety  in  the  boundless  steppes  of 
Scythia,  Bessos,  even  if  bereft  of  his  shadow  of  a  crown, 
would  have  kept  life  and  liberty.      But  it  was  not  so  to 
be.     Very   soon    after   the  king  had  crossed  the  great 
river,  he  received  a  message  from  Spitamencs  and  an- 
other of  the  companions  of  Bessos,  offering  to  seize  and 
give  him  up  if  a  small  force  were  sent  to  support  them. 
He  was  already  their  prisoner,  they  said,  though  not  in 
ehains.  Alexander's  resolution  was  at  once  taken.    Slack- 
ening his  own  pace,  he  ordered  Ptolemy,  son  of  Lagos, 
to  take  a  division  consisting  chiefly  of  cavalry  and  light- 
armed   troops,   and   to   come   up  with   Spitamenes   by 
forced  marches,  and  with  as  little  delay  as  possible.     In 
four  days  Ptolemy  was  so  close  upon  the  fugitives  that 
he  reached  the  camp  where  they  had  bivouacked  the 
night  before.     There  he  heard  that  the  conspirators  were 
hesitating.    He  instantly  started  with  the  cavalry,  leaving 
the  infantry  to  follow,  and  shortly  reached  a  village  where 
Bessos  was  resting,  with  a  few  soldiers— Spitamencs  and 
his  friends  being  ashamed  (it  would  seem)  at  the  eleventh 
hour  to  play  the  traitor,  and  having  retired  to  a  distance. 
Ptolemy  posted  his  troops  all  round  the  village,  which 
had  walls  and  gates,  and  then  summoned  the  inhabitants 
to  give  up  the  stranger  under  a  promise  of  immunity 
from  attack  if  they  did  so.     They  opened  their  gates  to 
him,  and  Ptolemy  with   his  own   hand  arrested  Bessos, 
and  set  out  again  to  rejoin  the  king.     Pie  sent,  however, 
an  officer  before  him  to  ask  in  what  guise  Alexander 
would  have   Bessos  brought  into  his  presence.     For  a 
man  who  had  murdered   his  sovereign  and  usurped  his 
place  there  was  no  room  for  mercy.     The  answer  was 
that  Bessos  was  to  be  bound  naked  in  chains,  with  a 


164 


TJie  Macedonian  Empire,  ch.  xiv. 


collar  round  his  neck,  and  placed  at  the  side  of  the  road 
by  which  the  army  would  march.  Then,  as  Alexander 
drew  near  to  the  place,  stopping  his  chariot,  he  sternly 
asked  how  it  was  that  he  had  dared  to  seize  and  bind  and 
slay  his  master  and  benefactor,  Darius.  Bessos  answered 
that  he  had  not  acted  alone,  and  that  the  deed  was  done 
to  propitiate  Alexander.  The  king's  only  reply  was  to 
order  the  traitor  to  be  scourged,  and  sent  back  a  close 
prisoner  to  Baktra  — shortly  to  die. 

The  onward  march  to  Marakanda  (Samarkand)  and 
the  Jaxartcs— undertaken,  perhaps,  in  emulation  of  th» 
E  isode  of  ^^^^  Cyrus— was  broken  by  a  curious  episode, 
the  Hran-       At   a  Certain    village  the   army  came  unex- 

chidai.  ,,  •      ,         •,    ^        , 

pectcdly  upon  an  isolated  Greek  population, 
said  to  be  descendants  of  that  priestly  family  of  the 
Branchidai  of  Miletos,  who  being  guardians  and  treas- 
urers of  the  great  temple  of  Apollo  near  that  city,  had 
surrendered  its  treasures  to  King  Xerxes  150  years 
before.  Covered  with  odium  for  this  treachery,  and 
obliged  to  abandon  their  old  home,  they  had  been  set- 
tled by  Xerxes  in  Sogdiana,  and  their  descendants  had 
continued  to  occupy  the  same  place.  Now  they  came 
out  to  meet  their  victorious  brethren  from  Greece,  doubt- 
less with  mingled  feelings  of  pride  and  apprehension. 
They  were  not  long  left  in  doubt  as  to  their  treatment. 
Alexander  had  a  special  tenderness  for  the  oracle,  which 
had  broken  silence  for  the  first  time  since  the  days  of 
Xerxes  to  pronounce  that  he  was  the  son  of  Zeus  ;  and 
the  sacrilege  of  the  Branchidai  against  the  god  had 
involved  treason  against  the  fatherland,  far  baser  than 
that  of  any  Greek  mercenaries  who  had  fought  for  Persia 
since  the  Synod  of  Corinth.  That  the  sins  of  the  fathers 
were  to  be  visited  on  their  posterity  was  a  common 
Greek  belief;  and  it  is  hard  to  assign  any  probable  mo- 


CH.  XIV. 


TJie  Branchidai, 


165 


tive  for  the  infliction  of  so  awful  a  retribution  as  the 
destruction  of  the  village  and  of  all  its  inhabitants,  men 
women,  and  children,  unless  it  were  this  belief,  coupled 
with  the  desire  to  avenge  the  treason  and  sacri- 
lege of  which  the  Branchidai  had  been  guilty  against 
Hellas  and  the  Hellenic  god.  If  Alexander  was  not  a 
conscious  agent  in  what  he  conceived  to  be  a  work  of 
righteous  retribution,  he  was  a  merciless  savage. 

Alexander  was  now  in    the   fertile   district  midway 
between   the  Oxus  and  Jaxartes,  watered  by  the  river 
Polytimotos,  or  Zarafshan, 'the  scatterer  of  March  to  the 
gold,'  which  pours  its  waters  into  the  Oxia   J^^^^Ss. 
Palus,  or  during  the  dry  months  is  lost  in  the  sands.   Hav- 
ing repaired  the  loss    in  horses  which  the  army  had  sus- 
tained in  the  march  across  the  mountains  and  the  desert 
he  advanced  to  Marakanda  (Samarkand).     In  Alexan- 
der's day  it  seems  to  have  had  little  of  the  importance 
which  it  gained  in  the  fifteenth  century  as  the  capital  and 
burial-place  of  Timour,  and  which  is  recalled  by  the  Per- 
sian proverb,  that  styles  it  the  focus  of  the  whole  globe. 
It  is  more  truly  said  that  it  resembles  Paradise,  for  no 
lapse  of  time  or  change  of  circumstance  can  efface  the 
contrast  between  the  terrible  desert  and  its  beautiful  site, 
fine  air  and  water,  and  luxuriant  vegetation,  which  even 
in  those  days  marked  it  out  as  the  capital  of  Sogdiana. 
Here  Alexander  left  a  garrison,  and  it  would  appear  from' 
subsequent  events  that  Spitamenes  also  retained  at  least 
a  part  of  the  power  which  he  had  held  under  Bessos. 
But  the  king  himself  still  set  his  face  steadily  northwards,* 
until  he  reached  the  left  bank  of  the  Jaxartcs.     Here,' 
too,  he  founded  another  city  or  military  colony,  Alex- 
andria (Khojend),  the  position  being  suitable  for  making 
it   at   once  a  frontier  fortress  and  a  base  of  operations 
against    the  Scythians  of   the  right  bank.     It  was  not 


i65 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  XIV. 


CH.  XIV. 


The  Jaxartcs. 


167 


Dangerous         long,  indeed,  before  the   place   became  of 

position  of  •.     1    •  ^  •  It  -.^        . 

the  Mace-  Vital  importance  in  each  character.     For  in 

Alexandria        ^^'^  remote  corner  of  the  empire  Alexander 
Rebate  was  unexpectedly  assailed   by   enemies  in 

(Khojend).  c        .  a    a       ^  a 

front  and  flank  and    rear,    not   acting    in 
combination  though  actuated    by   a  common  hostility. 
On    the    march    from     Marakanda     he    had    reduced 
without    difficulty    a    chain    of    seven    fort.-:,    standing- 
near  to   one  another    on  the  skirt  of  the  hills  and   th, 
desert,  and  intended  probably  as  outposts  against   Scy- 
thian   inroads.      The  largest    and  most  important  bore 
the    ambitious  name  of   Cyropolis.      He  now  received 
tidings  that  the  mountain  tribes   in  his  rear  had  taken 
all  these  forts,  and  put  their  Macedonian  garrisons  to  the 
sword.     And  not  only  so;  they  had  been  reinforced  and 
assisted   by  Sogdian  and  Baktrian  allies,  only  too  cer- 
tainly excited  by  the  intrigues  of  Spitamcnos,  who,  as  he 
learned  later,  was  even  threatening  Marakanda,  while 
presently  the  right  bank  of  the  river  became  lined  with 
a  host  of  Scythian  horsemen,  either  roused  to  action  by 
the  same  intriguer,  or  fearing  for  an  independence  that 
might  seem  threatened  by  the  erection  of  the  new  fortress. 
It  was  a  serious  crisis,  exactly  suited  to  try  the  king's 
judgment,  and  to  call  out  his  determined  energy.     The 
first  and  most  important  thing  was  to  recover  the  seven 
forts.     Accordingly  he  despatched  Krateros  to  blockade 
the  strongest,  Cyropolis,  which  lay  furthest  but  one  to 
the  east,  and  was  held  by  15.000  men,  while  he  himself 
hastened  to  attack  the  westernmost,  Gaza.     It  was  car- 
ried by  storm  and  burnt,  and  the  garrison  was  put  to  the 
sv/ord.     On  the  same  day  he  stormed  a  second.     On  the 
next  day  three  more  were  carried  ;  and  the  garrisons  in- 
their  attempt  to  flee  to  the  mountains  fell  into  the  hands 
of  the  Macedonian  cavalry.     The  resistance  at  Cyropolis 


was  more  desperate  ;  but  the  dry  bed  of  a  torrent  gave 
admittance  to  a  forlorn  hope  headed  by  the  king  in  per- 
son, while  the  attention  of  the  besieged  was  engrossed 
by  a  fierce  attack  on  the  other  side.     Even  so,  however, 
with  the  gates  open,  and  the  enemy  actually  within  the 
walls,    the   garrison  fought  bravely;  Alexanderhimself 
was  wounded  by  a  blow  in  the  neck  from  a  stone  ;  and  it 
was  not  till  8,000  had  fallen,  and  the  residue,  shut  up  in 
the  citadel,  were  fainting  for  want  of  water,  that   they 
thought  of  submission.     The  seventh  and  last  fort  sur- 
rendered at  discretion. 

By  this  time  the  new  colony  of  Alexandria  was  suffi- 
ciently advanced  in  building  to  sustain  an  attack ;  and 
after  leaving  a  garrison  there  of  combined 
Greeks  and  natives,  and  sending  a  force  of      fh^jST-"^ 
1,500   foot  and   800  horse  to  the  relief  of      --^ru's,  and 

Ml  J         1  1       ,  .  battle  with 

arakanda,   he    crossed    the    river   under      the  Scy- 

covcr  of  showers  of  arrows  from  the  cmrines      ^^''^"^' 
on  the  bank,  and  at  once  attacked  the  Scythian  horse- 
men, who  had  defied  liim  to  come  over,  and  boasted  of 
the  different  sort  of  enemy  he  would  find  in  them.     It 
was  a  new  style  of  fighting,  in  which  the  enemy,  so  to 
say,  eluded  the  grasp,  but  hovered  on  the  flanks  of  the 
army,  and  trusted  to  their  missiles.    Alexander's  genius, 
however,  was  shown  not  least  in  coping  with  strange 
emergencies,  and  few  generals,  if  any,  have  rivalled  his 
rapidity  of  movement.     The  Scythians  were  compelled 
to  fight  in  his  way,  and  not  their  own,  and  were  finally 
driven  off  the  field  with  a  loss  of  1,000  killed  and   150 
prisoners.     A   reverse   so   unexpected   speedily   led   to 
apologies,  submission,  and  peace.     Alexander  at  once 
recrossed  the  river;  and,  spurred  by  the  intelligence  of 
disasters  in  his  rear,  actually  made  the  whole  distance 
from  the  Jaxartcs  to  Marakanda  by  a  forced  march  in 


1 68  The  Macedonian  Empire.  CH.  xiv. 

less  than  four  days.     His  presence  was  indeed  needed. 
It  appears  that  on  the  approach  of  the  re- 
SpulmlnSL       Sieving  force  already  mentioned,  Spitame- 
nos,  who  was  pressing  the  garrison  of  Mara- 
kanda  hard,  at  once  retired  westward  down  the  valley 
of  the  Polytimetos  in  the  direction  of  the  modern  Bok- 
hara, and  passed  it  to  the  very  edge  of  the  desert  lying 
between  Bokhara  and  Khiva.     Here  he  was  joined  by 
6cx>  Scythian   cavalry;   then,    turning    fiercely   on   the 
Macedonians,  who  had  been  pursuing  him,  and  using 
cunningly  those  very  tactics  which  had  almost  baffled 
Alexander  himself,  he  harassed  their  advance  with  per- 
petual feints  and  unceasing  showers  of  missiles,  until 
they  were  driven  to  a  retreat.     At  the  river  the  retreat 
became  a  rout  and  simple  massacre,  so  that  less  than 
400  escaped  to  tell  the  tale.     Then  Spitamenes  marched 
a  second  time  to  Marakanda  to  renew  the  siege.     It  was 
the  first  reverse  of  the  Macedonian  arms,  the  possible 
signal  for  a  general  rising  against  the  intruders  in  ac- 
cordance  with   the   usual    habits   of   barbarous   tribes. 
Indeed,  it  is  in  this  light,  and  this  light  only,  that  a  word 
of  extenuation  can  be  said  for  the  pitiless  vengeance 
which  fell  upon  the  inhabitants  of  this  fertile  valley ;  for 
if  it  was  not  an  act  of  military  self-defence,  it  was  an  act 
of  atrocious  cruelty.     Spitarnenes,  on  hearing  of  Alex- 
ander's approach,  a  second  time  bowed  before  the  storm 
and  retreated  hastily  in  the  same  direction  as  before, 
this  time  into  the  very  desert  itself.    Alexander  followed 
as  far  as  he  dared  ;  but  to  enter  the  desert  would  have 
been  sheer  madness.     Baulked  of  his  prey,  he  turned 
back  up  the  valley,  ravaging  far  and  near  as  he  went, 
reducing  every   fort,   and    putting   all   alike   to   death! 
After  this,  he  returned  victorious  into  winter-quarters   at 
Baktra  (329-8),  where  he  received  reinforcements  from 


CH.  XIV. 


Death  of  Besses. 


169 


Greece    and  Syria.     During  the  winter,  moreover,  the 
unfortunate  Bessos  was  brought  before  the 
assembled  Macedonians  to  receive  his  final      ^"  winter 

.  .  .  .  quarters  at 

sentence.      If  Arrian   is  correct   m  saymg      Baktra 
that  Alexander  ordered  him  to  be  mutila-  '  ^* 

ted  in  nose  and  ears,  and  then  sent  him  to  Agbatana 
for  execution,  the  strictures  are  just  which  he  passes  on 
the  king  for  this  conformity  to  a  hideous  Eastern  cus- 
tom. On  the  other  hand,  Diodoros  avers  that  Bessos 
was  given  over  to  the  tender  mercies  of  the  brother  and 
other  kinsmen  of  Darius,  as  a  politic  concession,  and 
that  they  insulted,  and  tortured,  and  finally  put  him  to 
death,  with  ingenious  refinements  of  cruelty  only  possi- 
ble to  Orientals. 

The   events   of  the  campaigns   of  328   and   327   arc 
so  obscurely  narrated  that,  while  the  results  are  intelli- 
gible, it  is  almost  impossible  to  understand 
the  details.     It  will  be  sufficient,  therefore,      the  subjec- 
to    recount    briefly   the   steps  which   were      Ewopfovin! 
taken  to  insure  the  subjection  of  Baktria  and      *^^- 
Sogdiana  and  the  defeat  of  Spitamenes.    It  became  clear 
to  Alexander  during  the  winter  of  329-8  that  his  work  in 
these  provinces  was  as  yet  only  half  done.      There  were 
many  hill  tribes  still  restless  under  the  interference  with 
their  liberty.       There   were   many  independent  chiefs 
whose  submission  was  secure  only  so  long  as  Macedo- 
nian  troops  were   in   the  neighbourhood.     There  were 
several  important  leaders  at  large,  who  might  possibly 
become  centres  of  formidable  insurrection.      And  there 
was  more  than  one  almost  impregnable  hill-fortress  still 
unreduced,  where  an  insurgent  force  might  find  shelter. 
He  therefore  organized  a  series  of  flying  columns,  to  act 
in  several  directions  at  once  under  himself  and  his  lieu- 
tenants in  Sogdiana,  with  orders  to  rendezvous  at  Mara- 


End  of 
Spitamenfis. 


^  70   .  The  Maceifonian  E?iipire.  ch.  xiv. 

kanda.      Krateros   was  left   with   a  sufficient   force  to 
answer  for  order  in  Baktria.      From  the  mountains  of 
Nura  m  the  far  west,  lying  to  the  north  of  Baga.^  (Bok- 
-hara),  to  Marginia  in  the  north-east  (Marginan  in  P^rg- 
han),   and    Paroetakene   in    the    south-east,   the   whote 
country  seems  to  have  been  swept  by  these  flying  col- 
umns during  the  year  328.  and  the  early  part  of  327. 
IVIeanwhile  Spitamenes  in  their  rear,  ever  on  the  watch 
fell  upon    isolated  detachments,  and   on  one  occasion 
boldly  ravaged  up  to  the  very  walls  of  Baktra.      But  it 
was  an  unequal  struggle  ;  and  at  last,  after 
a  defeat  at  Baga^  more  crushing  than  usual, 
the  Scythian   allies,   weary  of  the  struggle 
and  thinking  the  cause  desperate,   first  plundered  "the 
baggage  and  then  cut  off  the  head  of  Spitamenes   and 
sent  It  to  Alexander.    Thus  fell  the  most  obstinate,  active, 
and.  courageous  enemy  that  the  Macedonian  troops  had 
met  m  Asia,  and  his  death  unquestionably  relieved  Alex- 
ander of  a  permanent  source  of  anxiety. 

Of  all  the  military  operalions  the  king,  as  usual  re- 
served the  most  difficult  for  himself.    This  was  an  attack 
Capture  of         ^"  ^'"'^  hill-forts  of  a  similar  character,  stand- 
thc^sogciian       ing  on  high,  insulatcd  rocks,  precipitous  on 
all  sides,  and  surrounded  by  deep  ravines  — 
so  lofty  and  apparently  inaccessible  that  the  taunting 
question  of  one  of  the  chiefs  seemed  not  amiss,  whether 
the  Macedonians  had  wings  to  fly  with  !     The  difficulty 
moreover,    of   attacking    the    first   of   these   forts-the 
famous  Sogdian  Rock-was  increased  to  all  appearances 
by  the  deep  snow  that  lay  on  the  ground  at  the  time- 
though  in  the  event  it  was  the  means  whereby  the  place 
was  taken.    A  reward  of  twelve  talents  was  offered  to  the 
first  man  who  mounted  the  rock,  and  less  in  proportion 
to  those  who  followed.     Three  hundred  volunteers  were 


CH.  XIV. 


Capture  of  Hill-Foi'ts. 


171 


soon  forthcoming.  Armed  with  ropes  and  iron  tent-pegs, 
they  made  for  the  steepest  and  least  protected  side  of  the 
rock  in  the  dead  of  night ;  and,  fixing  the  pegs  in  the 
crevices  of  the  rock  where  possible,  but  chiefly  in  the 
snow,  which  was  frozen  so  hard  as  to  bear  the  weicrht. 
slowly  and  with  difficulty  they  made  the  dangerous 
ascent.  Thirty  of  the  number  slipped  and  perished  in 
the  attempt,  and  their  bodies  were  buried  so  deeply  in 
the  snowdrifts  at  the  bottom  that  they  were  never  re- 
covered even  for  burial.  Nevertheless  the  deed  was 
done ;  for  the  chieftain  Oxyartes,  being  summoned  to 
surrender, "  as  the  Macedonians  (he  might  see)  had  found 
their  wings."  was  so  confounded  by  the  sight  of  the  ad- 
venturous soldiers  in  actual  occupation  of  the  highest 
point  of  the  rock,  that  he  at  once  gave  up  the  fortress 
and   all   the  souls  within  it.      Among  the 

Marriage  of 

prisoners  was  his  own  daughter,  Roxana,  Alexander 
declared  by  Alexander's  officers  to  have 
been  the  most  beautiful  woman  they  had  seen  in  Asia 
next  to  the  wife  of  Darius.  Amid  the  violent  acts  which 
at  this  time  sullied  the  conqueror's  fair  fame  it  is  just  to 
remember  that,  as  in  the  case  of  Sisygambis,  so  now  he 
treated  his  prisoner  with  honour  and  generosity  ;  and  we 
can  hardly  share  in  Arrian's  hesitation  whether  to  praise 
or  blame  his  hero  for  making  Roxana  his  wife.  After 
this  exploit,  the  capture  of  the  second  fort  in  the  follow- 
ing year  was  comparatively  easy ;  and  indeed,  when  the 
ravine  at  the  foot  of  the  rock  had  been  partly      ^    , 

.  Capture  of 

filled,  and  the  arrows  of  the  besiegers  could      the  Rock  of 
reach  the  battlements,  the  terror  of  Alexan- 
der's name  and  energy  seems  to  have  done  the  rest,  and 
the  fort  was  surrendered  with  vast  stores  of  provisions. 

Open  resistance  was  now  at  an  end ;  Spitamenes  was 
dead,  and  the  Macedonian  fortress-colonies  were  numer- 


Reasons  for 
a  march  into 
India. 


'72  The  Macedonian  Empire.  ch.  xiv. 

ous  and  strong  enough  to  hold  the  two  pro- 
vinces in  subjection.     Alexander  was,  there- 
fore, in  a  position  to  turn  his  face  towards 
the  one  province  of  the  Persian  empire  which  he  had  not 
yet  entirely  reduced,  though  he  was  master  of  all  the 
western  part  of  what  the  Persians  called  India.      His 
ambition  and  curiosity  were  both  aroused.     Stories  of  the 
wonders  and  riches  of  India  had  been  rife  in  Greece  for 
generations.      It  was   known   that   in   the  days  of  the 
first  Darius  its  tribute,  even  if  not  levied  beyond  the 
Indus,  had  amounted  to  a  third  of  the  whole  sum  received 
Among  the  adherents  of  Bessos,  moreover,  had  been  an 
Indian  chief,  who  had  fallen  into  Alexander's  hands- 
and,  while  the  king's  ardent  imagination  was  all  on  fire 
with  this  man's  stories,  making  clear  and  precise  what 
before  was  vague,  a  timely  embassy  arrived  from  another 
chieftain,  who  ruled  between  the  Indus  and  Hydaspos 
and  whose  capital  was  Taxila,  asking  Alexander's  help 
against  a  powerful  and  troublesome  neighbour,  named 
Poros.      Thus  the  die  was  cast,  and  Alexander  resolved 
to  march  at  once  into  India. 

Before,  however,  we  follow  his  fortunes  on  the  Indus 
It  is  necessary  to  recount  briefly  two  miserable  events' 
which  a  historian  would  gladly  omit,  but  cannot,  because 
they  are  clearly  true,  and  because  they  illustrate  the 
change  for  the  worse  in  the  character  and  position  of  the 
king. 

It  was  in  the  summer  of  328.  when  the  flying  columns 
already  mentioned  had  reunited  at  Marakanda.  that  a 
Episode  of  ^^^^'^^  banquet  was  held  on  a  day  sacred  to 
KHtos  Dionysos.    Deep  drinking  (says  Arrian)  was 

becoming  the  fashion  in  camp  ;  and  with 
the  deep  drinking  began  loud  talking  about  the  heroes 
of  the  day,  and  their  relationship  to  Zeus,  and  some  of 


1 

! 


CH.  XIV. 


Murder  of  Kleitos, 


173 


Alexander's  more  open  flatterers  began  disparaging  the 
deeds  even  of  Herakles,  in  comparison  with  those  of  the 
king.  There  was  one  man  present  to  whom  these  eulo- 
gies were  specially  distasteful.  This  man  was  Kleitos. 
commander  of  one  division  of  the  Companion  cavalry, 
who  had  saved  the  king's  hfe  at  the  Granikos,  and  whose 
sister  had  been  the  king's  nurse.  But,  however  intimate 
his  relations  were  with  Alexander,  he  had  long  been 
secretly  offended,  like  some  others  of  the  officers,  by  his 
adoption  of  Persian  habits,  and  by  the  adulation  which 
was  expected  and  given.  Heated  now  by  wine,  he  pro- 
tested aloud  against  this  disparagement  of  old-world 
heroes.  The  acts  of  Alexander,  he  cried,  were  not  com- 
parable to  those  of  Herakles,  nay,  not  even  to  those  of 
Philip.  Philip's  greatness  was  due  to  himself  alone ; 
Alexander's  in  part  to  others,  to  Philip's  officers,  to 
Parmenion.  Then  raising  his  right  hand  on  high,  "This 
hand."  he  exclaimed.  "Alexander,  at  the  Granikos  saved 
thy  life."  The  king  started  from  his  couch,  maddened 
by  a  conflict  of  feelings.  In  vain  did  his  generals  crowd 
around  and  try  to  restrain  him.  He  called  aloud  for  the 
guard.  He  protested  that  he  was  a  second  Darius  in  the 
hands  of  a  second  Bessos,  and  king  only  in  name.  At 
last,  exerting  his  vast  personal  strength,  he  broke  from 
the  group  of  officers,  who  were  doubtless  afraid  to  use 
much  physical  force,  and  snatching  a  pike  from  one  of 
the  soldiers  slew  Kleitos,  who.  after  being  once  dragged 
from  the  room,  had  been  rash  enough  to  return.  It  was 
a  terrible  deed,  followed  by  a  terrible  remorse.  Alexan- 
der hurried  from  the  hall  to  his  chamber,  and  for  three 
days  neither  ate  nor  drank,  calling  aloud  with  deep 
groans  for  Kleitos  and  for  Kleitos'  sister,  and  reproach- 
ing himself  as  the  murderer  of  his  friends.  It  was  indeed 
too  true.      Parmenion  was  dead,  and  now  Kleitos  was 


174 


The  Macedonian  Empire.  CH.  xiv. 


CH.  XIV. 


Death  of  Kallisihejies. 


175 


dead,  and  each  man  might  wonder  whose  turn  would  be 
next.  But  the  past  could  not  be  recalled  ;  and  soldiers 
and  officers,  seers  and  philosophers,  one  and  all,  feeling 
how  intimately  their  own  safety  at  the  ends  of  the  world 
was  bound  up  in  the  safety  of  the  king,  rebuked,  im- 
plored, and  argued,  until  he  was  induced  once  more  to 
eat,  and  return  to  that  life  of  energy  which  would  be  the 
best  solace  for  his  grief. 

The  second  episode  yet  to  be  related  was  even  more 
significant  of  the  unsound  state  of  things  in  the  royal 
Episode  of  camp.  In  the  spring  of  327  Alexander  ccle- 
KaliisthentS       bratcd  his  marriage  with  Roxana  at  Baktra 

and  the  page       ,-,, 

Hcrmoiaos  1  here  was  as  usual  a  banquet,  and  as  usual 
^^'^^-  the  conversation  turned  for  the  most  part  on 

the  greatness  of  Alexander.  The  king's  love  of  adula- 
tion had  not  waned  any  more  than  the  servility  of  his 
flatterers;  and  the  tragic  scene  at  I^Iarakanda  of  the 
previous  summer  would  be  in  every  man's  memory. 
When,  therefore,  some  of  those  present  not  only  main- 
tained the  right  of  Alexander  to  divine  honours  during 
his  lifetime  for  his  superhuman  deeds,  but  proceeded  to 
set  the  example  of  prostration  before  the  demigod  the 
veteran  officers  sat  still,  moody  and  dissentient ;  but  no 
one  spoke.  To  speak  might  be  to  provoke  the  fate  of 
Kleitos.  To  Kallisthenes,  of  Olynthos,  the  nephew  of 
Aristotle,  belongs  the  honour  of  possessing  moral 
courage  enough  to  protest  against  the  unworthy  act. 
The  gods  would  be  as  little  pleased,  he  said,  to  see  their 
proper  honours  assigned  to  a  mortal,  as  would  Alexander 
himself  be  to  see  a  private  man  claiming  the  honours 
peculiar  to  a  king.  Let  the  king  bethink  him  whether, 
on  his  return  to  Greece,  he  could  enforce  prostration  from 
all  Greeks,  and,  if  not,  what  distinctions  he  would  draw. 
Rather  let  him  be  content  with  whatever  utmost  honours 


mortal  man  might  righdy  have.  These  words  were  so 
clearly  in  harmony  with  the  feelings  of  the  niajority,  that, 
like  Caesar  when  offered  the  crown  by  Antony,  Alex- 
ander abstained  from  pressing  the  point,  but  was, 
nevertheless,  deeply  offended  with  Ivallisthenes — a  feel- 
ing which  was  not  lessened  when  the  philosopher  pledged 
the  king  in  a  goblet  of  wine  like  the  rest,  and  offered 
him  the  usual  kiss,  but  without  prostration.  Alexander 
declined  the  kiss,  and  Ivallisthenes  turned  on  his  heel, 
with  the  remark  that  he  was  going  away  the  poorer  by  a 
kiss  !  But  the  matter  did  not  end  here.  Kallisthencs 
was  intimate  with  Hcrmoiaos,  one  of  the  royal  pages ; 
and  Hermolaos  was  smarting  under  a  recent  injury.  He 
had  been  hunting  with  the  king,  who  was  suddenly 
charged  by  a  wild  boar ;  and  the  page,  fearing  for  the 
king's  safety,  launched  his  javelin  and  killed  it.  For 
this  offence  the  page  was  whipped,  and  deprived  of  his 
horse.  But  the  injustice  rankled  in  his  mind  ;  and,  with 
a  boy's  impetuosity,  he  arranged  a  plot  with  some  of 
his  fellow-pages  to  murder  the  king  in  his  chamber, 
when  they  were  on  guard.  The  plot  was  frustrated  by 
accident,  and  presently  divulged  ;  and  the  conspirators 
were  arrested  and  tortured,  but  no  confession  was  elicited 
implicating  others.  They  were  therefore  arraigned  as 
conspirators  before  the  assembled  army,  and  stoned  to 
death  by  the  soldiers.  If  this  were  all,  it  would  perhaps 
prove  no  more  than  that  Alexander's  arrogance  was 
undermining  his  popularity ;  but  it  is  only  too  clear  that 
the  friendship  existing  between  Kallisthenes  and  Hcr- 
moiaos was  made  an  excuse  for  the  gratification  of  the 
king's-  jealous  dislike  of  the  philosopher,  who  was  ar- 
rested, put  to  the  torture,  and  hanged. 


176 


The  Macedonian  Empire,  CH.    xv. 


en,  XV. 


Hill-Fort  of  Aornos, 


177 


CHAPTER  XV. 

FROM    THE   OXUS   TO   THE    HVPHASIS. 

It  was  the  summer  of  327  when  Alexander  set  out  for 
India.     He  left  Amyntas  in  chief  command  in  Baktria, 

March  from       "^'^^  ^  ^^''^^  ^^  ^^'Ooo  infantry,  and  3,500 
liaktriato         cavalry.     His  own  army  numbered  120,000 

iho  Kophen.        r      i.  j  i  «- 

toot,  and  15,000  cavalry,  of  whom  probably 
at  least  half  were  Asiatics,  and  mainly  recruited  from 
Baktria  and  Sogdiana,  serving  the  double   purpose  of 
reinforcements  and  hostages.     The  range  of  Paropanisos 
was  crossed  by  another  and  a  shorter   pass   than   the 
Koushan  in  ten  days.     At  Alexandria  he  appointed  a 
new  governor,  and  added  some  fresh  colonists  from  the 
less  robust  of  his  soldiers ;  and  then  marched  onwards 
to  Nikaia,  either  a  town  lying  between  Alexandria  and 
Ortospana  (Kabul)  or  a  new  name  given  on  this  occasion 
to  Ortospana  itself.     Then  he  turned  his  face  eastwards, 
to  pass  the  grim   defiles  where  a  British  army  was  de- 
stroyed in  1842.     But  he  met  with  no  opposition  which 
the  historians  think   worthy  of  notice;   and  presently, 
dividing  his  forces,  he  sent  Hephaiston  and  Perdikkas 
with  a  strong  division  down  the  valley  of  the  Kophen,  to 
its  junction  with  the  Indus  at  Attok  ('the  forbidden,'  to 
the  west  of  which   no  Hindoo  may  pass  without  losing 
caste),  with  orders  to  prepare  materials  for  a  bridge; 
while  he  himself  struck  north-east  into  the  mountains, 
partly  to  reduce  the  mountain  tribes,  and  partly  because 
supplies  were  reported  as  more  abundant  in  that  district. 
It  was  several  months  before  the  king  rejoined  Hephais- 
tion's  corps,  and  a  detailed  record  of  those  months  would 
be  but  a  record  of  marches,  sieges,  and  skirmishes  without 


a  single  reverse,  and  of  endless  booty  and  prisoners. 
But  of  all  his  successes  in  the  campaign,  probably  none 
was  more  gratifying  to  the  king  himself  than 
the  reduction  of  the  hill-fort  of  Aornos,  so  far  The  hill-fort 
stronger  than  the  fort  of  the  same  name  in 
Baktria  that  a  legend  told  how  it  had  baffled  even  the 
mighty  Herakles  himself.  As  described  by  Arrian 
(whose  authority  is  irreproachable  since  it  rests  on  the 
witness  of  Ptolemy,  a  prominent  actor  in  the  storming  of 
the  place),  it  was  a  huge  rock  or  mountain  plateau,  ri- 
sing eleven  stades  above  the  plain,  and  about  200  stades 
in  circumference,  with  plenty  of  good  spring  water, 
abundance  of  wood,  and  good  soil  enough  to  employ 
1,000  men.  Within  a  short  distance  lay  a  town  called 
Embolima.  Now  the  identification  of  spots  mentioned 
in  Alexander's  campaigns  in  India  is  not  easy  ;  but  the 
identity  of  Aornos  with  a  table  mountain,  called  Maha- 
bunn,  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Indus,  about  sixty  miles 
above  its  confluence  with  the  river  Kophen,  is  almost 
certain.  The  description  of  Aornos  answers  almost  ex- 
actly to  that  of  Mahabunn,  allowing  for  the  exaggeration 
of  height  and  size  natural  in  a  man  who  could  not  speak 
from  actual  measurement.  Mahabunn  is  4,125  feet 
above  the  plain,  and  is  fourteen  miles  in  circumference. 
It  is  spoken  of  as  a  mountain  plateau,  scarped  on  the 
cast  by  tremendous  precipices,  from  which  one  long 
spur  descends  upon  the  Indus,  and  as  the  natural  refuge 
of  the  neighbouring  tribes  from  the  arms  of  a  conqueror. 
•Nor  can  it  be  mere  chance  that  the  name  Embolima 
seems  to  survive  in  the  names  of  two  villages,  Um  and 
Balimah,  lying  respectively  in  the  river  valley,  and  in 
the  mountain  immediately  above  it. 

Leaving  Krateros  at  Embolima,  to  collect  corn  and 
other  necessaries  for  a  long  blockade  in  case  the  first 

N 


178 


Tlie  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  XV. 


assault  were  to  fail,  Alexander  himself  advanced  towards 
the  mountain  to  reconnoitre.  At  first  sicrht,  even  he 
might  well  despair  of  success.    There  was  only  one  road 

leading  to  the  top  of  the  plateau,  made  for 
Capture  of         ^j-jg  purpose,  and   difficult   of  access:  and 

the  steepness  of  the  cliff  walls  may  be  in- 
ferred from  the  fact,  that  in  the  night  attack,  in  which 
the  defenders  were  chased  from  their  stronghold,  great 
numbers  perished  by  falling  from  the  rocks.  But  the 
manoeuvre  which  succeeded  against  the  Baktrian  Aor- 
nos was  successful  here  also.  Some  natives  of  the  dis- 
trict came  into  camp,  and  offered  to  act  as  guides  to  a 
commanding  spot  on  the  weakest  side  of  the  plateau, 
from  whence  it  might  be  possible  to  take  it.  It  is  diffi- 
cult to  gather  an  exact  idea  from  Arrian's  somewhat 
confused  account;  but  it  would  seem  that  there  was  a 
hill  separated  from  the  rock  itself  by  a  long,  though 
shallow,  depression,  not  occupied  by  the  natives,  and 
only  to  be  reached  by  a  rough  and  difficult  track.  Its 
occupation  would  at  once  give  the  assailants  the  advan- 
tage of  attacking  from  above,  and  not  from  below. 
The  operation  was  accomplished  with  success.  Ptole- 
my, led  by  the  native  guides,  and  taking  a  considerable 
body  of  light  troops,  occupied  the  hill  unperceived  under 
cover  of  darkness,  and  having  hastily  intrenched  him- 
self, set  light  to  a  bonfire  as  a  signal  of  success  to  his 
friends  below.  It  was  well  that  he  had  succeeded;  for 
Alexander,  endeavoring  the  next  day  to  fight  his  way 
to  join  him,  found  the  difficulties  of  the  ground  too  much 
for  him,  and  was  rudely  repulsed.  Then  the  natives, 
elated  by  success,  made  a  dashing  attempt  to  carry 
Ptolemy's  intrenchments;  but  the  conditions  of  success 
were  here  reversed,  and  after  a  fierce  struggle,  they 
were  driven  back  at  nightfall,  and  obliged  to  retire.     In 


CH.  XV. 


Capture  of  Aornos, 


179 


the  night  Alexander  sent  off  an  Indian  with  a  dispatch 
to  Ptolemy,  ordering  him  to  watch  for  his  own  advance, 
and  when  he  himself  attacked,  to  do  the  same,  that  they 
might  place  the  garrison  between  two  fires.  There  was 
seldom  much  delay  in  the  Macedonian  camp  when  there 
was  work  to  be  done,  and  by  break  of  day  the  army  was 
in  motion.  Presently  Ptolemy's  troops  also  is'sued  from 
their  intrenchments.  A  desperate  battle  followed,  last- 
ing from  dawn  to  midday,  in  which  at  last  Alexander 
was  victorious,  and,  having  effected  a  junction  with  Pto- 
lemy, thus  became  master  of  a  base  of  operations  from 
which  to  attack  the  plateau  with  some  hope  of  success. 
As  many  times  before,  so  now  he  began  carrying  a 
mound  across  the  depression  already  mentioned.  Every 
man  was  set  to  work  ;  and  the  king  himself  stood  watch- 
ing, ready  to  praise  or  blame  as  need  might  be.  The 
mound  advanced  a  furlong  a  day ;  and  by  the  fourth 
day  had  so  nearly  reached  the  plateau,  that  a  handful  of 
Macedonian  soldiers  were  able  to  rush  across  the  inter- 
vening space  and  to  seize  a  small  peak,  which  abutted 
on  the  plateau,  and  where  they  were  partially  protected 
by  the  arrows  and  missiles  of  their  comrades  on  the 
mound.  Every  nerve  was  now  strained  to  complete  the 
communication  between  the  peak  and  the  mound,  and 
it  became  a  question  of  hours  how  soon  the  attack  might 
be  delivered.  But  by  this  time  the  garrison  was  thor- 
oughly cowed,  having  never  before  seen  such  resolute 
energy  in  an  assailant ;  and  they  sent  an  embassy  to 
Alexander,  offering  to  surrender  on  terms.  It  seems 
that  their  real  object  was  to  gain  time,  and  thus  to  steal 
away  on  the  following  night,  and  to  separate  to  their 
several  homes.  But  Alexander  was  as  far-seeing  as 
they.  Aware  of  their  design,  he  pretended  to  amuse 
them  with  overtures  for  their  surrender,  but  made  ready 


I  So 


TJie  Macedonian  Etnpire, 


CH.  XV. 


meanwhile  for  attack  ;  and  when  it  was  dark,  after  allow- 
ing time  for  them  to  withdraw  their  sentinels  and  to  be- 
gin the  stealthy  evacuation,  he  put  himself  at  the  head 
of  700  heavy-armed  troops  and  rushed  up  into  the  pla- 
teau, being  the  first  to  set  foot  in  it  himself.  The  rest  of 
the  army  soon  followed,  and  overtaking  the  panic- 
stricken  fugitives  began  cutting  them  down  in  all  direc- 
tions. Many  were  slain  on  the  spot,  or  pursued  into  the 
plain  and  slain  there.  Many  were  killed  by  falling  from 
the  cliffs.  When  day  broke  Alexander  was  master  of 
this  important  fortress,  and  of  the  adjacent  country 
which  it  commanded,  and  in  a  position  to  rejoin  Hepha- 
istion  and  Perdikkas  when  he  pleased,  at  the  bridge 
over  the  Indus  which  they  had  built  near  Attok. 

In  the  course  of  the  campaign  to  the  north  of  the 
Kophen  the  Macedonians  are  said,  by  Arrian,  to  have 
passed  a  city  called  Nysa,  which  claimed 
rceans  and  Dionysos  as  its  foundcr.  It  is  added  by 
ofDioify"  ^  Curtius,  that  in  this  country  of  the  Gyrceans 
^^  they  were  struck  by  various  sights  and  names 

among  the  natives  and  in  the  products  of  the  district, 
which  reminded  them  of  their  own  legends  of  the  same 
god  ;  and  that  near  to  Nysa  was  Mount  Meros,  where 
grape  vines  were  to  be  seen  as  well  as  the  ivy  and  laurel 
which  he  had  planted.  It  is  easy  to  believe  both  that 
Alexander  himself  was  nothing  loth  to  be  treading,  as  it 
might  seem,  in  the  very  steps  of  Dionysos,  and  that  the 
natives  were  acute  enough,  then  as  often  since,  to  humour 
the  whims  of  an  invincible  conqueror.  On  the  other 
hand,  we  are  in  a  position  to  go  further  than  this,  and 
even  to  infer  how  the  confusion  arose.  The  most  correct 
form  of  the  ancient  name  of  the  Plindukush  appears  to 
be  Paropa-nisus  (or  nisas),  so  that  the  name  Nysa  or 
something  similar  may  have  been  heard  and  misunder- 


CH.  XV. 


Alexander  at  the  Indus. 


181 


The  Indus. 


stood  by  Macedonian  ears.  Moreover,  if,  as  is  probable, 
the  country  of  the  Gyrceans  answered  to  the  modern 
Kafiristan,  whose  inhabitants,  like  those  of  Badakshan, 
have  still  floating  traditions  about  Alexander,  it  is  worthy 
of  note  that  grapes,  both  wild  and  cultivated,  grow  in 
profusion  in  the  valleys,  and  that  the  Kafirs  (unbeliev- 
ers), as  the  Mohammedans  of  India  call  the  people,  are 
great  wine-drinkers,  both  men  and  women,  and  are  given 
to  dancing  with  much  gesticulation,  and  to  the  accom- 
paniment of  wild  and  rapid  music.  Certainly  to  any 
Greek  such  customs  would  have  seemed  to  be  of  a  thor- 
oughly Dionysiac  character. 

Alexander  crossed  the  Indus  a  little  above  Attok  about 
March,  326.  At  this  point,  950  miles  from  the  mouth 
and  1 ,000  feet  above  the  sea,  the  river  is  at 
all  times  broad,  deep,  and  rapid,  averaging 
a  speed  of  six  miles  an  hour,  a  depth  of  60  feet,  and  a 
breadth  of  800  feet;  in  the  floods  of  August  it  is  some- 
times 1 5  miles  broad,  when  a  large  part  of  the  *  doab  ' 
(land  of  two  rivers),  or  country  between  the  Indus  and 
Hydaspcs,  (Jhelum),  is  under  water.  But  the  Indus  like 
the  Oxus  and  Jaxartos,  owing  partly  to  evaporation  and 
partly  to  irrigation,  diminishes  rather  than  increases  as 
it  approaches  the  sea;  while  the  Punjab  resembles 
Baktria  in  so  far  as  the  desert  is  never  far  off,  and  fertility 
depends  on  neighbourhood  to  a  river. 

On  the  eastern  bank  Alexander  offered  solemn  sacri- 
fice, and  then  advanced  to  Taxila  (Takshachila  "  the 
hewn  rock"),  the  capital  of  the  chief  who  had  appealed 
for  his  aid  against  Poros  (Purusha,  "hero").  If  it  be 
true  that  the  rainy  season  set  in  before  he  left  the  city, 
he  must  have  stayed  there  some  two  or  three  months, 
improbable  as  it  may  seem  ;  for  the  south-west  monsoon 
seldom  begins  in  the  Punjab  before  the  end  of  June. 


l82 


TJie  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  XV. 


From  Taxila  two  roads  diverge,  one  running  nearly- 
due  south,  past  Jelalpoor  and  crossing  the  Sutlej  just 
_.  ,        below  its  junction  with  the  Beas  ;  the  other 

Passagre  of  ,  -^ 

theHyJas-        running  more  to  the  eastward,  and  passing 
^^^'  through  a  more  fertile  and  populous  district. 

Alexander,  however,  had  no  choice  as  to  which  of  the 
two  he  should  follow,  as  Poros  had  taken  up  his  position 
just  opposite  Jelalpoor,  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Mydas- 
f  ei,  and  posted  scouts  up  and  down  the  river  to  v/atch 
for  his  enemy's  coming.  Having  sent  Koinos  back  to 
the  Indus  with  orders  to  have  the  vessels  which  had 
formed  the  bridge  sawn  in  pieces,  and  to  bring  them  c^vl 
wagons  to  the  Hydasp<''s  ready  for  use,  the  king  himself 
marched  onwards  to  that  river,  then  fully  a  mile  broad, 
where  he  came  in  sight  of  his  enemy,  who  had  30,000 
infantry  and  200  elephants,  with  numerous  chariots  and 
cavalry  ready  to  dispute  the  passage.  To  force  it  in  the 
face  of  such  an  army  was  clearly  impossible.  It  was 
necessary  to  wait,  to  distract  attention,  to  throw  the 
enemy  off  his  guard,  to  spread  false  intelligence  ;  and  then 
it  might  be  possible  to  deliver  a  sudden  and  rapid  blow. 
Accordingly  he  gave  out  that  he  was  aware  of  the  extra- 
ordinary difficulty  of  crossing  so  broad  and  rapid  a  river 
in  the  teeth  of  such  an  army,  and  had  made  up  his  mind 
to  defer  the  attempt  until  the  monsoon  was  over  and  the 
water  lower.  At  the  same  time  he  kept  Poros  always  on 
the  alert,  by  constantly  moving  his  boats  and  showing 
deceptive  intentions  of  crossing.  At  other  times  he 
would  send  off  large  divisions  of  troops  up  or  down  the 
river,  as  though  searching  for  a  ford,  all  of  which  move- 
ments were  plainly  visible  from  the  other  side.  Then  for 
many  nights  in  succession  he  posted  on  the  banks  squad- 
rons of  cavalry  at  intervals  who  shouted  to  one  another, 
and  ever  and  anon  raised  the  war-cry,  as  though  pre- 


CII.   XV. 


Passage  of  the  Ilydaspes. 


183 


paring  to  try  the  passage;  and  at  every  such  alarm  of 
course  Poros  made  instant  preparations  for  battle.  At 
last,  after  many  false  alarms,  and  since  they  always 
ended  in  noise  and  shouting,  Poros  was  thrown  com- 
pletely off  his  guard,  and  even  ceased  to  take  notice  of 
such  purposeless  agitation.  Then,  and  not  till  then, 
Alexander  resolved  that  the  time  was  come  for  action. 
About  eighteen  miles  up  the  stream  on  the  right  bank 
there  was  a  remarkable  cliff,  where  the  river  takes  a 
wide  bend,  turning  from  a  south-easterly  to  a  south- 
westerly course.  Opposite  the  cliff  in  mid  river  was  an 
island,  which,  as  well  as  the  bank,  was  densely  covered 
with  tamarisks.  This  was  the  point  decided  upon  for 
the  passage.  To  keep  up  the  illusion  in  the  mind  of  his 
enemy,  the  king  posted  sentinels  along  the  whole  dis- 
tance from  the  camp  to  the  cliff,  each  man  within  sin-ht 
and  earshot  of  his  neighbour,  who  during  several  nights 
kept  up  the  shouting  and  noise  already  described,  and 
lighted  fires  at  intervals.  Poros  was  again  completely 
deceived  and  took  no  notice,  merely  lining  his  side  of  the 
river  with  scouts  to  give  notice  of  any  unusual  movement. 
At  last  a  night  was  fixed  upon  for  the  attempt;  and 
Alexander  set  out  in  the  afternoon  with  two  divisions  of 
the  phalanx  and  the  flower  of  the  cavalry  and  lin^ht 
troops,  striking  somewhat  inland  (perhaps  by  the  Kan- 
dar  "  nullah,"  or  rivulet),  so  as  to  be  out  of  sight.  Kra- 
teros  was  left  in  camp  with  the  rest  of  the  phalanx  and 
some  cavalry ;  and  his  orders  were  to  remain  quiet  in 
case  Poros  detached  only  a  part  of  his  force  against  the 
king,  but  if  he  saw  that  the  whole  of  the  elephants  were 
withdrawn,  which  were  the  only  real  difficulty  where 
horses  were  concerned,  he  was  to  cross  without  loss  of 
time.  iVIidway  between  the  island  and  the  camp  were 
posted  the   mercenary  foot  and  horse,    with   orders  to 


i84 


The  Macedonia?!  Empire, 


CH.  XV. 


CH.  XV. 


Battle  of  Hydaspes, 


185 


or 


make  the  passage  whenever  they  saw  that'  fighting  had 
begun.     Pontoons  of  skins  had  already  been'' prepared, 
and  the  boats  brought  from  the  Indus  had  been  put  to- 
gether.    It  was  a  night  made  for  the  occasion,  dark  and 
windy,  with  thunder  and  heavy  rain  ;  so  that  the  words 
of  command  and  the  noise  inseparable  from  the  move- 
ment of  large  bodies  of  armed  men  were  inaudible  at  a 
distance.     Just  before  dawn  the  wind  and  rain  ceased, 
and  the  passage  began.     The  whole  force  was  thrown 
across  to  the  island,  as  silently  and  rapidly  as  possible, 
in  the  boats  and  pontoons.     It  would  seem,  however' 
from  Arrian,  that  they  had  all  mistaken  the  island  for  a 
projection  of  the  bank,  and  were  taken  aback  at  findin. 
that  a  rapid  though  narrow  channel  of  the  river  still  sep 
arated  them  from  the  mainland.     But  there  was  no  time 
to  be  lost  in  embarking  the  troops  a  second-  time.     The 
scouts  had  already  sighted  them,  and  galloped  off  to  raise 
the  alarm.     At  last  they  found  a  ford  :  but  so  heavy  had 
been  the  rainfall  that  it  could  hardly  be  called  practica- 
ble, for  the  water  was  above  the  men's  breasts  as  they 
waded  and  up  to  the  horses'  necks.     Nevertheless  all  got 
safely  across ;  and  Alexander  at  once  made  his  arrange- 
ments for  the  battle,  which  he  intended  to  bring  on  with- 
out delay.    Pushing  on  himself  at  the  head  of  the  caval- 
ry. 5,000  in  number,  in  case  the  enemy  should  be  panic- 
stricken  and  attempt  to  flee  without  fighting,  he  ordered 
the  archers  and  the  6,000  heavy  infantry  to  follow  him 
as  fast  as  they  could. 

But  Poros  was  a  different  man  from  Darius.     As  soon 

as  he  learnt  that   he   had  been  outwitted,  and  that  the 

Tac  [  Macedonians  were  actually  across  the  river, 

Porosr  °  ^^  sent  forward  one  of  his  sons  with  2,000 

cavalry  and  120  chariots,  while  he  himself 

^  prepared  to  follow  with  the  main  body.     These  cavalry 


were  presently  met  by  Alexander ;  but  recognizing  him, 
and  seeing  his  superior  numbers,  they  fLiltercdj  broke, 
and  fled,  hardly  waiting  for  his  charge.  All  the  chariots 
which  had  stuck  fast  in  the  mud  remained  in  his  hands, 
and  400  of  the  horsemen,  including  their  leader,  lay  dead 
upon  the  field.  Meanwhile  Poros  had  stationed  a  small 
force,  with  a  few  elephants,  on  the  river-bank  to  hold 
Krateros  in  check ;  and  having  chosen  his  ground  on 
sandy  soil,  where  there  was  firmer  footing  and  ample 
room,  was  engaged  in  drawing  up  his  troops  in  order  of 
battle.  The  200  elephants  were  the  mainstay  of  his  line, 
standing  forward,  says  Diodoros,  "  like  the  bastions  of  a 
wall,"  at  intervals  of  100  feet  from  one  another :  and  the 
heavy-armed  infantry  were  "  like  the  curtain,"  ranged  in 
line  immediately  behind  the  elephants.  No  horses,  he 
thought,  could  be  brought  to  face  such  a  line ;  no  troops 
could  be  so  rash  as  to  venture  within  the  spaces  between 
the  elephants.  On  either  flank  were  massed  the  cavalry  ; 
but  his  main  reliance  was  clearly  placed  in  the  centre 
of  the  line,  "  that  seemed  like  a  city  to  look 
at.''     As  usual  Alexander's  tactics  were  suit-      ^"'^  °^, 

.  Alexander. 

ed  to  his  enemy.  As  at  Issos  and  Gauga- 
mela,  so  here,  he  resolved  that  the  cavalry  of  the  right 
wing  should  bear  the  brunt  of  the  attack,  and  that  he 
himself  would  lead  it ;  while  the  phalanx  in  the  centre 
was  to  hold  back  for  awhile,  in  readiness  to  deliver  the 
decisive  blow.  Koinos  was  on  the  left  wing  with  about 
1,500  cavalry,  and  was  ordered  to  watch  the  cavalry  of 
the  enemy's  wing  opposite,  and  if  they  should  offer  to 
ride  across  to  help  their  comrades  on  the  left,  to  follow 
and  charge  them  in  the  rear. 

The  Indian  cavalry  on  their  left  wing  were  still  de- 
ploying from  column  into  line  when  the  Macedonian 
mounted  archers  rode  forward  to  the  attack,  supported 


1 86 


TJie  Macedonian  Empire.  CH.  xv. 


by  the  king  himself  with  the  Companion  cavalry.     The 
Indians  moved  forward  to  meet  the  attack  ; 
^^e  Hy/  ^"^    s^    ^"^^^    superior   were   Alexander's 

da^spes  numbers   seen   to   be,  that    the    horsemen 

from  every  part  of  the  field,  including  the 
right  wing,  were  at  once  ordered  up  to  reinforce  the 
threatened  left.     It  was  the  very  movement  which  Alex- 
ander had  foreseen  and  provided  for.     Scarcely  had  the 
cavalry  on  the  Indian  right  galloped  off  along  the  front 
to  join   their   overmatched  comrades  on  the  left  than 
Koinos  wheeled  round  and  followed  them,  and  one  wing 
of  each  army  was  thus  suddenly  withdrawn  to  the  other 
end   of  the    line.     The    Indian  cavalry,  however,  now 
massed  upon  the  left  had  a  difficult  manoeuvre  to  per- 
form, and  that  in  the  very  face  of  the  enemy;  for,  beino- 
well  in  advance  of  their  own  centre,  they  were  threat- 
ened on  two  points  at  once— by  Alexander  in  front,  and 
Koinos  in  the  rear,  and  had.  therefore,  to  face  both  rear 
and  front.     They  were  in  the  act  of  attempting  this  ma- 
noeuvre when  Alexander  gave  the  word  to  charge.     Un- 
steady and  hesitating,  they  wavered  for  a  moment,  then 
broke  and  rode  for  their  lives  towards  the  elephants  as 
to  the  shelter  of  a  friendly  rampart,  passing  between 
them  and  through  the  intervals  between  the  divisions  of 
the  infantry.     The    mahouts,  it  would  appear,  had  al- 
ready begun  to  urge  their  animals  on  to. the  charge  and 
were   supported   by  the    infiintry— a   movement  which 
might  have  been  dangerous  had  it  not  been  checked  by 
a  rapid  advance  of  the  phalanx.     It  was  a  fearful  strug- 
gle such  as  even  these  veterans  had  never  before  expe- 
rienced.    The  huge  animals  trampled  down  their  ranks 
by  sheer  weight,  or  seized  the  men  singly  with  their 
trunks,  and,   raising   them   aloft,   dashed  them    to   the 
ground  ;  while  the  soldiers  in  the  howdahs  plied  them 


CH.  XV. 


Capture  of  Foros. 


187 


with  arrows  and  javelins.  The  cavalry,  moreover,  had 
rallied,  and  presently  advanced  once  more  to  the  charge. 
But  they  were  no  match  for  Alexander's  troopers  either 
in  steadiness  or  bodily  strength,  and  were  speedily  re- 
pulsed and  driven  in  again  upon  the  centre.  By  this 
time,  too,  the  elephants,  a  force  scarcely  more  dangerous 
to  foes  than  friends,  were  becoming  unmanageable.  Some 
of  them  had  been  wounded,  and  many  of  the  mahouts 
slain  ;  and  being  hemmed  in  by  the  close  press  of  horse- 
men and  infantry, distracted  by  the  confusion,  and  mad- 
dened by  pain,  they  kept  up  an  incessant  trumpeting, 
and  began  to  turn  round,  treading  down  the  men  of  their 
own  side,  or  to  try  and  back  out  of  the  turmoil  "  like 
boats  backing  water."  Then  the  infantry  also  were 
thrown  into  confusion,  foot,  and  horse,  and  elephants 
being  hopelessly  intermingled ;  whereupon  the  king  or- 
dering the  phalanx  to  push  steadily  onwards  in  front, 
drew  a  cordon  of  cavalry,  as  it  were,  round  the  flank  and 
rear  of  the  struggling,  helpless  mass,  and  completed  the 
demoralization  and  ruin  by  repeated  charges.  The  loss 
was  prodigious,  including  all  the  chariots.  Two  of  the 
sons  of  Poros  were  slain,  and  a  great  number  of  the  su- 
perior officers.  If  a  portion  of  the  infantry  and  cavalry 
broke  through  and  escaped,  it  was  but  to  find  themselves 
hotly  pursued  by  a  fresh  and  unspent  enemy  in  the  per- 
son of  Krateros,  who  had  forced  the  passage  of  the  river 
during  the  battle  ;  so  that  3,000  of  the  horse  are  said  to 
have  been  slain,  and  12,000  of  the  infantry ;  while  9,000 
prisoners  were  taken,  and  80  elephants.  The  Mace- 
donian loss  was,  as  usual,  trifling ;  amounting  to  no  more 
than  280  cavalry  and  700  infantry — taking  the  highest 
estimate  of  the  Macedonian,  and  the  lowest  of  the  Indian 
losses  (July,  326). 

Poros  himself  fought  like  a  brave  man,  not,  as  Darius 


i88 


The  Macedonian  Empire.  CH.  xv. 


being  the  first  to  flee,  but  stoutly  resisting  to  the  last. 
But  when  he  saw  the  day  was  lost,  being 
pdloni.  himself  also  wounded  in  the  shoulder,  he 

turned  his  elephant  and  began   to   retire. 
Alexander  wa^  most  anxious  that  he  should  be  taken 
alive ;  but  Poros  sullenly  resisted  all  overtures  for  sur- 
render, even  attacking  the  officers  whom  the  king  sent 
after   him.     At   last,  weary   and   faint   with   thirst,   he 
yielded  to  the  appeals  of  a  personal  friend,  halted,  and 
dismounted  from  his  elephant.      The  king,  it  is  said, 
when  Poros  was  brought  into  his  presence,  was  struck 
with  admiration  of  his  manly  presence  and  undaunted 
bearing,  and,  because  he  approached  him  as  one  brave 
man  should  approach  another,  Alexander  asked  him  how 
he  wished  to  be  treated.  "  Like  a  king,"  was  the  answer. 
"That  boon,  O  Poros,"  replied  the  conqueror,  "  thou  shalt 
have  for  my  sake.     For  thy  own  sake  ask  what  thou 
wilt."     But   Poros  answered  that  everything  was  con- 
tained in  his  request  to  be  treated  like  a  king.     Alexan- 
der was  so  charmed  with  his  reply  that  he  restored  to 
him  his  kingdom,  and  added  to  it  largely,  and  thus  se- 
cured a  faithful  friend. 

The  army  was  now  allowed  to  rest  a  month  in  the 
capital  of  Poros  until  the  rams  had  somewhat  abated. 

Passage  of  the  ^"  ^^  mterval  Alexander  founded  two  cities 
Akesim^  and  — Nikaia  near  the  field  of  battle,  and  Bou- 
kephalia,  which  he  named  after  the  favourite 
horse  which  had  carried  him  so  gallantly  through  a 
thousand  dangers,  and  was  now  dead.  He  further  ordered 
timber  to  be  felled  in  the  forests  of  the  Upper  Hydasp6s, 
and  a  fleet  to  be  built  for  the  navigation  of  the  Indus. 
Then  he  crossed  successively  the  Akesines  and  the  Hy- 
draotes,  into  the  country  of  the  warlike  Kathasans  whom 
he  soon  reduced,  and  added  to  the  subjects  of  Poros. 


CH.  XV. 


Advance  to  the  Hyphasis. 


189 


The  Hyphasis  (Sutlej),  to  which  he  next  advanced, 
was  the  eastward  limit  of  his  conquering  march.   Beyond 
it,  he  was  told,  lay  a  desert  of  eleven  days' 
march  as  far  as  the  mighty  Ganges,  whose      ttf  Hypha- 
valley  was  the  empire  of  a  king  greater  than      ^'*- 
Poros.     To  Alexander's  enterprising  spirit  such  a  vista 
of  adventures  was  no  doubt  delightful.     Indeed,  if  we 
can  credit  the  speech  to  the  army  put  into  his  mouth  by 
Arrian,  he  had  some  strange  notion  that  "  the  great  sea 
which  encircles  the  earth,"  was  just  beyond  the  Ganges, 
and  that  thence  they  might  circumnavigate  Libya  to  the 
pillars  of  Herakles,  and  so  march  through  Libya  home- 
wards.    But  soldiers  and  officers  alike  were  downcast 
and  homesick,  and  at  first  only  answered  his  appeals 
with  an  eloquent  silence  ;  until,  being  urged 
by  him  to  speak,  they  expressed  their  feel-      Susfto'^'" 
ings  in  the  curious  speech  assigned  by  Ar-      ^'■°^^' 
rian  to  Koinos.     "Our  numbers  are  thinned,"  he  said; 
"  we  are  longing  to  see  our  wives  and  children  ;  let  us 
return,  and  afterwards,  if  thou  wilt,  lead  other  troops, 
fresher  and  younger  than  we  are,  to  the  Euxine,  or  to 
Carthage,  or  wherever  thou  wilt."    But  Alexander  was 
wroth,  and  dismissed  the  troops  to  their  quarters.     Next 
day  he  tried  a  further  appeal  to  their  loyalty  and  devo- 
tion.    Anyone  who  pleased,  he  said,  should  return  ;  he 
would  take  with  him  only  volunteers  ;  the  rest  might  go 
home  and  report  that  they  had  abandoned  their  king  in 
the  midst  of  his  enemies.     And  then  he  retired  to  his 
tent,  deeply  mortified.     For  three  days  no  one  was  ad- 
mitted to  his  presence.     But  gloom  and  silence  still  per- 
vaded the  camp,  and  the  revulsion  of  feeling  which  he 
hoped  for  never  came.     On  the  fourth  day  he  offered 
sacrifice  preparatory  to  crossing  the  river  ;  but  the  vic- 
tims were  unpropitious. 


m  ""'    -iJK 


190 


T/ie  Alacedonian  Empire,  CH.  xvi. 


CH.  XVI.  Preparation  for  the  Voyage, 


191 


Then  at  last,  overborne  by  all  these  adverse  signs,  he 
summoned  his  friends  and  some  of  the  Companions,  and 

bade  them  make  known  to  the  army  his 
Return  to  resolution  to  return.     The  universal  joy  was 

attested  by  shouts  and  tears  and  blessings 
on  their  king,  who  had  never  known  defeat  but  from 
them.  Twelve  huge  altars  were  raised  on  the  bank  as  a 
thank-offering  for  the  protection  of  the  gods,  and  as  a 
memorial  of  his  victories  ;  and  sacrifices  were  offered 
and  games  were  celebrated  before  he  set  his  face  finally 
westward.  Then  at  last  the  army  set  out  on  its  long 
march  for  home.  The  Hydraotcs  was  passed,  and  the 
Akesines;  and  at  length  they  reached  the  new  cities, 
Nikaia  and  Boukephalia,  where  the  fleet  was  being  built, 
and  the  preparations  made  for  the  voyage  down  the 
Indus.  But  one  man  at  least  was  destined  never  to  g-o 
further.  Koinos  died,  and  was  honoured  with  a  magr- 
nificent  funeral;  although  Alexander,  having  not  for- 
gotten nor,  perhaps,  forgiven  his  expostulations  at  the 
Hyphasis,  could  not  forbear  the  cynical  remark,  that 
Koinos  had  made  his  long  speech  to  very  little  purpose. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

THE   RETURN   FROM    THE    HYPHASIS  TO  SUSA. 

However  disappointed  Alexander  may  have  been  to 
give  up  his  schemes  of  adventure  beyond  the  Hyphasis, 
Alleviations  there  was  quite  enough  of  the  marvellous 
poiutmSit.  ^"^^  ^^  unknown  in  the  future  to  make  him 
soon  forget  the  disappointment.  He  had 
seen  alligators  in  the  Indus,  and  a  lotus  similar  to  that  of 
Egypt ;  and  a  letter  of  his,  written  about  this  time  to  his 
mother  Olympias,  shows  that  he  thought  he  had  discov- 
ered the  source  of  the  Nile  in  the  Indus,  which  he  be- 


lieved must  flow  by  a  circuitous  course  through  the 
desert,  and  there,  losing  its  name,  pass  through  Ethiopia 
and  Egypt  under  the  new  title  of  Nile.  His  after  dis- 
coveries, of  course,  and  more  particularly  the  adventu- 
rous voyage  of  his  admiral  Nearchos,  who  explored  the 
whole  coast  from  the  Indus  to  the  Euphrates,  dispelled 
the  illusion. 

The  fleet  built  or  collected  for  the  downward  passage 
amounted  to  2,000  vessels,  including  eighty  men-of-war. 
The  ships  were  chiefly  manned  by   Phoe- 

.  Preparation 

nicians  and  Egyptians,  and  Nearchos  was  m      f..rthe 
command.     Of  the  troops,  8,000  were  to  be      d^wn^the 
on  board  under  the  king's  own  command ;       Indus. 
the  main  body,  with  the  elephants,  under  Hcphaistion 
was  to   accompany    the   fleet  along  the  eastern  bank;' 
Krateros  was  to  lead  a  smaller  division  along  the  opposite 
side  ;  while  a  fourth  corps  was  to  follow  after  three  days' 
interval. 

On  the  appointed  day  at  dawn  the  army  began  its 
embarkation;  and  Alexander  himself,  after  sacrificing  to 
the  gods,  took  his  stand  on  the  bows  of  his 
ship  and  poured  a  solemn  libation,  with 
prayers,  to  the  river  deities  whose  waters  he  was  about 
to  explore,  and  especially  to  his  great  forefathers  Her- 
aklcs  and  Ammon.  Then,  at  a  given  signal,  the  oars 
were  dashed  into  the  water,  and  the  fleet  was  under 
weigh,  each  division  of  horse  transports,  baggage  ships, 
and  men-of  war  being  ordered  to  keep  at  a  safe  and  in- 
variable distance  from  the  others.  Never  before — and 
probably  never  since — was  such  a  sight  seen  on  the 
Hydaspes.  The  banks  rising  high  above  the  level  of  the 
water  were  crowded  with  natives,  whom  the  splash  of  the 
oars  and  the  shouts  of  the  boatswains,  re-echoing  from 
the  cliffs  and  surrounding  woods,  had  drawn  from  every 


The  start. 


T92 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  XVI. 


side  to  gaze  on  the  unwonted  sight.  With  childish  de- 
light they  ran  along  the  shore  by  the  side  of  the  fleet, 
and  sang  barbaric  songs,  keeping  time  with  the  meas- 
ured sweep  of  the  oars.  Thus  hour  by  hour  the  fleet 
dropped  quickly  down  the  stream,  till  on  the  fifth  day 
they  reached  the  confluence  of  the  Akesines  and 
Hydaspes,  a  point  of  no  little  danger.  For  here  the 
banks  converged,  and  the  greater  mass  of  water,  pent 
within  a  narrower  space,  formed  an  eddying,  chafing 
rapid,  the  roar  of  which  was  heard  from  afar.  Amazed 
at  the  sound,  the  sailors  almost  involuntarily  rested  on 
their  oars,  and  the  boatswains  ceased  their  chant.  They 
had  barely  time,  indeed,  to  recover  presence  of  mind 
before  they  drifted  into  danger.  The  broader  vessels 
suff"ered  no  damage ;  but  the  long  war-ships  got  athwart 
the  current,  which  broke  some  of  the  oars  and  made 
them  almost  helpless.  Two  of  the  number  fouled  one 
another  and  foundered,  losing  most  of  the  crews.  At 
last,  partly  drifting,  partly  rowing,  they  reached  the 
broader  water  below,  and  put  in  to  the  right  bank  to 
refit. 

As  they  were  now  approaching  the  country  of  a  people 
from  whom  a  fierce  resistance  was  expected,  Alexander 
at  this  point  made  a  new  disposition  of  his  forces.  The 
people  were  the  Mallians,  whose  name,  perhaps,  remains 
in  that  of  the  city  of  Multan.  It  is  true  that  their  ter- 
ritory lay  to  the  north  of  the  Hydraotos,  and  that  Multan 
now  lies  considerably  to  the  south  of  it ;  but  it  is  well 
The  Mai-  known  that  the  Punjab  rivers  often  change 

ma"ns.^anf*      ^^^'^    courses^in    the     present    day,    and 
Oxydra-  geographers  have  supposed  that  the  Hydra- 

otcs  (Ravi)  and  Hydaspes  in  Alexander's 
time  met  far  more  to  the  south.  In  conjunction  with  the 
Mallians  occur  two  other  names,  at  once  curious  and  in- 


CH.  XVI.       Campaign  among  the  Malli. 


193 


teresting — Brachmans  and  Oxydrakans  (Sudrakae).  If 
we*  may  suppose  that  these  names  represent  what  we 
know  as  Brahmins  (high  caste)  and  Sudras  (low  caste), 
it  is  not  only  of  interest  as  confirming  the  high  antiquity 
of  Indian  castes,  but  will  serve  to  explain  why,  powerful 
as  they  were,  they  failed  to  act  in  concert.  The  mutual 
jealousy  of  high  and  low  caste  was  only  supended  for  a 
while  by  common  hostility  to  the  invader.  Their  forces, 
if  united,  are  said  to  have  numbered  80,000  infantry, 
10,000  cavalry,  and  700  chariots,  but  they  do  not  appear 
to  have  dreamt  of  resistance  in  the  field,  but  to  have 
trusted  rather  to  their  walled  towns  and  to  the  belt  of 
desert  which  sheltered  their  northern  frontier.  Fearing 
lest  they  might  seek  to  escape  him  by  flight,  Alexander 
organized  four  flying  columns,  as  he  had  before  done  in 
Sogdiana,  to  sweep  through  the  country.  He  himself 
intended  to  strike  boldly  across  the  desert,  the  side 
whence  they  would  least  anticipate  attack,  and  thus  to 
be  upon  them  before  they  expected  him.  Nearchos  was 
sent  on  with  the  fleet  to  the  confluence  of  the  Akesines 
and  Hydraotes. 

This   campaign  against  the  Mallians  reminds   us  in 
many    points   of   the   campaign   of   329  in    Sogdiana. 
Rapidity  of  action  characterized  both  alike. 
The  preparations  of  the  natives  were  fore-      agaTnS'fhe 
stalled  by  the  king's  dash  across  the  desert.       Maihans. 
Town  after  town  was  taken  with  ease.     Scattered  bodies 
of  their  troops  were  intercepted  and  cut  to  pieces.  Fugi- 
tives were  pursued  and  destroyed.     Little  by  little  the 
miserable  remnant  of  the  population  was  driven  in  upon 
their  chief  town,  where  it  was  hoped  that  all  further  re- 
sistance might  be  crushed  at  one  blow.     If  we  can  over- 
look the  inhumanity  of  an  attack  on  unoffending  natives 
— and  it  can    hardly  be  too   often   repeated  that  to  a 

o 


194 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  XVI. 


Attack  of 
the  capital 
anH  danger 
of  Alex- 
ander. 


Greek  the  use  of  the  term  in  such  a  connexion  would 
seem  quite  out  of  place — we  cannot  but  admire  the  king's 
skilful  tactics,  and  the  energy  with  which  they  were  car- 
ried out. 

In  attacking  this  town  Alexander  was  within  a  little  of 
losing  what  might  have  seemed  a  charmed  life.      At  the 
first    onset   the   defenders    abandoned   the 
walls  and  fled  to  the  citadel.     The  Mace- 
donians burst  in  through   a  postern    gate, 
Alexander  leading  the  way.     The  rest  fol- 
lowed, but  in  the  hurry  of  the  moment,  or  in  the  belief 
that  the  place  was  as  good  as  taken,  most  of  the  ladders 
were  left  behind.     It  soon  became  clear  that  the  walls 
must  be  scaled  if  the  citadel  was  to  fall ;  and  the  king, 
seizing  the  first  ladder  that  came   to  hand,   planted  it 
against  the  wall  himself,  and  crouching  behind  his  shield 
mounted  and  leaped  to  the  top.     Close  behind  him  fol- 
lowed  Peukestas,  bearing  the  sacred  shield   from   the 
temple  of  the  Ilian  Atheng  :  behind  Peukestas  was  Leon- 
natos.     The  veteran  Abreas  mounted  by  another  ladder. 
At  the  foot  were  swarming  the  foremost  troops,  eager  to 
be  at  their  king's  side,  when  suddenly  both  ladders  broke 
beneath  the  weight  of  the  climbing  crowd,   and  Alex- 
ander was  left  with  his  three  companions  on  the  wall,  a 
mark  for  every  weapon.     To  clear  a  free  space  around 
him  was  the  work  of  a  moment ;  some  of  the   enemy 
were  slain,  others  pushed  headlong  from  the  wall.  Then 
after  a  moment's  hesitation,  and  with  what  even  in  Alex- 
ander was  insane  rashness,  he  leaped  down  among  the 
enemy  on  the  inside  and,  setting  his   back  against  the 
wall,  prepared  to  defend  himself.    At  first  they  ventured 
to  attack  him  at  close  quarters,  thinking  to  kill  him  off- 
hand ;  but  when  they  saw  their  leader  slain,  and  three 
others  fall  beneath  his  sword  or  by  the  stones  which,  hke 


CH.  XVI. 


Descent  of  the  Indus, 


195 


some  Homeric  hero,  he  picked  up  and  dashed  among 
them,  they  drew  off  and  plied  him  from  a  distance  with 
darts  and  arrows.      By  this  time  his  three  companions 
were  at  his  side,  but  the  position  was  becoming  critical. 
Abreas  was  struck  in  the  face  and  slain.     The  king  him- 
self was  wounded  in  the  chest,  and  after  fighting  for  a 
while  began  to  faint  from  loss  of  blood,  and  sank  upon 
his  shield ;  while   Peukestas  and   Leonnatos,  who  shel- 
tered him  as  best  they  could,  were  also  wounded.  Mean- 
time the  soldiers  outside  were  in  a  state  of  fury  at  their 
king's  danger.  In  the  absence  of  ladders  they  improvised 
means  of  mounting   by  driving  pegs  into  the  earthen 
rampart,  or  climbing  on  each   other's   backs.      Others 
burst  a  hole  through  one  of  the  gates,  and  so  struggled 
in,  a  few  at  a  time.     A  short,  sharp  conflict  followed,  and 
then  a  terrible  massacre,  the  enraged  soldiers  sparing 
neither  man,  woman,  nor  child  to  tell  the  tale.     Alex- 
ander was  carried  out  on  his  shield  in  a  dead  faint,  and, 
when  he  came  to  himself,  the  barbed  arrow  was  cut  out 
of  the  wound  ;  but  when  from  loss  of  blood  he  fainted 
again  and  lay  as  one  dead,  the  rumour  that  he  was  dead 
spread  even  to  the  camp  on  the  river,  and  was  followed 
by  an  universal  outburst  of  genuine  sorrow  and  panic. 
Their  heroic  leader  had  fallen,  it  seemed;  and  now  who 
was  to  lead  them  back  to  Macedon  through  the  thousand 
dangers  which  were  before  them  ?     It  is  easy  to  imagine 
the    general  shout  of  joy,  therefore,  which  welcomed 
Alexander,  when  he  was  sufficiently  recovered  to  drop 
down  the  river  to  the  camp,  and  was  seen  not  only  to 
wave  his  hand  to  the  anxious  crowds  upon  the  bank,  but 
to  be   able   even   to   mount  his   horse.     They   pressed 
around  him  to  touch  his  hands,  his  knees,  his  clothes,  or 
crowned  him  with  garlands  and  fillets. 

Before  the  camp  on  the  Akesines  was  abandoned  the 


196 


TJie  Macedonian  Empire, 


CH.  XVI. 


Mallians  made  their  submission.  The  king  then  sailed 
to  the  junction  of  the  five  rivers  and  founded, 
conflkience  as  usual  another  colony,  with  docks  and  forts 
nvii^fj'the  to  command  the  navigation;  and  thence 
sea.  proceeded  southwards  towards  the  mouth, 

meeting  with  but  little  opposition  except  from  the  Brah- 
mins, who  seem  to  have  been  able  in  those  days,  as  in 
these,  to  rouse  a  tempest  of  religious  and  political  fanati- 
cism against  the  "  infidel,"  and  induced  a  certain  king 
Mousikanos  to  revolt  when  Alexander  had  passed  to  the 
south.  But  such  partial  resistance  was  useless,  and  its 
punishment  fearful.  Mousikanos  and  his  advisers  were 
attacked,  seized,  and  crucified.  Many  of  his  towns  were 
razed  to  the  ground,  and  the  inhabitants  reduced  to 
slavery.  Others  were  occupied  by  garrisons.  There  was 
still  a  voyage  of  some  200  miles  before  the  open  sea 
could  be  reached;  but  when  the  Rajah  of  the  Delta  of 
the  Indus  had  surrendered  his  dominions,  there  was  little 
more  hostility  to  be  feared,  and  Krateros  was  detached 
with  three  divisions  of  the  phalanx,  the  elephants,  and 
some  hght  troops,  together  Avith  the  invalids,  to  take  the 
easier  but  longer  road  to  Persia,  by  way  of  the  Bolan 
Pass  and  the  valley  of  the  Etymander  into  Karmania. 
The  king  himself  continued  the  descent  of  the  river  to- 
wards its  mouth,  accompanied  by  Hephaistion  on  the 
left  bank.  At  the  apex  of  the  Delta,  130  miles  above  the 
sea,  Hephaiston  was  left  to  turn  the  native  town  of 
Pattala  into  a  strong  fortress ;  and  Alexander  took  only 
the  swiftest  ships  of  the  fleet  to  face  the  unknown  dangers 
before  him.  The  shifting  sand  banks  were  presumably 
as  great  a  source  of  peril  then  as  now,  and  for  the 
greater  part  of  the  distance  he  could  obtain  no  pilots. 
Near  the  mouth,  moreover,  his  vessels  were  caught  in 
the  ebb  and  flow  of  a  rushing  tide  (an  experience  quite 


\l 


CH.  XVI. 


March  ihrouirh  Gcdrosia. 


197 


unfamiliar  to  Greeks)  and  somewhat  roughly  handled. 
All  dangers,  however,  were  happily  surmounted ;  Alex- 
ander sailed  some  miles  out  into  the  Indian  Ocean  and 
satisfied  himself  of  its  true  nature  ;  he  explored  the  Delta 
and  the  Runn  of  Cutch ;  and  then  returned  to  Pattala, 
to  finish  the  preparations  for  his  own  march  to  the  West, 
and  for  the  voyage  of  exploration  along  the  shores  of  the 
ocean  the  direction  of  which  was  given  to  Nearchos. 
'  Although  Alexander  was  in  part  aware  of  the  difficul- 
ties of  his  intended  march,  he  clearly  did  not  know  them 
all,  nor  the  time  which  the  march  would  re-  ^^^^^^  ^^ 
nuire      Yet  his  object  in  making  it  was  pre-      the  king 

"  .    .,  ,  rr  ,.1  through 

cise  and  intelligible.  If  we  suppose,  with  Cedrosia 
Arrian,  that  he  was  eager  to  do  what  Cyrus  mania.''" 
and  Scmiramis  had  failed  to  do,  we  may  be 
sure  also  that  he  wished  to  reduce  provinces  of  the  em- 
pire as  yet  unvisited,  and  to  be  near  at  hand  in  case  the 
fleet  were  in  need  of  help.  He  had  set  out  from  Pattala, 
with  perhaps  50,000  men,  towards  the  end  of  August,  323. 
The  great  heat,  therefore,  which  lasts  from  March  to 
November,  though  beginning  to  subside,  was  still  so 
terrific  as  to  render  night  marches  for  the  most  part 
necessary.  The  nature  of  the  country,  too,  is  harassing 
and  forbidding.  There  are  ranges  of  mountains  which 
form  the  southern  fringe  of  the  terrible  central  plateau 
before  described,  and  which  run  parallel  to  the  sea,  but 
seldom  nearer  than  ten  miles.  The  ridges  are  bare,  and 
even  the  valleys  poor  and  barren.  At  intervals  the 
desert  seems,  as  it  were,  to  intrude  upon  the  mountains, 
and  though  here  and  there  aromatic  plants  were  found 
to  reUeve  the  bareness,  the  horrors  of  heat  and  thirst  were 
aggravated  by  the  numbers  of  poisonous  herbs  and  veno- 
mous snakes ;  while  they  were  not  a  little  annoyed  by 
thorns,  says  Arrian,  of  such  uncommon  size  and  strength 


p 


198 


Tkf  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  XVI. 


CH.  XVI. 


Desert  of  Kar mania. 


199 


\ 

\ 

I 


as  to  tear  the  horseman  from  his  horse  if  they  caught  his 
clothes,  and  to  hold  an  entangled  hare  as  firmly\s  the 
hook   does   a   fish.       Sometimes   they  would   come   to 
stretches  of  fine  soft  sand,  like  untrodden  snow,  dazzlin- 
to  the  eye  and  hot  to  the  feet,  and  swept  by  the  wind 
into  vast  rolling  billows.      Men  and  beasts  alike  sank 
under  the  toil  of  ascending  and  descending  these  yield- 
ing sand  waves,  so  that  the  sick  and  weakly  fell  out  of 
the  ranks,  while  the  chariots  for  their  transport  had  been 
broken  up  to  avoid  the  labour  of  dragging  them  through 
the  sea  of  sand.    To  fall  out,  therefore,  was  certain  death 
But  of  all  their  hardships  thirst  was  the  most  terrible   as 
It  IS  of  all  human  sufferings  the  most  intolerable,  the  one 
torture  which  robs  ordinary  men  of  the  spirit  of  self- 
sacrifice.      Yet  a  fine  and  touching  story  is  told  of  Alex- 
ander, which  borders  on  the  sublime.    They  were  on  the 
march,  Alexander  at  the  head  ;  all  alike  oppressed  with 
heat  and  thirst.    Some  light  troops  had  come  upon  some 
water  in  a  shallow  torrent  bed,  a  priceless  prize,  which 
they  gathered  in  a  helmet  and  bore  loyally  to  their  kin- 
Greedy,  if  loving,  eyes  were  turned  upon  him  ;  yet  it  w^s 
too  little  to  share  with  others.      Who  but  a  man  of  self- 
restraint,  almost  heroic,  would  have  endured    as  Alex- 
ander endured,  to  take  the  helmet  and  calmly  pour  the 
water  on  the  ground  !      And  so  refreshed  was  the  whole 
army  by  this  example  (such  is  Arrian's  comment)  that 
one  might  have  thought  that  every  man  had  drunk  of 
the  water  poured  out  by  Alexander. 
^    From  the  horrors  of  Gedrosia  the  army  passed  with 
joy  into  the  fertile  country  of  Karmania.  and  the  kin^ 
celebrated  games,  and  offered  solemn  thanksgivings  for 
his  victories  over  the  Indians  and  for  his  safe  return. 
Here  also  he  was  joined  by  abundant  convoys,  by  troops 
from  Media,  and  by  Krateros  with  his  division.      Some 


I 


satraps  and  officers,  who  had  presumed  upon  his  long 
absence  to  misconduct  themselves  in  office, 
were  arrested  and  put  to  death.  Here,  too,  vvith  K?a- 
he  met  with  Nearchos,  who,  as  we  shall  see  NeardTol 
presently,  had  passed  through  dangers  and  ^^  Susa^*^ 
privations  nearly  as  great  as  the  king  him- 
self, and  more  trying  because  strange  and  novel.  Then, 
dividing  his  forces,  he  bade  Hephaistion  lead  the  main 
body  to  Susa,  by  the  shore  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  where 
the  climate  was  mild  and  provisions  plentiful ;  while  he 
himself  made  for  Persagerd  and  Persepolis.  At  the 
former  place  his  special  anger  was  aroused  by  the  dis- 
covery that  the  famous  tomb  of  Cyrus  had  been  violated 
in  his  absence,  the  golden  coffin  chipped  and  opened, 
and  the  body  of  the  great  king  gone.  Having  done 
justice  on  the  offender,  and  having  stopped  for  awhile  to 
lament  over  the  memorial  of  his  own  folly,  the  blackened 
palace  of  Persepolis,  he  went  on  his  way  to  rejoin 
Hephaistion  at  Susa.  A  strange  spectacle  was  there 
witnessed  by  the  whole  army.  At  Taxila,  Alexander 
had  met  certain  Indian  anchorites,  whom  the  Greeks 
called  Gymnosophists ;  and  one  of  them,  by  name 
Kalanos,  had  been  persuaded  to  follow  the  king.  This 
man,  being  advanced  in  years  and  threatened  with  dis- 
ease, resolved  to  die  while  he  was  still  in  possession  of 
his  faculties,  and  so,  mounting  an  immense  funeral  pyre, 
he  was  burnt  to  death  in  the  sight  of  all,  amid  the 
screech  of  elephants  and  the  blare  of  trumpets. 

Nearchos,  meanwhile,  had  led  the  fleet  in  safety  along 
the  coast  of  Gedrosia  and  the  shores  of  the  Persian  Gulf, 
and  proved  {if  nothing  else)  that  the  Indus      ^^  ^^^  ^^ 
was  not  the  Nile.      Arrian's  account  of  this      Nearchos 
memorable  nautical  enterprise  in  Grecian      Indus  to  the 
antiquity  is  a  compilation  from  other  and      Euphrates. 


200 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  XVI. 


later  authors,  as  well  as  from  Nearchos  himself;  yet  the 
general  accuracy  of  the  details,  and  the  frequent  refer- 
ence to  the  admiral's  own  words  as  the  basis  of  them, 
prove  that  it  must  have  been  an  epoch  in  the  annals  of 
Greek  geography.     If  not  the  first,  it  was  one  of  the  first 
steps  towards  correcting  the  crude  notions  of  earlier  geo- 
graphers.     The  coast  line  was  followed  from  the  Indus 
to  the  Euphrates,  and  landings  were  made  at  various 
points;  while  curious  observations  were  recorded  both  in 
physical  phenomena  and  in  natural  history.      Quantities 
of  crabs,  oysters,  and  indeed  fish  of  all  kinds  were  met 
with   throughout   the   voyage.     Whales   and   porpoises 
were  seen  many  times.      One  monster  of  the  deep  is  de- 
scribed, which  had  been  cast  up  by  the  sea,  whose  length 
was  50  cubits  and  its  skin   a  cubit   in  thickness,  and 
covered  with  limpets  and  oysters.     In  fact,  the  southern 
shore  of  Gedrosia  was  occupied  by  people  who  lived 
upon  fish,  partly  eating  it  raw,  partly  drying  it  in  the  sun 
and  then  pounding  it  into  a  sort  of  pemmican  or  fish- 
bread,  and  who  made  their  huts  with  fish-bones  and  their 
clothes  with  fish-skins — uncivilized  barbarians,  who  had 
the  claws  of  wild  beasts  rather  than  nails,  wherewith  they 
tore  their  fish  asunder,  and  who  supplied  their  ignorance 
of  iron  by  the  use  of  flints.      But  inside  the  Persian  Gulf 
they  reached  less  wild  districts,  where  provisions  were 
comparatively  abundant,  and   every  island  was  fertile 
with  vines  and  palms.     The  approaches  to  the  mouth  of 
the  Euphrates,  Nearchos  described  in  terms  which  micrht 
be  used  now — shallows,  not  of  sand  but  of  deep,  treacher- 
ous mud,  in  which  a  man  would  sink  up  to  the  shoulders 
and  where  the  channel,  marked  out  by  stakes,  was  only 
navigable  for  a  single  ship.      Another  observation  he 
made,  which  in  the  hands  of  a  geographer  eighty  years 
later  was  the  basis  of  the  first  measurement  of  the  cir- 


CH.  XVI. 


Voyage  of  Nearchos. 


201 


cumference  of  the  earth.  He  observed,  when  they  were 
in  the  open  sea  about  latitude  25  north,  as  Eratosthenes 
observed  at  Syene  in  nearly  the  same  latitude,  that  the 
sun  at  midday  cast  no  shadow.  Facts  like  these,  appar- 
ently unimportant,  were  in  reality  of  the  greatest  value 
as  items  in  the  slowly  growing  mass  of  physical  know- 
ledge, which  the  philosophers  of  Hellas  were  accumula- 
ting? and  learninor  how  to  use.  Nor  were  the  observations 
of  Nearchos  the  only  scientific  results  of  Alexander's 
reign.  At  the  request  of  Aristotle,  the  king  had  been 
for  some  time  employing  agents,  in  many  parts  of  Asia 
as  well  as  Europe,  to  collect  specimens  of  animals  and 
send  them  to  Athens  ;  and  after  examining  and  compar- 
ing these,  Aristotle  wrote  down  the  results  in  the  fifty 
volumes  of  his  Natural  History.  Alexander  also 
despatched  three  exploring  squadrons  along  the  south- 
ern coast  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  having  clearly  in  his  mind 
the  reduction  of  Arabia,  and  the  establishment  of  a  sea 
route  between  Egypt,  Babylon,  and  India. 

But  the  leading  idea,  as  well  as  the   hardest  task, 
which  Alexander  had  set  before  him  was  the  amalgama- 
tion of  his  diverse  subjects  into  one  people. 
It  was  equally  difficult  to  conciliate  the  Eu-      Akxander 
ropean  and  to  protect  the  Asiatic.  The  latter      ^;,^^„^|,f  " 
had  been  drilled  by  centuries  of  oppression      his  sub- 
into  abject  submission  to  extortion  and  tyr- 
anny.    The  former  had  learned  from  years  of  freedom 
and  a  long  muster-roll  of  victories  to  despise  the  effemi- 
nate Oriental.    How  was  it  possible  to  combine  elements 
so  antagonistic?     Nevertheless  Alexander  set  himself 
the  task.     It  was  before  all  things  necessary  to  convince 
Asiatics  that  tyranny  and  extortion  were  not  the  princi- 
ples of  the  king's  government ;  and  with  this  view,  as 
has  been  already  mentioned,  many  satraps  and  officers, 


202 


The  Macedonian  Einpire,  en.  xvi. 


who  had  presumed  on  his  long  absence,  were  banished 
or  executed.     The  worst  offender  had  been  Harpalos, 
the  Macedonian.     Already  convicted  of  peculation  as 
treasurer  before  the  battle  of  Issos,  and  a  fugitive,  he 
had  been  pardoned  by  Alexander,  restored  to  his  post, 
and  afterwards  appointed  satrap  of  Babylonia.     There, 
as  lavish  as  he  was  grasping,  his  shameless  luxuries  in 
the  king's  absence  had  rivalled  even  those  of  a  Sardan- 
apalus.     The  fish  for  his  table  were  brought  specially 
from  the  sea.     His  gardens  were  filled  with  choice  ex- 
otics.    On  Alexander's  return  he  fled  a  second  time  to 
Athens  with  a  vast  sum  of  money,  and  so  escaped  jus- 
tice.    But  it  was  men  like  these,  if  any,  who 
Tf'Sast        '^^"^^  endanger  the  empire,  and  whose  ex- 
cesses, therefore,  it  was  essential  to  punish. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  was  not  less  essential  and  much 
more  difficult  to  induce  the  conquerors  of  these  Asiatics 
to  acknowledge  the  conquered  as  their  equals  under  a 
common  sovereign.     Englishmen  are  only  now  begin- 
ning to  find  it  possible,  after  loo  years  of  empire,  to  re- 
cognize Hindoos  as  fellow-subjects  and  equals.      It  is 
true  that  the  gulf  between  the  latter  is  greater  than  was 
that  between  Greeks  and  Persians  ;  but  such  a  fusion  is 
impossible  in  the  course  of  a  few  months  or  even  years, 
and  when  forced  on  people  against  their  will  is  often 
opposed  with  singular  obstinacy.     And  so  it  was  with 
Alexander's  attempted  fusion  of  Macedonians  and  Per- 
sians.    He  did  his  best,  indeed,  to  bribe  and  flatter  the 
former  into  acquiescence.     He  offered  to  pay  the  debts 
of  every  Macedonian   in  the  army  ;  and  when  the  sol- 
diers hesitated  to  register  their  names  lest  it  should  be 
remembered  against  them,  heaps  of  gold  were  placed 
on  tables,  from  which  every  man  was  allowed  to  help 
himself.     Several  of  the  generals  were  presented  with 


CH.  XVI. 


Projects  of  Alexander. 


203 


crowns  of  gold.     He  himself  married  Statira,  daughter 
of  Darius,  and  nearly  100  of  the  officers  to  please  him 
followed  his  example  in  marrying  Persian  women  ;  and 
when  as  many  as  10,000  of  the  soldiers  were  found  to 
have  already  formed  such  connexions,  or  to  be  ready  to 
do  so,  he  presented  each  with  a  marriage  portion,  and 
the  weddings  were  celebrated  publicly,  with  the  accom- 
paniment of  a  grand  banquet  in  a  pavilion  built  for  the 
occasion.     But  the  jealousy  of  the  Macedonians  was  not 
one  whit  lessened  ;  and  when  on  one  occasion  he  had 
assembled  the  troops  at  Opis,  and  told  them 
that  he  meant  to  disband  any  of  them  who      troop^^al 
were   unfit   to   serve  from  age  or  wounds,      Tigris?"  ^^* 
they,  remembering  that  he  had  drafted  thou- 
sands of  Asiatics  into  the  ranks,  and  choosing  to  sus- 
pect that  he  only  wanted  to  get  rid  of  them,  broke  out 
into  open  mutiny,  and,  no  longer  awed  into  silence  by 
his  presence,  bade  him  dismiss  them  all  and  go  cam- 
paigning alone  with  his  father — meaning,  of  course,  Zeus 
Ammon.     The  outbreak  was  sudden,  but  told  of  a  deep 
current  of  feeling  below.      Another  man   might  have 
hesitated  what  to  do  ;   but  Alexander  leaped  down  at 
once  among  them  with  three  or  four  of  his  generals,  and, 
pointing  out  the  ringleaders  to  the  guards,  ordered  them 
off  to  instant  execution.     They  were  at  once  seized  and 
put  to  death,  to  the  number  of  thirteen.     A  deep  silence 
immediately  followed  among  the  vast  crowd,  broken  af- 
ter a  pause  by  the  king's  voice,  who  had  remounted  the 
platform.     He  was  bitter  and  angry,  and  his  words  were 
sarcastic.    "  They  to  mutiny  !     Men  who  owed  all  to  his 
father  and  himself!     Men  who  once  were  rude  clowns 
dressed  in  skins,  and  now  were  satraps  and  generals 
loaded  with  the  wealth  of  Lydia  and  the  treasures  of  Per- 
sia and  the  good  things  of  India.    They  thought,  per- 


\\ 


204 


The  Macedonian  Empire. 


CH.  XVI. 


haps,  he  had  spared  himself,  or  kept  too  much  for  him- 
self? Could  any  man  show  more  wounds  than  he  could  ? 
or  accuse  him  of  niggardliness  in  his  rewards  ? "  "  You 
are  all  wishing  to  go,"  he  cried,  "  and  go  you  shall ;  and 
tell  those  at  home  how  you  left  your  king,  who  had  led 
you  victorious  from  the  Granikos  to  the  Hyphasis — ay, 
and  would  have  crossed  the  Hyphasis  had  you  not  been 
laggards !  —to  the  care  of  barbarian  guards  ?  It  may  be 
that  such  things  are  glorious  in  the  eyes  of  men,  and 
right  in  the  sight  of  the  gods !  Away  ! "  With  these 
words  he  hurriedly  left  the  platform  and  shut  himself  up 
in  the  palace.  For  two  days  he  saw  no  one.  On  the 
third  he  sent  for  the  chief  Persian  officers,  and  gave 
them  his  orders.  In  future  (he  said)  he  would  have 
Persian  troops  only,  named  and  organized  after  the  Ma- 
cedonian model,  but  officered  by  Persians.  This  was 
the  last  drop  in  the  cup.  Repentant  before,  the  soldiers 
were  now  in  despair ;  and,  rushing  to  the  palace,  they 
threw  their  arms  at  the  gates,  and,  with  cries  and  pray- 
ers for  admittance,  declared  that  they  would  not  depart 
by  night  or  day  till  Alexander  showed  them  some  pity. 
Then  the  king  relented,  and  came  out  to  them  in  haste ; 
and  the  reconciliation,  soon  effected,  was  sealed  by  a 
banquet  at  which  9,000  of  the  troops  were  entertained  by 
Alexander. 

Soon  afterwards  10,000  veterans  were  led  home  by 
Krateros — "  the  trusty  friend,  dear  to  the  king  as  his  own 
life '' — each  man  receiving  a  talent  above  his 
of^Aiex^-^^^  pay.  At  the  same  time  he  sent  despatches 
to  Greece,  bidding  the  cities  receive  back 
all  exiles  who  had  not  been  guilty  of  sacri- 
lege or  murder,  and  requiring  them  to  give  himself  di- 
vine honours.  Of  the  two  demands  the  latter  seemed  to 
Hellenes  ridiculous,  and  the  former  intolerable.    Alex- 


ander to  the 

Greeks. 


CH.  XVII. 


Meeting  at  Opis. 


205 


ander's  speedy  death,  indeed,  relieved  the  Greek  cities 
from  this  direful  prospect  of  having  in  fact  to  receive  so 
many  Macedonian  garrisons  in  the  persons  of  their  ex- 
iled citizens  ;  while  the  general  view,  held  on  the  ques- 
tion of  divine  honours,  may  be  adequately  summed  up 
in  the  advice  of  Demades  to  the  Athenians,  not  to  lose 
earth  while  contesting  about  heaven,  and  in  the  reply 
of  the  Spartans  that  if  Alexander  would  be  a  god,  he 
might. 


CHAPTER   XVII. 


CLOSING   SCENES. 


In  the  winter  of  324-3  Alexander  set  out  from  Susa  to 
Agbatana,  passing  on  his  way  the  famous  rock  monu- 
ments of  Behistun.     His  object,  no  doubt, 
was  to  gratify  the  Medes  by  a  short  stay  in         AgbilaLa! 
their  capital,  as  he  had  already  stayed  in 
Babylon  and  Persepolis,  and  to  retain  what  had  been  a 
yearly  custom  of  the  former  kings  of  Persia.    They  were 
further  gratified  by  a  magnificent  celebration  of  the  an- 
nual festival  of  Dionysos.     But  the  general  joy  was  sud- 
denly overcast  by  a  great  sorrow.    Hephais- 
tion.the  "lover  of  Alexander,"  fell  ill  of  a    g-f,°^j,„. 
fever,  which  a  foolish  confidence  in  his  own 
strength  induced  him  to  neglect.     During  the  feast  he 
became  rapidly  worse,  and  at  last  sank  before  the  king 
could  reach  his  bedside  from  the  amphitheatre,  whence 
he  was  hastily  summoned.     It  was  only  natural  that  a 
man  of  strong,  manly  affection  like  Alexander  should 
for  three  days  shut  himself  up  in  sorrowful  isolation,  and 
neither  eat  nor  drink.  It  was  only  natural  that  he  should 
bury  a  comrade,  so  dear  and  faithful,  with  extraordinary 


2o6 


The  Macedonian  Empire,  ch.  xvii. 


honours  at  Babylon,  his  capital,  and  that  he  should  order 
a  general  mourning  throughout  Asia.    But  we  may  surely 
dismiss,  as  the  mere  gossip  which  gathers  round  every 
great  name,  such  tales  as  that  he  cut  off  the  hair  of  his 
horses  and  mules,  or  dismantled  the  town  walls  of  their 
battlements,   or  killed  the  foolish  physician  who  could 
not  save  his  friend's  life,  or  razed  to  the  ground  the  tem- 
ple of  Asklepios  in  Agbatana  by  way  of  revenge;  and 
may  echo  Arrian's  verdict,  that  such  barbarous  "  follies 
were  not  consistent  with  Alexander's  character,  though 
they  might  be  natural  enough  in  a  Xerxes,  who  chas- 
tised the  Hellespont  with  fetters  for  wrecking  his  bridge." 
The  king  was  roused  from  his  deep  dejection  by  that 
best  of  remedies,  the  necessity  foraction.     The  Kossa.\ans, 
Subjection         a  mountain  tribe  on  the  borders  of  Susiana 
Ko'I's'^ans.         ^"^  ^^^^^^,  Were  up  in  arms.     Taking  with 
him  the  dead  body  for  burial,  he  set  out  on 
his  march  to  Babylon,  about  mid-winter  324-3,  dividing 
his  army  into  two  corps  under  himself  and  Ttolemy  re*^ 
spectivcly,  and   crushing  the   armed  resistance   of  the 
mountaineers  as  he  went.     He  then  came  down  from  the 
mountains  into  the  Tigris  valley,  and  so  passed  on  to  the 
capital. 

It  was  his  last  march.  Already  omens  and  presages, 
we   are   told,  of  impending  calamity  were  of  freqircnt 

occurrence,  and  it  would  seem  that  even 
co1Sns"cvii.      Alexander's  strong  mind  was  not  a  little 

impressed.  As  he  drew  near  to  Babylon  he 
was  met  by  a  body  of  Chaldean  priests,  who  in  private 
audience  besought  him  to  defer  his  entry  into  the  city; 
for  their  god  Belus  had  revealed  to  them  that  an  entrance 
into  Babylon  at  that  time  would  not  be  for  his  good. 
Then  a  strange  story  got  wind  about  the  Indian  phtloso- 
pher  Kalanos.     Before  his  death,  it  was  said,  he  declined 


CH.  XVII. 


Omens. 


207 


to  take  leave  of  the  king,  because  he  should  soon  meet 
him  at  Babylon.  On  another  occasion  Alexander  was 
cruising  on  the  canal  of  Pallakopas,  which  had  been  dug 
to  carry  off  the  superfluous  waters  of  the  Euphrates  at 
flood  time.  As  the  boat  in  which  he  was  sailing  passed 
by  some  tombs  of  ancient  Assyrian  kings,  it  chanced 
that  a  sudden  gust  lifted  from  his  head  the  kausia,  or 
broad-brimmed  cap,  which  fell  into  the  water,  while  the 
diadem  which  encircled  it  lodged  in  the  reeds  that  grew 
out  of  one  of  the  tombs.  A  sailor  at  once  plunged  in 
and  swam  to  recover  it,  but  in  returning  placed  it  on  his 
own  head,  lest  it  should  be  wetted.  For  this  exploit  he 
was  rewarded  with  a  talent,  but  afterwards  flogged  for 
being  so  thoughtless  as  to  put  on  the  king's  head-dress. 
Some  of  the  soothsayers  were  even  so  alarmed  at  the  evil 
omen  as  to  urge  the  king  to  put  the  sailor  to  death.  By- 
and-by  another  event  happened  still  more  disquieting. 
It  was  at  Babylon,  and  the  king  was  holding  a  council 
about  his  intended  campaigns.  P'eeling  thirsty,  he  rose 
from  his  throne  and  left  the  council-room,  followed  by 
his  officers,  only  a  few  attendants  remaining  behind.  It 
was  a  moment  of  unguarded  relaxation.  On  a  sudden  a 
man,  a  stranger  to  all,  entered  the  chamber,  and  passing 
through  the  midst  of  the  astonished  slaves,  before  they 
had  presence  of  mind  to  stop  him,,  seated  himself  in  the 
empty  throne.  The  etiquette  of  the  Persian  court,  as 
stringent  as  that  of  the  French  or  Spanish  courts  in  their 
palmy  days,  forbade  the  laying  of  a  finger  on  one  who  was 
sitting  ill  the  royal  seat.  So  the  slaves  fell  to  rending  their 
clothes  and  beating  their  breasts,  but  had  nothing  else 
that  they  could  do.  The  news  was  presently  carried  to 
Alexander,  who  ordered  the  man  to  be  seized ;  and  an 
attemp  was  made  by  torture  to  elicit  his  purpose  or  the 
names  of  his  confederates.     But  the  only  thing  that  he 


2o8 


The  Macedonian  Empire,         CH.  xvii. 


could  say  was  that  it  came  into  his  mind  to  do  and  he 
did  it — a  statement  from  which  the  seers  inferred  that  it 
was  an  inspiration  from  heaven,  and  must  be  regarded 
as  a  warning.  Our  inference  should  be,  perhaps,  that 
he  was  mad. 

However  little  any  of  these  omens  singly  might  have 
affected  so  powerful  a  mind  as  Alexander's,  it  was  inevi- 
_^  .    ^  table  that  their  concurrence  at  a  time  when 

X  heir  effect 

upon  he  was  depressed,  and  when  perhaps  the 

seeds  of  fever  were  already  in  his  system, 
should  impress  him  not  a  little.  The  first  warning  of 
the  Chaldean  priests  he  set  aside  with  a  jesting  quotation 
from  Euripides,  and  indeed  shrewdly  suspected  that  they 
had  a  personal  interest  in  keeping  him  out  of  Babylon, 
fearing  to  be  brought  to  book  for  peculation  during  his  ab- 
sence. But  the  recurrence  of  the  omens  and  the  increas- 
ing alarm  of  the  seers  seem  at  last  to  have  made  Alex- 
ander himself  anxious,  and  to  have  inspired  him  with 
fears  of  a  plot. 

Nevertheless,  it  became  necessary  to  enter  Babylon, 
and  (owing  to  the  morasses  on  the  south  and  west)  witK 
his  face  turned  towards  the  gloomy  west 
and  by  the  very  eastern  gate  against  which 
the  priests  had  warned  him.  But  it  was  a 
splendid  spectacle,  such  as  the  city  had  seldom,  if  ever, 
seen.  There  were  the  veteran  troops  that  had  conquered 
Asia— the  fleet  of  Nearchos.  which  had  sailed  in  waters 
never  but  once  navigated  before.  There  were  new  ships 
from  Phoenicia,  and  others  building  on  the  stocks  of  the 
new  harbour.  There  was  an  army  of  workmen  busy 
upon  the  splendid  funeral  pile  of  Hephaistion.  Last,  but 
not  least,  there  were  crowds  of  ambassadors,  not  only 
from  Greek  cities,  but  from  Libya,  from  the  Lucanians, 
the   Tyrrhenians,   and   even,  according  to  one  author, 


The  entry 
into  Baby- 
lon. 


CH.  XVII. 


Alexander  at  Babylon, 


209 


from  the  Romans,  from  Scythia,  Ethiopia,  and  Carthage 
— an  imposing  array,  testifying  to  the  wide-spread  influ- 
ence of  Alexander's  name.  For  the  moment  Babylon 
was  the  centre  and  capital  of  the  world. 

But,  as  Arrian  repeats  many  times  over,  with  an  almost 
dramatic  iteration,   the  end  was   drawing  near.      All 
things  indeed  went  on  as  usual.     Reinforce- 
ments were   coming  and  going.     The  Eu-      ^^"^  P'^"^' 
phrates  fleet  was  finished  and  its   sailors  were  under 
constant  drill.     The  details  of  the  Arabian  voyage  and 
campaign  appear  to  have  been  settled,  and  a  scheme  for 
the  exploration  of  the  Caspian  was  so  far  arranged  that 
a  party  of  shipwrights  was  sent  to  the  sea  to  build  a  fleet. 
Finally,  a  further  step  towards  the  fusion  of  the  peoples 
of  the  empire  was  made  by  the  incorporation  of  a  certain 
number  of  Persians  with  the  Macedonian  infantry  of  the 
phalanx,  each  file  of  sixteen  containing  twelve  Persians, 
while  the  places  of  honour  and  importance,  the  first  three 
and  the  last  in  the  file,  were  reserved  for  Macedonians. 

But  the  end  was  drawing  near.  A  solemn  sacrifice 
was  celebrated  for  the  success  of  the  projected  expedi- 
dition,  at  which  wine  and  meat  were  distri- 

ij  1  111-1-1/-        Illness  and 

buted  to  the  troops;  and  the  kmg  himself  death  of 
gave  a  banquet  to  his  friends,  which  was  ^^^"  ^^' 
carried  on  far  into  the  night.  As  he  was  leaving  the 
feast,  Medios,  an  officer  of  the  Companion  cavalry, 
pressed  him  to  continue  the  revel  at  his  quarters,  and 
Alexander  complied.  The  next  evening  Medios  renewed 
his  invitation,  and  again  a  great  deal  of  wine  appears  to 
have  been  drunk.  On  the  following  day  the  king  felt 
the  first  symptoms  of  fever,  and  accordingly  slept  at  the 
house  of  Medios,  though  still  well  enough  to  transact 
business.  He  was  afterwards  carried  on  a  couch  to  the 
river  side,  and  rowed  over  to  a  park  on  the  other  bank, 


2IO 


The  Macedonian  Empire,  CH.  xvii. 


CH.  XVII. 


Characteristics, 


►/•s/ 


211 


passing  the  next  day  in  retirement,  and  in  conversation 
with  Medios.  But  he  now  grew  rapidly  worse,  and  day 
by  day  became  weaker,  hardly  mustering  strength  to 
perform  the  usual  sacrifice  ;  until  on  the  seventh  day  of 
the  attack,  feeling  apparently  that  he  was  dying,  he  had 
himself  carried  back  to  the  palace,  and  summoned  the 
generals  to  his  presence.  He  recognized  them,  but  had 
no  strength  to  speak.  Four  of  them  in  despair  passed  the 
next  night  in  the  temple  of  Serapis,  hoping  for  a  sign. 
Three  others  even  consulted  the  oracle  as  to  whether 
it  would  be  better  to  bring  the  king  to  the  temple  of 
the  god.  The  answer  was  that  he  was  better  where 
he  was.  Some  of  the  soldiers  meanwhile,  from  anxiety 
and  affection,  demanded  to  be  admitted  to  see  Alexan- 
der, and,  being  allowed  to  pass  through  his  chamber, 
soon  saw  that  all  hope  was  gone.  He  lay  speechless  but 
sensible,  recognizing  them  severally  as  they  passed  by 
his  bedside  with  eloquent  eyes,  but  hardly  able  to  raise 
his  head.  Had  he  been  able  to  frame  articulate  words, 
it  is  possible  that  he  might  have  returned  the  answer 
ascribed  to  him  in  the  story,  and  said  that  he  left  his 
kingdom  "to  the  worthiest."  As  it  was,  all  he  had 
strength  for  was  to  take  the  riryj  from  his  finger  and  give 
it  to  Perdikkas.  Shortly  afterwards  he  died  in  the  33rd 
year  of  his  life,  and  the  13th  of  his  reign  (June,  323). 

It  has  been  said  that  none  of  mortal  birth  ever  went 

through  such  an  ordeal  as  Alexander  the  Great ;  and 

Arrian  insists  on  certain  points  which  ought 

His  personal  ^         v      r  •      r  •  ■ 

character.  "ot  to  be  torgottcn  m  formmg  an  estimate  of 
***'"•  his  hero.     He  was  the  son  of  the  able  and 

unscrupulous  Philip  and  of  the  violent  Olympias.  He 
was  brought  up  in  a  court  notoriously  licentious.  He 
was  a  king  at  twenty — the  greatest  monarch  of  the  world 
before  thirty,    A  general  who  never  knew  defeat,  he  was 


surrounded  by  men  vastly  inferior  to  himself,  who  in- 
trigued   for    his  favour    and    flattered    his    weakness. 
Thus  inheriting  a  fierce    and   ambitious   temper,    and 
placed  in  circumstances  calculated  to  foster  it,  it  would 
have  been  little  short  of  a  miracle  had  Alexander  shown 
a  character  without  alloy.      To  stand  on  a  pinnacle  of 
greatness  higher  than  man  had  ever  reached  before,  and 
to  be  free  at  the  same  time  from  vanity,  would  have  re- 
quired a  combination  of  virtues  impossible  before  Christ, 
perhaps  never  possible.    Alexander  was  beyond  question 
vain,  impulsive,  passionate,  at  times  furious ;  but  he  had 
strong  affections,   and   called   out   strong   affections  in 
others.     A  man   of  energy  and  ambition,  he  was  the 
hardest  worker  of  his  day  both  in  body  and  mind.     In- 
capable of  fear,  he  foresaw  difficulties  or  combinations 
which  others  never  dreamed  of,  and  provided  against 
them  with  success.     Amid  endless  temptations  this  son 
of  Philip  remained  comparatively  pure.     Unlike  his  fel- 
low-countrymen, he  was  (says  Arrian)  no  great  drinker, 
though  he  loved  a  banquet  and  its  genial  flow  of  con- 
versation.    On  one  point  in  his  character  Arrian  dwells 
with   an    admiration   in   which   we    may  heartily  join. 
Alexander,  he  says,  stood  almost  alone  in  his  readiness 
to  acknowledge  and   express   regret  for  having  done 
wrong.     That  in  his  later  days,  and  when  he  had  suc- 
ceeded to  the  position  of  the  Great  King,  he  adopted 
the  Persian  dress  and  customs  may  be  ascribed  to  the 
same  motive  which  induced  him  himself  to  marry,  and  to 
press  his  officers  and  soldiers  to  marry,  Asiatic  women, 
a  politic  desire  not  indeed  to  ape  the  ways  of  foreigners, 
but  to  amalgamate  his  diverse  subjects  into  one  body. 
And  if,    over  and   above   this,   he   went  so   far  as  to 
claim  divine  honours    as  the  son  of  a  god,  we   may 
remember  that  of  all  men  Greeks    were   most    easily 


Ml 


) 


^1 


212 


The  Macedonian  Empire,  ch.  xvii. 


thrown  off  their  balance  by  extraordinary  prosperity,  as 
were  Miltiades  and  Alkibiadcs,  Pausanias  and  Lysan- 
dros,  and  tliat  few  men  of  his  day  or  country  were  more 
susceptible  to  the  charm  of  heroic  and  legendary  associa- 
tions than  was  Alexander.  Elated,  therefore,  by  success, 
and  genuinely  wrought  upon  by  the  legends  which 
were  as  the  air  he  breathed,  he  set  an  extravagant  value 
on  obtaining  a  public  recognition  of  the  super-human 
nature  of  his  powers,  in  which,  perhaps,  he  had  even 
come  to  believe  himself. 

It  has  been  said  in  depreciation  of  Alexander  that 
His  con-  ^^^  conquests  were  needless  and  the  blood- 

?mSora"?n        ^^^^^  wanton,  that  he  gave  the  final  stroke 
the  eyes  of        to  the  ruin  of  free  Hellas,  and  that  whatever 
benefits  Asia  derived  from  its  conquests  by 
Greeks  were  due  rather  to  Alexander's  successors  than  to 
himself.     These  objections  are  as  false  in  the  spirit  as 
they  are  true  in  the  letter.     For  on  the  first  of  these 
points  we  shall  go  altogether  astray  unless  we  place  our- 
selves at  the  point  of  view  of  a  Greek  of  the  fourth  cen- 
tury.    His  view  of  the  relations  between  himself  and  a 
barbarian  (and  all  who  were  not  Greeks  were  barbarians) 
was  something  similar  to  that  of  a  mediii:val  Christian 
towards  a  Mohammedan,  or  of  a  Mohammedan  towards 
an  infidel.     The  natural  state  of  things  between  them 
was  war;  and  for  the  vanquished  there  remained  death 
to  the  men,  slavery  or  worse   for  women  and  children. 
Any  milder  treatment   was    magnanimous    clemency.* 
For  years  before  Alexander,  the  idea  of  a  war  of  revenge 
against  Persia  had  been  rife.     That  he  should  invade 
Asia,  therefore,  and  put  down  the  Great  King,  and  harry 
and  slay   his  subjects,  would   seem   to    almost    every 
Greek  right  and  proper. 
A  few  here    and    there    indeed  were    clear-headed 


CH.  XVII.  Effects  of  Alexamfer' s  Conquests.  213 


Greek  free 
dom  de- 
stroyed, be- 
cause the 
Greeks 
hardly  de- 
served to  be 
free. 


enough  to  see  that  the  elevation  of  Macedon  meant  the 
downfall  of  free  Greece.      It  clearly  was  so. 
And  yet,  if  we  look  the  facts  in  the  face,  we 
observe  the  free  life  of  Greece  in  the  fourth 
century  assuming  a  phase  incompatible  in 
the  long  run  with  freedom.      It  was  the  day 
of  orators,  not  of  statesmen  or  warriors — of 
timid  action  and  peace  at  any  price.      It  was  a  time  of 
isolation,  when  (thanks  to  Sparta)  the  glorious  oppor- 
tunity of  a  free  Hellenic  nation  had  been  forever  lost, 
and  when  the  narrow  Greek  notion  of  political  life  with- 
in the  compass  of  city  walls  and  no  further  had  reasserted 
itself.      It  was  the  day  of  mercenary  forces,  when  free 
men  talked  of  freedom  but  did  not  fight  for  it.     It  was  a 
time  of  corruption,  when  politicians  could  be  bought, 
and  would  sell  their  country's  honour.      Indeed,  con- 
sidering that  the  hegemony  of  Macedon  was  distinctly 
less  oppressive  than  that  of  Sparta,  we  may  well  believe 
that  while  cities,  like  Athens  or  Sparta,  which  had  once 
been  leaders  themselves  felt  a  real  humiliation  in  sub- 
jection to  Macedon,  many  less  prominent  states  felt  it  to 
be  a  change  for  the  better,  in  proportion  as  such  govern- 
ment was  less  oppressive  than  rulers  of  the  type  of  the 
Spartan    harmosts   or    the   Thirty   Tyrants   at  Athens. 
Technically  the  Macedonian  conquest  did  put  an  end 
to  Hellenic  freedom.      On  the  other  hand,  that  freedom 
was  fast  tending  towards,  if  in  some  cases  it  had  not 
already  passed  into,  the  anarchy  which  belies  freedom, 
or  the  pettiness  which  cramps  it. 

Lastly,  we  may  allow  that  in  all  probability  Alexander 
neither  intended  nor  foresaw  half  the  bene- 
fits which  resulted  from  his  career  to  Asia  and      fluin'ce'^of"" 
the  world,    without  saying  more  than    has      ^n^'ue^t"'^ 
to  be  said  of  every  man  of  commandinf^      upouAsia. 


/ 


214 


The  Macedonian  Empire.  CH.  xvil. 


and  progressive  ideas.     It  is  not,  as  a  rule,  given  to 
men  to  see  the  fruit  of  their  labours.      Nevertheless  the 
world  combines  to  honour  those  who  initiate  its  varied 
steps  of  progress.    The  change  for  the  better  which  Alex- 
ander's conquests  made  in  Asia  can  hardly  be  exagge- 
rated.   Order  took  the  place  of  disorder.      The  vast 
accumulations  of  the  Persian  kings,  lying  idle  in  their 
coffers,  were  once  more  brought  into  circulation,  and  at 
least  tended  to  stimulate  energy  and  commercial  activity. 
Cities  were  founded  in  great  numbers.      New  channels 
of  communication  were  opened  between  the  ends  of  the 
empire.     Confidence  was  restored  ;  and  it  may  fairly  be 
added  that  only  the  king's  own  premature  death  cut 
short  the  far-sighted  plans  which  he  had  devised  for  the 
gradual  elevation  of  his  Asiatic  subjects  to  the  level  of 
his  European,  and  which,  indeed,  had  already  begun  to 
work  the  results  which  he  intended.      It  is  true  we  can 
trace  no  signs  of  political  reform  in  Alexander's  projects; 
but  Asiatics  had  never  known  any  but  despotic  govern- 
ment, and  beyond  question  were  unfit  for  any  other ;  while 
a  king  of  Macedon  would  probably  look  on  government 
by  free  assemblies  with  as  much  contempt  and  suspicion 
as  a  Tsar  of  Russia  in  our  own  day.    Even  Greece,  which 
gained  no  direct  benefit  from  the  Macedonian  empire, 
was  yet  indirectly  a  gainer,  in  the  fact  that  it  was  her 
language  which  was  the  medium  of  communication,  her 
literature  which  modified  the  religion  that  came  back  to 
her  and  to  Europe  from   Asia.      It  was  Alexander  who 
planted  that  literature  and  language  in  Asia ;  and*  it  was 
to  Alexander  that  the  great  Christian  cities  of  Jerusalem, 
Antioch,  and  Alexandria  always  looked  back  with  reve- 
rence as  in  some  sort  their  founder  and  benefactor. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  conclude  this  short  sketch  of  a 
heroic  life  more  aptly  than  in  the  words  of  Bishop  Thirl- 


CH.  XVIL 


Results  of  his  Life, 


215 


Conclusion. 


wall.  "  Alexander  was  one  of  the  greatest  of  earth's 
sons — great  above  most  for  what,he  was  in 
himself,  and,  not  as  many  who  have  borne 
the  title,  for  what  was  given  to  him  to  effect ;  great  in  the 
course  which  his  ambition  took,  and  the  collateral  aims 
which  ennobled  and  purified  it,  so  that  it  almost  grew 
into  one  with  the  highest  of  which  man  is  capable,  the 
desire  of  knowledge  and  the  love  of  good — in  a  word 
great  as  one  of  the  benefactors  of  his  kind.** 


! 


CAMPAIGN  S  OF  ALEXANDER 


Gredc    S  tadia 

iOO      UK/O  tOCiO  3000 

March,  of  Aic^xmdrr  __.... 
(hursf  of  t/ie  Fhe<-t    _— • 


CHRONOLOGICAL  TABLE. 


I                           YEAR   1 

PAGE 

f            B.  C. 

About  1 
700  J 
498 

9 

10 

413  ^ 

About  ) 

\          385  ) 
1          368 

12 

15 

23 

1          359 

'          358 

25 

38 

•  •• 

40 

357 

43 

352 

47 

j         347 
1         346 

55 
62 

64 

^                          340 

71 

339 
338 
336 

•  •  • 

72 
78 
82 
88 

335 

90 

334 

100 

•  •• 

lOI 

■  •  ■ 

107 

1 

109 

J,         333 

116 

11          333-2 

122 

1  ,         332 

129 

Perdikkas  I.,  first  of  the  so-called  Dorian  Kings  of 

Macedon.  .         . 

Alexander  L,  takes  part  in  the  invasion  of  Greece 

by  Xerxes. 
Archelaos,  the  "  civilizer  "  of  Macedon. 
Amyntas  XL,  the  friend  of  Sparta  and  enemy  of 

(jlynthos. 
Philip   son  of  Amyntas,  a  hostage  at  Thebes. 
Philip  King  of  Macedon,remodels  the  army  (p.34). 
Question  about  Amphipolis  between  Philip  and 

Athens.  .        »       ,  .     ,. 

The  Social  War.    Philip  seizes  Amphipolis. 

(Second  Sacred  War. 

1  Philip,  master  of  Thessaly.  takes  Pagasai. 

I  Capture  and  destruction  of  Olynthos  by  Philip. 

1  Falsa  Legatio. 

iThermopylai  surrendered  by  Phokians  to  1  hilip. 

Athens  declares  war  against  Philip. 
'iThird  Sacred  War. 

Battle  of  Chaironeia.     Ruin  of  Thebes. 

Assassination  of  Philip.     Alexander  king. 

Congress  of  Corinth. 

Revolt  and  destruction  of  Thebes. 

Alexander  crosses  the  Hellespont  to  invade  Persia. 

Battle  of  the  river  Granikos. 

Siege  and  fall  of  Halikarnassos. 

Alexander  at  Gordion. 

Battle  of  Issos. 

Siege  and  fall  of  Tyre,  and  of  Gaza. 

Alexander  at  Jerusalem. 

Foundation  of  Alexandria. 

217 


2l8 


YEAR. 

PAGI 

B.C. 

331 

134 

•  •• 

143 

330 

149 

•  •• 

155 

329 
3*9 

162 

166 

328 

171 

•  •• 

173 

327 

174 

326 

177 

181 

•  •• 

182 

•  •• 

186 

•  •• 

189 

325 

191 

•  •• 

197 

•  •• 

199 

324 

203 

323 

•  •• 

205 
208 

Chronological  Table. 


Battle  of  Gaug.imela. 

Alexander  at  Babylon,  Susa,  Persepolis. 

Murder  of  Darius  by  Bessos. 

Alexander  in  AfFghanistan.    Execution  of  Philotas. 

Judicial  murder  of  Parmenion. 
Capture  of  Bessos  in  Sogdiana. 
Alexander  at  the  Jaxartes— the  furthest  point  of 

his  march  north-eastwards. 
He  marries  Roxana,  daughter  of  Oxyartes, 
Murder  of  Kleitos  at  Marakanda. 
Execution  of  Kallisthenes  and  Hermolaos. 
Capture  of  Aomos,  a  hill-fort  in  the  Punjab. 
Passage  of  the  Indus. 
Passage  of  the  Hydaspes. 
Battle  of  the  Hydaspes,  and  defeat  of  Poros, 
Alexander  at  the  Hyphasis  (Sutlej) — the  furthest 

point  in  his  march  eastwards. 
Descent  of  the  Indus,  and  return  march  through 

Gedrosia  ahd  Karmania. 
Famous  voyage  of  Nearchos. 
Mutiny  of  soldiers  at  Opis. 
Death  of  Hephaistion  at  Agbatana. 
Death  of  Alexander  at  Babylon. 


1 


INDEX. 


ABR 

ABREAS,  194,  195. 
Ada.  107,  109. 
Adrapsa,  161.  ,      ^      £ 

iEschines,  51,  55,  58,  59.  62,  63,  69, 

74,  81. 

Agamemnon,  8. 

Agbatana,  147,  148,  156,  205. 

Anesipolis,  17. 

Aglaokreon,  58,  59. 

Aigai  f/Egae),  3,  5,  6.  1°.  i^,  25,  83. 

Akanthos,  7,  15,  16. 

Akarnania,  81.  [ 

Akesines  (Riv.),  188,  189,  192. 

Akte,  6,  7.  I 

Alexander  I.,  10.  /.  ,  1 

Alexander  II.   (the  Greats  fights  at 
Chaironeia,    7^*  ;    l^in^.   84 ;    early  , 
years,   8s,   86 ;     in    Peloponnesos,  I 
88  ;  in  Thrace  and  Illyria,  89  ;  re- 
volt of  Thebes,  90  ;  destruction  of 
Thebes,   92  ;    crosses    Hellespont, 
100;  visits  Ilion,ioi;  battleofGran- 
ikos,  loi  ;    treatment  of   prisoners. 
104  ;  besieges  Halikarnassos,  106  ; 
cuts'  Gordian  knot,  no  ;  at  Tarsos, 
III  ;  battle  of  Issos,  116  ;    besieges 
Tyre,    122;     at    Jcrus;ilem,    128; 
founds  Alexandria,  130 :    at  oasis 
of  Ammon,  131  ;  passes  Euphrates 
and  Tigris,   133 ;  battle   of  Gaug- 
amela.   136 ;  Babylon,    142  ;  Susa, 
143  :     Persepolis,  144  :    Agbatana, 
147  ;  pursues  Darius,  148  ;  position 
at   death  of  Darius,  150;  through 
Parthia,   isi  ;  Aria,  153:  Aracho- 
sia,    153:  founds   Herat.  154:  epi- 
sode of  Philotas   and   Parmenion, 
156-160;  crosses  Paropanisos,  161; 
takes    I'.essos,    162  ;    pimishes   the 
Branchidai,  164;  at  River  Jaxartes 
167;    campaigns    in    Baklria    and 


AOR 

Sogdiana,  169-70  ;  marries  Roxana, 
170;  murders  Kleitos.  171;  puts 
Kallisthenes  to  death,  175;  marches 
to  India,  176;  takes  hill-fort,  Aor- 
nos.  177,  178;  crosses  Indus,  181; 
and  Hydaspes,  183 ;  defeats  Poros, 
186  ;  crosses  Akesines  and  Hydra, 
otes,  188  ;  turns  back  at  Hyphasis, 
190 ;  sails  down  Hydaspes,  191 ; 
defeats  Mallians,  193  ;  nearly  killed, 
195  ;  sails  down  Indus,  196 ;  through 
Gedrosia,  198  ;  and  Karmania, 
199  ;  his  plans,  202  ;  quells  mutiny 
at  Opis,  203  ;  grief  at  Hephais- 
tion's  death,  205;  omens,  206 ;  en- 
ters Babylon,  208  ;  illness  and 
death,  209  ;  character  and  policy, 
210-15. 

Alexander  (of  Pherai),  22. 

Alexandria  (in  Egypt),  130,  214- 

(Kandahar),  154,  161. 

(Herat),  154. 

(Beghram),  161. 

(Khojend),  165, 166. 

Amanos,  Mt.,  112.  114. 

Ammon  (Oasis  of),  T30,  131. 

Amphictyonic  Council,  44.  48,  65,  67, 

68.  73,  74.  83. 
:  Amphipolis,  6,  7,  n,  21,  24,  25,  38, 

39.41- 
1  Amphissa.  73,  74,  75- 
Amyntas  II.,  13,  21,24. 

(nephew  of  Philip),  25,  »s. 

Macedonian  general),  177. 

Ankyra,  m. 
Anthemous,  43,  49- 
Antioch,  214. 
Antipater,  94, 100. 
Antwerp.  57. 
Aornos  (Baktria).  163. 
(India),  177. 

219 


220 


Index, 


'  Index, 


221 


\ 


APO 

Apollo,  44,  72. 

ApoUonia,  16. 

Arabia,  201. 

Arachosia  (Affghanistan),  96,  153. 

Arados,  120,  126. 

Aral  Sea,  96. 

Arbela,  141, 

Archelaos,  5, 12. 

Argaios   25. 

Argos  (Peloponnese),  9,  28,  82. 

(Orestis),  9. 

Aria  (Iran),  95,  96,  151. 

Aristotle,  86,  174,  210. 

Ariiis  (Riv.,  Heri-Rood),  154. 

Arkadia,  i-j,  29,  81. 

Arrian,  84,  92.  136.  140.  143,  146,  155, 

168,  177,  17S,  180,  184,  i85, 197,  198, 

200,  205,  208,  210,  211. 
Arsames,  11 1. 
Arsites,  100. 
Artabazos,  147,  149. 
Artakoana,  152. 
Artemisia,  106. 
Aryans,  151. 

Asia,  26,  120,  142,  151,  212,  213. 
Asklepios,  112. 
Athens,  ii.  12,  16, 18,  20,  24,  27,  28, 

30.  33.  38,  39.  45,  48.  49.  50,  52,  53. 

57,  63, 64,  69,  70.  71,  74,  73,  80,  81, 93, 

105. 
Athos,  Mt..  6. 
Atrestidas,  55. 
Attalos,  82,  83,  88. 
Attica,  20. 
Attila,  128. 
Attok,  176,  181. 
Axios  (Riv.)  3,  4,  7,  89. 


BABYLON,  143,  151,  206,  2.,8. 
B.'ibyl  >nia,  97,  202. 
Bagai  (Dokhara),  161,  168,  170. 
Baktra,  15^,  161.  169,  17J. 
Baktria,  161,  176. 
Barnos  Mt.,  4. 
Bisqties,  152. 

Beghram  (Alexandria),  161, 
Begorritis,  Lake  of,  5. 
Bermios,  Mt.,  4. 
Bessos,   137,   147,   149,    153,  161-163, 

169. 
Boiotit.  20,  27,  45,  65. 
Bolan  Pass,  196. 
Bosporos,  69. 
Boukephalia,  188,  189. 
Boukephalos  (Bucephalus),  86,  i83. 
Brachmans,  192. 


DRY 

Branchidai,  163-164. 
Brasidas,  12. 

Byzantion   (Constantinople),   40,   42, 
56,  70,  130. 


Cif:SAR  (Julius),  83,  132,  176. 
Caspian  Gates,  148. 
Caspian  Sea,  94,  96,  151. 
Chaironeia,  28,  37,  78,  79. 
Chalkidike,  6,   7,  11,  14,  16,  18,  24, 

^49.  53- 

Chalkis,  7,  54,  66. 

Chares,  42,  46, 

Charidemos,  113,  114. 

Chersonese  (Tauric),  51. 

Chersonese  ( I'hracian),  6,  24,  39,  40^ 

49,  69. 
Chios,  33,  40,  42,  127. 
Chorasmia  (Khiva),  96,  151. 
Clive  (Lord),  142. 
Columbus,  133. 
Corinth,  7,  9.  27,  82,  93. 
Croesus,  43. 
Cromwell,  92 

Cunaxa  (Battle  of),  99,  138. 
Cyprus.  119,  122,  125. 
Cyropolis,  166,  167 
Cyrus  (the  Great),  197-198. 

(the  Younger),  100,  11 1,  133. 

(Riv.),  97. 


DAMASCUS.  114.  119. 
Darius  (Codomannus),  93,   iii, 
115,   118,   119,   120,  127,    133,  134, 

n7,  .142-5- 
Delphians,  43,  74. 

Delphoi,  20,  21,  43,  44  64,  65,  72,  73. 
Demades,  80,  90,  204. 
Demaratos,  133. 
Demavend.  Mt.,  148. 
Demosthenes,  2,  8,  25,  30,  33,  35,  50, 

53,  56,  58,  60,  62,  63,  66,  69,  71,  76, 

Dimnos,  157. 

Diodoros,  80,  145,  169,  185. 

Dion,  13,  J04. 

Djidda,  73. 

Doab,  181. 

Dorians,  7,  9,  43. 

Doriscos,  63. 

Dranfijiana,  153. 

Drogheda,  92. 

Drymos,  6g. 


/ 


EGE 

EGEAN  Sea,  2,  6,  7, 18, 29, 42, 127. 
Egnatian  Road,  4. 
Egypt,  97.99.  "2,  128. 
Elateia,  76,  77. 
Elimeia,  4. 
Elis,  27. 
Emathia,  3,  5. 
Embolima,  177. 
Eordaia,  5. 
Eordaikos  (Riv.),  4. 
Epamiiiondas,  20,  23,  27,  37. 
Epeiros,  20. 
Ephesus,  105. 
Ephialtes,  106,  108. 
Eratosthenes,  201. 
Eretria,  54. 
Erigon  (Riv.).  4,  89. 
Etymander  (Riv.),  154,  196. 
Euboia,  39,  47,  54,  61,  63,  64. 
Eudamidas,  16. 
Euphrates  (Riv.),  95,  96,  97,  127,  200, 

208.  _ 
Eurydike,  14,  22. 
Euxine  Sea,  6,  69. 


FLORENCE,  30. 
Furrah  (Prophthasia),  154,  160. 


GANGES  (Riv.)  189. 
Gaugamela,  133,  142. 
Gaul,  29. 
Gaza  (Palestine),  128. 

■ ( Jaxartes),  167. 

Gedrosia,  197-200. 

Genoa,  30. 

Getai,  89, 

Gordion,  109,  no,  142. 

Granikos  (Riv,\  100,  170. 

Greece,  i,  26-29,  81,  84,  85,  212,  214. 

Gyraeans,  180. 


HATMOS  Mt.,  10.  71,  89. 
Haliakmon  (Riv.),  4,  5,  9,  91. 
Halikarnassos,  105-108. 
Halonnesos,  69. 
Halos,  59-61.  ' 
Hannibal,  99. 
Harmodios,  143. 
Harpalos,  148,  201. 
Hebros  (Riv),  63. 
Hekatompylos,  152. 
Pellas,  28,  43,  55.  93i  212. 
Hellenes,  3,  6,  8.  10. 
Hellespont,  61,  69,  99. 


KOR 

Hephaistion,  141,  17G,  191,  196,  199, 

205,  208. 
Herakleia,  21,  76. 
Herat,  155. 
Hermolaos,  175. 


Herod otos,  9. 
Hydaspes 
185,  186. 


Riv., 


Jhelum),  181,  183, 


Hydraotes    (Riv..    Ravi),    i88,    189, 

192. 
Hyphasis  (Riv.,  Sutlej)  181,  189. 
Uyrkania,  152. 


ASON,  20-22,  43. 
X     llion,  99. 
I  lyria,  2. 

I  lyrians,  8,  12,  14,  15,  «4,  25,  39.  89. 
India,  171. 
Indian  Ocean,  197. 
Indus   (Riv.),   94,  95,  96,   181,   190, 

196,  197,  199,  200. 
Ionian  Sea,  9,  26. 
Iphikrates,  20,  22,  42. 
Isaios,  51. 
Isokrates,  51. 
Issos,  112,  114. 
Istros  (Riv.  Danube),  70,  89. 


TADDUA,  128. 

J      Jaxartes  (Riv.),  i64-€8. 

Jelalpoor,  182. 

Jerusalem,  128,  214, 

Jo.sephus,  128. 

Julian  (Emp.),  in. 

KAFIRISTAN,  181. 
Kalanos.  199,  206. 
Kallidromos,  Mt.,  76. 
Kallisthenes,  174,  175. 
Kambounian  Mts.,  3,  4,  91. 
Kappadokia,  96. 
Kardakes,  115. 
Kardia,  70. 
Karmania,  196,  198. 
Karthage,  208. 
Kathaeans,  188. 
Kersobleptes,  60-63. 
Kirrha,  44,  72,  74. 
Kilhairon,  Mt.,  68. 
Kleander,  158. 
Kleitos,  103,  173. 
Kleopatra,  81,  83,  87. 
Koinos,  149,  182,  186,  189,  190. 
Korkyra,  33. 


222 


Index. 


KOS 


\ 


Kos,  40. 

KosssB.ins,  206, 

Koushan  Pass,  161. 

Krannon,  19,  zt. 

Krateros,  153,  156-159,  i65,  170,  177, 

183,  187,  191,  196,  199,  204. 
Kris'^a,  72. 
Kydnos  (Riv.),  iii. 
Kyrene,  131. 


LAKMON,  Mt.,  3. 
Larissa,  19,  21,  22,  44. 
Lebanon  Mt.,  124. 
Lemnos,  6. 

Leo  (Bishop  of  Rome),  128. 
Leonidas,  144. 
Leonnatos,  194,  195. 
Leuktra,  18,  34. 
Libya,  189,  208. 
Lokrians,  27,  45,  72,  73. 
Louis  XIV.,  82,  92. 
Liicanians,  208. 
Luther,  132. 
Lydias  (Riv.),  5. 
Lykia,  125. 
Lykophron,  19,  46. 
Lykos  (Riv.j,  142. 
Lynkestis,  4,  14. 


MACEDON,  2-6,  10,  14,  18,  19- 
23,  25,  26,  27,  30,  34,  37,  39,  45, 

65,  84,  212-14. 
Macedonians,  3,  8,  9,  142,  151,  202. 
Magnesia  (Battle  ofj,  142. 
Mahabunn  ('Aornos>,  177. 
^Liliac  Gulf,  76. 
Maliians,  192.  193,  196. 
Marakanda  (Samarkand),    162,     163, 

168,  172. 
Marathon,  47.  78,  117. 
Marathos,  120. 
Mardians.  152. 
Mareotic  Lake,  130-2. 
Margos  (Riv.).  153. 
Maiisolos,  106. 
Mcdins,  209. 
Megalopolis,  8r. 
Megara,  29 

Memnon,  99,  too,  105,  106. 
Memphis,  129,  133,  134. 
JNIessene,  81. 
Messenia,  27. 
Methonfi,  7,  10,  II,  38,  45. 
Midas,  no. 
Milan,  30. 


PAR 


Miletos,  106. 
Mithridates,  103. 
Moscow,  145. 
Mousikanos,  196. 
Multan,  193. 
MyndoSj  108. 
Myriandros,  112,  120. 


NAPOLEON  L,  67,  85, 
Nautaka,  162. 
Nearchos,  191,  193,  197,  199,  200,208. 
Nikaia  (Lokris),  73 

(India),  188,  189. 

Nile  (Riv.\  4,  95,  96,  97,  191 
Nineveh,  133. 
Nysa,  180. 

OLYMPIA,  10. 
Olympias,  82,  83,  191,  210. 
Olympos  Mt.,  3,  5. 
Olynthos,  7,  14-18,  24,  30,  38,  41,  42, 

45,  48,  49.  51-55- 
Onchestos,  91. 

Onomarchos,  45,  46. 

Opis,  203. 

Orbelos,  Mt.,  5. 

Orchomcnos,  92. 

Orccs,  57,  62. 

Orestis,  4,  9. 

Oropos,  62   81. 

Ortospana  (Kabrtl).  154,  161, 176. 

Oxus  (Riv.),  96,  162. 

Oxyartes,  171. 

Oxydrakuns,  193. 

PAGAS.\I,  6,  47,  54. 
Paionians,  8,  25,  39. 

Palatinate,  92. 

Pallakopas,  199. 

Pallene,  7. 

Panakton,  69. 

Pangaios,  Mt.,  7,  39. 

Piraitonian,  i^i. 

Parapotamii,  78. 

Paraxia,  4. 

Paris,  29. 

Parmenion,  60,  82,99,101,  109,  no, 
III,  115,  119.  127,  128,  134,  1^5, 
137,   iti.    146,    15s,  156,  137,    158, 

159.  167 
Paropanisos,  Mt.  (Hindu  Kush),  96, 

T53.  160,  161,  176,  180. 
Parsageod(Pasargidai),  143, 144, 199. 
Parthia,  151. 


I 


Index, 


223 


PAT 


Pattala,  196,  197. 
Paul  (the  Apostle),  in. 
Pausanias,  23,  25. 

83. 

Pelagonia,  4. 

Pel  a,  3,  5,  12,  15,  62,  63,  150. 

Pclopidas,  20,  23. 

Peloponnesos,  27,  8r,  8S,  125. 

Pelusium,  128,  132. 

Perdikkas  I.,  9. 

Perdikkas  II.,  11. 

Perdikkas  III..  23,  24. 

Perdikkas  (Macedonian  general),  156, 
176,  219. 

Periklcs,  11. 

Perinthos,  70. 

Persepolis,  144,  146,  199. 

Persia,  18. 

Persian  Gulf,  94. 

Peter  ^Tsar),  23. 

Petersuurg,  145. 

Peukestas,  194,  195. 

Phalaikos,  58,  64,  65. 

Pharnabazos,  127. 

Pharsalos,  19. 

Pherai,  20,  45,  63. 

Philip  XL  a  hostage  at  Thebes,  23  ; 
returns  to  Macedon,  23  ;  governor 
of  a  district,  one  of  seven  pretend- 
ers, 24 ;  king,  25  ;  position  of,  33, 
52  ;  gives  Macedon  a  sea-board,  2  ; 
extends  boundaries,  4  ;  re-organizes 
army,  34 ;  policy  towards  Amphi- 
pohs,  39 ;  takes  Amphipolis,  40; 
policy  towards  Olynthos,  41 ;  com- 
pared to  Croesus  and  lason,  43 ; 
Second  Sacred  War,  45  ;  master  of 
Thessaly,  47;  called  in  to  end  war, 
49;  quarrels  with  Olynthos,  49;  in- 
trigues in  Euboia,  54 ;  destroys 
Olynthos,  S4 :  invited  by  Thebes 
to  suppress  Phokians,  56;  Athenian 
embassy  to.  58  ;  letter  of,  59  ; 
swears   to   Peace    of   Philokrates, 

63  ;    Thermopylai   surrendered   to, 

64  ;  cruel  treatment  ot  Phokis,  65; 
commanding  position,  67;  quarrels 
with  Athens,  68  ;  tries  to  seize  Bos- 
poros,  70  ;  Athens  declares  war, 
71  ;  invited  to  end  Sacred  War— 
sf^izes  Elateia,  76  ;  threatens 
Thebes,  77 ;  gains  battle  of  Chair- 
oneia.  7S  ;  treatment  of  Athens  and 
Thebes,  81 ;  at  Congress  of  Corinth, 
82  :  assassinated,  83  ;  his  character 
and  influence,  83,  85,  173. 

Philippos,  III,  112. 


SPI 


Philokrates,  58,  59,  61,  64. 

(Peace  of),  59,  62,  63,  68. 

Philomelos,  45.    .   . 

Philotas,  137,  155,  156,  156-60. 

Phoenicia,  120,  122,  125,  208. 

Phoibidas,  17,  30. 

Phokians,  27,  43-7,  56,  59,  60,  60,  61, 

64,  65,  92. 
Phokion,  77,  So;  90. 
Phokis,  30,  60,  62,  66. 
Phrygia,Q7. 

Pinaros  (Riv.),  114,  115,  118,  119. 
Pindar,  10,  92. 
Pindos,  Mt.,  25. 
Pisa,  30. 

Plassy  (Battle  of),  143. 
Plataia,  74,  92. 
Plato,  51. 

Plutarch,  86,  119,  146. 
Polybios,  80. 

Polytimetos,  (Riv.),  164,  167. 
Poros,  172,  182,  183,  184,  187. 
Potidaia,  7, 11,  16,  17,  38,  42,  48. 
Prophthasia  (Furrah),  154,  160. 
Propontis,  25,  63,  69. 
Proxenos,  62. 
Ptolemaios,  23. 
Ptolemy    (Lagi),  102,    118,     163,  164, 

177-9,  2(6. 

Punjab,  97. 

Pydna,  10,  12,  36-9,  41,  42,  65. 


RHAKOTIS,  129. 
Rhodes,  35,  40,  125. 
Rome,  50,  65,  69. 
Roxana,  171,  174. 
Russia,  23,  55,  154. 


SAHARA,  94. 
Samos,  24,  41,  42. 

Sardis,  105. 

Satibarzanes,  153. 

Scythians,  167. 

Sidon,  120,  125. 
'  Sitalkes,  11,  12. 

Sithonia,  7. 
1  Skardos,  Mt.,  4,  5. 
I  Skarpheia,  76. 
j  Sogdiana.  170,  193. 
j  Sogdian  Rock,  170. 

Solon,  52. 

Sparta,   8,  14-18,  27,  30,  45,  63,  81,  8j, 
212,  213. 

Sphodrias,  30. 

Spitamenes,  163,  165,  170. 


224 


Index, 


SPI 

Spithridates,  loo,  103. 
Statira,  ao2. 
S  rabo,  122,  152. 
Strasburg,  57. 
Strymon  (Riv.),  7. 
Sunium,  29, 
Susa,  143,  144,  199. 
Syracuse,  12,  19. 

TARSOS,  111. 
Tatars,  151. 
Tauros,  Mi.  (Elburz),  95. 
Taxila,  171,  181. 
Teheran,  148. 
Teleutias,  16,  17, 
Thapsakos,  112,  118,  132. 
Thebes,  16,  18,  23,  27,  30,  45,  48,  56, 

6r,  62-4,  68,  73,  76, 77,  80,  81,  90, 91. 
Thedrikon,  71. 
Therm<?,  5,  7. 
Thermopylai,  30,  45,  47,  56,  61,  62,  6 

75,  76,  92. 
Thessalians,  14,  27,  116,  118,  119 
Thessaly,  19,  21,  46,  61,  65,  91. 


o> 


XER 


Thirlwall  (Bishop),  214. 
Thrace,  6,  51,  62,  63,  69. 
Thracians,  14,  70,  89. 
Thucydides,  12,  51. 
Tigris  (Riv.),  97,  132. 
Timotheos,  24,  42. 
Timour,  165. 
Toron^,  7,  17. 
Tribaliians,  89. 
Tripolis,  xiS. 
Turkestan,  95. 
Tyre,  120,  122. 
Tyrrhenians,  208. 


T  TXIANS,  144. 


T17EXF0RD,  92. 


XENOPHON,  15,  94,  III,  115. 
Xerxes,  27,  83,  144,  164,  206. 


ANOTHER  GREAT  HISTORICAL  WORK. 


Wfi   l^ixfOFg    of  (JPFFtF, 

By  Prof.  Dr.  ERNST  CDRTIUS. 

Translated  by  ADOLPHUS  WILLIAM  WARD,  M.A.,  Fellow  of  St.  Peter's 
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The  FRENCH  REVOLUTION  and  FIRST  EMPIRE;  an  Historical  Sketch. 
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The  AGE  OF  ELIZABETH.     By  the  Rev.  M.  Creighton,  M.A.      (Now  ready.) 

The  PURITAN  REVOLUTION.     By  J.  Langton  Sanford.  (Now  ready,) 

The  FALL  of  the  STUARTS ;    and  WESTERN  EUROPE  from  1678  to  1607 
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The  EARLY  PLANTAGENETS  and  their  relation  to  the  HISTORY  of  EUROPF  • 
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The  BEGINNING  of  the  MIDDLE  AGES  :  CHARLES  the  GREAT  and 
ALFRED  :  the  HISTORY  of  ENGLAND  in  its  connection  with  that  of  EUROPF 
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The  NORMANS  IN  EUROPE.     By  the  Rev.  A.  H.  Johnson,  AL  A. 

(No~v  ready.) 
^•KEDERICK  the  GREAT  and  t!ie  SEVEN  YEARS'  WAR.     Bv  F  W  1^^^^.^ 
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